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Shopflooi Trade Unionism At Herbert's: A Case 8tudy In The 
Development and Demise Of Workplace Organisation.
Through a case study, this thesis explores the limitations of 
workplace unionism among shopfloor engineering workers. This 
subject is examined through an historical case study of one 
amchine tool factory, Herbert's Bdgwick plant, and an account of 
the research process itself.
The historical approach show how far the limitations of 
workplace unionism at Bdgwick resulted from the resilience of a 
distinctive accomodation between skilled workers and aunagers. It 
also reports several findings that parallel those made in other 
labour studies. However, greater emphasis is placed on (1) the 
stewards' active reproduction of sectionalism - detailing, 
particularly, the Impact on women and Asian workers - and (2) the 
corporatist politics that arose out of their pragmatism. This 
study also challenges some contemporary theories about both the 
politics of new technology and the internal centralisation of 
workplace organisations.
The narrative of the research process links together the subject 
4f the case study with the experience of the Coventry Machine 
Tool Committee's campaign for iaq>ort controls. It does this both 
chronologically, by showing how my research came to focus on 
Bdgwick, and thematically by highlighting the common limitations 
in workplace unionism which led to the CMTC's demise and the 
dispirited opposition to massive redundancies at Herbert's.
The first two chapters develop the setting and identify key 
issues by providing a biography of the research process. Chapters 
3 to 9 provide the main narrative and analysis by tracing the 
historical development of industrial relations at Herbert's and 
detailing key events leading up to Bdgwick's closure in 1983. 
Chapter 10 links the case study with the combine and considers 
the 'pragmatic' character of the stewards' politics. Chapter 11 
draws the thesis to a close by reviewing the main findings of the 
case study and considering their wider relevance to the study of 
workplace politics.
Keywords;
shop stewards 
redundancies 
workplace politics 
new technology 
Alfred Herbert Ltd 
women workers 
black/Aslan workers 
young workers 
craft workers
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CHAPTER ONE: BIOGRAPHY OF A RESEARCH PROJECT
"Firm which beat the Luftwaffe is finally thrown to the wolves"1 
Introduction
For five days in October 1983, the entire plant and equipment of 
Alfred Herbert's 14-acre Edgwick site, the last remnant of the 
Herbert 'empire', went under the auctioneer's hammer. It was the 
biggest industrial auction since Talbot's Linwood plant was 
dismantled in 1981* and with it went much of the hopes for a 
broad-based campaign amongst machine tool workers against their 
employers' strategy of disinvestment and rationalisation. 
However, it did not end the sense of frustration and perplexity 
felt by a small group of academics and community workers who, 
through Coventry Workshop, had tried to encourage shop stewards 
at three local machine tool factories, including Edgwick, to 
develop just such a campaign.
From its launch in 1977, the Coventry Machine Tool Committee 
(CMTC) - a combine which drew together workplace representatives 
of shopfloor and office workers at Wickman's (Banner Lane), 
Webster t Bennett (Northey Road), and Herbert's (Edgwick) - had 
campaigned for selective Import controls; but the Workshop had 
hoped that, through a process of dialogue, this would change if
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the stewards could be persuaded that the market crisis was 
largely the outcome of their own employers' strategies.
First, the Workshop brought together a number of academics and 
volunteers - myself among the latter - to form a machine tool 
project team. Then, with the support of a local MP, it secured a 
commission from the combine to undertake an investigation into 
the causes of recent job-losses in the industry and then compile 
a report that could be presented to the Secretary of State at the 
Department of Industry, Eric Varley. Six months later, the 
project team presented its main findings to the stewards at a 
series of ‘teach-ins'. Everything appeared to go extremely well. 
At the conclusion of one ‘teach-in', Ron Doughty, the CMTC's 
secretary and works convenor at Edgwick, observed that we had 
"reversed cause and effect": we had shown that the rise in 
imports was a product of the redundancies, instead of the other 
way around. Shortly afterwards, a local firm held an exhibition 
of Polish machine tools and, almost apologetically, the stewards 
decided to organise a picket. That was in the summer of 1978. For 
the next two years the demand for import controls remained their 
central objective. Then came redundancies which decimated the 
workplace organisation at Edgwick. And, in the early months of 
1981, the surviving members of the combine, now part of a 
"national steering group", made a rhetorical (and strangely 
unconvincing) pledge to fight for "the social ownership of the 
Industry under workers' control" shortly before their Jobs were
ide ‘redundant'.
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When I began my academic research in the autumn of 1978, I hoped 
it would enable me to develop the work I had undertaken as a 
volunteer. Still full of enthusiasm about the potential of the 
combine, I set out to support the Workshop's continuing 
discussions with the stewards by examining the present and 
potential impact of new technology on factory politics in the 
machine tool industry. After a long and unrewarding struggle with 
the problems of trying to sort out 'academic' from 'activist' 
research - made all the more difficult because of the inactivity 
of the stewards' campaign - I retreated into a case study.
I selected Edgwick as the subject of that case study largely 
because the works convenor there, of the three AUEW convenors who 
dominated the combine, was the most sympathetic towards the 
Workshop. It also happened that through his patronage I was given 
access to all stewards' meetings and union records, and tolerated 
for the many hours I spent on the shopfloor talking to stewards 
and members. These encounters 'diverted' my research as I 
witnessed the senior stewards' curious passivity in the face of 
the company's approach towards its second bankruptcy in five 
years. As with the CMTC's politics, I was baffled by their 
rejection of any kind of class-based campaign both inside and 
outside Herbert's, despite the fact that the National Enterprise 
Board's well-known Intention to cease funding the company in 1980 
threatened the very existence of Herbert's few remaining plants. 
Again, as in the CMTC's 'campaign', the senior stewards seemed to
ignore past rebuffs and persisted with corporatist appeals to MPs 
and employers to save the company. At the very last moment, and 
prompted by the staff unions, a ‘sit-in' was organised; but it 
was a sullen affair and collapsed after Edgwick, Herbert's sole 
surviving plant, was ‘rescued' on the basis of a massive 
redundancy programme. From that point the workplace organisation 
was reduced to the role of impotent spectator as the company 
continued its decline until its liquidation in 1983.
To make sense of these experiences, I decided to take advantage 
of the access I had gained to union archives at Herbert's by 
looking back into the history of trade unionism at Edgwick from 
the re-armament boom, in the 1930s, to the early 1970s, when the 
stewards had to respond to the company's first major financial 
crisis. The account that seemed to emerge from those documents 
was tested out against the reminiscences of former managers and 
stewards, and some of the established accounts of workplace 
politics in twentieth century engineering plants. (This latter 
task involved challenging a variety of specific arguments on such 
matters as the gang system, employer-paternalism and the wartime 
phenomenon of ‘Coventry Communism'.) The findings of that 
historical case study of workplace trade unionism which finally 
emerged from this process provide the subject of this thesis.
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Signposts
Before coamencing the narrative of unionism at Herbert's, chapter 
2 continues the narrative of the research process by discussing 
the main findings of ay fieldwork in 1979. This fulfills a number 
of objectives. First, by providing a glimpse of Bdgwick in its 
twilight days, the chapter offers a signpost to the historical 
narrative. Second, through its discussion of Marxist accounts of 
technical change, it establishes the double importance of an 
historical approach. Such an approach not only provides a means 
of understanding the contradictory foras of factory politics that 
have been encountered in a number of cross-sectional studies of 
new technology (and the contradictions in managerial policies at 
Herbert's); but also offers a way of coming to teras with the 
apparent inadequacies of the stewards' response to Management's 
drive to rationalise the labour process through new technology's 
impact on product design.
Chapter 3 begins that historical narrative at the firm's 
beginning: the first years of Alfred Herbert, the company's 
founder, as an entrepreneur. This starting point was chosen for 
two reasons. During the fieldwork I was impressed by the 
importance given to the firm's history, both by the Managers and 
stewards, and the way current events were judged and interpreted 
through a knowledge of that history. The second point relates to 
the argument about Management determining the political terrain 
for the stewards' activities. In an examination of Herbert's
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early years as an entrepreneur, I will want to show the prine 
importance of family ties in starting and sustaining the rapid 
growth of his company from the 1890s to the First Vorld War. 
Chapter 3 also looks at the firm's period of consolidation during 
the inter-war years and, observes, contrary to its "progressive" 
image, the first, ominous signs of managerial conservatism in 
this machine tool "giant".
Covering the same, inter-war years, chapter 4 examines workplace 
politics at Bdgwick before the emergence of a shop stewards' 
organisation outside the craft enclave of the patternshop. The 
link between the role of the family in sustaining 
Herbert-the-entrepreneur and Bdgwick's factory politics is 
established by focusing on three major features of work at the 
plant: the presence of young people as employees and, more 
particularly, as part of Herbert's "vast apprenticeship system"; 
the firm's variant of the gang system, a form of collective 
piecework; and, lastly, employer-paternalism.
Having sketched out the more prominent features of this 
management-created terrain, I am able to begin the stewards' 
story. Chapter 5 charts the development of the stewards' 
organisation from the early phase of the re-armament period 
through to the ismediate post-war years. In that account, it 
details how, during the first years of the Second World War, a 
leftist leadership which had re-built the organisation was
limitations imposed by Herbert's variant oE employer-paternalism.
Chapter 6 continues the stewards' story by looking at political 
developments within the workplace organisation during the first 
two decades of the post-war period. Through an analysis of the 
sectional experience of work at Herbert's detailed in the first 
part of this chapter, I will try to show how the weak and tenuous 
character of the organisation reflected the Interests of those 
sections at the top of the plant's labour hierarchy. The second 
part of the chapter elaborates the same theme by following events 
after a 'palace coup' in 1961 in which the old steward leadership 
was ousted by one that adopts a principled and class-conscious 
approach to its dealings with management and challenged the 
limits of workplace politics. The outcome of that struggle echoed 
the experiences of the previous generation of activists: the 
resilience of the accomodation between managers and skilled 
workers was re-affirmed. The chapter closes with an intimation of 
an attempt by a new senior management to challenge that 
accomodation * from above'.
In chapter 7 the focus of the case study is switched, once more, 
to senior management. First, it shows how, contrary to the firm's 
public image, the managers were aware of Herbert's relative 
decline during the 1950s and the ways in which the founder's 
conservatism both in technique and product design had contributed 
to this situation. Then it details the efforts to stem that 
decline, from the early, partial reforms which addressed
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essentially non-labour issues to a number of major initiatives 
including, and significantly, last of all, the attempt to re-cast 
workplace politics at Edgwick. This narrative concludes with the 
observation that the reform of labour relations was both prompted 
by Herbert's corporate crisis and became one of its victims.
Managerial crisis provides the setting for chapter 8 which looks 
at the politics of the productivity payment scheme introduced in 
the closing years of the 1960s. This chapter contrasts the 
radical scope of the scheme with the changes that actually took 
place in workplace politics at Bdgwick. Observations on the 
senior stewards' enthusiasm for the scheme is linked to the 
continued frallity of the workplace organisation. The stewards' 
subsequent failure to organise any serious opposition to 
redundancies demonstrated both the correctness of their concern 
and the resilience of the old accomodation that had characterised 
workplace politics before the reforms. This discussion concludes 
the detailed examination of Bdgwick's history.
In a brief, selective narrative of a decade of crises. Chapter 9 
links that first, major redundancy programme with the plant's 
closure in 1983, the moment when, as the Daily Mirror put it,
"the firm which survived the Luftwaffe is finally thrown to the 
wolves".* Through that narrative I shall point out the continued 
limitations of workplace organisations at Herbert's. I shall also 
demonstrate how those same limitations created a difficult 
terrain for the stewards and encouraged the leadership to keep
within established political horizons, even though this 
effectively ruled out the possibility of organising any serious 
opposition to the steady attrition of jobs and the plant's 
eventual closure.
Chapter 10 develops this argunent by moving beyond the strict 
confines of the case study to consider the ‘pragmatic' character 
of corporatist politics of the CMTC combine - a combine largely 
started, and organised by, Edgwiclt's works convenor - and explore 
the reasons behind the Workshop's failure to persuade the 
convenors to adopt a socialist response to the jobs crisis.
Finally, chapter 11 concludes the Edgwick case study by reviewing 
the main findings and considering their wider relevance to the 
study of workplace politics.
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Chapter One: Endnotes and References
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1983, p. 9.
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/
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CHAPTER TWO: NEW TECHNOLOGY AT HERBERT'S
Introduction
In the previous chapter a brief reference was made to the 
Workshop's investigation into the causes of the massive 
job-losses in the machine tool industry during the 1970s. As I 
mentioned earlier, the finding was that the employers' strategies 
of rationalisation and disinvestment in the UK industry had 
prompted a sharp rise in imports which later became the focus of 
the stewards' campaign. Another finding of that enquiry was that 
firms intending to continue production in the UK would have to 
'automate or perish'.x It was this analysis which provided me 
with the rationale for extending the Workshop's enquiry into the 
machine tool industry by looking at the impact of new technology 
on the shopfloor. As I explained in the introductory chapter, I 
had two reasons for pursuing that research through a detailed 
case study of one machine tool plant. Firstly, I hoped to gain a 
clearer understanding of the processes of change. Secondly, and 
equally important, both the subject and the research approach 
presented a fresh opportunity for the Workshop to break the 
political inertia that seemed to grip the Machine Tool Committee 
and renew our dialogue about class-based strategies to defend 
jobs. On the first point, Edgwick was a debateable choice. During 
the 1970s Herbert's was frequently described as the 'ailing 
machine tool giant' and Edgwick widely regarded as the source of
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that ‘sickness’.* However, since ‘nationalisation’ in 1975, the 
National Enterprise Board had pumped £57m into the company and 
some of that money had gone into the re-organisation of 
production and product development at Edgwick.* The then imminent 
launch of a new CNC lathe, codenamed AL-76, hinted at (another) 
possible revival of Herbert's fortune. So there was much to be 
learned from this example of state-sponsored restructuring of 
capital. But there could have been no doubt about Edgwick's 
suitability on the second point. Among the three works convenors 
who controlled the Machine Tool Committee, Ron Doughty was 
certainly the Workshop's best ally. He enjoyed political debates, 
broadly supported the policies of the Labour Party's left-wing, 
and was very happy to ‘return a favour' to the Workshop even 
though our report had challenged the rationale of his campaign 
for import controls.
This chapter discusses the main findings of the fieldwork 
conducted at Edgwick during the latter half of 1979. It tackles 
the subject in two stages. The first contrasts Braverman's 
account of numerical control, "as a prime instance" of technical 
change under capitalism, with my observations on management's 
application of computer-based control systems on the shopfloor. 
The second section tries to explain those contrasts by drawing on 
historical material gathered long after the fieldwork was ended. 
As I elaborate that explanation I will try to develop the 
argument that while the systems installed on the shopfloor did 
not have the effect on the organisation of work that Braverman's
account might suggest, new technology had already had some impact 
on the level of employment through changes in product design, and 
was about to provide the rationale for halving the plant's 
much-reduced workforce. I then conclude this chapter with a few 
words about why I discontinued my study of new technology and 
became concerned to try and understand workplace politics at 
Edgwick.
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Braverman and New Technology at Herbert's
Marxist assumptions about managerial strategies and the 
subordination of labour
In a classic restatement of Marx’s ideas on the relationship 
between technological change and workplace politics, Braverman 
claimed that the distinctive feature of technology under 
capitalism is that techniques are developed that not only 
increase the productivity of labour but also augment managerial 
control over the productive process. This, he argued, is why 
technology is used to separate the conception and execution of 
labour. In his chapter on ‘machinery' he cited numerical control 
(NC) as "a prime instance of the managerial use of machinery in 
the capitalist mode of production, and how this affects the 
worker and the labour process".4 I shall argue that, as Lazonick 
observed in Marx's discussion on self-acting mules in 
Lancashire's cotton mills, Braverman used a Marxist theoretical
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framework "as a substitute for, rather than as a guide to, 
empirical analysis" and "derived his conclusion of the 
omnipotence of technology in the subjection of labour from an 
uncriticial acceptance of capitalist ideology".0
Braverman observed that NC was designed to effect a separation of 
the conceptualisation and execution of work. There was, he 
claimed, no practical reason why the process should not be united 
in the hands of the skilled machinist; but this rarely happened 
because the technology was intended to break up the machinist's 
craft skills and "cheapen the resulting pieces of labor". 
Braverman elaborated this argument by providing a detailed 
account of the division of labour under NC technology. First, the 
job of the skilled machinist is broken down into a planning 
function to be carried out by a parts programmer who is young and 
relatively cheap to employ because the task entails only a 
minimal knowledge of metal-cutting. This was possible, Braverman 
explained, because the required information had been abstracted 
and contained in engineering manuals. Then another worker, 
invariably a "girl", produces a paper tape from the programmer's 
work which is inserted into the machine's control console. The 
cutting operation is still monitored by an operative; but this 
person has only been trained to "perform several rather 
straightforward prescribed routines...(and) does not possess the 
technical skills of the experienced machinist". Indeed, in one 
passage Braverman claimed that all the machinist's skill are
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eliminated:
"So far as the machine operator is concerned, it is now 
possible to remove from his area of competence whatever 
skills still remain after three quarters of a century of 
'rationalisation'. He is now definitely relieved of all the 
decisions, judgement, and knowledge which Taylor attempted to 
abstract from him by organisational means. The true 
'instruction card' - Lillian Gilbreth's 'self-producer ' of a 
pre-determined product' - is at last fully revealed in the 
program tape.""
Leaving aside the implications of Braverman's explanation for the 
minimal knowledge of the planner - which suggests there was 
little 'mystery' left in the machinist's craft if management 
could adequately represent it in "tabulated and standardised 
form" - the chapter conveys the powerful impression that this new 
technology was not problematical for managers and that machinists 
have offered very little resistance wherever it has been 
introduced. The only managerial 'problem' Braverman mentioned - 
and significantly it came in a footnote - was the practice of 
*red-circling' in which managers agreed to maintain the pay of 
individual, skilled machinists for the duration of their 
occupancy of the job in order to avoid "a bitter battle with the 
union".7 Interestingly enough, Braverman does not explain why 
skilled machinists were allowed to operate these machines at all, 
or why any managers should wish to avoid confrontation if the 
technology gave them, as Braverman's account implies, such
/overwhelming superiorlty on the shopfloor?
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Lazonick's paper on technical change in the textile industry 
during the nineteenth century makes it clear that the impact of 
the technology on the shopfloor cannot be read off the technology 
itself. Marxist theory on the dynamics of technical change, and 
capitalist claims about the power of the technology to re-shape 
workplace politics, he argued, cannot be used as a subrf!tute for 
empirical analysis. Instead, it is important to look at tn* 
political and economic factors which have shaped production in 
the past and provide the context for the introduction of the new 
technology. Lazonick argued that "the relations of production and 
the development of the forces of production interacted in a 
dialectical manner, primarily because there was a continual 
process of conflict, compromise and even co-operation between 
capitalists and workers, over the form and content of the 
components of technical change"." It is important to note that 
when Lazonick talked of the "relations of production", he was 
concerned with relations between capitalists as well as between 
workers and capitalists. Indeed, at one point, he claimed that in 
his case study, "the nature of the relations between capitalists 
themselves was of prime importance. Excessive competition and 
vertical disintegration from cotton suppliers to cloth merchants 
deprived capitalists in the industry of the possibility of 
developing, either individually or collectively, a strategy to 
reshape the technical structure of production and control 
markets, ie, to 'rationalise' the Industry. "• Similarly Elbaum et
al. have argued that "three basic sets of relationships influence 
the development of the labour process: relationships between 
capital and labour, among capitalists, and among groups of 
workers."10
Fieldwork observations
When I visited Edgwick's main machine shop in 1979, there 
appeared to be relatively few NC and CNC machine tools on the 
shopfloor. In fact, there were 28 of these devices but in the 
cavernous spaces of what was reputed to be Europe's largest 
machine shop,** where they stood beside another 260 machines (and 
the spaces created by the removal of over 300 more machines since 
1974),xa they seemed to have a marginal presence. Most were 
produced by Herbert's - this included eight CNC and four NC 
turning machines built at Edgwick itself and eight NC drilling 
machines from Herbert's Lutterworth plant - and installed after 
1972.
Despite this apparent marginality, I found common agreement among 
managers and stewards that these NC and CNC machines had 
increased productivity. The stewards felt this had caused 
job-losses in the turning section as the plant's output had 
declined; but they also believed that the productivity of the CNC 
milling machines had only resulted in production bottlenecks. It 
also seemed that, much as Braverman's account suggests, some
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machinists had accepted the ‘new division of labour* without 
resistance. This, I was told, was particularly true cf the ‘older 
men', those in their fifties. If this observation was generally 
correct - later I learned that it most certainly did not apply to 
those veterans who were described, by both management and 
stewards, as "intelligent machinists" - it was an understandable 
reaction. The push-button facade of the machine's control console 
can look frighteningly new. And there is a world of difference 
between pushing a button and handling ‘knobs and wheels': with 
one you hope that the machine will do what it is supposed to do; 
with the other you can physically guide the machine along. This 
kind of passivity seemed also to typify the attitude of the men 
who operated the NC drilling machines, where there was little 
scope for intervening in the actual cutting operation of the 
machine since most of the skill content of the job had been in 
the marking out of the work. But in two different ways this 
passivity was not as total as might be assumed from Braverman's 
study.
A monitoring role
Machinists still had an important monitoring role both because of 
the unreliability of the machinery and its software and the 
variable quality of some metals that are machined. In the early 
years of NC and CNC the unreliability of the machinery made 
constant monitoring necessary. Sid Birch, a service engineer in
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the late 1960s recalled irreverantly:
"Now, we built this thing and it didn't always stopt I'm 
joking but I'm (also) dead seriousI In a customer's works 
you'd perhaps spend three days curing his fault and your 
heart's in your mouth. It could miss the feed trip (and) go 
straight through. Then it's a mess, you know."x>
My Impression was that these major 'teething problems' had been 
overcome by 1979; but it is possible, as Bhattacharyya found In 
his survey of NC users in 1976, that the reliability of CNC 
machines was a continuing problem.14
The second reason for active monitoring by the machinist relates 
to the variable quality of the metal components fed into the 
machine. One senior engineer at Herbert's explained that "NC 
programming according to the 'book' is like programming a lawn 
mower and letting it run”.XB Harley Shaiken used the analogy of 
planning the route for a motor trip to convey the same point:
"The problem arises if there is no way to monitor the road 
conditions while one drives. If it's raining, one has to slow 
down considerably; if there is an obstruction in the road 
that is not on the map, the best computer-selected route 
is...(no) protection against a serious accident."xm
When the machine shop superintendent talked to me about the NC 
operative's "responsibilities" he was implicitly acknowledging 
management's continued dependence on what Shaiken called the
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worker's "feedback skills":*’ his knowledge of metal-cutting - 
which would tell him, for example, that "a slight change in the 
sound of the machine could mean a poor finish"1" - and his 
ability to handle potential mechanical disasters.
Interventions in ‘planning1
Apart from this monitoring role, there were other ways in which 
some machinists did not conform to Braverman's image of labour's 
passivity. Two programmers I talked to complained of machinists 
who edited the parts programs and then tried to conceal them from 
the office. Without any formal instruction, these operators had 
learnt how to read paper tapes and how to edit them on the 
machine's computer console. When they combined this new knowledge 
with their practical experience of metalworking, it is easy to 
see why the programmers were jealous over their access to the 
console: "We need to Insist on control over all alterations", I 
was told, "not to protect our jobs, but to make sure that the 
office has a copy of the latest tape."*• There may have been some 
financial advantage to be gained from secretly editing the 
programmer's work since the machinists, like all the other 
workers on the shopfloor, were paid on the basis of a day-rate 
system with a plant bonus. But this Incentive would have been 
small since the technology provided a much-reduced scope for 
increasing the speed of operations and the bonus was determined 
by the effort of a much wider group of people than this small
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section of machinists. Instead, I would suggest that the main 
incentive for altering the program is that it provided the 
operator with the means to carve out a little free time and 
re-assert some control over the organisation of work.
Machinists could exercise control over their work in a more open 
fashion, too. Some were prepared to complain about the 
programmer's work in much the same way as they would have 
challenged a methods engineer under the traditional technology.
As the foremen and machine shop superintendent viewed the eight 
programmers as young men with little, if any, direct experience 
of metal cutting, the machinists usually had their way if a 
dispute developed. Geoff Buckler, a section leader of the 
programmers for the turning machines, explained how he tried to 
avoid this sort of confrontation:
"Sometimes we produce tapes and think: 'how would George 
machine this job’...or 'how would Harry do that?’ It's 
amazing. You'd think one tape for one job would be OK for all 
the operators for that type of machine; but it's not...The 
tape has to be tailored to their ideas."*0
In addition to siding with machinists in particular disputes with 
programmers, I found management's general attitude towards these 
two groups of workers could not be read off Braverman's account 
of the technology. The senior engineers were happy to explain why 
skilled labour was still needed. One argued, as mentioned 
earlier, that certain monitoring skills were required. Another
engineer, Frank Craven, (then hired as a consultant but formerly 
employed by Herbert's) asserted machinists also had a vital role 
in planning the job. In a paper published by Herbert's in the 
early 1970s, he disputed the common claim that NC increased 
managerial control. Control passed, ostensibly, to the programmer 
who "even with aids such as computer terminals, has a complex and 
difficult task to carry out...(and) is frequently subjected to 
criticism by shopfloor management and others who cannot accept 
tape errors as reasonable." Such criticisms, he argued, 
frequently led to "inherent caution" being built into the 
programs. Craven claimed that Herbert's took this point into 
consideration when they developed a CNC design that allowed tape 
editing on the machine's control console:
"There is little point in having rigid ‘management control' 
if the result is to give cutting conditions which are less 
than perfect. Surely, it is better to release some of this 
control so that the operator can be less exasperated and can, 
himself, take command."ax
First-line management not only recognised their continued 
dependence on the practical skills and knowledge of the 
shopfloor; they seemed to celebrate it. For example, Bill White, 
the machine shop superintendent, told me of machinists he called 
"engineers", men such as Jack Garner - a Herbert veteran like 
himself - who tested out the company's proto-types in routine 
production runs. Jack had operated Edgwick's first Batchmatic; 
and now he had the AL-76. He had said - and Bill believed him -
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that he did not begin to learn about the capabilities of those 
machines until the design engineers had left him alone. Overall, 
Bill believed he could draw a distinction between the NC 
programmers who were "educated" and the "intelligent" machinists. 
The programmers were young men, fresh from their craft or 
technician apprenticeships: the "engineers", the best of them, 
had through years of experience got to know their machines and 
how to cut metal.2’ What is particularly interesting about these 
comments is that, through them. Bill reproduced and re-affirmed 
the craft ethos of the shopfloor. When I told the senior stewards 
of my interest in new technology, they advised me to talk to "the 
intelligent machinists".
Some sections of management dismissed the programmers because of 
their youth and their 'bookish' knowledge. But there may have 
been some resentment also at the way these young men literally 
played with the new technology at their fingertips. At that time, 
Herbert's had a variant of computer-aided programming called 
Batchcurve. Through a satellite link-up with a computer in the 
United States, Batchcurve was supposed to eliminate much of the 
mathematical work for the programmers. However, I was told that 
as Herbert's terminal was a "second-hand GPO printer", the 
computer's response rate was only marginally faster than the 
manual process and, at any event, the technology had been 
overtaken by 'canned cycles', that is, the instructions for 
routine machine operations which are pre-programmed into a 
machine tool's control console. They had sharply reduced the
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number of 'blocks' needed to make a program.** Ray Stanton, a 
senior engineer at Edgvick, confirmed the success of this 
particular development. He claimed 'canned cycles' had reduced 
the average number of blocks in a program from 250-300 in 1972 to 
80 by 1979.34 But if Batchcurve was of doubtful value to 
management, that was not the case with the programmers. They used 
the satellite link-up to play computer games and did so quite 
openly.*8 Of course these activities could have had a 
'functional' purpose. The argument here is that management may 
have tolerated these ostensibly non-functional activities because 
they facilitated the development of computing skills useful to 
the company. But I suspect that these antics rankled for all 
that. If so, it could explain why Stanton told me that "we never 
liked the programmer".*• And if there was any hostility between 
some managers and the programmers, this in turn could explain a 
curious technical feature of the proto-type versions of the AL-76 
I noted during my fieldwork.
AL-76 was the codename given to a machine design Herbert's were 
developing at that time. Targetted at small and medium-sized 
firms, the key feature of AL-76 was its facility for manual data 
input or MDI. This is a variation of CNC in which programming is 
simplified to enable the machinist to build up a parts program by 
directly inputting the information into the machine's control 
panel. The curious feature about the proto-types tested out on 
the shopfloor at Edgwick was that they had no facility for 
recording the completed programs. This could have been remedied
quite simply by installing cheap cassette recorders. Instead, the 
machinists had to record the programs on any bits of paper that 
came to hand. This provided a rare opportunity for the AUEW 
stewards to claim a new job-demarcation by insisting that these 
manuscript records were the machinists' 'property', and that 
under no circumstances were programmers allowed to look at the 
programs or take them away. Despite formal complaints from TASS, 
management made no efforts to resolve the dispute.
Apart from the remarks by the senior manager who confessed a 
strong dislike for programmers, much that I have described here 
can be found in other studies of NC in British engineering firms. 
They suggest there was nothing aberrant about Herbert's use of 
skilled machinists as NC operators or about the ways in which 
those workers pushed out the 'frontier of control' at the 
programmers' expense. For example, Littlefield and Rathmill 
observed that skilled machinists operated the machines during 
management's "Initial learning period" in the application of NC 
technology.*T Bhattacharyya made much the same point when he 
commented on the problems firms experienced in de-bugging the new 
technology.*• Both Littlefield and Rathmill, and Jones have also 
commented on the continued need for skilled machinists where the 
work consists of small batches of dlfficult-to-machine 
components.** Littlefield and Rathmill have also suggested that 
"current low (pay) differentials between skill groups" has also 
persuaded managers to employ skilled labour on NC machines since 
there would be a "negligible difference in operating costs".30 In
a different way, Bryn Jones picked up the same point in his case 
studies.*1 Wilkinson, Littlefield and Rat tail 1 have suggested cases tdiere 
managers have had no policy on manning and it has been the 
shopfloor unions which have proved to be a major influence in 
determining the skill status of the operator.** Jones and 
Wilkinson have observed how, once esconced in front of a CNC 
machine with tape editing facilities, the skilled machinist may 
quickly master the new technology and apply his new skills to 
re-define the division of labour.** Given the evidence that 
suggests Herbert's experience in the application of NC and CNC 
machines was a typical, rather than an aberrant, feature of 
British engineering firms, there may appear to be no further need 
to explain the observations of my fieldwork. However, the very 
different experiences of other firms, including another machine 
tool company, challenges such an assumption.
For example, I subsequently learned that at the Halifax plant of 
the American machine tool firm, Warner & Swasey, the managers 
insisted that a newly-installed machining centre would by 
operated by semi-skilled labour. Despite subsequent difficulties, 
such as a high turnover of operators, programming errors and 
‘bugs' in the software, the firm persisted.*4 And in three of his 
five case studies, Bryn Jones found the managers had actually 
overcome a range of technical obstacles such as "programmer 
availability and gaps In tool and metal knowledge" and taken 
active steps to ensure the operators did not edit the tapes in 
any way*9 which seemed to demonstrate the point one machinist
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made to Harley Shaiken: "The equipment is a joke - right up until 
they get it to work".30 These accounts indicate that it is not 
enough to say Herbert's used skilled machinists because it was 
easier, for a whole host of reasons, to do so. Instead, the 
question has to be asked: why did they take the ‘easy' route?
This question becomes even more pertinent when attention is 
focused on Herbert's experience in the application of another 
computer-based system, CLASS.
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The CLASS that failed management
Apart from NC, the other form of computer-based technology I saw 
which directly affected the production process at Edgwick was an 
IBM 'package' called CLASS (Computerised Loading and Scheduling 
System) which was intended to fully computerise a number of 
management information systems: production scheduling, 
progress-chasing, stock control and labour performance. From the 
accounts of shopfloor workers, staff, and production managers it 
was clear that the introduction of CLASS in 1970 contrasted 
sharply with the way in which management had applied NC 
technology.
Herbert's appeared to have been pioneers in this application of 
the computer, both among local engineering firms and in the 
British machine tool industry. CLASS represented a major 
investment in new technology. No details on costs are available.
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but it is easy to imagine the scale of the firm's expenditure, 
both in time and money, on installing a computer system that was 
supposed to shadow the construction of nearly 30 different types 
of lathes made from some 60,000 components.** Furthermore, this 
project would have been unthinkable at that time without a prior 
and considerable investment in computer applications to business 
administration. This was certainly the case with Herbert's. In 
1962 Herbert's purchased the IBM 1401, one of the most powerful 
computers available to business organisations at that time. 
Between that year and 1970, the accumulative costs of computer 
hardware were £2.7m and staffing in the firm's Computer Servires 
Division rose from 42 to over 1 0 0 . CLASS was commissioned very 
quickly** and members of senior management were not slow to 
exploit the potential of the system to reduce clerical labour in 
areas such as stock control.40 The stewards' protests about the 
lack of consultation over the introduction of the system were 
brushed aside.41 Similar treatment was given to chargehands' 
complaints that form-filling was becoming a full-time 
occupation.4*
The system encountered a number of difficulties very quickly 
because of a cluster of technical, financial and political 
factors. The near bespoke character of machine tool production 
did not lend itself to computer control at that time. The process 
involved in generating the data in 'batch mode' created a long 
paper chain which, in each link, provided ample scope for human 
error, accidental or otherwise. On one occasion it was calculated
that to deal with 40,000 components circulating around the plant, 
"somewhere between 4 and 5 million control documents (were) 
produced each year" and about 4000 decisions taken each week to 
update the system.4" To operate effectively this immense 
bureaucratic system needed stable conditions; but this was far 
from the case at Edgwick during the early 1970s. Soon after its 
'commissioning', the system had to cope with a production process 
that was disrupted by frequent modifications of machines 
developed during the late 1960s, the transferral of products from 
other plants, the senior engineers' experiments in group 
technology and abrupt changes in production schedules.44 A high 
turnover of punch-card operators - prompted by poor working 
conditions and low pay - also helped to ensure the weekly reports 
frequently came out late peppered with inaccuracies.40 Other 
errors were built into the system by the use of 'estimated' 
jobtimes which had a certain notoriety on the shopfloor and by 
the chargehands' long-standing practice of manipulating the 
returns on completed work to ensure stable bonus earnings for 
their colleagues. Unlike the previous manual system in which 
separate information systems were used to establish progress and 
calculate pay, the two were combined with the result that 
production records were falsified or rather, inaccurately 
completed, to maintain the operators' bonus earnings.4* It is 
worth noting here that when Barry Wilkinson looked at the 
computerised scheduling system used at a machine tool plant in 
Birmingham formerly owned by Herberts, he claimed the major 
factor behind the failure of that system was this same
combination of information systems on work-in-progress and labour 
performance.«1*
On numerous occasions the stewards pressed for the restoration of 
the manual 'white card' system so that data used to calculate pay 
could be separated from the information system used to establish 
work-in-progress, but this proposal was rejected on each 
occasion, as was their request that the jobtimes be measured by 
outside consultants.4* Disenchantment with CLASS was not confined 
to the stewards. Senior engineers argued that the highly 
centralised character of CLASS undermined their own initiatives 
on group technology.4* First-line and middle managers complained 
about the unreliability of the system. One observed that, once 
given the distinct impression that the system was intended to 
de-skill and reduce their jobs, the shop clerks adopted a 
"slavish attitude" towards the data it produced and stopped using 
their "common sense".*® Dr.Austin's remarks about those early 
days of CLASS typify the views expressed by the middle managers I 
met:
"(It) was probably one of the final nails in the coffin. It 
just garbled everything up....and there was absolute chaos 
on the production side....The old classic of 'garbage in - 
garbage out’... was certainly true in the Herbert case."
Data on the soaring levels of stock and work-in-progress during 
this period added pressure to the demand to scrap or alter CLASS 
in some way. And yet, despite all this, the more powerful
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sections of senior management refused to countenance any 
revisions of the system. For Dr Austin it seemed that:
"No criticism of the computer department, or the computer 
operation, or the way it was done, was permitted. It was 
stifled at birth.
No major action was taken until the takeover by the National 
Enterprise Board in 1975 when the directors had to respond to a 
report by Herbert's own auditors which endorsed many of the 
criticisms levelled against the computerised system and also 
advised management to: carry out immediate stock checks; install 
manual systems to run in tandem with CLASS; and "study and 
develop, where applicable, alternative shop scheduling methods to 
those of CLASS.".93 However, as other matters were seen as much 
more pressing over the next five years, production staff at 
Edgwick were encouraged to 'make do' with a combination of 
computerised and manual systems.
This fierce determination to implement CLASS as originally 
envisaged demonstrates the inadequacy of the argument that key 
aspects of NC technology at Edgwick - the minimal expenditure on 
NC and CNC machines and the use of skilled machinists who then 
re-defined the division of labour - were the products of an 
absence of any managerial strategy on new technology, or the 
outcome of certain technical difficulties and worker resistance 
(either articulated through the stewards and formal 'union 
policies' or manifest through individual and covert acts). For
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the early history of CLASS demonstrated senior management's 
readiness to cope with serious technical difficulties and various 
forms of worker resistance. On the contrary, as I said earlier, 
the question has to be: why did they refuse to take the ‘easy' 
route on CLASS when they had done so on NC technology? As the 
answer is based on historical material that will be discussed in 
some depth in later chapters I will only attempt a brief 
explanation here.
An Historical Perspective on New Technology at Herbert's
An important point to make at the outset is that there was no one 
managerial strategy: from 1964 to 1980, corporate management 
changed three times and each change saw significant amendments of 
the previous regime's policies alongside some continuities.
From 1957, when the company's founder died, to 1964, the company 
was managed by ‘Herbert's men'. Apart from one non-executive 
director, they were veteran employees who had gained promotion 
through Sir Alfred's patronage. As I mentioned earlier, on office 
administration, Herbert's soon became pioneers in the application 
of the computer after purchasing a machine that was identical to 
the one used by the Atomic Energy Authority. But, overall, they 
made a cautious approach to the reform of the founder's 
managerial policies. There was little expenditure on product 
development at Edgwick, largely because the firm still commanded
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a dominant, if declining, share of the domestic market for 
capstan and turret lathes - the plant's main product - and 
apparently even less was spent on the production process inside 
the plant's engineering shops. 'Herbert's men' also continued the 
founder's labour policies, in particular his firm determination 
to control job-prices. In the tightening labour markets of the 
1950s and early 1960s, this had two major effects on the 
character of the production process. First, it led to a gradual 
re-skilling of the workforce as Herbert's found it was unable to 
continue the pre-war practice of recruiting hundreds of 
'apprentices' and trainees each year which had served both to 
reproduce a core of skilled workers imbued with the 'Herbert 
Spirit' and maintain a large workforce of young and semi-skilled 
operatives. This process of re-skilling is reflected in figures 
which indicate a major change in the ratio of semi-skilled to 
skilled labour: from 4:1 in 1952 to 1.2:1 in 1968.** How far 
these figures reflect changes in the social definitions of skill 
is a difficult question to answer. However, the gradual 
disappearance of operational drawings specifically produced for 
Herbert's semi-skilled operatives suggests that the changing 
skill composition of the labour force was also related to some 
material changes in the organisation of work.84 Second, it 
produced some weakened piecework systems - in which pay was kept 
close to the district average by means of a substantial shop 
bonus and systematic overtime - that, in turn, created a 
workforce of 'satisfleers' who developed strong pay norms and 
relatively low levels of productivity. I would suggest that these
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effects of this tacit compromise in capital-labour relations on 
the shopfloor reinforced managerial conservatism in production 
technique by encouraging the managers to become increasingly 
dependent on their (ageing) employees to gain a satisfactory 
output from ageing machinery.
When Richard Young became Chairman in 1964, his appointment was 
welcomed by some of the directors as an opportunity to increase 
the tempo of reform and widen its scope.90 Radical changes were 
made in many areas of Herbert's activities; but relatively few 
had a direct impact on production at Edgwick. One exception 
included the development of eight different turning machines for 
the Olympia Exhibition in 1968. While concerned about labour 
productivity and the age of capital equipment at Edgwick, these 
issues had low priority for Young as he set about *re-modelling 
Herbert's for the seventies'.
"America wishes you luckl"
Martin Smith, a craft apprentice at that time gave me a graphic 
account of the age of the machinery at Edgwick then. He told me 
that he worked in the horizontal milling section, on a Milwaukee 
machine which appeared to come to Herbert's through the 
‘Lend-Lease' scheme. On the bedway was stamped the message: 
"America wishes you luck". When Martin complained about the 
antiquity of the machine his mates replied that his was the most 
modern one on the section. It is difficult to know how far Martin
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intended his story to be taken literally; but it certainly 
contains more than an element of truth.•• In 1975, the firm's 
auditors found in a 50% survey of the machinery in Herbert's 
Machine Tool Division that 47% was 20 years old or over.*T 
Initially, this situation was not for want of capital or any 
indifference on the Chairman's part to new techniques. At the 
time of Young's appointment, Herbert's had £5m in reserves and 
the Herbert-Ingersoll plant, built on a greenfield site at 
Daventry in 1968 and regarded as very much Young's personal 
project, was praised for the modernity of its layout.*• But most 
of this capital was put into a series of company takeovers and 
the joint venture with Ingersoll Milling Inc.. The expansion and 
're-modelling' of the Herbert group was premised on strong 
predictions of a boom in machine tool markets, especially for the 
motor industry. Instead, the late 1960s saw the onset of a 
serious trade recession and, before the end of the decade, 
Herbert's was on the verge of a major cash crisis. In these 
stringent circumstances the only new machines installed at 
Edgwick were built there. The combination of the growing 
antiquity of the machinery with the spate of new designs only 
increased management's dependence on the skills of the shopfloor. 
The recession also ensured there was also little scope for 
increasing productivity through a new payment scheme agreed with 
the stewards at the beginning of 1969.**
Neale Raine's appointment as Chief Executive in 1970 did little 
to alter crucial features of production and workplace politics at
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Edgwick. Pressure from the banks and major shareholders to 
restore the company's liquidity effectively blocked any plans, if 
they existed, to up-date capital equipment at the plant. Over the 
next five years a small number of CNC machine tools were 
installed and all but three - two machining centres and a NC 
grinding machine - were built by Herbert's. I mentioned earlier 
the findings of the auditors' survey on the age of machinery in 
Herbert's Machine Tool Division; the same report asserted that 
£5.5m was needed to re-equip Edgwick to "sustain the necessary 
quantity and quality of production".•° This represented just over 
half of the sum calculated for all the manufacturing plants in 
the division and nearly £2m more than the total value of capital 
equipment (after depreciation) at Herbert's.
Financial stringency was not the only reason for this situation. 
During the early 1970s, while Raine was pursuing his "survival 
plan" for Herbert's - which involved 3000 redundancies 
immediately and, phased over five years, the elimination of all 
but three factories"1 - there was considerable discussion within 
corporate management over a proposal to close Edgwick and 
transfer production to the smaller (and more manageable) plants 
at Mackadown Lane and Lutterworth. So, instead of installing new 
machinery, it made more sense for corporate management to try and 
increase productivity at Edgwick through organisational means. In 
part this was attempted through the long experiments with group 
technology (GT) and the efforts which immediately preceded GT to 
standardise components made at Edgwick. The elimination of some
of the less viable machines in the product range also contributed 
to this strategy. But there is no doubt that senior management 
pinned most of its hopes on the computerised shop-scheduling 
system. There was, Ron Austin recalled, "an idealistic belief 
that the computer would solve all their production problems".
But, as I hope I have shown, that belief was misplaced. As Ron 
put it, CLASS was "just digging a deeper and deeper hole for the 
company to fall into.""* In essence, then, senior management 
tried to raise productivity through the organisation of work 
while leaving the man-machine interface largely unaltered.
This strategy was almost made explicit shortly after the firm's 
financial collapse and state ‘rescue’ in 1974. Tony Benn, then 
Secretary of State at the Department of Industry, insisted that, 
as a condition for state aid (and eventual takeover), the 
workforce must participate in the formulation of a "corporate 
plan" for the firm's future.** At one point in the many 
discussions on this "plan", the stewards were told that the 
company could emulate the strategy of firms such as Colchester 
and go for volume production of low technology machines. But the 
senior managers also made it clear that this was an option they 
had not seriously explored.*4 Instead, they talked of plans to 
phase out the semi-automatics - except for the 9C-30 which had a 
lucrative domestic market - and concentrate on a small range of 
new CNC designs (the Husky and the Batchmatic Mk II).** I would 
suggest that management rejected the ‘Colchester’ option mainly 
for two reasons. First, it seemed unlikely that the government
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would finance the necessary expenditure on capital equipment.aa 
Second, and I think more importantly, the managers were deterred 
by the skill composition of the workforce and the kind of 
accomodation they had made with that workforce. It made doubtful 
economics to employ skilled employees to carry out semi-skilled 
work and, given past managerial difficulties in organising work, 
scaling production down was preferable to an expansionary 
strategy.
In the second half of the 1970s, when Herbert's survived as a 
subsidiary of the National Enterprise Board, the new corporate 
management, headed by Valter Lees, made some attempt to up-date 
machinery at the plant. However, my fieldwork in 1979 suggested 
that the results were not impressive. A few more CNC and NC 
machines on the shopfloor did not disguise management's continued 
dependence on the operatives' skills. And CLASS survived simply 
because other issues were regarded as more pressing. Gone were 
the illusions about its potential to provide a relatively cheap 
means of extending control over production. On the contrary, the 
system had become just another managerial problem.
From this short account, it should be clear managerial Intentions 
behind the application of new technology cannot be assumed from 
accounts of that technology's potential to fragment workers' 
skills and Increase managerial control. This case study also 
Indicates some of the limitations of cross-sectional studies of
new technology, such as those offered by Jones and Wilkinson. For 
Herbert's provides an example of a senior management team that 
attempted, simultaneously, two contrasting strategies in the 
application of new technology. A ‘snapshot1 of factory politics 
in a variety of engineering factories cannot explain that 
phenomenon. Indeed, a cross sectional study cannot explain the 
different forms of workplace politics - the conflicts at one 
plant, the compromises at another - that it describes. It is 
necessary, as in this case study, to attempt a ‘longitudinal 
section', or historical approach, to explain those variations and 
contradictions. To paraphrase Lazonick, it is important to look 
at the political and economic factors that shaped production in 
the past and provided the context for the introduction of new 
technology.
In the circumstances that confronted the firm at the end of the 
1960s NC technology did not look like a serious option for ending 
management's traditional delegated mode of control and tackling 
Edgwick's low productivity. In a factory housing some 600 
machines, NC technology could only bring change in a slow, 
piecemeal fashion as other eguipment wore out - unless, of 
course, they had £5m (or a little more) in capital reserves which 
was no longer the case by that time. And the managers were 
perhaps too familiar with its technical ‘bugs' to believe that NC 
could, at that time, free them from their dependence on workers' 
practical knowledge and skills. In brief, senior management had 
neither the time nor money to consider NC technology as a means
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of effecting the desired reforms. In contrast, CLASS was 
relatively cheap and promised a way of extending managerial 
control right across the shopfloor - and reducing staff levels in 
production administration - within a matter of months. And, 
unlike NC technology, Herbert's had yet to learn about the gap 
between the extravagent claims made on Its behalf and its 
performance. As Edgwick's production difficulties deepened during 
the early 1970s, those senior managers most closely associated 
with CLASS seemed to cling to it with more desperate 
determination. These experiences demonstrated the truth that 
there were no quick and cheap technical solutions to management's 
problems at Edgwick. In the second half of the 1970s, the 
question was: were there any 'solutions' that offered a future 
for machine tool production at Edgwick? But before considering 
that question, the next section will look at another way in which
new technology may have posed a challenge to labour: as a
product. To accomplish that task, there is a need to re-examine
the history of the labour process at Edgwick from another
perspective.
The labour process and product rationalisation
From the turn of the century until the inter-war years, Herbert's 
was regarded as exemplary in the machine tool industry not only 
for its impressive export sales organisation, but also for its 
adoption of ‘American methods' in the productive process.
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Specialising in the design and production of lathes, Herbert's 
was one of the few firms that produced 'standardised' machines in 
comparatively large batches and made considerable use of 
semi-skilled labour in doing so.*’ However, these celebratory 
accounts failed to note that Edgwick - the firm's largest and, 
for some time, its sole manufacturing plant - still produced a 
variety of machine types and tooling accessories, and that there 
was very little standardisation and commonality of parts in 
Herbert's products despite the strong vertical integration of 
production at the plant. Nearly all the parts for each machine 
were cast, machined and assembled at Edgwick. To build the 2D 
capstan lathe, for example, Herbert's bought-in only electric 
motors, ball bearings, belts and washers.**
By the mid-1960s some product rationalisation had taken place.
The plant built lathes exclusively, though in 17 different 
designs** and Nol Factory at Edgwick, controlled by another part 
of the Herbert group, continued to produce tools and accessories.
By this time, some of the machines were fitted with either NC or 
'plugboard' controls. (The latter was an electro-mechanical 
control system which, though developed after NC, occupied an 
intermediate technological position between the conventional 
semi-automatics and NC machines.70) As stated earlier, management 
made little attempt to directly apply this new technology to the 
productive process Itself. But the designs of the new machines 
must have had some Impact on the organisation of work. The
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control panels of the 'plugboard' and NC machines were made 
outside Edgvick. The bits and pieces of the servo-systems - the 
ball-screws and hydraulics, for example - were bought-in, too. 
Then, in the early 1970s, the engineers adapted the technology of 
the DC-drive to Herbert's turning machines which allowed the 
designers to reduce the number of gears and shafts in Herbert's 
machines.So, while the technology of the control systems 
became increasingly sophisticated - the control console for the 
Batchmatic 75-250, launched by Herbert's in 1972 as the world's 
first CNC latheTa was a mini-computer - the mechanical parts, the 
only bits made at Edgwick, became s i m p l e r . B y  1975 one third of 
the 60,000 components handled at Edgwick was bought-in.^ While 
these figures suggest the machine designs had a potential to 
'save' labour in the machine shop, it is not clear that the 
designs led to labour cuts across the plant since the new designs 
required more assembly work. The 2D needed approximately 1000 
parts, the 4 Senior needed 1500, while the average for the 
Batchmatics was 2000 components.7“ Unfortunately, it is difficult 
to establish how much more assembly work was created at Edgwick 
by the Batchmatic design.
Another potential means of 'saving' labour came through the 
senior engineers' experiments with group technology, the cellular 
organisation of plant machines. Though GT made its own 
distinctive contribution to Herbert's malaise, it also 
contributed to the rationalisation of production. Before moving 
the machinery around the shopfloor, the parts made at Edgwick had
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to be grouped into ‘families'. This exercise provided the 
information needed to standardise components and try to achieve 
commonality of parts between machine designs.
Licensing agreements provided another means of rationalising 
production at Edgwick. Before the end of the 1960s, 
Herbert-designed semi-automatic lathes were being built under 
license in India.'7-7 However, it seems that progress was slow on 
this deal for in 1975 Herbert's was still supplying CKD kits of 
the 2D to Mysore Kirloskar. In the early 1970s, management 
appeared anxious to pursue this tactic further. One deal was 
concluded with an Iranian agency-7* and the possibilities of 
fixing similar licensing agreements with companies in Egypt, 
Czechoslovakia, and Mexico were explored; but little seemed to 
have happened by 1975.*° (The stewards were told that, as rival 
firms abroad had discovered, such deals were needed to maintain, 
and hopefully develop, trading links with countries determined to 
establish their own machine tool industries.*x There was no need 
to explain that such deals also allowed further savings in labour 
at Edgwick.)
However, there is no evidence that the potential labour-savings 
of all these measures were realised before the company's collapse 
and state rescue in 1974, or, to be more precise, if there were 
savings they were not made manifest. On the contrary, the 
fragmentary data on sales and manpower made available to me 
suggest that by the end of 1974, when nearly 50\ of the orders
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were for NC and 'plugboard' machines,** labour productivity 
across the plant had declined. In the 1950s, I was told, some 
3,000 employees at Edgwick built about 2,000 low technology 
machines, mostly semi-automatic lathes.** In rather more exact 
terms, documentary sources indicate that in 1974/5, when the 
machine tool plant employed 2,300 workers *4 it received orders 
for only 672 machines (excluding 'carcasses', ie, the main body 
of the machine)•■ though the TASS stewards estimated the plant 
had the capacity to produce double that number of machines.** If 
the union's estimate was accurate, the figures indicate a decline 
in output per employee from 0.7 machines to 0.5.
Perhaps no-one should be surprised by these figures on 
productivity. The early 1970s witnessed a period of profound 
crisis for corporate management and nowhere, it seems, was this 
more evident that at Edgwick. Plant-level management then had to 
cope with the apparently endless modifications of machines 
launched in 1968 (a product of "the debacle of the 1968 era")*T, 
with the transfer of machine designs from the crumbling outposts 
of the Herbert 'empire', and with the errors generated through 
the computerisation of production control. But by 1979, after 
four years in which £57m of state funds had been used to 
restructure the company, it was a different story.
During my fieldwork both the managers and stewards I spoke to 
commented on the many ways in which product design had reduced 
the labour content overall and increased the proportion of
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bought-in components. On the latter point, I was told, for 
example, that the tooling stations on Herbert's new low-cost CNC 
lathe, the Husky, were made in West Germany. Prior to my visit, 
the latest series of redundancies - which had cut the workforce 
to little over 1000 - had been explained by management as the 
direct consequence of a continuing need to rationalise the 
plant's product range. Furthermore no effort was made to conceal 
or deny plans to continue that process even further by 
concentrating, almost exclusively, on the construction of CNC 
machines that would halve the current the labour fo rce.(The 
managers intended to continue the production of the 9C-30, a 
semi-automatic oil lathe, because predictions about the domestic 
market were good.) An output of 500 CNC machines could be 
produced, I was informed, by just 500 workers - clearly a 
significant improvement on productivity.••
Conclusions: A Redundant Analysis and the Riddle of the Stewards' 
Passivity
In the course of my fieldwork I came to the conclusion that the 
application of computer-based systems to the production process 
had neither proved a "job-killer" nor resulted in a significant 
extension of managerial control over production at Bdgwick . It 
was new technology as a product, rather than a piece of capital 
equipment, that provided the opportunities for management to 
increase labour productivity and, because of the Herbert's
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declining share of the the markets, cause major job-losses. But, 
at the time, I had the feeling that this knowledge was somehow 
redundant which, for me, was a far more important observation. As 
I said earlier, at the start of the fieldwork I had hoped the 
project would provide a fresh opportunity for the Workshop to 
break the political inertia that gripped the Machine Tool 
Committee. Yet, it was obvious, long before management asked me 
to terminate the fieldwork at Edgwick, that this was not going to 
happen - not even at Herbert's where the best prospects for the 
Workshop's hopes lay. It is this point that brings me to the 
conclusion of this chapter.
From my discussions with the senior stewards of the office and 
shopfloor unions, it was obvious that they were very well aware 
of the direction of management's strategy for Edgwick and its 
consequences for their members' jobs. The point that seemed to 
concern them most was not the threat of another 500 
redundancies - after a decade of cuts that did not appear 
particularly alarming - but the doubtful viability of 
management's strategy. The chair of the staff unions committee 
pointed out that the fixed overheads would make production 
uneconomic. The plant was built to produce over 5000 machines 
each year and not 500.*° Aware of the strong and intensifying 
competition in world markets for CNC machines, the works convenor 
criticised management for "putting all their eggs in one 
basket".9X At the time, both criticisms were sustained by 
evidence of the continuing market gains of Japanese firms that
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had decided to emulate the 'mass production' techniques of the 
Krasni Proletari factory at Moscow where, in the late 1950s, 1000 
workers produced 12,000 lathes each year.»* A confidential report 
presented to the NEB in 1979 also cast doubt on the viability of 
management's strategy at Herbert's.** Subsequent events, after 
the Edgwick plant was purchased by Tooling Investments, confirmed 
the accuracy of that analysis. When, in April 1983, a receiver 
was appointed to deal with Herbert's final bankruptcy, the 
Guardian commented:
"It's the old, old story - Britain has simply fallen behind 
in modernising its technology; it has failed to Invest in 
advanced production technigues, and where it has - as with 
Alfred Herbert's production of computer numerically 
controlled (CNC) machine tools -it does not produce enough 
to compete. Herbert's annual production of CNC machines is 
equal to just one month's of the leading Japanese 
exporter."**
The stewards were also fully aware of the significance of the 
Tory government's election for the future of the entire company. 
They realised that the NEB, anxious about its own survival, was 
likely to refuse further funding to its "problem company". And 
yet, for all their critical insights into the firm's malaise, for 
all their rebukes of managerial incompetence, the stewards 
remained curiously passive as a kind of 'loyal opposition' to 
management's strategy of rationalisation and re-organisation. A 
few of the senior stewards were prepared to discuss with the 
Workshop current left-wing ideas about how to fight redundancies;
but no action flowed from those debates. Instead, at EC meetings, 
they stuck to what one steward called, the "bread and butter 
issues" such as the pursuit of the current pay claim. When the 
stewards talked of the imminent redundancies it was as if they 
were a part of the political terrain set by management, something 
that made other tasks more difficult. From my superficial 
knowledge of workplace politics in engineering firms elsewhere in 
the West Midlands, it was a depressingly familiar situation; but 
one I did not fully understand. Without appreciating the 
methodological link with the study of new technology at 
Herbert's, I realised that if I wanted an explanation I would 
have to search for clues through the history of workplace 
politics at Edgwick.
The next chapter begins that search at the point of Alfred 
Herbert's earliest days as an entrepreneur. This is not because 
it is conventional to start a narrative at the beginning. Hy main 
reasons are twofold: the first is based on observation, the 
second on logic. First, Herbert's seemed to be a firm dominated 
by its past - an observation made by other ‘Herbert watchers'.•• 
During my fieldwork I was impressed by both the managers' and 
stewards' consciousness of the firm's history and how they used 
it to measure the depth of their current crisis. This indicated 
that it would be necessary for me to come to terms with that 
history so that I could evaluate the political significance of 
their accounts. My second point is that if ideas about the firm's 
founder remained an important influence at the close of the
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1970s, it would be logical to begin that historical study by 
carefully examining his early strategies as an entrepreneur since 
they would have shaped the terrain for the development of 
workplace politics.
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CHAPTER THREE: HERBERT'S EARLY YEARS, PROM HEROIC PHASE TO 
CONSOLIDATION.
Introduction
In the previous chapter I argued that to understand the stewards' 
passivity in the face of imminent redundancies it was necessary 
to re-examine the firm's history and that the startingpolnt for such 
task was Alfred Herbert's early years as an entrepreneur. To 
achieve that aim this chapter is divided into two main sections. 
The first deals with what could be called the heroic phase of 
Herbert's early years. The second section looks at its period of 
consolidation. Where their histories of the machine tool industry 
touch on Herbert's early years, both Saul and Ploud describe an 
"outstanding" success story attributable, "in large measure", to 
the founder's personal abilities and luck1- and his adoption of 
"American methods of manufacture".* By re-interpreting the 
information presented in their accounts, and drawing on new 
material provided by Davies, the first section of this chapter 
will try to qualify that celebratory account by developing, as 
its main argument, the proposition that Alfred Herbert was an 
opportunist who knew how to exploit family and business links in 
exceptionally favourable circumstances. The second section 
extends the chronology beyond the 'heroic phase' of the firm's 
growth to its period of consolidation during the inter-war period
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and, in doing so, challenges Aldcroft's 'progressive' image of 
Herbert's by pointing to the first, ominous signs of the 
company's managerial conservatism.
Heroic Beginnings
The conventional account of Herbert's success story begins with 
an obligatory reference to his "humble origins". In 1887, Alfred 
Herbert, then 21 years of age, quit his apprenticeship at "a very 
ordinary engineering firm" in Leicester to become works manager 
at a business in Coventry.9 There he found 12 men4 principally 
involved in the repair and production of small boilers, and the 
hire of a steam roller and two sets of steam ploughing tackle.* 
Vith "a small amount of capital" from their respective fathers, 
Herbert and a former schoolfriend and fellow apprentice, Villiam 
Hubbard, formed a partnership and took over the business in 1889. 
They began to make machinery for the cycle industry; but Hubbard 
also designed some "rather interesting machines" for use in the 
local ribbon trade and others for picking, sizing and sorting 
pills. Five years later the partnership dissolved: Hubbard 
returned to Leicester; and the company became Alfred Herbert 
Limited.* By 1897, there were 500 employees at the works. Six 
years later, the number had risen to 930,T and by 1914 it had 
more than doubled to 2000 employees.*
This expansion mirrored the dramatic growth in sales. In addition
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to its considerable success as an agent for other companies, 
notably American machine tool firms, Herbert's enjoyed comparable 
results in the turnover of its own products. Sales of Herbert 
machine tools passed £50,000 by 1898, more than doubled by 1902 
and passed £300,000 a decade later. By 1913, its output was two 
and a half times that of its nearest rivals.»
As well as charting the company's growth, Floud guotes 
contemporary comments on the company's progressive technique and 
product design. Even before the end of the century Herbert's was 
praised as a firm that followed "American methods of manufacture 
perhaps more closely than any other machine tool makers in this 
country";1-0 and when G.L.Carden toured many European engineering 
works on the US government's behalf in 1909-1910, he commented: 
"There is no denying that the Herbert machine tools, and in 
particular the turret lathe of this firm, are strong 
competitors of the best work turned out from American 
shops.
‘Self-made man' or beneficiary of family ties?
While both Floud and Saul are fulsome in their praise of Alfred 
Herbert's achievements, nevertheless their studies - when linked 
principally with Davies' research - provide strong reasons for 
qualifying that acclaim and developing the counter argument that 
he was the beneficiary of some exceptionally helpful family
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connections.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, entry into the 
machine tool industry was comparatively easy on each of three 
basic prerequisites. The first, Ploud claims, was a level of 
technical expertise which could be acquired through practical 
activity. Among Herbert's contemporaries, nearly all successful 
entrepreneurs in the industry began their careers as premium 
apprentices.** The second, capital, also posed little difficulty 
for middle class families: a relatively small amount of money was 
sufficient to purchase the basic machinery. For example, Wilson 
Lathes of Halifax began with a capital outlay of £300.** In 
comparison, when Herbert and Hubbard launched their business, 
they were provided with £2000 from each of their fathers.*4 The 
third prerequisite for entry into the industry, the availability 
of skilled labour, would have presented little or no problems to 
a fledgling enterprise such as Herbert t Hubbard. In general, 
Floud found no evidence that labour supply impeded any of the 
machine tool firms;** but it is likely that Herbert particularly 
benefitted from the decline of the local watch-making industry.*4
If entry into the machine tool industry was comparatively easy, 
Saul's research suggests that the inducement to do so at the turn 
of the century was apparent. During the 1890s, the rise of the 
cycle industry and then the motor industry, developments in 
electrical engineering, the demands of steam-turbine and gas- and 
oil-engine builders created a steady rise in the home market for
machine tools.XT The rewards for those who could respond to this 
surge in investment were remarkable. From 1890 to 1900, the 
output of the nine largest machine tool firms trebled, and grew 
two and a half times again over the next 14 years.x*
While it is true that this boom created favourable conditions for 
machine tool firms across the country, it also seems the case 
that a machine tool builder was literally placed at an advantage 
to his rivals if his business was located close to new and 
expanding engineering firms. For, as Floud has argued, before 
1914 the British manufacture of machine tools was characterised 
by firms which specialised in the production of a range of 
machinery which were customised to meet the specific needs of a 
particular set of local firms.x* The benefits and disbenefits of 
this kind of double specialisation have been the subject of some 
debate.30 But for those placed like Herbert & Hubbard, the 
advantages were clear.
During the 1880s and 1890s, Coventry was the main location of 
Britain's bicycle industry which,*1 with the development of the 
'safety* bicycle and the pneumatic tyre, suddenly discovered a 
new, mass market. In 1881, 400 of Coventry's workers were 
employed in the production of bicycles. By 1891, the number had 
risen tenfold and by 1907 it had reached 6000 or 18.5% of the 
city's total working population.** In the initial period of 
expansion during the 1880s, it seems that, contrary to the firm's 
"American" image, Herbert & Hubbard responded in a way that
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fitted in with the 'British system'. This is how Herbert 
described those early years:
"About this time, the bicycle industry entered on the 
beginnings of its serious development and a demand arose for 
machine tools suitable for bicycle making...
"Simple capstan lathes were... produced (at Herbert S Hubbard) 
as well as hub drilling machines, rim drilling machines, hub 
tapping machines, spoke screwing machines, ball grinding 
machines, hub boring and recessing machines and a variety of 
other machines of a more or less specialised character. "**
In addition, the company produced mudguards on a large scale: "at 
one period," Herbert wrote, "we were making and selling three or 
four tons a weeks of these articles.
During the 1890s, as the cycle boom quickened, this 'system' 
broke down to some degree. Local machine tool builders were 
unable to satisfy the volume of demand, or match the new designs 
of labour-saving machinery from America. Hundreds of American 
machine tools were imported. Exports to Britain from four leading 
American firms rose from £86,165 in 1895 to £337,528 in 1897.*"
With characteristic opportunism - more on this point later - the 
newly-formed company Alfred Herbert Limited, responded in two 
ways: by securing agency agreements with some of the leading 
American firms, such as Lodge & Davies;*" and by imitating those 
machine designs which were in most demand. *T To further the
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latter objective, Herbert recruited the talents of an American 
engineer, Oscar Harmer, in 1897. His appointment, Herbert wrote, 
"lead to a rapid development of Herbert Capstan and Turret 
Lathes".*•
The cycle boom burst at the end of the 1890s, and Coventry 
experienced a short recession; but the surviving, larger firms 
began switching to the production of motor cycles and motor cars. 
By 1911, Coventry had around 6000 bicycle workers and 7000 car 
workers (approximately a quarter of its total workforce), while 
Birmingham, the second largest location of the motor industry, 
had 5000 car workers.** As Herbert put it, this new industry 
"further stimulated" the development of the firm's capstan and 
turret lathes.*0
As I mentioned earlier, in their seperate accounts of Herbert's 
"phenomenal" rise, Saul and Ploud drew attention to some of the 
circumstances which made that success possible: the ease of entry 
into the industry at that time, and the character of the 'British 
system' of machine tool production which placed Herbert's at a 
distinct advantage to its rivals because it was located in the 
centre of, first, the cycle industry, then the motor industry. It 
is also worth mentioning that Saul recognised that Alfred Herbert 
gained from the remarkable, technical skills of two of his 
associates; first Hubbard and then Harmer. However, both 
historians managed to adopt an uncritical attitude towards 
Herbert's autobiographical notes and overstate the significance
of luck and the founder's personal qualities as causal factors in 
the rise of Alfred Herbert Limited.
For example, Floud wrote that the company went into machine tool 
production "by accident".*x Similarly, Saul wrote that "luck 
played a part" in the deal over the sale of weldless steel tubes 
- a comment made all the more remarkable for the fact that in the 
same sentence Saul referred to the role of Herbert's brother, 
William, in fixing the deal.** And when Saul asked what were the 
reasons for Herbert's rapid success, he offered this answer:
"In large measure it undoubtedly arose from the personal 
magnetism of Herbert himself. His origins were humble enough 
- an apprenticeship with a very ordinary engineering firm and 
£2000 from his father to buy a partnership."**
This image of Herbert as a self-made man, rising from "humble 
origins" was something that Herbert himself consciously 
cultivated. In his study of the company's early years, Davies, a 
former Herbert apprentice himself, found that through his 
speeches and his writings in the firm's house journal, Alfred 
Herbert gave the impression that success came through personal 
thrift, self-discipline and hard work. Davies observed:
"In an article written in 1929 for example, entitled 
'Thoughts for Young Engineers' he urged his workforce to 
remember that 'the world is full of men who started life with 
no chance at all except their own courage and determination'. 
Elsewhere he declared rich parents to be 'an absolute
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handicap' for young people with ambition."**
Davies found these pronouncements fitted ill with the findings 
from his own research.** Alfred was born in 1866, the son of a 
prosperous farmer who owned a ’town house' in a 'salubrious area’ 
of Leicester and remained connected with a modestly successful 
building firm managed by the senior members of the Herbert 
family. As Richardson put it, Alfred was born into "the 
comfortable middle class which the Industrial Revolution produced 
in Victorian England".*• Alfred was educated at a good, private 
school in Leicester, and seemed destined for university and 
ultimately the clergy until he saw an old friend, Villiam 
Hubbard, working on a lathe at Jessop t Sons. Fascinated by the 
'mechanical arts', Alfred persuaded his father to let him pursue 
a career in engineering. Soon Alfred joined the firm as a premium 
apprentice. And though, in some respects, it was "very ordinary", 
Jessop's was one of the few firms in Leicester that provided 
technical training adequate for would-be entrepreneurs.*7 From 
there, Alfred planned to seek a position at his brother William's 
Premier Cycle Company in Coventry; but, finding "no opening at my 
brother’s concern",*• he accepted the appointment of works 
manager at Coles £ Matthews with a view to taking it over a year 
later. Davies believes that, contrary to Herbert's account, this 
move was very carefully planned by brother William. At that time 
the Premier Cycle Company was highly successful - by 1894 it was 
producing over 20,000 cycles a year at plants in Coventry, 
Nuremberg and Bohemia - and should have found, quite easily, a
position £or a close relative. Instead, William arranged matters
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so that Alfred could take over a small engineering firm in 
Coventry and begin producing machinery for the cycle trade, with 
sales to the Premier Cycle Company virtually guaranteed. In 
accordance with this plan, Alfred quit his apprenticeship 
prematurely - an unusual action in those days - and moved to 
Coles £ Matthews in 1887. A year later, Matthews, the sole 
remaining proprietor of this former partnership, decided to 
accept a position at the Premier Cycle Company's Nuremberg plant. 
He offered to sell his business to Alfred for "a relatively small 
amount". In 1889, Alfred bought the firm in partnership with 
William Hubbard and, as I mentioned earlier, their respective 
fathers provided £2000 each to launch the venture. A year, or at 
most, two years later, brother William arranged matters again 
when he introduced Alfred to Monsieur Scretan, the president of a 
French company that produced weldless steel tubes for the cycle 
industry. From this meeting Herbert £ Hubbard secured the UK 
agency for these tubes. It was a lucrative arrangement for the 
British partners. In 1891, it yielded a net profit of £5,712, an 
amount equal to almost three quarters of the firm's machine tool 
output.** By 1894, Herbert £ Hubbard was on the road to success; 
but Hubbard chose that moment to return to Leicester - possibly 
because of Alfred's 'autocratic' behaviour and perhaps because, 
as Davies put it, he felt overpowered by the influence of the 
Herbert family. At any event, on 17 July 1894, when the 
shareholders of Alfred Herbert Limited held their first annual 
general meeting, those present were: William Henry Herbert,
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Fannie Millicent Herbert, Ellen Adela Herbert, Villiam Herbert, 
Sarah Ann Herbert, Alfred Edward Herbert, Frank Floyd (Alfred's 
father-in-law) and J.H.Marston (Herbert's new works manager).
It would be wrong to suggest that this account shows the rise of 
Alfred Herbert Limited owed nothing whatsoever to the founder's 
personal abilities. If he was not entirely 'self-made', neither 
was he the mindless beneficiary of other people's machinations. 
Instead, Herbert appears to have been a person who knew how to 
use an intricate network of family and business contacts to build 
an "outstanding" success from a set of exceptionally favourable 
circumstances.40
Beyond the 'Heroic Phase' to Consolidation and Conservatism
The 1914-18 war saw a continuation of Herbert's success story. In 
1915, Alfred Herbert was appointed Controller of Machine Tools at 
the Ministry of Munitions. In effect, this made him principal 
adviser from private industry to a government department that was 
charged with the task of re-organising and rationalising machine 
tool production across the industry to meet the needs of the war 
effort. The appointment was a recognition of both Alfred's 
personal, political influence and the pre-eminence of his company 
within the industry.41 Alfred must also have been gratified by 
the rise in Herbert's profits during the war, from just over 
£100,000 in 1914 to £220,000 in 1916.4* There is no doubt that
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this was linked with an expansion of production at the Butts 
plant; but the scale of that expansion can only be surmised from 
fragmentary data. In 1914, Herbert's employed some 2000 workers. 
By 1921, in the middle of a sharp, post-war recession, employment 
stood at 2,700.4"
Herbert's did not escape the effects of that recession. After a 
profit of nearly £230,000 in 1919, the company suffered losses of 
£33,000 in 1920 and £21,000 the following year.44
During the 1920s, the decline of Britain's traditional industries 
affected the fortunes of some of the major machine tool companies 
and generally depressed demand in the home market.4* But, for 
Herbert's, the period from 1923 to 1929 was one in which the firm 
enjoyed a steady growth in demand for its products - particularly 
its range of automatic and semi-automatic lathes - as a result of 
the domestic growth of the motor, aircraft and electrical 
industries, which were located chiefly in the Midlands and 
Greater London, and the sudden expansion of international 
trade.4* During this period, Herbert's transferred production and 
administration from its crowded, city-centre premises at Upper 
York Street, the site of its original workshop, to a vast, 
single-storey building complex at Edgwick on the periphery of 
Coventry. This move was paralleled by those of other, major firms 
in the Midlands and Home Counties,47 and though it took place in 
1928, it was the culmination of a process that had gone on for 
nearly 30 years.
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First, in 1889, a small foundry and a patternshop were built at 
Edgwick.4* Then a ‘factory' was added during the 1914-18 War.
(The ‘factory’ gained its tag through the fact that its 
predominantly female workforce was involved in the large batch 
production of tools and simple drilling machines.**) Later, a 
heavy machine shop made a further addition to the site. This 
development allowed the company to develop a range of machines, 
such as the Atritor, that could not have been built at the Butts 
because of the difficulties of installing adequate craneage 
facilities in a crowded, multi-storey building. The first 
Atritors, rock-pulverising machines originally developed for the 
Portland Cement Company, were relatively small machines of 
200-3001b capacity; but by the early 1930s, machines of 10 tons 
and more were being built to serve as coal-pulverisers for power 
stations.90 The final stage in the development of the Bdgwick 
site came in 1928 when a large extension was built onto the heavy 
machine shop to create a combined machine- and fitting shop that 
was 30 bays in length.*x
Soon after the transfer was completed, Herbert's sank into the 
second major recession of the inter-war period. From profits of 
£294,000 in 1930, Herbert's made a loss of £38,000 in 1931.**
This paralleled the experiences of other machine tool firms in 
Britain. Between 1929 and 1933, production of machine tools in 
the UK was roughly halved.*9 However, first the Soviet 
industrialisation programme,*4 then the re-armament drive in
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Britain quickly and dramatically reversed Herbert's fortunes." 
By 1935, company profits stood at £242,000; two years later they 
were nearly trebled to reach £667,000. The workforce rose from 
3,700 in 1935 to 4,500 in 1938."
Aldcroft has argued that during the inter-war period, Herbert's 
maintained its reputation as "one of the most progressive firms" 
in the industry, in terms of its methods of production and sales 
organisation.9-7 However, there is some evidence to suggest that 
the firm's founder was already becoming rather conservative in 
his approach to management and that this was having a marked 
effect on Herbert's performance in product design.
For the industry, the major technical innovation during the 
inter-war period was the development of tungsten carbide tooling. 
This new ‘heavy metal' allowed cutting speeds to be increased 
from 75-80 feet per minute (on cast iron and steel) to 200, 400 
and even 1000 feet per minute." Developed by Krupps, at Essen, 
Germany, tungsten carbide was quickly brought to Britain by Axel 
Wickman. Formerly employed as an engineer at Krupps, Wickman 
worked at Herbert's for a few years before setting up his own 
company in Coventry which started producing carbide tools in 
1928. Soon afterwards, there was strong competition between 
Wickman Wimet and Herbert's to establish their range of carbide 
tools in the market.”
This new tooling necessitated changes in machine tool design, in
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particular the development of ball and roller bearings. The 
traditional bearings, white metal or babbit bearings as they were 
called, simply melted under the new speeds. And yet, unlike its 
nearest rival. Ward's of Birmingham, Herbert's continued to 
produce machines with babbit bearings until 1945. Bill Elliston, 
a Herbert service engineer from 1933 to 1941, had the opportunity 
to compare performances:
"During the war I was at a place in Newcastle. They were 
doing up the Rotel airscrew, and they'd got a big Ward 16, 
equivalent to the Herbert 20 Comb', brand new. Both brand new 
machines, side by side. The Ward was running at twice the 
speed on roller bearings to the Herbert on white metal. And, 
of course, the old Herbert white metal was trying to keep 
up...and seizing up by the middle of the morning. It couldn't 
stand up to it.""°
However, during the 1930s, Herbert's did re-design some machines 
to incorporate roller bearings, such as the 9B and the 12B 
combination lathes; and they were a feature of all the new 
designs. In the mid-1930s, Herbert's also designed the Preoptive 
Headstock which was, the firm claimed, a "revolutionary" 
configuration of sliding gears and friction clutches which 
allowed a smooth and rapid change in spindle speeds.*1 But then 
Herbert's were relatively late in developing hydraulic- and 
electrical-lubrication systems. Bill Elliston, again:
"If the old man said 'Nay!', it was nay...I mean, he wouldn't 
even have pressure oil on the slides of the machines. They
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were still the old wick and wire. Ve were travelling around 
the country putting in package pressure-oil at that time. 
There were no hydraulics. Everything was mechanical...Where 
the Americans, the Germans and these other people had got 
pressure oil and automatic lubrication, Herbert's were still 
sticking to the wick and wire...It went out with carriage 
lamps."-»
There is no evidence that this erratic performance on product 
design had any serious impact on Herbert's sales in general: the 
‘sins' of technological conservatism did not catch up with 
Herbert's until thirty years later. For the moment, Herbert's 
remained foremost among the three firms which together controlled 
80* of the UK production of automatic and semi-automatic 
lathes.-»
The benefits of ‘obsolete' forms of industrial organisation
An additional criticism of Aldcroft's account of Herbert's 
concerns the way he contrasts the firm's performance, and that of 
other leading firms, with the industry's small employers. In an 
unflattering account of the British machine tool industry during 
the inter-war period, Aldcroft directs his main attack on the 
small firms. To his mind, they had failed to adopt the ‘best 
practice' of the larger enterprises because of an irrational will 
to keep the business firmly in the hands of "family cliques" and
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spurn the economies of scale offered by working within an 
association of companies, such as the ABMTM. Aldcroft asserts 
that, in some way, these small firms were "a burden to the new 
dynamic sector of the industry"."*
An alternative perspective on the relationship between small and 
large firms is suggested in Dobb's study of the inter-war 
economy. He noticed that alongside the trend towards 
concentration of production there was the marked persistence of 
the small firm. Oobb argued that this was the result of cartel
/
arrangements between the small and large firms. The latter 
organised the former and co-ordinated their marketing policies.
Also, in times of peak demand, the small firms served as 
sub-contractors to the larger companies."* It is easy to see how 
this insight could be applied to the machine tool industry in 
general. Given the notorious "feast-famine" character of demand, 
larger machine tool firms would have had particularly strong 
reasons for ensuring the survival of apparently 'obsolete' forms 
of industrial organisation and technigue.
Just how far Dobb's analysis offers insight into Herbert's 
continuing 'success story' cannot be explored here, but it is 
relevant to note the centrality of factoring in Herbert's 
activities. Saul's research shows that by 1914 a substantial part 
of the company's turnover was obtained through factoring 
arrangements."" It is also known that, in addition to acting as 
agents for several, prominent American firms, Herbert's sold the
products of a large number of small, British firms.*7 Lastly, it 
has been said that Alfred Herbert himself, founder member and 
first president of the Machine Tools Trades Association, was 
largely responsible for ensuring that the Association - unlike 
its sister organisations in America and Germany - incorporated 
agents as well as builders of machine tools.••
Conclusion:
This chapter has looked at Herbert's entrepreneurial policies 
from the heroic phase of the company's early years to its period 
of consolidation in the inter-war years. By challenging the 
conventional wisdom on Herbert's early "outstanding" 
achievements, I have tried to show that they were merely human in 
two major respects. First, like a number of British machine tool 
firms, Herbert's was a beneficiary of the wave of new technology 
that swept through the light engineering industries at that time. 
Second, Herbert's growth outstripped its rivals because it was 
placed in a major centre of cycle and then motor production 
(which generated considerable demand for the new ‘automatic’ 
machinery) and was able to exploit some exceptionally useful 
family ties in those same industries. As Williamson, an historian 
of another local firm, would have put it, there were ‘wheels 
within wheels'.The second part of this chapter also questioned 
the claim that Herbert's remained "one of the most progressive 
firms" in the inter-war machine tool industry. It was suggested
that Herbert's may have sustained some small firms, despite their 
"obsolete" nature, to diversify Its markets and provide a buffer
Page 87
from the cyclical character of demand. The chapter also used 
primary sources to highlight the firm's very patchy performance 
on product design. Herbert's period of consolidation was one in 
which ominous signs of managerial conservatism were already 
evident. These findings provide the background to the subject of 
the next chapter: an examination of key features of workplace 
politics at Herbert's before the emergence of the shop stewards' 
organisation.
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CHAPTER FOUR: WORKPLACE POLITICS AT HERBERT'S BEFORE THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE SHOP STEWARDS' ORGANISATION.
Introduction
The previous chapter described the rise of Herbert's from a tiny 
jobbing shop of less than 20 workers in 1889 to a factory which, 
some 40 years later, had over two thousand employees. That 
“success story' for Herbert the entrepreneur now provides the 
background to an enquiry into three key aspects of the firm's 
workplace politics before the emergence or rather, as I shall 
explain later, the re-emergence of the shop stewards' 
organisation, namely: youth labour, the gang system and employer 
paternalism.
I have chosen to approach these related topics principally 
through the personal recollections of a small number of men and 
women who were young workers at Herbert's during those years. 
Initially, this choice was based on obvious methodological 
considerations - it was in C. Wright Mills' terms a neat exercise 
and, on some questions, the only way of collecting data - but 
during the research process it became evident how fortuitous that 
choice was particularly in relation to the first topic of this 
chapter. For only through those interviews and correspondence did 
it become clear that during the inter-war period, and probably
Page 94
much earlier too, young workers at Herbert's occupied a central 
position in the productive process. Apart from Davies' study 
which quotes scattered references in the ASE minutes to the 
"scandalous employment of boys" at Herbert's before the First 
World War,x and broader studies of employment which discuss the 
significance of youth labour during the inter-war period,* the 
standard business histories gave little Indication that I would 
find this situation at Edgwick. Those same recollections also 
contradicted the present-day, popular image of Herbert's as the 
location of an adult, as well as a male-dominated, craft 
excellence.
In the first section of this chapter I will argue that the oral 
material suggests that Herbert's employed relatively large 
numbers of young women in the offices and young men in the 
machine and fitting shops. More importantly, it is suggested that 
many of these youths were part of what one former employee called 
a "vast apprenticeship system" which regulated an internal labour 
market for young workers at the firm. For besides providing the 
means to reproduce a skilled labour force (and managerial staff), 
it also generated a large and constantly shifting population of 
semi-skilled operatives. Additionally, Herbert's "apprenticeship 
system" effectively secured the loyalty of adult workers to the 
gang system, a form of collective piecework which, though it 
excluded them from any direct involvement in wage bargaining, 
facilitated their participation in the exploitation of youth 
labour.
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The second part of this chapter looks at Herbert's variant of the 
gang system. Beginning from the point made earlier, namely that 
this payment system was ‘very good for the rated men' as it 
allowed them to increase their bonus earnings at the expense of 
the apprentices, this section attempts to trace the origins of 
the gang system, how it became a ‘weakened' piecework system 
under the pressures of the re-armament boom, and how it continued 
to provide substantial benefits for management. Lastly, I suggest 
that the gang system both generated the need for, and sustained,
Herbert's variant of employer paternalism.
/
The final section looks at Herbert's paternalist regime and tries 
to develop two principal arguments. The first is that, while it 
shared many of the features of the employer paternalism practised 
in the textile mills of Victorian Lancashire, it was not as 
idiosyncratic as it appeared. At the turn of the century 
Herbert's labour management fitted into the current interest in 
"welfarism” and the customary response of firms that had expanded 
their workforce rapidly without changing the familial structure 
of management. The second argument offers some qualifications to 
Herbert's self-image and points to evidence of ‘dissenting 
beliefs' among the firm's employees.
The Exploitation of Youth Labour 
Young women at Herbert's
"I was 14 when I started. I never worked anywhere else. I 
worked there until I was 21, when I got married.. .in 1936."•
Doris Digger worked in the wages office - on "punch cards and 
that" - until her marriage. She explained:
"In them days you had to leave when you got married. They 
wouldn't have married women. It was only the war that brought
/
married women into Herbert's."
If this observation is correct, then it would follow that most of 
the women who performed routine, clerical labour at Herbert's 
during the inter-war years were young. This assumption is 
supported by the comments made by two other former office 
employees: Ruth Dyer and Joan Hughes. In March 1919, Ruth was 14 
years old when she started work as a junior in the Correspondence 
Department. She recalled an occasion when, at the Butts works,
"Sir Alfred complained that he was falling over too many 
children running up and down the stairs, and it was arranged 
for us who had the authority to do this, to wear arm bands.
They were in pale blue velvet."*
Ruth also showed the author a photograph of her former colleagues 
- dictaphone typists, office juniors and filing clerks - which 
conveys the image of a very youthful workforce.
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In 1936, Joan was nearly 15 when she started work at Herbert's. 
Her first job was as a junior in the Planning Department. Some 
three years later, she became secretary to Walter Shepherd on his 
appointment as the firm's first Industrial Relations Officer.®
Young women were employed on the shopfloor too, though precisely 
where is a matter of some controversy among the male respondents. 
Phillip Banks-Price, who became a special apprentice at Edgwick 
in 1926, recalls:
"There was more semi-skilled labour and, of course, there was 
a lot of women. They always used a lot of female labour in the 
Factory... (which) was built during the First World War...they 
used female labour then and didn't stop using it during the 
whole of the inter-war period. . . 1  can remember seeing, as 1 
came out of the gate, the women coming out of the Factory. "• 
Ron Green started work in the Factory Tool Store in 1934. He 
recalls:
"They had girls in our department, on 2S capstans and the bar 
lathes. But they were a small percentage of the workforce." 
Other have insisted that female machinists were confined to 
semi-skilled work in the Factory. Bernard Woolly started work in 
the machine shop in 1933. His mates told him about the women in 
the Factory, "that was upstairs where they made die-heads and all 
the tools.. .And up there they reckoned there was a lot of women 
worked. Ah, there was. There was a lot of girls."7
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Not surprisingly, estimates of the numbers of "girls upstairs" 
varied between the respondents. However, given the size of the 
Factory at that time, 100 or more is a likely figure. Also, 
though female shopfloor workers have a shadowy presence in these 
male reminiscences, there is little doubt that they were 
marginalised in Herbert's internal labour market and exclusively 
confined to a ghetto of semi-skilled work.
"There were women on machines on the semi-skilled rate. They 
had women on milling machines, just milling the threading for 
the dies. They'd have a setter and that was it..."*
"In the Factory there was women because they were small 
jobs...The operations were broken down into far simpler 
bits."*
Young men at Herbert's
Whatever else may be said, young male workers were not a marginal 
phenomenon at Herbert's. Their numbers alone made them a 
significant feature of the labour process. Bernard Woolly, a 
trainee du:ing the 1930s, remembered there were "no end of 
youths" at Herbert's. In his gang on the capstan section,
"There'd be about, roughly, 25 of us, and the oldest one of us 
was - well, we were almost the same age - was 18. All young 
lads. Good lads we were...The setter, to us lads he'd be a 
bloody old man; but he'd be...he couldn't have been more than
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30 or 35.**®
In addition to these trainees, Herbert's recruited large numbers 
of apprentices each year. Bernard Wall's estimate of "an Intake 
of 100 apprentices a year" is generally supported by other 
respondents. For example. Bill Elliston recalls:
"He had a vast apprenticeship system. He had 650 lads at any 
one time going through the shop...The empire was constructed 
on those lines and it worked extremely well."11
The figure of 650 apprentices can be compared with an estimate of 
3,700 as the total number of employees in 1935.la But, for much 
of the inter-war period, apprentices must have constituted an 
even larger proportion of Edgwick's workforce. In the early 
1930s, for example, when the number of employees was probably 
little more than 2000 and rated men were put on short-time - one 
week on, one week off - Edgwick must have appeared to be little 
else than "a vast apprenticeship system".1*
As was shown in the recollections on female labour, there was 
also some disagreement on the distribution of this youthful 
workforce. Bernard Woolly, it may be recalled, said that all the 
machinists in his gang of capstan operators were teenagers. But 
Bill Elliston, a fitter-apprentice at that time, claimed the 
apprenticeship system worked so well because "Each gang had an 
equal number of apprentices and an equal number of skilled men." 
While Vic Brown recollected that in his fitting gang "there were
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about 14 in the gang and about three lads, (or) about 12 men and 
3 lads."**
One explanation for these conflicting accounts is that each is 
based on personal experiences and reflects the way management 
used the "apprenticeship system" to pursue two contradictory 
objectives, namely: to exploit youths in a labour process that 
was fragmented and de-skilled, and to reproduce a skilled 
workforce. Bernard Woolly's description of the capstan gang 
suggests that he and his work mates were employed as semi-skilled 
machinists, assisted by a setter, and overseen (literally, it 
seems) by a "non-working chargehand". Here management had clearly 
succeeded in that first objective:
"He had his desk at the bottom of the section. He used to 
stand on a box. God, he used to watch me all day long! And 
there was no smoking allowed then, you know. And if you used 
to be away for more than five minutes from your machine, he 
used to come and say something to you and he'd get as close as 
he could to you...and you'd say something and he'd say:
'You've been smoking, son, haven't you? You know you've been 
down the back for a quick drag.'"
References in other interviews to the presence of "non-working 
chargehands" elsewhere in the machine shop - usually with gangs 
operating automatic and semi-automatic machinery - suggests that 
Bernard's experiences were shared by many more young people at 
Edgwick.
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To have kept these machines permanently 'manned' by youths, the 
recruitment and turnover of trainees must have been considerable. 
During this period, Herbert's would have experienced no 
difficulties in recruiting hundreds of school-leavers and young 
workers by self-referral, and I would suggest that it is 
significant that none of the three former trainees whom I 
interviewed - Tom, Bernard and Ron - had any relatives at 
Herbert's. Of course, I could not claim this to be a 
statistically significant sample of the many hundreds of youths 
who worked, briefly, at Herbert's; but it seems reasonable to 
believe that the vast majority of the trainees shared their lack 
of family connections at the firm. For that absence made it 
easier for management to treat them as low-paid temporary 
workers. (Until recently, their modern equivalent would have been 
the trainees on the Youth Training Scheme, a form of vocational 
training described as excellent ‘for somebody else's child'.)
My remarks on turnover are possibly more speculative. During the 
1920s and earlier, when few jobs were available elsewhere, it is 
likely that front-line management summarily dismissed many young 
workers for minor infringments of discipline. But by the 
mid-1930s, it is possible that the turnover largely resulted from 
the young workers' own quest for change. Bernard, for example, 
had already had a change of jobs - having spent a few months at 
Daimler, first as an errand boy then a tub grinder - before 
moving to Herbert's and reaching his fifteenth birthday. He left
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three years later.
"Nov why did I leave Herbert's? It wasn't for better money.
Veil, when you're that age you don't care a lot. I Just
happened to leave. I don't know why. Perhaps I needed a
change. So I vent to Singer."
After three months, Bernard went to Siddely, then Morris Engines, 
then Dunlop, then Riley, and finally arrived back at Daimler in 
June 1940. Apart from this wanderlust of youth, many trainees 
must have left as a result of some "encouragement" from 
management such as their exclusion from the rewards granted to a 
few like Tom Batchelor and Ron Green.
In 1932, Tom was 16 years old and "a bit too old to be an 
apprentice" when he started at Herbert's. Nonetheless, he claimed 
to have "learned all aspects of grinding" and became a rated man 
by the age of 21.xs Also in 1932, Ron was taken on as a trainee 
in the Factory Tool Store. Six months later he became a rated 
man. Unfortunately, I do not know what his age was at the time; 
but even on the assumption that he was about 20, that would still 
have been a remarkable achievement. Ron's own explanation, that 
he had a "natural aptitude” for the work, could only be part of 
the story. His experience - and Tom's to a certain extent - 
suggests that management enjoyed considerable discretion in the 
way it employed trainees: it could put them together into gangs 
of semi-skilled machinists or, if they demonstrated exceptional 
abilities, treat them as non-indentured apprentices.
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I would suggest that, unlike the trainees, the vast majority of 
Herbert's craft apprentices were recruited through adult, male 
relatives at the firm. Bill Elliston's son, John, described it as 
"a sort of tradition that was handed down".1" It did not 
guarantee a place to every school-leaver who had family 
connections at Herbert's - Vic Brown was one who had to work a 
year elsewhere (Sterling Metals, in fact) before starting his 
apprenticeship at Edgwick in 1930 - but it helped. As Vic put it:
"(Herbert’s) was the cream of the place.. .and if your father 
worked there, that was always a lever, you know."
The implication behind this observation is that local 
school-leavers were confronted by a dual labour market. The
/
prevalence of ‘lads of dads' recruitment during the inter-war 
period is clearly asserted in Croucher's account of the 
apprentices' strikes in 1937;iy and the race relations literature 
provides ample evidence of the continuing influence of family 
recruitment in determining job opportunities for 
school-leavers.The reasons why both management and workers 
supported this system have been explored by other writers. Here 
it will suffice to make a few comments.
In addition to reducing the administrative costs of recruitment 
and selection, family recruitment was attractive to management 
because it increased its employees' dependence on the firm's 
continued prosperity. This comes through in the oral material, in 
the repeated association of ‘family' with ‘loyalty' to the
company. For example, after my interview with Bill Elliston, his 
son (also a former Herbert employee) said:
"Father mentioned that during the 'forties, 'fifties, the 
family worked at Herbert's. That didn't apply just to the 
Elliston family. It applied to many, many people at Herbert's. 
It was a sort of tradition that was handed down. And you had 
this marvellous spirit of loyalty to Alfred Herbert’s."
For Herbert's employees, the system offered a chance of 
perpetuating shopfloor customs and practices built up over the 
years, of retaining the opaqueness, the ‘mystery’ of their trade, 
and maintaining a collective loyalty against management's efforts 
to fragment and intensify work. Equally, if not more important, 
it offered each man a small way of reducing the risk of 
unemployment and increasing the opportunity of gaining long-term 
job security for members of his family.
At first sight, it is obvious why there was increased competition 
for craft apprenticeships at Herbert's. In contrast to the 
uncertain character of traineeships, the experiences of Ernie 
Digger, Bill Elliston and Vic Brown suggest that, if job security 
was not exactly guaranteed, craft apprentices in the fitting shop 
could depend on the quality of their training. Of course, as 
Ernie put it, it was very much "a working apprenticeship": they 
were not given any formal instruction away from the shopfloor, 
but were expected to acquire the skills of their trade by working 
alongside rated men on their section. It was also a "working
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apprenticeship" in the sense that, from their first day at work, 
they were put on piecework and expected to make a contribution to 
the gang's earnings. But all these men moved through the shop and 
acquired a range of mechanical skills before becoming machine 
tool fitters at the age of 21. However, even for craft 
apprentices, things were not as solid and reliable as they 
seemed. For example, it is known that some youths were 
transferred to the Drawing Office in the final year of their 
apprenticeship and subsequently moved into technical posts.1-* 
Alternatively, some spent most of their time on a small range of 
semi-skilled operations.*" It seemed that the quality of training 
depended on a variety of factors: the strength of the youth's 
family connections with the firm; his aptitude for the work; and, 
as one apprentice learned twenty years later, a certain degree of 
self-assertion:
"So I go to the foreman, Tom Lawrence, old sod of the old 
school...
'Mr Lawrence?’
'Yes, laddie...’ You hadn't got a name, see.
*1 want to move.'
'You again? I’ve seen you twice in three years!’...Always had 
a sense of humour. 'Why?'
'Veil, I’m 18 and I can’t scrape.’
'Ah, OK, leave it with me.’
Well, months go by; nothing happens until you go back...Knock, 
knock.
'Mr Lawrence?’ He knows what you’ve come for.
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‘Hhat now?'
'Three months have gone by and I can't scrape.'
’Monday, I'll give you a move.' Takes you round to an old 
chargehand, called Jack Barnesley...What do they do? You're 
still a bit green. You know what Tom Lawrence said?
‘John, I've got a little lad here from Bedworth wants to know 
how to scrape. ' And a little look they'd exchange with each 
other, and off he’d go. **x
Lastly, within Herbert's "vast apprenticeship system" there was 
an elite of premium and special apprentices. These youths were 
articled to a specific trade, but, unlike craft apprentices, they 
were assured of acquiring a familiarity with a range of manual 
skills before moving into the Drawing Office. They also had the 
chance to go to ‘half-day Tech'. Obviously, they were groomed for 
posts in technical and managerial work; and yet their's was still 
a ‘working apprenticeship', as Bernard Hall recalls:
"Vhen I started there you were put on a machine, next to a 
qualified operator. That skilled man set up the first 
job...and you did that batch of work...The next job you had to 
set up yourself, with the skilled man looking after you. And 
then, if you could do that successfully, from then on you had 
to set yourself up...We were setting machines when we were 15 
years of age."
Fred Lynes claimed that he was put on gang piecework, even though 
he was a special apprentice.** Bernard Hall said he had a similar
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experience:
"Oh, yes l You had a piecework price on the job, and you were 
expected to make it pay and contribute to the gang bonus. You 
were on piecework from the word 'go'."
But Banks-Price, a premium apprentice, disagreed:
"Now I worked on a daywork system. All the apprentices did in 
those days...(though) I think you could, if you wanted to, go 
on a piecework system. But I think, by and large, that 
apprentices were like myself: they were only passing through." 
The explanation for this conflict of evidence may be that Phillip 
generalised - wrongly, I believe - from his own experiences. For 
he had started his apprenticeship in the patternshop where the 
dayrate was the norm.
The size of this elite of special and premium apprentices is 
uncertain. One estimate, offered by Ernie Digger, was of 50 each 
year. However, the oral evidence indicates there were several 
routes of entry, though the importance of family network was 
stressed by most respondents. For example, Bernard Wall's parents 
were supposed to pay a premium of some £200 for his training but, 
because Bernard's father was then the foreman in Gear Cutting, it 
came ’free'. It was "one of the perks of the job". And the 
testimony of another special apprentice, Phillip, suggests that 
men at every level of line management, including the works 
manager, availed themselves of that privilege. Phillip, however, 
had no family ties with the firm. He recalled that he did not pay 
the premium because he had passed an entrance examination "which
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previously had only been taken by Bablake boys". (He did not 
explain why this test was opened out to 'non-Bablake' boys by 
1926. Perhaps it was a reflection of a declining interest in 
mechanical engineering among middle class youth.)
There were, then, significant differences between young people in 
their experience of labour on the shopfloor at Bdgwick - 
differences which were, I have argued, essentially a product of 
management's conflicting objectives. But equally important are 
those experiences of work which those young people shared.
Toilet facilities at Edgwick were primitive. The lavatories at 
the back of the main shop were "like a cowshed","3 unlit and 
exposed to the elements. It is not clear whether there were 
'proper' washbasins, but most remember washing their hands in 
buckets placed near each gang. And Ernie Digger claimed this was 
an improvement on previous conditions:
"We started using buckets after we'd complained a bit about 
washing our hands in the paraffin tank and oil. We used to use 
machine oil and then go and wash in the dirty paraffin 
tank.. .and we used some dirty cotton waste.. .to wipe our 
hands."
For all young workers at Herbert's, it must have been a long 
working day. Prom most accounts it seems that in the inter-war 
period, the working hours were: 8.0am to 12.30pm, and 1.30pm to 
5.30pm. After 30 minutes, most workers were obliged to work
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another two hours overtime - though this is a matter of some 
dispute among the respondents. Fred Lynes, for example, recalls 
that in his first days as a special apprentice in 1917 he worked 
a 54 hour week. He continued to work these hours " t i l l  they found 
out” that apprentices were not supposed to be on systematic 
overtime. (The phrase " t i l l  they found out" is something to keep 
in mind when I discuss later trade unionism at Herbert's.) But 
Bill Elliston, a craft apprentice in the fitting shop during the 
1930s, remembers the imposition of systematic overtime:
"It was eight in the morning until eight at night, and 
Saturday morning until twelve. If you wanted a night off - 
generally a Wednesday - you had to get permission off the 
foreman. That was when you were an apprentice. "
Bernard Woolly and Tom Batchelor, both trainees in the machine 
shop during the 1930s, also claimed they were obliged to do 
systematic overtime.
With these long hours, discipline was strict. Ron Green remembers 
this reaction to a summons to the foreman's office one day:
"I said (to myself), 'It's the sacki ' Because at that time 
they were so strict, you see. the foremen used to stand behind 
girders. They hid behind girders to catch you out." 
Fortunately, Ron's fears proved unfounded; but on another 
occasion he witnessed a summary dismissal when a foreman saw a 
machinist throwing a handful of swarf and suds at another worker. 
The foremen could also demonstrate their authority over late
arrivals:
"Dead on 8 o'clock they’d shut the gates...and If the foreman 
wanted you, you’d go In. If he didn't, you'd go home."
But in most instances, discipline was imposed by the chargehands. 
This idea is supported by Bernard Woolly's reminiscences quoted 
earlier in this chapter. It i; also supported by Ernie Digger's 
recollection of the ’funny' ways of another chargehand:
"They had us on the bench with little jobs on the vice, and 
Arthur Gardner'd say: 'First one to finish that gets a bar of 
chocolate.’ And when you went to ask for the bar of chocolate, 
he’d kick you behind or clout your ear. That was so-called 
fun; but your ear used to be damned red and tingling."
For those apprentices and trainees who had to work alongside 
adults on gang piecework, the payment system encouraged a wider 
interest in discipline. As Ernie put it:
"If you didn't get on with the job, the chargehand would get 
onto you or the chaps would get onto you."
For, as Fred Lynes explained, Herbert's variant of gang piecework 
ensured that the apprentices contributed rather more to the gang 
bonus than they received:
"Of course, it was a good system in a way for the rated men if 
they'd got any apprentices. They weren't earning much money - 
I started at 6/9 each week for 54 hours...(and) by the time, 
say, the last two years, they were quite as competent as 
plenty of the rated men; but they weren't earning anything 
like as much money. In other words, if they were doing a job 
which was worth £5, it pulled in £5 for the gang, but they
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(the apprentices) didn't get the bonus on £5...The apprentice 
only got a 100% of whatever he was earning. If the gang got 
lOOt, I got 6/9, you see."
Thus the gang system gave the men - both rated and semi-skilled - 
a direct stake in the perpetuation of the youth's low pay. And it 
was low pay. In October 1936, the average hourly earnings of 
skilled fitters in Coventry were just under 2/-.*4 But when Fred 
Lynes started his craft apprenticeship in 1917, his weekly wage 
for 48 hours (and sometimes more) was 6/9. In 1925, Ernie Digger 
started his craft apprenticeship on "6/- a week plus 3/- war 
bonus, which was a cost of living bonus, and a monthly bonus if 
you had any". Nine years later, Bernard Wall started on a wage of 
7/-. In his indenture papers, it stated that he could expect to 
receive 8/- per week in the second year; 9/- in the third; 13/- 
in the fourth; and so on up to his 21st birthday. Vic Brown, who 
started his apprenticeship at the same time as Bernard (1934) 
recalls:
"You didn't get much bonus. I think I used to get 18/- a 
month. I got 8/9 (each week) till I was sixteen, then it went 
up to 11/6, then it went up to 15/8...and I forget what the 
other was, but I remember they were low."
But Bernard Woolly apparently did rather better as a trainee on 
the capstan gang in 1933:
"I was on about 12/6 a week for three weeks. Now, on the 
fourth week, instead of picking up 12/6, you'd pick up between 
£3 and £3.10.0. that was good money then for a kid, you know
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what I mean? But, God, you worked for It/"
In March 1919, Ruth Dyer earned 11/9 when she started work as a 
junior in the Correspondence Department. In her letter to the 
author she wrote:
"No overtime was paid in those days; but tea was provided in 
lieu of."
When she was transferred to the Postal and Filing Department, she 
was content to accept the same conditions:
"In those days we knew it to be part of our job and we were 
quite happy to stay however late it was to see the job 
through."
When Joan Hughes took up her job at Herbert's in 1936, she earned 
10/- a week plus a monthly production bonus. Her basic rate rose 
in annual increments of half-a-crown.
These stories about the low rates of pay, the strict discipline 
and the long hours of work at Herbert's would fit neatly into 
Croucher's grim evocation of labour there. And yet, among the 
respondents, only Tom looked back on those days as "terrible" and 
"diabolical really". For the others, they were, as Ruth put it, 
"HAPPY DAYS":
"It was a very good firm to work for before the war."**
"They were the happiest days of my life."*"
"I was a lad at the time, and I enjoyed it there."**
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There are several explanations £or this paradox. Although few of 
the people interviewed had experienced unemployment before going 
to Herbert's - most had moved straight on from school without any 
apparent difficulty - the fear of unemployment is hinted at in 
several accounts. For example, Vic Brown recalls that when he got 
a job at Herbert's in 1930 "the blokes in the street used to say, 
'You lucky devil/' 'Cause it was a busy place then, you see, and 
it was recognised for full-time working." So a job, almost any 
job, was welcomed. Similarly, while it was acknowledged that the 
basic rates were low, most people would have agreed with Harry 
Earle's observation:
"Well, you know, it was a good place to work. You were in 
constant employment - which was something in those days. The 
car industry in those days was six months on, six months 
off."*•
A few argued that the pay differential - between Herbert's and 
the other, major firms - was marginal, anyway:
"'Course, Herbert's weren't noted for paying top money...But 
they always used to say that provided you were a competent 
worker and you didn’t break into the safe, you'd got a job for 
life. And some people valued that more than perhaps an extra 
10/- working in a car factory. "**
And one respondent, Ron Green, claimed that earnings at Herbert's
were, for a time, competitive with the best offered elsewhere as 
output at Edgwick rose sharply in the late 1930s:
"I was on about £9.10.0 a week, which was very good because 
most (outside Herbert's) were on £4 or £5 a week - which is 
what I'd said to you over the 'phone. Before the war, people 
at Herbert's were earning good money."
Toilet facilities were deplorable, but also unexceptional for a 
large engineering firm at that time. As Ernie Digger put it: "Oh, 
it was no mod con. We were there to work." However, for its time, 
Edgwick offered exceptionally good canteen and recreational 
amenities. Bernard Woolly again:
"They had a good canteen, though. I'll give them that. They 
had good sports facilities as well...In the summer, we used to 
play bowls... (and) they had a good library."
The main shop itself was, by all accounts, thoroughly clean. And 
the routine of cleaning down the machines on a Saturday morning, 
described by Vic Brown, appears to have created a sense of pride 
in working at the factory:
"Every Saturday morning at 11 o'clock, the kids on the gang 
got handbrushes. They put up all the hammers, all the files, 
hacksaws, drills, everything; swept all the bench and put up 
everything. And the chargehand would come round and look at 
them. And then, before you knocked off, the foreman used to go 
all the way around and look. And everything was beautiful and 
clean. Lovely. You could eat your meal off the floor. It was
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always nice, though, Herbert's, I thought."
If the managers tried to inculcate a sense of pride through 
cleanliness of the machines - not the workers, of course - they 
were also concerned to stress the virtues of quality in Herbert 
workmanship. Probably the best illustration of this point is the 
tale about the day when the works director, Oscar Harmer, put a 
machine under the hammer. Whether fact or fable, it has entered 
into Herbert lore.*® This is how Phil Barnes related it to the 
author:
"There was a machine waiting to be delivered to a 
customer.. .and on the foot casting there was some sort of 
blow-hole - not a serious thing in itself, it wouldn't have 
affected the machine, not in five minutes.. .So, what to do 
about it? Eventually, Mr Harmer came by. ..and he said: 'That 
isn't a Herbert casting, is it?...he said, 'You know what to 
do with it, don't you?' They knew they’d got to change the 
casting, re-build the machine, strip it down, re-build...and 
test it all over again - and the customer was waiting for this 
machine."
After Harmer had left the shop, the foremen thought better of it: 
the hole was plugged and then re-painted. But, sometime later, 
when the machine was loaded on a horse and dray and being taken 
out of the works, Mr Harmer re-appeared on the scene. He hailed 
the dray to a halt and re-examined the machine. Phil continues 
the story;
"'Is that the machine we were talking about?’ Yes, they had to 
admit it was... (then /farmer) said: 'Ask Stringer to come here, 
will you?’ - Stringer was a blacksmith - 'and ask him to bring 
his sledge fianuner with him’... (When Stringer arrived, Harmer) 
took the sledge hammer and put it across the machine, a brand 
new machine, and he smashed the bed...frightened the life out 
of everybody...then he gave the hammer back to Stringer and 
said: 'That machine won’t go out now, will it?’"
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In part, Barnes' tale is a message about the irrational display 
of managerial power, the autocracy of the factory boss during 
those days. It is also a message about the superior quality of 
the Herbert product. Not surprisingly, this message was often 
reinforced through the house journal. Here is one example:
"Who doubts the individual artistry of the engineer.
If it were not so how then could he create a machine?
"Will man ultimately reach a climax to his creative ability...
"The world demands that it should be so. The machine tool puts
its demands into action.
"Herbert No22. Massive. Prodigious. Impassive.
Unparalleled. A work of art. Yes, truly a work of art.
The artist? The A.H.engineer. ",x
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Linked with the practice and ideology of quality, there was also 
the matter of safety at work. In the interviews, the claim is 
made repeatedly that Alfred Herbert was a pioneer in this regard: 
"He was one of the first, the earliest people to have a 
full-time safety engineer. He was a man who didn't care to 
take risks himself, and he wouldn’t have other people taking 
risks."»*
Not surprisingly, safety can become entangled with the issue of 
discipline, as Vic Brown found in his brush with ‘Mr Coles':
"And I (will) always remember one day. I was polishing a shaft 
up and I was looking around...He said: 'What are you doing, 
young man?’ So he called all the apprentices around, maybe 
half a dozen, and he said: 'Ah, he’s polishing a shaft. Now 
show ’em how you polish it/' Then he said: 'You wasn't doing 
it like that, you was bloody doing like thisl' And he went and 
told the chargehand off, and I got it off him...I was in tears 
nearly, you know. I was frightened to death."
Perhaps memories of incidents like this are reflected in the 
statement frequently voiced in the interviews, that discipline 
was "hard but fair".33 The general impression which emerges from 
these interviews is that, as a major engineering firm in 
Coventry, Herbert's was no worse than the others, and probably 
considerably better than most. I would suggest that there is one 
other reason for all the fond recollections of those "happy
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days". Bernard Woolly expressed it in this way:
"Veil, you're a young lad yourself, and you wouldn't 
understand...1 mean, as you get older, it doesn't matter how 
bad times were in your younger days, you had a good time..."
As youths they could enjoy a growing sense of independence from 
their parents without acquiring any parental responsibilities of 
their own. Shifting between the adult world and that of the 
child, they had a licence to indulge in practical jokes - 
sometimes with near-fatal consequence - without risking 
dismissal. Ernie Digger, for example, recalls an occasion when he 
and other apprentices overturned a fully-laden coal barge at the 
works. For that offence they were suspended from work for one 
day. The apprentices could also enjoy che routine events which 
subverted managerial authority. Bill Elliston recalls:
"The men used to have a drink of tea, but it was very 
clandestine. And, as an apprentice, I used to have to take 20 
tea cans on a big run down to the foundry and open the foundry 
and boil the tea, you know...And then you had to dodge the 
watchman who was patrolling the gangways, and carry it back to 
the men."
These reminiscences suggest that the young men did not passively 
consent to the harsher realities of their 'apprenticeship' at 
Herbert's. It was a kind of compliance or accomodation in which 
they enjoyed some immediate benefits and anticipated others (such 
as the acquisition of marketable skills). Furthermore, that
accomodation did not prevent them from participating in a factory 
sub-culture in which workers collectively and routinely subverted 
managerial authority. It is not surprising, then, that when the 
re-armament boom changed the industrial climate and encouraged 
trade unionists at Herbert's to rebuild a stewards' organisation 
that had been dormant since the Engineers Lock-Out of 1922, it 
was precisely these young men who took the lead in openly 
challenging their employer by taking part in the wave of 
apprentices' strikes which swept through the local factories in 
September 1937; though explaining this in detail would be another 
story. Now, it is time to move on to a discussion of the second 
topic of this chapter: the gang system.
The Gang System at Herbert's In the Inter-War Years
Earlier, I indicated a direct link between the "vast 
apprenticeship system" and gang piecework. As Fred Lynes put it: 
"it was a very good system in a way for the rated men if they'd 
got any apprentices". Through the oral accounts used earlier, it 
is possible to form an impression of the spread of Herbert's 
variant of gang piecework across the plant, its history and its 
politics.
During the inter-war period, management ran several, distinctly 
different payment systems at Edgwick. The clearest statement on 
this, and on the location of gang piecework at the plant, is
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provided by Phillip Banks-Price who, you may recall, began his 
apprenticeship in the patternshop in 1926:
"...where I started...there was no piecework at all. It was 
all daywork. The foundry was a bit of a mixture of piecework 
and daywork - chiefly piecework, individual piecework - there 
was no gang piecework. Then the machine shop and the fitting 
shop was all on gang piecework... "
However, the origins of Herbert's gang system can only be guessed 
at from the fragments of information at hand. Fred Lynes' 
recollections suggest Herberts operated such a system at the 
Butts as early as 1917. Davies' research found evidence to 
indicate it existed in 1899 and possibly earlier. Unfortunately, 
these chronologies fit neither of the studies of local labour 
history written by Croucher.*« From his research, Croucher 
concluded that gang piecework was first introduced in Coventry at 
Standard's Canley plant in 1922. Other local engineering firms, 
he claimed, adopted this system a few years later.*“ Friedman, 
however, found "a nascent gang system" at another local firm, 
Daimler, during the First World War. Attempts to re-impose 
individual piecework immediately after the war failed and a three 
month long ‘go-slow' by 6000 workers eventually forced management 
to formally recognise the system in 1919.*“
One possible explanation for the wide divergence between the 
evidence on Herbert's and the chronologies suggested by the two 
local studies is that Herbert's gang system may have been a form
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of internal sub-contract. But this explanation is extremely 
unlikely. By the 1890s, when the firm's expansion began, internal 
contracting was in decline, particularly in the engineering 
industries. As Littler put it: "new ideas, new methods, and new 
technology Influenced many employers to reach down for more 
control over the shopfloor." Part of that push for workshop 
re-organisation involved the introduction of piecework payment 
systems which Littler described as "a widespread attempt to 
extend petty capitalist motives to all workers". "Thus," he 
wrote, "the decay of contract systems was associated with the 
spread of collective and individual piecework." Given the earlier 
account of Herbert's emulation of 'American techniques', it would 
seem reasonable to assume that his payment system was a form of 
collective piecework.37
If this assumption is correct, then alternative explanations of 
these divergent claims have to be sought. I would suggest that 
both Croucher and Friedman simply got the chronology wrong, 
though for different reasons. Because it was marginal to his 
thesis, Croucher probably relied on some inadeguate secondary 
sources such as Pollard and Richardson.3* In Friedman's case, I 
would suggest that the error may be due to a romantic 
misconception of the politics of the gang system. He saw it as 
the product of worker-resistance, or at least, a reflection of 
their "strong position" in shopfloor politics. For though it 
could also provide solutions to "top managers' technical 
predicaments", as he put it, clearly workers had most to gain
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from a system which -
"...increased workers' direct control over productive 
activity, increased their job security, Increased their 
security against other forms of disciplinary action and 
improved their working relations with each other."99
This orientation led Friedman to make the comment that, after 
1945, the gang system was "most widespread at Standard Motors" 
which, "as a result...became better known for high wages, more 
pleasant working conditions and faster work pace." In a footnote, 
Friedman made a minor qualification to this argument. 
Occasionally, he observed, gangers transferred their loyalties 
and became, in Drayton's words, "Gaffers' men". But in this 
unhappy circumstance, the men sometimes responded by electing 
•gang stewards' who, presumably, kept the gangers in check."0
In contrast to this celebratory account of gang piecework, 
Croucher argued that whether or not the system operated to 
workers' advantage depended on the politics of each factory. In 
particular, he claimed that while Herbert's, Armstrong & 
Whitworth, and Standard were alike in that, among local 
employers, they made the most extensive use of gang piecework, at 
Herberts "the system was at its worst, from the workers' point of 
view." During his research, Croucher Interviewed old workers who 
could remember "being sworn at, threatened with the sack and even 
struck by gangers trying to extract more production."4X While my 
oral material suggests Croucher over-painted the scene, it is
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clear that the gangers, or chargehands in this case, were very 
much "Gaffers' men" at Herbert's:
"The king pin at Herbert’s was the chargehand - before we went 
on to individual piecework - and he ran the place."49
"...the chargehands were very strong, very strong indeed. They 
were the strongest element in the whole of the management."43
"Now the chargehands in the gang system were controlling their 
own interests. He took over everbody under him. If they didn't 
toe the line, they were out. He'd go to the foreman and say,
*1 don't want him.' And the foreman would sack him."44
Prom these same interviews it is possible to construct an 
impression of how the gang system worked at Herbert's.
For three weeks each month, the pieceworkers received a regular 
payment that was made up from their base-rate - usually fixed by 
the national engineering talks - plus a cost of living 
supplement. Through personal approaches to management, individual 
workers could earn a base-rate that was enhanced by a 
discretionary award. An example of this kind of favouritism is 
provided by the chargehands. During the 1930s, they usually 
received 7/6 on top of their base-rate; but particularly favoured 
ones could earn considerably more than that:
"Now, when I went to see the foreman that took over from 
Voffie Allen, and he said he couldn't do this for me and he
couldn't do that, I said: 'Veil, what about the other chaps? I 
know that Jim Berry is getting 66/- above the rate. •
"'He can’t be’, he said.
"'He is I’, I said. 'I was there when Vof ’ Allen gave it to 
him. ’ And it was right/ you see. He was a foreman; but he 
wasn't getting as much as Berry, and it hurt him a little."4*
The total sum of these base-rates within a gang was divided by 
the number of workers in that gang. This average was called the 
gang-rate and was used to calculate piecework prices for the 
gang. At the end of the month, the value of the work produced and 
the gang-rate were compared. If the gang had earned more than 
their gang-rate, the difference was paid as a gang bonus. But the 
size of the bonus was communicated to the gang as a percentage, 
and not as a sum of money, as it was shared out according to the 
base-rate of each gang member. In practice, this meant that the 
chargehand took the largest share, and the apprentice the 
smallest. So, the monthly allocation of the gang bonus was a 
regular reminder to each member that there was a hierarchy within 
the gang which was partly a product of national pay structures 
and, more importantly, a product of the chargehand's own power 
and patronage.
At one level, it is possible to describe the theory of gang 
piecework prices by saying the rate-fixer priced a job by 
relating "average effort" to the gang-rate and the chargehands 
were formally excluded from the process that determined that
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price. However, the reminiscences suggest that pay bargaining 
between the rate-fixer and the chargehand did take place. 
Banks-Price recalled:
"Well, you used to find out - but it's awfully difficult to 
find out the truth on a thing like this, you knowt They're 
very sore pointsl But I think what you could say as a general 
rule was that the piecework people would say: '»ell, alright 
Jack, I know it's a lousy job; but I'll give you a good price 
on this one here. You'll be alright. You'll get your usual 
percentage. ’ This was the way it went as far as I could see."
Phil Barnes, a rate-fixer from 1936 to 1958, confirmed that this 
process of informal negotation did take place:
"And then, at the end of the month, the rate-fixer went down 
with the chargehand into a corner of the office somewhere, and 
he'd have all the piecework tickets that'd been issued and 
signed by the inspector, and he'd say:'»as it alright at 3d a 
piece?'
'Yes, it was alright...a bit thin, it didn't give us much.* 
'»ell, why? What's the matter?'
‘Well, you can't get the tools to stand up...' or something 
like this, you see...This was your technical stuff, »ell, the 
rate-fixer would appreciate this point, and he also knew his 
man...He knew whether he was a leg-puller - which some of them 
tried to be... You knew who you were dealing with because you 
were dealing with them every day. ..'How much is it now? 3d a 
piece? Veil, I'll give you 4d. How's that?'"
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Bargaining over piecework prices was also influenced by the gang 
members' preference for stable earnings. This was tacitly 
recognised by both rate-fixer and chargehand as an imperative to 
stabilise the gang bonus.4* Leaving aside the allocation of work, 
this could only be achieved in two ways. First, the rate-fixer 
could offer a higher price on one job to compensate for a low 
price on another - in Banks-Price's words:
"Veil, alright Jack, I know it's a lousy job; but I'll give 
you a good price on this one here. (So) You'll get your usual 
percentage."
The second way by which the gang could get its "usual percentage" 
was through a kitty. Phil Barnes explained how it worked:
"Veil, you were not supposed to keep a kitty, but you 
did...You see, sometimes you'd have a thin week: the work 
wouldn't come in; it would be stuck down the end of the bay or 
somewhere. So it was very nice to have a pound or two in the 
kitty to help out...(The chargehand would) say: 'Well, we’re 
about four or five quid light on our gang this week. We had 
trouble with that machine; (it) put us back a bit.'...So, 
you'd put in some money from the kitty. The men needn't ever 
know about it. Their bonus would be the same...It was their 
money, anyhow."
This "little bit of diplomacy between chargehand and rate-fixer" 
may have played havoc with the shop scheduling system, but there 
is no evidence that it affected piece-prices or distorted labour 
costs to any significant degree. The same cannot be said of the
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various shop bonuses and merit payments that took an increasing 
share of the Edgwick's wages bill.
Banks-Price became "a sort of junior production engineer" in the 
Sub-Contract Department during the 1939-45 war. His explanation 
of the complexities involved in determining costs provides a 
glimpse of the way the system had developed between the wars:
"The prices we were allowed to offer were the piecework prices 
at Herbert's multiplied by a figure -, starting off at six, 
but it altered all the time. Don't forget the piecework price 
at Herbert's was the pre-1914 price...Then there was what we 
called 'war bonus'. Then the 'consolidation’ something or 
other - that was a percentage - then there was another 
percentage, then another percentage this, that and the 
other...It really got complicated."
These "percentages", encrusted one on top of the other, were an 
ungainly compromise between Sir Alfred's determination to keep a 
tight control over labour costs - that is why the “production 
engineers and rate-fixers had to start their calculations from 
the "pre-1914 prices" - and the growing struggle to attract and 
retain labour in a local economy which, from the mid-1930s, was 
fast becoming a “boom town'.47 From his vantage point,
Banks-Price recognised that "one of the difficulties" linked with 
the payment system was that senior management "always wanted 
production and more production, and the only way you get more 
production is by more co-operation." Under these circumstances, 
it is easy to see how the job prices became, as he put it.
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"extremely phoney". The "phoney" prices o£ this weakening 
piecework system effectively prevented management from building 
up a reliable costing system that could be used in negotiating 
with Herbert's many sub-contractors during the war. Banks-Price, 
again:
"I do know that there were some jobs that we just couldn't 
hope to get anywhere near with on the sub-contract basis. 
Nobody would look at the job. They'd say: 'You must be 
absolutely madI'"
And Bernard Wall noted similar "trouble" at Herbert's shadow, or 
'dispersal', factories:
"They found that when they moved one of the jobs from Edgwick 
to one of the dispersal factories, although the price was 
acceptable at the main works and it paid, as soon as they 
moved it, other people couldn't make it pay. ..And they was 
getting into trouble."
An additional difficulty with the gang system, as it operated at 
Herbert's, was that it seems to have encouraged some chargehands 
to regard themselves, and sometimes behave, as sub-contractors. 
This is how Bill Elliston, formerly a fitter-chargehand and now 
the owner of a medium-sized machine tool business, described his 
tasks:
"...the chargehand had control of the money, the running of 
the job, the payment. He paid the men. He had a lump sum off 
the company and, before he could make any bonus, he had to pay 
back the wages of his men to the company, if you get what I
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mean."
I believe that this self-conception of chargehand as 
sub-contractor encouraged some who, like Bill, intended to become 
employers, to practice some of the traditional fiddles of 
sub-contractors - smuggling parts out to furnish their own 
'backyard businesses'; failing to record work for small, local 
firms - before leaving Herbert's.4*
However, the gang system still retained some benefits for 
management. In particular, it continued to ensure that, on the 
question of pay at least, the employer-worker relationship would 
be mediated through that stratum of semi-supervisory workers, the 
chargehands. Since the gang was excluded from the bargaining 
process, the only way they could measure their effort against 
piecework prices was through the size of the "percentage" of the 
gang bonus. They could compare it over time:
"You would get 100% or 75%. And, of course, our bonus started 
to go right down. It was 50,40,60..
They could also compare it with the percentages earned by other 
gangs:
"their gangs got a higher bonus than us. We were producing 
about 1001, and they were on 120, 130%."*°
Not unnaturally, if they came out badly in these comparisons, the 
gang would often put the blame on the chargehands initially. 
Sometimes this kind of collective pressure encouraged some to 
bend the rules in other ways. One chargehand, Tom Batchelor 
recalls, was
"that disgusted with the amount of money that his men were 
getting in bonus that when they had half-built the machine, he 
booked it...It went on and on like this until they'd got every 
machine on the section booked in before they'd started them - 
purposely to give his men a reasonable wage. And when they 
found out, he got the sack."
From the other side, management applied its own form of pressure 
to obtain more production. As you may recall, Ron Green mentioned 
one chargehand who, he claimed, received 66/- above the rate. He 
explained:
"Jim Berry had got all the automatics, you see, that did most 
of the work on the section. And Wof' Allen's job was to see 
that the output was there. So he kept the chargehands 
happy...Now there was a bloke...on the bar lathes, and he was 
well above the rate... You could always tell who the highest 
rated chargehands were because the foreman was always having a 
natter with them.. .Now some of the chargehands were very 
placid. They wouldn't say 'Boot' to a goose...and those were 
the sort of people who weren’t on the top money, you see."
Many among the latter group of chargehands must have felt, like 
Ernie Digger, that their enhanced base-rate simply did not 
compensate for the pressure they came under from both sides:
"For that ten bob you had kicks from anything between 10 and 
20 men, plus the kicks from the foreman and the manager."
Ernie's complaint raises a major qualification to Croucher's 
accounts of intimidation by chargehands; but it does not
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contradict such evidence. Indeed, given the fact that the 
chargehand directly gained from an intensification of work, the 
payment system encouraged him to become "a bully and a sweater" 
to a degree that could easily become disfunctional for 
management.81 In a survey of payment systems at the close of the 
nineteenth century, Schloss identified the following as the "most 
objectionable results" of this form of collective piecework: the 
threat to workers' health and safety; 'scamped' work; and, where 
possible, deception as to the amount of work done.8* To avoid 
these dangers, he suggested a reasonable precaution would be to 
appoint "superior officials" who were "in receipt of fixed 
salaries", with perhaps a bonus "contingent upon the rate of 
profit realised by the business".03 In his example, these 
"superior officials" were inspectors. At Herbert's, I would 
suggest, they were foremen and the firm's large army of 
inspectors. It can also be argued that management's evident 
interest in both work safety and quality acted as powerful 
countervailing forces against those that encouraged the 'bullies 
and sweaters' among Herbert's chargehands.
If some aspects of gang piecework were disfunctional for 
management, they were obviously outweighed by considerable 
advantages since the evidence suggests that the gang system in 
the 1930s was much the same as that used in the 1890s. Pirstly, I 
would argue that it offered some of the advantages associated 
with internal sub-contracting: it was, effectively, a delegated 
mode of control which generally reduced the costs of production
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control and labour administration, and provided a route for the 
upward mobility of key workers.88 Secondly, it facilitated the 
exploitation of youth labour. Thirdly, with the necessary 
safeguards, it was a system which encouraged every man to be a 
'supervisor' to his colleagues,88 and gave the actual supervisor 
(the chargehand) a direct interest in increased production.88 
Fourthly, it was technically suited to specific elements of the 
labour process, such as fitting, where the calculation of 
individual piecework would have been "special, elaborate and 
troublesome".37 Lastly, the gang system must also have been 
linked to management's success in keeping down labour costs 
without provoking serious, oppositional activity among workers 
until the end of the 1930s - an achievement made more remarkable 
by the fact that, by then, Bdgwick was one of only 519 factories 
in Britain which employed over 1000 workers.88
Some of the possible reasons for that near-absence of 
oppositional activity were discussed earlier: workers were 
divided by the hierarchies within gangs as well as between them; 
and tensions created by a low wage policy were frequently 
mediated through the chargehands. As a continuation of this last 
point, I would suggest that management also gained because, in 
the gang system, the formal and informal systems of control 
remained united. Using Littler's argument, I would say that the 
gang system prevented a "disassociation of work groups" which 
created "the potential for the emergence of rival work-group 
leadership, such as the...shop stewards.888 I would also suggest
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that as well as discouraging the emergence o£ a shop steward 
leadership, the gang system both generated the need for and 
sustained Herbert's variant of employer paternalism.
Employer Paternalism at Herbert's
Littler argued that, in the closing decades of the nineteenth 
century, employers moved away from internal contract systems and 
piece-mastership and took direct control over labour management. 
Consequently, there were "some signs of a turning towards 
paternalistic forms of organisation between 1880 and 1914."*° 
While the tradition of paternalism in Britain was "thin and 
spasmodic", Littler wrote, the Quaker employers, such as Cadbury 
and C & J Clark, provided a new impetus to paternalistic 
practices in the 1890s and 1900s. A few, such as Cadbury, built 
model factory villages; but in this new paternalism, there was a 
shift of emphasis away "from housing and community work to a 
concern for factory amenities and working conditions."mx
However, Littler found that this new form of paternalism, or 
"welfarism", as it was sometimes called, only affected a small 
minority of firms and was confined to factories which employed 
large numbers of women and girls. "Welfarism" had a "restricted 
coverage", particularly in engineering, partly because such 
proposals provoked hostility from foremen and workers alike, 
especially skilled workers who were "saturated in values of
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self-help and staunchly resistant to dependent employment 
relationships".•* Littler also argued that this new paternalism 
was incompatible with the consequences of the introduction of 
premium bonus schemes and associated workshop changes which 
"actually increased casualisation of labour". Paternalism, he 
argued, entailed increased employment stability, as well as 
considerable concern for the non-work life of the employee.
As I mentioned earlier, at the turn of the century, Alfred 
Herbert had become a major employer. In 1903, some 900 people 
worked at his factory on Upper York Street, and by 1914, the 
workforce had more than doubled to 2000. This made the Butts 
works easily one of the largest factories in the city. In 1907, 
the largest was the Rudge-Whitworth cycle factory with a 
workforce of 1800 employees.■» Clearly, then, Herbert had the 
necessary capital to finance a kind of "welfarism".
There is also no evidence to suggest that there was "staunch 
resistance" by "self-reliant" foremen and workers. On the 
contrary, I suspect some employees positively welcomed a strong, 
paternalist management because it legitimated their own ways of 
imposing their authority over younger workers.
Similarly, there is no evidence that Herbert adopted management 
practices which led to the increased casualisation of labour, for 
example, through chaotic production planning. Given the fact that 
the company's early history was characterised by a phenomenal
growth rate, and the general view that the £irm emulated the best 
of 'American' technique, it seems likely that from those first 
years Herbert could offer stable employment to a core of his 
employees at least. As already stated, Fred Lynes claimed that 
the "competent worker" had "a job for life". For a significant 
number of employees at Herbert's this meant work well into the 
age of retirement.-4
On the basis of Littler's argument then, the essential conditions 
for "welfarism" were present at Herbert's, so it should not be 
surprising to find abundant evidence of its existence. Some of 
that material has been mentioned earlier in this chapter: 
Herbert's exceptional concern for safety at work; the light, 
clean and spacious conditions on the shopfloor; the canteen 
facilities and the abundance of recreational activities based at 
the factory's social club. However, the concept of "welfarism" 
does not adequately characterise Herbert's kind of paternalism. I 
would argue that a more relevant model is provided in Patrick 
Joyce's evocation of the paternalism of some of the major textile 
firms in Victorian Lancashire.
There was the same attempt to manage face-to-face interactions 
with employees without carrying the degree of identification too 
far, and consequently risking the legitimacy of the employer's 
authority. One simple device Herbert used, perhaps intuitively,
"to combine the aloof with the familiar"-- was his habit of 
smoking Woodbines when he visited the shopfloor. These cigarettes
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were certainly cheap; but they also signified the employer's 
authority as no one else could smoke for fear of instant 
dismissal.*" Similarly, through articles in the house journal, 
Herbert sometimes tried to claim an affinity with his employees. 
On one occasion, for example, he declared rich parents to be "an 
absolute handicap" for ambitious, young people.*T But Davies' 
research suggests that these efforts failed with some workers.
One respondent told him that Herbert "hardly ever spoke to the 
men in the shop".*• Instead, he appeared to be more comfortable 
in formal situations: attending an apprentices' prize-giving 
ceremony, for example, or an annual sports or departmental 
dinner:
"He could make a speech, include references to the 'Herbert 
Spirit', make presentations, and withdraw."m*
Some workers also recall Herbert's acts of meaness, such as the 
occasion when he was approached for a donation to a works outing: 
"Wjat he gave wouldn't have bought a packet of Woodbines, and 
they were two pence a packet."70 Another anecdote suggests an 
attitude that was perhaps more militaristic than paternalistic. 
This is how Ron Green related it to the author:
"He used to come down the shop in his little limousine.. .He 
used to come riding down.. .because the bays were wide enough." 
Then, one year, just before Christmas, *Alfie' tried to arrange 
an inspection without prior warning:
"But the managing director must have 'phoned up the works 
manager and told him that Alfie was on his way. . .The idea was
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that when Alfie came all the foremen stood at the end of the 
bays - their offices used to come at the end of the bays, you 
see. So the foreman and his deputy would have to stand there 
and...you know: 'Good morning, sir.’ Well, this particular 
morning, at the fourth office down, the foreman wasn't there.
Alfie must have taken particular note of this because the next 
thing we heard was that this bloke had got the sack. Now 
that’s how it was, you see...The foreman had to bow and scrape 
to Alt’, to a certain degree. This was before the War."
/
When considering stories such as this, it becomes clear that 
there are difficulties in contrasting, as an ideal-type, the 
paternalistic with the military-bureaucratic mode of control on 
the shopfloor because there seem to be many similarities in the 
way generals and large employers secured the ‘loyalty' of their 
subordinates. Military commanders often acted 'paternally'; and 
employers developed structures of authority which not only 
reflected military models, but were sometimes described by 
employers in military terms. For example, in Littler's book there 
is a quote from an employers' association that talked about 
foremen as NCOs.71 On occasions such as the dismissal of the 
absent foreman, Sir Alfred's conduct certainly appeared more 
militaristic than paternalistic.
All these anecdotes also convey a certain degree of hostility 
towards the founder's authority on the shopfloor. So perhaps it 
was fortunate that, from an early date, he had no involvement in
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the day-to-day management of the factory. From the turn of the 
century, that task was entrusted to Oscar Harmer, a man who, in 
Joyce's words, could be seen by the employer "as the apostle of 
his moral purpose and family spirit."**
Harmer could also be autocratic, as Phil Barnes tale about the 
blacksmith's hammer suggests; but it seems he was far more 
successful than his employer in blending the aloof with the 
familiar. One shop manager recalled that Harmer "could swear for 
ten minutes without repeating himself".T> Ernie Digger remembers 
him as "a grand old fellow."
"When he was eighty (in 1930, KG) they rapped him all the way 
round, as if he was an apprentice coming out."*"
Like the Victorian paternalists described by Joyce, Herbert also 
drew his family into personal contact with the operatives. His 
first wife, and later his daughter and son-in-law, attended 
numerous company functions. Lady Herbert's visits to the sick 
became legendary:
"any employee off ill for any length of time - from the works 
manager to the lowest labourer - Sir Alfred and Lady Herbert 
got to know about it... (and) Lady Herbert used to go around 
visiting the sick."*"
After her death, the factory surgery was dedicated to the memory 
of this "mother of the firm", as she was called by the local
press.
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There is also some slender evidence that Herbert provided housing 
for some of his operatives at Edgwick,TT though nothing 
comparable to the scale of Saltalre, Ripleyville or Akroyden.-*- 
Herbert did not try to physically reconstitute an entire 
community. But Davies' research indicates that something close to 
a factory community, created through proximity to the works, 
family recruitment, the range of recreational and educational 
activities organised through the Alfred Herbert Institute, and 
Lady Herbert's involvement in the local church bazaars. He also 
tried, like earlier paternalists, to impress his image on the 
local community through ‘good works': the gift of land at the 
Butts, Lady Herbert's Garden and Town Thorns School; donations to 
Coventry and Warwickshire Hospital and towards the building of 
the Herbert Art Gallery and Museum; and lastly, his patronage of 
educational awards.T-
Sir Alfred's inner motives are a matter of speculation; but it is 
likely that his form of paternalism was grounded in 
self-interest. First, as I have argued, the evident concern over 
safety and working conditions at the plant acted as a 
countervailing force against the ‘sweating' tendencies of the 
firm's gang system. Second, like previous generations of 
employers,*° Herbert probably calculated that all these acts of 
benevolence would be a strong antidote to trade unionism. In his 
writings and speeches, his views on trades unions seemed 
ambivalent;-1 but through his actions, his employees were left in 
no doubt that he was "not a lover of unions".-- For example, in
1901 his managers purged a small number of ASE activists after a 
brief dispute over fines for lateness.•* On another occasion, 
eight years later, trade unionists learnt they were barred 
employment in the Inspection Department."4 And, in addition to 
these overt acts of hostility, the managers used more subtle 
means to harass union activists. Bill Elliston, formerly a 
chargehand, recalls:
"If you were seen talking to, divulging any secrets to, the 
union men, it was frowned on; and you had to rely on 
management because if you fell out with management you 
wouldn’t get a good run of machines and they could kill you 
financially. So you became part of the management team, see?"
A possible third motive was financial. As Joyce has observed, 
paternalism could be made to pay for itself: the employer's 
benevolence was sustained by the long hours and low pay of its 
supposed beneficiaries."* It had been demonstrably successful for 
large, capitalist employers during the nineteenth century and,"" 
until the inter-war period, a coherent alternative was absent in 
British management theory."T
You may also recall that Littler characterised the British 
tradition of employer paternalism as "thin and spasmodic". It can 
be argued that while this description is broadly true, it 
under-estimates the strength of that tradition among Coventry's 
employers until the Second World War. Shortly after his arrival 
in the city, Herbert would have learnt about the history of
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paternalist innovations by employers such as Joseph Cash, Eli 
Green and A.E.Fridlander; and, among his contemporaries, he had 
the example of M.Bettman, J.D.Siddeley, and not least J.Black.•• 
In addition to his measures on health and safety, in 1936 Black 
introduced a non-contributory pension scheme for Standard's 
shopfloor workers before he had even thought of doing the same 
for his fellow executives. (Given Herbert's deep and personal 
antipathy towards him, this innovation may haveprodded Herbert 
into setting up, and then granting a large donation to, a staff 
pension scheme of his own.)
The inter-war period witnessed the rapid concentration of British 
capital. Giant conglomerates began to dominate the industrial 
landscape. These organisations provided the material basis for 
the emergence of new management theories, such as the 
rationalisation movement, and neo-Taylorite business 
consultancies of which Bedaux was the most well-known example.•• 
But it seems that employer paternalism persisted in Coventry. I 
would argue that this was the product of the city's unusual 
circumstances. Coventry became in turn the centre of two new 
industries - cycle and motors - which were created by small, 
family businesses and based on an empirical technology. The 
successful firms rapidly expanded and concentration of capital 
took place; but the familial management structure remained intact 
in many companies and the traditional response to size - 
paternalism - seemed adequate.
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In a discussion of Herbert's paternalism, especially one based on 
oral material, there is a danger of mistaking the myth for 
reality. It is doubtful, for example, that the "mother of the 
firm" visited all the chronically-ill employees (especially after 
the family's move to Hampshire in the late 1920s). And the 
treatment received by one apprentice, after he had been 
hospitalised as a result of an industrial accident, suggests 
something less than a 'paternal' concern by the employer's 
agents. Tom Batchelor recalls that when the youth returned to 
work he was offered money and asked to sign a paper:
"Any road, he signed this paper and they gave him his pay 
packet, and there was 7/6 in it, and this 7/6 was payment for 
him signing that to relieve the company for all responsibility 
for the accident. Now, he didn't know that. He didn't know 
until he got it home and showed the copy to his father."
Similarly, the accounts of veteran employees who "died in 
harness" have to be balanced with eye-witness accounts of 
dismissals for minor infringements of discipline, and evidence of 
the forced departure of many youths after completion of their 
training.
There is also good reason to suspect Davies' evocation of the 
factory community. Firstly, his account blurs over the fact that 
until the late-1920s, there were two factory sites some two miles 
apart in Coventry. Secondly, and more importantly, it takes no 
account of the instability of such "communities" from the turn of
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the century caused by the city's phenomenal population growth»0 
and the development of passenger transportation which transformed 
thousands of agricultural labourers from the surrounding 
districts into industrial commuters.»1 "It was the tram and the 
bicycle, much more than the railway," wrote Joyce, "that 
liberated the factory worker from the domination of the 
territorial. The link between home and work remained firm until 
these severed it"."* Thirdly, local state politics in the 
twentieth century effectively limited Herbert's involvement in 
the "community". Like previous generations of employers, Herbert 
treasured the ambition of becoming a councillor. But if factory 
politics seemed unchanged, this was clearly not the case with 
politics outside the gates. Party politics were becoming visibly 
linked to a kind of class politics; and this seems to have 
discouraged nearly all of the large, local employers - not only 
Herbert - from becoming councillors, as such involvement 
threatened their efforts to create a class-less image of 
themselves.**
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, it should not be assumed 
that Herbert's image of himself as ‘patriarch' was reciprocated 
by a uniformly ‘deferential' workforce. One of the more serious 
weaknesses of Joyce's account of employer paternalism in 
Victorian Lancashire is that it dwells too much on the employer's 
self-image and then reads from it - seeking support mainly from 
records of workers' public conduct before management and 
ambivalent electoral data - the opposite image of the
‘deferential’ worker without exploring the extent and depth to 
which factory workers shared their employer's values, as well as 
the intensity and range of dissenting beliefs.*4 Leaving aside 
the presence of trade union activists - the subject of the next 
chapter - there is some evidence of ‘dissenting beliefs' among 
other workers. Several examples have been quoted already: the 
complaints about the employer's austerity and meaness, and the 
evasion of responsibility in the case of one industrial accident. 
One interview suggests that sometimes Herbert's patriarchal image 
was cynically appraised by his employees. Jim Sephton, one of the 
small number of apprentices who became a senior manager at 
Herbert's, remembers an occasion during the 1930s when Sir Alfred 
summoned his staff to announce his decision to start a staff 
pension scheme. After informing his audience of his intention to 
contribute several thousand pounds to this new fund, he sat down 
and waited for some acknowledgement of his benevolence, a vote of 
thanks at least. Instead, the room fell silent. Everyone, Jim 
recalls, was busily trying to work out the boss's ‘angle' on the 
gift. After an awkward silence, Herbert rose and left the 
meeting. Later, staff were informed that he had decided to 
withdraw the scheme because of their apparent ingratitude. 
(Subsequently, he changed his mind once more, and introduced the 
scheme as planned.)*8 Of course, it is virtually impossible to 
know how far attitudes expressed by former employees in the 1980s 
reflect those felt half a century before. But if these dissenting 
views had some substance then, I would argue that they reflected 
both the particular and general circumstances which lessened
workers' dependence on the employer. For adult male workers with 
skills that were not locked into the firm's internal labour 
market, and for adolescent trainees who were free of family 
responsibilities, for example, employer paternalism had little 
tcrit; and for all but the oldest employees, the re-armament boom 
from the mid-1930s must have reduced, very considerably, their 
fear of dismissal.
Conclusions
Key features of Herbert's labour management policies locked 
together to provide a stout defence against the development of a 
shop stewards' organisation inside Edgwick's engineering shops. 
The "vast apprenticeship system" provided the means to reproduce 
a core of skilled workers embued with the 'Herbert Spirit', to 
produce a constantly shifting population of semi-skilled workers 
and, through the gang system, to offer the 'rated men' 
opportunities to increase their earnings at the expense of their 
younger colleagues. Despite the ravages of time, the gang system 
continued to ensure that Herbert's low-wage policy was mediated 
through a stratum of semi-supervisory workers who also held 
together the formal and informal systems of control. Lastly, 
Herbert's conscious efforts to develop a paternalistic style of 
management provided countervailing pressures against the worst 
excesses of the gang system and created an ideologically hostile 
environment for trade union activists. Nonetheless, 'dissenting 
beliefs' survived and as re-armament transformed Coventry into
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the tightest concentration of light engineering in the country, 
created systematic and excessive overtime at Edgwick and still 
brought hundreds of immigrants and youths flooding into the 
factory, a few workers decided it was time they extended the shop 
stewards' organisation beyond the craft enclave of the 
patternshop.
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CHAPTER FIVE: HERBERT'S AT WAR.
Introduction
Having recognised both the obstacles to effective organisation 
and, at the same time, the sources of union-based opposition on 
the shopfloor, this chapter attempts to chart the development of 
the stewards' organisation at Edgwick from 1930 to the end of the 
1940s. While the chapter has a chronological order, I have not 
sought to provide an exhaustive and critical history of workplace 
politics at Herbert's during that period (a useful project that 
must be left to other researchers). Instead, I have focused on 
four episodes: the re-emergence of a workplace organisation 
outside the enclaves of craft labour in the patternshop during 
the 1930s; the lull in union activity during the period from the 
Phoney War to the People's War, covering the years 1939-41; the 
period of consolidation during the "heyday of the Communist 
engineer" in the years 1942-43; and, lastly, the shop stewards' 
struggle to survive peacetime conditions. These four episodes 
provide a broad history of the entire period and, more 
importantly, raise issues which I intend to consider in greater 
detail, and within a longer historical span, in later chapters.
The Re-Emergence of a Stewards' Organisation
Hard tiroes: 1922-32
After the 1922 Lock-Out, trade union organisation at Herbert's 
was pushed back to the craft enclave in the patternshop.x In the 
machine shops, fitting shops and toolroom - then located at the 
Butts - the ASE shop stewards' organisation collapsed and what 
membership remained appeared thoroughly intimidated by the 
company's determination to assert "management's functions" and 
impose severe wage cuts in line with the objectives of the 
Engineering Employers' Federation.*
The survival of the patternmakers' shopfloor organisation was 
perhaps unremarkable. Situated in splendid isolation at Edgwick, 
on the northern perimeter of the city, the patternshop was small; 
their work remained exceptionally skilled; and the UPA's district 
organisation still retained some authority in local industrial 
politics. The contrast with the toolroom, that other enclave of 
craft labour, was stark.
The AEU's district organisation was demoralised: many of its 
activists had been victimised, and its membership more than 
halved. In February 1923, the DC Secretary reported that 
membership had fallen from nearly 14000 in 1920 to 5900.* In 
comparison to the patternshop which employed less than 30 
workers, Herbert's toolroom was vast. When management transferred
the main works to its Edgvick site in 1928, the toolroom came to 
occupy two large bays within the Heavy Machine Shop and employed 
over two hundred workers. Also unlike the patternshop, the 
toolroom was not an exclusive centre of craft excellence. To a 
certain degree, management had succeeded in routinising and 
de-skilling toolroom work and this was reflected in the 
composition of the shop's labour force. There was a core of 
skilled toolmakers, probably no more than 60, who were involved 
in proto-type or one-off jobs and left very much to themselves to 
organise their work on a day-to-day basis. Many more workers did 
small-batch jobs, producing tooling for the firm or its clients. 
Lastly, there were some operatives, usually ‘boys', who performed 
semi-skilled operations on capstan lathes and drilling machines 
and who came under particularly close supervision. The size of 
Herbert's toolroom and the diversity of its skills inevitably 
assisted management's resistance to paying the toolroom rate - 
even during the 1914-18 Var when there was some semblance of a 
shop stewards' organisation at the Butts. At the beginning of the 
1930s, when management imposed wage cuts again and short-time 
working, the membership of the AEU (formerly the ASE) - already 
weak and scattered across the plant - must have diminished even 
further. The District Committee (DC) had to depend on its branch 
organisation to be kept informed of pay and working conditions at 
Edgwick, and if the union possessed any kind of collective 
presence on the shopfloor it had a clandestine character. Almost 
invariably the union's district officials had to negotiate with 
works management on their own, over the few grievancies that were
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brought to the DC's attention during this period, largely, I 
suspect, because of fear of victimisation. Certainly, this had 
been the case in 1924 when the DC felt obliged, after hearing a 
report on the introduction of female workers at Herbert's, to 
"urge all members not only to give Information to the Secretary 
but to protest inside the shops in accordance with (the) 
Agreement";4 and there is nothing in the records to suggest that 
matters had improved much eight years later. For example, in June 
1932, when the DC decided to approach Herbert's to "secure such 
adjustments on (the price of the) Ho2 S as were required", it 
appears that the district officials had to enter negotiations on 
their own." But if some people kept their union membership "dark" 
at work," this did not prevent others from playing a more 
conspicuous role in politics outside the factory.
Commenting on Labourism in Coventry during the 1930s, Hinton 
observed that, though most leaders of the Labour Party were, or 
had been, engineering workers, when Labour finally captured power 
on the City Council in 1937 there was little link between Labour 
politics and life in the factories.7 Herbert's proved no 
exception to this "Labourist fracture".
In 1933, while the AEU members at Edgwick continued to negotiate 
with management by proxy and "everything was done under-handed 
like",* one of the toolroom workers became Coventry's first 
Labour Mayor." 'Tommy' Harris was then nearly 68 years old and 
had worked in Herbert's toolroom since 1903. In one way, his
achievements were a reflection of the weakness of trade unionism 
at Herbert's (and also, of course, at other local engineering 
factories). Municipal politics offered an escape from the 
oppressive regime of the factory.10 But it is probable that 
Harris' achievements as a councillor also may have been secured 
at the expense of the union's position in the plant. I have no 
direct evidence to establish this point. However, it seems a 
reasonable interpretation to impose on the remarks made on the 
occasion of Harris' retirement in 1940. The works director 
described Tommy as "a staunch trade unionist" who had "always 
proved a steady Influence on the works". In his reply, Harris, by 
then an alderman and magistrate, said how deeply indebted he felt 
for being allowed to carry on his civic work. The fact that his 
employer had allowed him to perform his duties as a councillor 
even though their views may not have coincided was, Alderman 
Harris said, "an example of the great heritage of liberty which 
we as a nation enjoyed".xx "Tommy" could have spoken of Sir 
Alfred as a "rare example” of that heritage for, during the 
1930s, the Co-op was virtually the only other employer in 
Coventry that allowed Labour activists time off to carry out 
Council business.1*
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The Arcos contract: 1932-36
Herbert's was among the first engineering firms in Coventry to 
recover from the inter-war trade depression, largely as a result
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of the Soviet Union's industrialisation programme. In 1932, the 
company secured a major contract from Arcos, a Soviet trading 
agency, which immediately brought an end to short-time working at 
Edgwick and quickly restored systematic overtime.1* Bill Elliston 
recalls:
"As an apprentice, short-time didn't affect me; but for the 
ordinary men, the skilled men, there was one week in and a 
fortnight out, you know. And there was no supplementary 
benefit and things like that...Times were really hard. And 
then the Russians came along in 1932, and they bought up 
every bit of stock that Herbert's had got...And from that day 
on we never looked back. We went on full overtime. It was 
eight in the morning until eight at night, Saturday mornings 
until 12."x4
Very soon even "full overtime" was not enough to meet the Russian 
delivery d a te s . M o r e  labour was needed; much more. In 1921, the 
firm employed 2700 workers; by 1930, the nadir of the depression, 
it had probably slumped to 2000; five years later, the workforce 
had nearly doubled to 3700; and by 1938 it had risen to 4500.14
Initially, these conditions may not have favoured union 
organisation. Rising wages and plentiful overtime in a period 
when many engineering factories in the district remained on 
short-time were likely to have suggested the relative advantage 
of employment at Herbert's rather than underlined the need for 
organisation. But within two years, the AEU district officials.
through the union's branch network, could sense the stirrings of 
discontent that were slowly shifting factory politics in their 
favour.
In the previous chapter I tried to show that, during the 
inter-war period, factory politics at Herbert's created a 
particularly hostile environment to the development of a shop 
stewards' organisation because of the strength of the firm's 
variant of employer paternalism and the delegated control 
exercised through the piecework gang system. However, some of the 
supports for that regime must have been dislodged by the flood of 
new workers into the plant.
There can be little doubt that many of the hundreds of local 
youths Herbert's recruited as trainees during the early 1930s did 
not feel especially grateful to the firm for their jobs. Bernard 
Woolly was one such youth. When he left school in 1933, his 
father fixed him up with a job at Daimler. For a few months 
Bernard spent his time "running errands", then he was put on "an 
old tub grinder" and "stuck that" that until Christmas, when he 
got a job at Herbert's.
"So I’d be 14 at the time. And I left there when I was 17.
And then I went to Singer. And from there to Siddeley.. .And
from there I went to Morris."x7 
Unlike Vic Brown, who was recruited as a craft apprentice at 
about the same time, Bernard's comments on his time at Herbert's 
betrayed little trace of gratitude. As far as he was concerned,
his time at Herbert's simply provided him with a passport to all 
the other firms in Coventry - hardly the attitude to keep 
employer paternalism alive.
The flood of new workers also included immigrants from the 
depressed regions of the country. Undoubtedly, as Zeitlin 
observed of the Welsh migrants who sought employment in Oxford's 
motor industry,1* many brought with them "well-developed trade 
union traditions" which contributed to an anti-boss consciousness 
at the plant. (In 1940, Herbert's works director felt that he 
could legitimate his resistance to the formation of a Joint 
Production Committee by telling the shop stewards "there were 
many men who appeared to have no faith in the management".1-9) 
There is strong evidence in workers' recollections of this period 
to suggest that, as Zeitlin also observed in the case of the 
motor industry, these same migrants played "an important role in 
the revival of union organisation in the 1930s".90 For example, 
Harry Marston, a migrant himself, gained his place on the TGVU's 
district committee through the sponsorship of a Bradford man,
Bro. Poole, a detail inspector at Herbert's.*1 Vic Brown, a local 
lad who was persuaded to become a shop steward by Harry, recalls: 
"As you know, the union wasn't very strong, and then these 
men came down from the North, from Yorkshire and Lancashire: 
the Isherwoods, Harry Marston...Reg Williams came from 
Wales."99
Just outside the Edgwick works, the Vauxhall Working Hen's Club 
provided the venue for the Vauxhall AEU Branch which probably
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provided the most important organisational focus, off-premises, 
for Herbert workers. Not surprisingly, this branch was started by 
"the two Isherwood brothers".2J Given the scale of recruitment 
that took place during the 1930s, I should think the experienced 
trade unionists were able to form a core of activists among the 
migrant workers. But their appeal would not have been limited to 
such workers. I have no doubt these new shopfloor activists were 
assisted by a continuing sense of vulnerability felt by skilled 
workers at the plant.
In his review essay on the emergence of shop stewards' 
organisation in the British car industry, Zeitlin observed that: 
"where skilled workers found themselves fighting what they 
believed to be a losing battle against employers, they might turn 
towards an alliance, temporary or permanent, with the less 
skilled.""* In this instance, I do not think the skilled 
machinists and fitters saw themselves in a losing battle with 
Herbert's; but, unlike the patternmakers, they must have been 
very conscious of their weak bargaining position and the need for 
an alliance with the less skilled. This, I think, was especially 
true for the majority of the toolmakers. However, the only direct 
evidence of this alliance appears in the DC minutes which provide 
some interesting data on the background of Edgwlck's first AEU 
shop stewards. After the toolroom and reconditioning departments 
elected their shop stewards, workers in the "Factory" met next. A 
broad range of skills were represented at that meeting, including 
grinders, capstan operators, fitters, tool store workers and
labourers. In December 1936, when the AEU stewards met and chose 
their senior stewards, I think it is significant that a toolroom 
worker, Bert Horton, was elected convenor, and A.J.Mills, a 
miller in the Factory, was elected secretary.
Reminiscences about the organisational activities of some migrant 
workers and evidence of a resistance to the ideology of employer 
paternalism among some of the other new workers convey the 
impression that the shop stewards' organisation developed 
autonomously at workplace level. This interpretation of events is 
also supported by a number of academic studies, such as Zeitlin's 
account of the motor industry and Croucher's comments on the 
engineering industry in the period of re-armament.*® The minutes 
of the AEU's District Committee, however, suggest a very 
different story. These records lend themselves to the argument 
that the shopfloor organisation which re-emerged at Herbert's was 
largely the product of the DC's recruitment drive, assisted by 
management's anxiety to meet the delivery dates for the Arcos 
contract and avoid a confrontation with the unions that could 
isolate the firm within the employers' federation.
In this alternative account, the struggle to re-build a shop 
stewards' organisation at Herbert's began in 1934. In June of 
that year, chargehand members met district officials to answer 
the charge that they had been "bribed" with higher base rates to 
accept certain price cuts. Whatever the substance of the 
allegations, the minutes indicate that the chargehands felt
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obliged to promise to "help the Society in Propaganda".*" The 
same minutes also record the firm's argument that systematic 
overtime was necessitated by the delivery dates imposed by the 
Russian contract. Over the next two years, the district officials 
continued to exploit such grievancies as rare opportunities to 
pursue a recruitment drive. In November, 70 workers attended a 
meeting to discuss "the extension of female labour and other 
matters", namely overtime and gang piecework prices.** The same 
issues were aired at two more meetings held a month later. There 
followed a lull for a year. Then, in June 1936, after receiving
/reports on meetings with chargehands and inspectors, the DC 
instructed its officers to convene a meeting of the "Big Machine 
Shop". In July, it was informed that only 50 had attended and so 
the meeting was adjourned to a Saturday lunch-hour at the end of 
the month. One DC member volunteered to take "handbills... inside 
the shop and see that they were effectively used".*• At this 
adjourned meeting, "a Sub-Committee was appointed to arrange 
details of Sections requiring Stewards and then to take 
nominations from those sections."**
This marked the breakthrough. From this point it seems that a 
core of activists on the shopfloor, essentially the 
"Sub-Committee", was able to take direct control of the 
recruitment and organisation. Through the autumn months, this 
"Sub-Committee" quietly pursued its work until it was able to 
convene a series of "propaganda meetings" in November. First, 
workers in the toolroom and re-conditioning departments elected
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five shop stewards.30 A week later three shop stewards were 
elected in the fitting shop.31 After a gap of a fortnight, eleven 
were elected to represent a diverse membership in the "Factory 
Department" including skilled workers in the fitting shop and 
tool stores, semi-skilled capstan and auto operators, and 
labourers.33 Finally, a week later, two stewards were elected in 
the main machine shop.33 There is no evidence that management 
actively sought to block these developments on the shopfloor. On 
the contrary, when the AEU presented its list of the shop 
stewards, Herbert's acknowledged their credentials within a 
matter of days.34
It is likely that the truth of the matter lies somewhere between 
these conflicting emphases on internal and external stimulation 
in the development of the shop committee. Obviously, much 
depended on developments within the workplace; but, as Tolliday 
observed in his research on shopfloor organisation in the British 
car industry, the growth of workplace organisation also depended 
"crucially on the policies, and organisational structures of 
unions and on managerial strategies".39
"Youth Makes History"3"
The available evidence suggests that the new shop stewards were 
relatively young men. George Smith was about 28 years old when he
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was elected shop steward at that inaugural meeting of Herbert's 
AEU members.*7 Vic Brown became a shop steward as soon as he came 
out of his time.*" Tom Batchelor claims he was elected at 19 
years of age.*" Not surprisingly, it seems that they had most 
success in recruiting among their contemporaries. Ron Green can 
recall that even when management recognised the union, "there was 
still a lot that wasn't in, and they'd been there for years"*0 
and Vic Brown clearly recollects that:
"It was usually the older ones, the old timers, who wouldn't 
join the union. Blokes my age who were round about 22, 23 and 
24, up to 35 (would join); but the old blokes, they would 
never join the union."*3-
Significantly, while these relatively young shop stewards were 
still "feeling their feet a bit" in factory politics, building up 
membership by "underhanded ways", one of the first issues they 
addressed was the question of the rates for individual "young 
journeymen".*3 (Some members had complained that when they came 
out of their time, as craft apprentices, they received less than 
the rate fixed by the young Journeyman's Agreement which governed 
pay for the first year after apprenticeship and was itself less 
than the full rate for a skilled worker). But the shop stewards 
did not anticipate that even younger workers would make a direct 
contribution to the development of the workplace organisation at 
Herbert's.
National pay agreements had widened the gap between adults and
apprentices in the mid-1930s,4S and cany young workers were 
conscious of their exploitation by employers during this period. 
In Croucher's words, these and other grievancies brought "workers 
previously thought to be among the most 'backward• sections of 
the working class exploding into incandescent militancy".44 The 
Apprentice Strike of 1937 began on the Clyde in March that year.
A series of stoppages then followed in April and May, and though 
they were confined to Scotland, their reverberations were felt in 
Coventry. For example, in April a deputation of young workers 
from Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft complained to the DC that "many 
youths with experience were being called upon to teach (new) men 
who were getting three of four times the amount of money";4* and 
through the summer the DC continued to receive reports on 
apprentices' grievances - including one from the shop stewards at 
Herbert's.4* Then a second wave of strikes took place in 
September and October. It started in Salford, but quickly spread 
to engineering factories in Coventry.
At the beginning of October, Bert Horton reported to the DC that 
at a regular Wednesday meeting, held for "Propaganda" or 
recruitment purposes, "boys turned up in such numbers that the 
room was inadequate and the meeting turned into a Boys Meeting".
A six-strong delegation - composed equally of apprentices and 
"non-indentured boys" - was elected to put their demands for 
higher pay to management. After the anticipated rebuff, "the 
whole of (the) boys walked out of the shop at 11.30am on Friday" 
and Horton himself "called a meeting of the Stewards at the
dinner hour on Saturday to organise support for the Boys".*"7 The 
managers' response was characteristic. They refused to meet a 
deputation while the strike continued and asked the chargehands 
to encourage a return to work - even "to the extent of personal 
visits to the boys' homes".** Despite this kind of paternalist 
intimidation, the strike remained firm. Indeed, at the meeting 
when the DC called for a district-wide return to work on 18 
October, Horton had tabled a resolution that the strike continue 
until all the demands had been satisfied.4*
The action taken by the apprentices and trainees at Herbert's can 
be seen as a reflection of a growing confidence among the young 
workers; a realisation that they could safely challenge 
management's power and ignore the jeremiahs among their seniors: 
"Most of the back chat was from the older ones: 'You bloody 
fools!• and that, you know. You see, they lived through a 
depression and always had a job, and that made them 
thankful"90
Sometimes that confidence was expressed through more 
individualistic activities as Vic, a member of the "boys'" strike 
committee, can recall in the case of one of his workmates:
"And he got into trouble ’cause there was a strike on and he 
went touring round Vales, and half way through the week we 
went back to work and he didn't know."
Perhaps Vic's mate was caught out because he had not anticipated 
the strength of the city-wide campaign which forced the local
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engineering employers' association to concede quickly to the 
strike demands. In Croucher's account, the EBA conceded increases 
of between one and three shillings per week and trade union 
recognition. At Herbert's, the apprentices wrung 1/3 from their 
management. It was a small gain, but a great victory which gave 
the other workers clear proof that the character of factory 
politics was changing decisively in their favour especially as it 
came shortly after management's recognition of the toolroom.
Management's consistent refusal to pay the toolroom rate was one 
of the first issues the newly-formed shop stewards' committee 
decided to tackle. This was hardly surprising. The toolroom was 
the first shop to organise, and one of its shop stewards was 
subsequently elected convenor. A group of skilled workers in 
another department, the factory tool stores, had a vested 
interest in this issue as they also wanted to claim toolroom 
rate. But it was not just a sectional question. It was also seen 
as a test of the credibility of the shop stewards' organisation 
and one which the district officials were determined to see come 
to a successful conclusion. So it was significant that victory 
(of a sort) came relatively quickly. The issue was first raised 
by the shop stewards in December 1936. After a Local Conference 
in May 1937, management agreed to recognise the toolroom. But it 
was not an unqualified triumph. The agreement was applied to "all 
men except Capstan Operators and Drillers" and "new men with no 
previous experience of Tools" who would be given a month's trial 
before being considered for the rate."1 Nonetheless, the speed
with which this agreement was reached must have provided a fillip 
to the shop stewards in their efforts to organise the plant.
After their success over the toolroom and the "boys'" strike, the 
shop stewards must have taken up a whole range of issues, and 
sometimes with equal if not more success, but very little is said 
of these activities either in the DC's minutes or in workers' 
recollections. One exception to this is the vexed question of 
workers who accepted jobs at Edgwick that were under the district 
rate. A few cases were brought to the DC's attention which then 
responded by demanding the removal of these "non-ers". But I 
suspect that most cases were dealt with in the way Ron Green 
responded to one worker's complaint:
"Well, this particular fellah come in on the fitting. He 
hadn’t been there a month when he came to me and said,'I'm 
working under rate and the bloke next to me is getting the 
rate. I'm getting 38/-.' I said, 'You knew the rate for the 
job and you started at 38/-?' He said, 'Yes, I wanted a job.' 
I said, 'You've got one.'"
Such cases were a frequent and painful reminder to the shop 
stewards of the limitations of their achievements thus far. On 
the positive side of unionism at Herbert's, nothing is recalled 
until the summer of 1938 when the shop stewards broke the smoking 
ban.** Initially, they gained no more than two half-hour periods 
each day;** but it clearly meant a lot to the people I 
interviewed as it was recalled by all who worked on the shopfloor 
at that time.
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It is not too far-fetched to argue that, in terms of factory 
politics, this concession symbolised a kind of coming of age for 
both the workers and the shop stewards' committee. Smoking, as a 
social habit, had long been associated with ideas of adulthood 
and, in a particular way, this association was carried through 
into the harsh regime of inter-war factory politics. Smoking at 
work, like smoking at school, could only be performed publicly by 
figures of authority: the subordinates were compelled to smoke in 
the toilets. A violation of this rule could mean instant 
dismissal. Herbert's was no exception. On the contrary, one 
strand of its paternalism - the myth of Sir Alfred "cadging 
Woodbines" from his employees - reinforced the same message: 
while the "paternal" employer smoked his employees' cheap 
cigarettes, the "lads" had to look on. If this interpretation is 
correct, then it is hardly surprising that some shop stewards saw 
the concession on smoking periods as a marvellous recruiting 
sergeant for the union.
"I think there was about 17 in the union when I joined...17 
fitters. And then overnight it became - when they got this 
smoking concession -it suddenly lept to about 60% on the 
fitting. It was quick. It was a rush...I remember they were 
queueing up on the stairs (at the Vauxhall WMC) to Join the 
union...That was Isherwood; he was behind all that. They 
really had a good push."9*
The smoking concession was seen as a particularly important
breakthrough for the trade union activists at Herbert's; but I do 
not believe Isherwood, or any of the shop stewards, would suggest 
that it entirely explained their recruitment successes. It was 
another concession which greatly enhanced their credibility among 
their colleagues; but it came at a favourable moment, for within 
the workplace, changing conditions were providing a seedbed for 
union organisation. Since 1932 there had been "excessive and 
systematic overtime" and after September 1938 those long hours 
had to be worked under artificial light as management imposed 
blackout conditions.”  There were complaints about "dilution" as 
more women were recruited onto the shopfloor and semi-skilled 
workers put onto jobs customarily done by skilled men; and also 
complaints about working conditions. In effect, workers at 
Herbert's were experiencing the re-armament "boom" at least four 
years before most engineering factories in Coventry. From 1936, 
when UK defence orders generalised the "boom" and transformed the 
city into the tightest concentration of light engineering in the 
country,”  union recruitment at Edgwick was undoubtedly assisted 
by the consequent changes in industrial politics outside the 
plant: the tightening labour market, the growing mood of 
self-confidence and militancy among shopfloor activists.®7
Compared to the activities of the shopfloor organisations at the 
aircraft factories, such as the Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft 
plant at Baginton, these achievements appear unremarkable. But, 
given the character of production at Edgwick - which in some ways 
could be better compared to the larger motor firms than the
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aircraft industry - they were no poorer than those secured at 
some of the other major engineering firms in Coventry at that 
time, such as Armstrong Siddeley Motors, Humber and Riley, and 
considerably better than some, such as Singer, Carbodies, BTH and 
G E C . T h i s  is rather different from the view that comes through 
Croucher's account of the gang system in Coventry where Herbert's 
is placed at the opposite end of the spectrum to Standards.I 
would suggest that one reason why this writer exaggerated the 
"backwardness" of factory politics at Edgwick is that he was 
uncritical in his use of the comments of Herbert veterans. These 
men, like Ernie Digger who claimed that Herbert's was the last to 
recognise its toolroom, tended to compare their experience of 
unionism with the image of Standards as the model of factory 
politics in Coventry's engineering industry. Their views should 
be balanced with those of Bernard Woolley, who worked at Daimler, 
Singer, Morris' and elsewhere. He commented that "the only place 
I've known the union strong is Triumph, Canley (the Standard 
plant - KG)".
Popular Front politics at Herbert's
Most workers' reminiscences on trade unionism at Herbert's also 
give a misleading impression of the politics of the early 
activists. Vic Brown, for example, who became a shop steward 
during the war, commented:
"But once it was started, it was never what you would call a 
'hot-shop', never; never anything hot-headed or anything like 
that."
Similarly, only one worker recalled that the first AEU convenor 
was Bert Horton - others named Nixon or Harr - who, if he was not 
exactly "hot-headed" (whatever that meant), was both an unusually 
active trade unionist (in January 1940, he was elected as one of 
the two shop steward representatives to serve on the DC)"° and a 
leftist. On one occasion he moved a resolution which demanded 
that "arms made will not be used to help Fascist states destroy 
Democratic peoples in Europe";•*■ and I would suggest that his 
influence was instrumental in the shop stewards' decision to bar 
a "Fascist Leader" from AEU membership."3 It is, of course, 
possible to exaggerate the significance of both actions. After 
all, the revival of trade unionism at Herbert's took place at a 
time when the politics of the Popular Front enjoyed broad support 
in the labour movement, and even right-wing Labour leaders were 
prepared to pay lip-service to it by supporting leftist 
resolutions. The action against the fascist may have been largely 
provoked by himself. Tom Batchelor claims "Frank Massinguard", 
who worked on his section though, significantly, on the 
night-shift, was "the leader of the Coventry Union of Fascists". 
Nonetheless, the bar on Frank's membership betokens more than 
‘resolution mongering'. The shop stewards' decision had to be 
defended at the DC; and I know of no similar controversies caused 
by AEU leftists elsewhere in Coventry during this period. (After 
his protest, "Frank Massinguard" decided to seek a new life, and
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possibly a new identity, elsewhere. Tom Batchelor recalls that 
when the war started, the fascist left Herbert's and "went to 
Australia".)
TGWU gain a •toe-hold' at Herbert's
Until a few months before the War, the story of the revival of 
shopfloor organisation at Herbert's was essentially a story of 
the AEU. The second major union in Coventry, the TGWU, had 
members at Edgwick from the early 1930s if not before; and yet it 
seems that they chose to keep a very low profile until the end of 
1938. It is difficult to understand why this was so unless, as it 
appears from what little information is available, the union's 
district organisation had tacitly accepted Edgwick was part of 
the AEU's ’territory', and so left its own membership to organise 
on their initiative. If this was the case, the key ’organiser' 
was Harry Marston.
Harry started work at Herbert's, as a machine tool fitter, in 
1934. He had joined the Workers' Union at 14 when he went to work 
at a wool mill in Keighley, and though he became a skilled 
fitter, retained his membership in that union (which, by then, 
had merged with the TGWU) when he moved to Coventry. Despite his 
evident commitment to trade unionism, it seems that he did not 
begin to seek new members until December 1938. One of Harry's 
first contacts was "Bro L.Poole on Inspection who came from
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Bradford" and was already a TGWU member. However, Harry's 
recruitment drive had very modest results. When he first went 
onto the union's district committee, apparently through an 
introduction by "Bro Poole", he represented six members. 
Nonetheless his efforts provoked "some haggling by AEU members 
who I worked with". In the circumstances, this was 
understandable. He was working in a skilled area and among AEU 
members who had already built a plant-wide organisation (which 
included semi- and unskilled workers) in much more dangerous 
times. Though the AEU's records suggest that this inter-union 
rivalry was first raised with the DC in December 1938, it was not 
resolved until the arrival of the War when Jack Jones, newly 
appointed as the TGWU's district organiser, took up the issue. 
Harry recalls:
"Bro Jones met (the) AEU organiser, W.H.Stokes, and the shop 
stewards' committee who decided to accept me provided I had 
their membership forms as well as our own union forms to 
approach unskilled labour into our union.""3
In one way this arrangement appeared to be no more than a 
cosmetic device, as Harry quietly proceeded to recruit crane 
drivers, truckers, labourers and female pieceworkers - all of 
whom had been largely ignored by the AEU - into the TGWU. But in 
another sense, this formal subordination to the AEU clearly 
signalled the future relationship between the two unions at 
Edgwick. To retain its toe-hold in the shopfloor organisation, 
the TGWU accepted the role of a junior partnership.
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Shifts in Shopfloor Politics During the Phoney War: 1939-41
Initially, the outbreak of war must have caused few changes at 
Edgwick as the plant had been on a war-footing for some time. 
Blackout conditions were imposed after the Munich crisis; in 
April 1939 workers complained about lost time due to Air-Raid 
Precautions (ARP) practice;*4 and the shop stewards had become 
well versed in handling grievancies about dilution and the 
extension of female labour. A few changes were made quickly to 
expand production: the product range was rationalised to a 
limited degree and machines made to a minimum standard or "war 
quality". But, initially, the war meant more of the same: more 
fresh labour, more dilutees, more workers on night-shift.
To meet part of this accelerating demand for production, a large 
sub-contract department was established, and small dispersal 
plants and a medium-sized shadow factory were set up in the 
outlying agricultural districts. The plant at Exhall (or No3 
Factory as it was sometimes called) probably began producing 
tools in 1940.** Factories at Earl Shilton and Cosby started 
producing machine tool components in March 1941.•• A small 
re-conditioning shop at Warwick was probably set up at about this 
time; the precise date is not known. The machine tool plant at 
Lutterworth was commissioned in November 1941.*T In addition, the
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labour force at Edgwick must have been expanded by one thousand 
or more. Given this scale of recruitment, it is not surprising 
that management frequently discussed labour shortages. This 
problem was shared by many engineering firms in Coventry (and 
undoubtedly persuaded Herbert's to site a small tooling factory 
at Glasgow in May 1942).••
By 1939, Coventry had become a major centre of munitions 
production. Three shadow factories were already in operation in 
the city and three more were opened during 1940. Between 1931 and 
1939, over 42,000 immigrants, mostly single men, came to Coventry 
in search of work.** And yet the demand for labour remained 
insatiable. The resulting competition forced local employers to 
bid against each other. Cost-plus contracts from the Government 
and, from 1940, the existence of a compulsory arbitration system, 
also encouraged high wage policies in the city.
Initially, the local federation tried to deal with this crisis 
through a secret pact between employers. Thus, in June 1939, the 
AEU encountered an "embargo on members who voluntarily (left) 
their employment" in the federated companies.70 However, it 
appears that this "embargo" did not substantially improve the 
situation for the employers. For, on 10 May 1940, Sir Alfred 
observed that while practically no skilled labour remained 
unemployed, the newspapers were full of advertisements for such 
work. The effect, he complained, was "simply to rob Peter to pay 
Paul".T1 But it was not simply a question of the demand for
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skilled labour as such. The high wages offered for repetitive, 
semi-skilled work on the production line in the local munitions 
factories were attracting machinists away from skilled work in 
the toolrooms. Sir Alfred tacitly recognised this fact only a few 
days later. When, on 20 May, Herbert reiterated his complaint 
about firms "tempting" employees away from urgent work, he added 
semi-skilled work to his proposed advertisement ban:
"At a recent meeting of our local Engineering Federation I 
proposed a resolution that no members should in future 
advertise for skilled or semi-skilled workers, and this 
resolution was carried unanimously. "7a
The ban on advertisements had no better success than the 
'embargo'. And, despite Sir Alfred's sponsorship, it was really 
no more than a token gesture towards employer solidarity.
Managers of high-wage firms in the district did not need to 
advertise their vacancies. They could recruit their workforce 
through word-of-mouth. For example, George Smith hurriedly left 
Herbert's in 1938 when a friend advised him that Aero 
Mechanisations at Far Gosford Street were offering higher 
earnings for similar work. Nor did this ban stop Herbert's 
directors from considering the proposal to use sandwich boards to 
advertise for women workers in the agricultural districts.TJ Both 
the secret 'embargo' and the advertisement ban had a Canute-like 
character to them.
Herbert's own labour shortages were compounded by Sir Alfred's
decision to hold a firm line on wages. As one director put it on 
a later occasion:
"At the beginning of the war we adopted the policy of trying 
to keep our piece work prices as they were, but they would 
not yield sufficient earnings to the men to enable us to keep 
them..."7*
Ron Green's recollections confirm this account:
"I was on about £9, £10 a week, which was very good because 
most were on £4 or £5 a week - which is what I'd said to you 
over the 'phone: before the war people at Herbert’s were 
earning good money. Ironically, when the war broke out, 
people started to leave Herbert's to work in the munitions 
and most of them were starting on £20 a wee*, £20, £25, £35."
In response to this crisis, management decided to be "liberal 
with claims" while not actually altering the piecework prices.7* 
Given the company's traditional ’tightness' on pay and Sir 
Alfred's protests about employer ’Peter' robbing fellow 
manufacturer ’Paul', it is likely that, initially, this device 
achieved only a marginal increase in pay, though by the end of 
the war claims for one month in the machine shop were calculated 
to be 40% of total wages.7* It seems that this particular 
elastoplast did not work. The haemorrhage of labour continued.
Then in May 1940, the Emergency Powers Bill was enacted and the 
character of the labour market was suddenly altered. Among the 
regulations based on this Act, the Essential Works Order (EWO)
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was specifically designed to end the free movement of labour. 
However, such was the magnetism of the local munitions plants 
that, a month later, the employers' association felt it necessary 
to negotiate with the trade unions a district agreement whereby 
all toolroom workers in member firms would be paid a fixed sum 
above the average earnings of skilled piece-workers in the 
district.
Sir Alfred never concealed his opposition to the Coventry Tool 
Room Agreement. He argued throughout the war years that instead 
of stabilising wage costs, the deal only encouraged "profiteering 
by labour". In an article published in the Machine Tool Review, 
one of his own house journals, in September 1941, Sir Alfred went 
on to castigate his fellow employers for their irresolution in 
the face of this challenge. "They take the line of least 
resistance", he complained.TT For his part. Sir Alfred remained 
determined that he would not concede substantial wage increases 
to gain higher productivity, even though the cost-plus contracts 
meant that this involved no financial penalty for the firm. His 
objections were twofold. First, as he explained to his own 
employees,ym this kind of wages policy was not "patriotic" since 
it undermined the economy by setting off an upward spiral of 
inflation (a point he also laboured in published articles 
throughout the War). Second, it eroded managerial authority. As I 
indicated in the previous chapter. Sir Alfred equated a tight 
control on labour costs with strong management.
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If his wages policy made matters especially difficult for his 
managers, it is also likely that it had the same effect on the 
shop stewards' organisation. Croucher found that in the early 
years of the War local employers took advantage of the hysteria 
about "sabotage" and "communistic influence" to dismiss 
individual militants in an attempt to break the shop steward 
organisations in their plants.7" There is no evidence that such 
victimisations occurred at Herbert's, though it would be 
surprising if the shop stewards were unaware of these dismissals 
and did not see them as reminders of the dangers of militant 
trade unionism. Instead, I believe it more likely that morale was 
affected in a more insidious way by the downward shift in 
Herbert's position in the wages 'league' of local engineering 
firms in the months leading up to the promulgation of the EVO 
regulations. Some of the key shopfloor militants may have 
interpreted the drain of skilled labour from Edgwick - which 
included some of the stewards - as *a vote of no confidence' in 
the workplace organisation,"0 and few stewards would have doubted 
that the disparity in wages was likely to grow in the succeeding 
months since they were still far too weak to challenge the firm's 
"patriotic" wages policy. If this was the case, the message would 
have been underlined by three events in the early months of 1940. 
In April, the shop stewards could only secure an agreement that 
gang pieceworkers had a right to know "the time allowed" for 
their jobs.** Next month, after a worker had been dismissed for 
refusing to work overtime on Saturday afternoon and Sunday, the 
DC decided that action would only be taken on any subsequent
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dismissals.•* Also in May, management made it clear that there 
was to be no consultation over transferrals of labour requested 
by the Ministry of Labour: If workers did not volunteer, they 
would be forced to go.*" So it is not surprising that, after the 
EWO regulations came into effect, some activists - such as Bert 
Horton and Frank Isherwood - quickly volunteered for transferrai 
to other factories.** In this way Herbert's managers were able to 
deal with their more militant shop stewards without any visible 
confrontation.*9
Not surprisingly the documentary evidence indicates that there 
was a marked lull in trade union activity at Edgwick for the next 
18 months or so. One important documentary source is Walter 
Shepherd's notes on his meeting with the shop stewards. Shepherd 
was Herbert's first Industrial Relations Officer. It seems that, 
in common with many engineering firms at that time, his 
appointment was made in response to the flood of government 
regulations on labour, including welfare, working conditions and 
the national arbitration system, rather than due to pressure from 
the shopfloor.** From 6 January 1941, Shepherd began to log his 
meetings with the shop stewards at Edgwick and the neighbouring 
dispersal plants. His notes indicate that he had very few 
meetings with the shop stewards during 1941: for that year they 
covered only 11 pages (which can be compared to 129 pages for 
1942). If, as those minutes suggest, meetings with the shop 
stewards were infrequent in 1941, they also indicate that
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management was anxious to assert its authority. One note in 
particular, on the "canteen committee", conveys this point well. 
Part of it reads:
"Mr Lloyd (Works Director - KG) said activities of Committee 
undesirable. Took up too much time of men and canteen staff, 
and endeavouring to assume authority. Committee to be 
disbanded."*y
However, the weakness of the shop stewards' organisation does not 
mean that management's authority went unchallenged at this time. 
It seems that problems of discipline, such as absenteeism and 
late arrivals for work, grew worse during this period. More 
importantly, management found that it, too, was powerless to 
challenge events when, in the wake of the bombing on 14 November 
1940, its workers (in common with many others in the district) in 
an apparently spontaneous protest, refused to work nights. Their 
response was understandable. This is how Hinton described that 
particular air raid:
"Then for ten hours on the night of 14 November 1940, in an 
attack more concentrated than anything experienced in London, 
German planes bombed Coventry. 568 people died; one house in 
three was seriously damaged; most of the city centre was 
obliterated; and war production was brought to a halt 
temporarily, through the direct destruction of plant, 
disruption of essential services, or the desertion of the
workforce."mm
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At Edgwick, the fire station was demolished and seven workers 
killed. Most of the bombs missed the main buildings and 
production was resumed within four days,*» but working conditions 
remained bleak for months afterwards, if Tom Batchelor's 
testimony is reliable.
"During the war when the roof were off and the heating was 
gone, we used to have a coke tin with holes knocked in 
it...And we used to work in our overcoats.. .And there was 
many a time when we used to come in to find ice on machines 
that wasn't working, and there used to be ice on the water in 
the shop. It was that cold."
The Herbert managers were unable to revive the night-shift until 
the early months of 1941 when the local employers' association 
offered to pay 50% of the bonus for the time workers spent 
sheltering from the bombs - at Edgwick most had to take cover "in 
the trenches" - and the Ministry of Supply provided helmets.*0
The Limits of Change during the "Heyday of the Communist 
Engineer": 1942-43
Among the earliest available minutes of the shop stewards' 
committee, there is one, dated 18 March 1942, which reads: "The 
officers were instructed to round up Stewards who had not 
attended our meetings recently." This "round up", if there was
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one, only brought temporary success. At the next meeting, 21 
stewards were present (an increase by 50% on the previous 
attendance); but the figures quickly slipped back to produce an 
average of 17. And yet other signs suggest that 1942 witnessed a 
definite revival in trade union activity at Edgwick.
The strongest evidence for this revival is provided in 
management’s records. Not only did Walter Shepherd, the 
Industrial Relations Officer, cover 128 pages of his logbook for 
1942 compared with only 11 for 1941, but these notes referred to 
over 200 meetings compared with only 15 meetings held in the 
previous year. In isolation, this could simply mean that Shepherd 
took a full year to settle into his job; but the trend it 
suggests is consistent with several general accounts of shopfloor 
organisation in the engineering industry during the War.
Croucher claims that a "red haze" settled over British politics 
after the Nazi invasion of Russia in June 1941 and until the end 
of 1942.*l Inside the factories, the victimisation of militants 
had largely ceased and employers were placed on the defensive, 
ideologically, by an irresistable campaign for Joint Production 
Committees which, strengthened by frequent and well-publicised 
accounts of managerial incompetence, challenged in a 
distinctively new way employers' "right to manage". If those 
months marked "the heyday of the Communist engineer",** it seems 
that nowhere was this more true than in Coventry. Croucher 
asserts that the Party had 33 factory branches in the city and,**
in an article entitled "Coventry Communism", Hinton claims the CP 
had a "significant presence" in all the large factories.*4 In 
addition, as Tolliday observed, "the changed legal framework from 
the time of the Essential tfor* Order provided the anions with an 
alternative tactical repertoire with which they could supplement 
or bolster direct bi-lateral bargaining with management. * Over
a wide range of matters from welfare provisions to waiting time, 
the stewards were able to use the threat of third-party scrutiny 
to make the managers more willing to negotiate with them.*4
The shopfloor organisation at Edgwick may not have peaked in 1942 
- like many other engineering factories, that probably came a 
year or two later - but I would argue that that particular year 
is worth detailed examination for two reasons: firstly, the 
records suggest that in this period of revival the stewards 
tested the limits of change at Edgwick; secondly it provides an 
opportunity to make a direct comparison between Hinton's and 
Croucher's account of "Coventry Communism" and factory politics 
at Herbert's.
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Low pay at Herbert's:
During 1942, low pay must have remained the major issue for 
workers at Herbert's. Many with friends or relatives in the local 
munitions factories could relate stories of the fabulous wages
earned there. For example, when Ernie Digger's sister-in-law was 
conscripted into the munitions industry, she had a friend who 
"got her in at Harwell" where, after only six weeks training, she 
went onto piecework which, Ernie recalls, brought in wages that 
were "£5 or £6 more than me and I was a chargehand then building 
machines". Another Herbert veteran, Tom Batchelor claims it was 
"common knowledge" that "the men at Ryton were earning £20 a 
week" while "we were getting about £8 or £10". Of course, low pay 
is a relative question. Nationally, average earnings were 
significantly lower than at Herbert's. In January 1944, when 
wartime earnings peaked, average wages in the metal, engineering 
and shipbuilding industries stood at £7. 8s. 7d..*7 But the 
workers at Herbert's did not compare themselves with turners and 
fitters on the Clyde or the Tyne. Comparison, were made much 
closer to home and, as I suggested earlier, they were conscious 
of the fact that, as early as 1938 when the local munitions 
plants moved into full production, other workers were earning 
more money on piecework without working the same horrendously 
long hours.
There are obvious dangers in relying on oral history, 
particularly on the question of pay. Memories can fade or be 
confused with more recent experiences; stories may be exaggerated 
to underline a particular message or simply entertain the 
researcher. One or other of these things must have happened in 
Ron Green's case. He recollects meeting, through the Home Guard, 
former colleagues who "were getting £60 a week". These were
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indeed fabulous wages. Croucher claims that at the highest-paying 
factory in Coventry, skilled pieceworkers were then paid 
(pre-tax) an average of 5.34 shillings per hour.** Yet I would 
suggest that Ron's recollection truthfully reflects a view that 
was widely held by Herbert workers at that time, namely, that 
they were missing out on a local wages bonanza.
Transferrals of workers from neighbouring engineering factories 
to Herbert's - arranged at the behest of Ministry of Labour - 
must have reinforced this feeling on many occasions. There was, 
for example, the case of a worker, transferred from AWA's 
Bagington plant, who complained to the shop stewards that he had 
agreed to the move on the promise of a wage of over £6 and then 
found his pay was half that amount.** Perhaps more importantly, 
such cases also reminded the shop stewards of the weaknesses of 
their own organisation. For, on each occasion, the best they 
could do was negotiate for the worker's "release" (which 
management must have been happy to grant as it removed a 
potential militant from the plant).
In an earlier section to this chapter I tried to show that the 
newly-formed stewards' committee benefitted from a number of 
quick concessions. Then I argued that this happened chiefly 
because the issues had symbolic value (such as the question of 
smoking) or threatened a serious conflict with the unions - at a 
time when management was pushing for more and more production - 
and jeopardised the firm's standing within the local employers'
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association (examples here could include such issues as the 
district toolroom rate or the Young Journeyman's Agreement). 
Subsequently, the stewards continued to "niggle" Herbert's "hard 
gaffers", winning minor concessions (mostly relating to working 
conditions) in a steady, unspectacular fashion. But on the issue 
of pay, management was adamant: it was a question of 
"patriotism".
By 1942, there was a resurgence in the shopfloor organisation. If 
Marston's account can be believed, largely through his efforts 
the AEU shop committee became a joint committee. But it did not 
yet possess the authority to centralise collective bargaining. 
Shepherd's logbook shows that the senior stewards of each union 
negotiated with management either separately or jointly according 
to the interests directly involved. (For example, Marston talked 
to the managers alone when he tried to raise the base rate of 
female pieceworkers.) In addition to the problems of 
organisation, the new arbitration system imposed by Government 
ruled out even the idea of negotiating higher pay across the 
plant. The combined effect of these circumstances was to 
encourage a form of sectional activity which challenged the 
politics of Herbert's variant of the gang system.
The challenge to the gang system: a tale of two stewards?
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The story of the shopfloor challenge to Herbert's variant of the 
gang piecework system during 1942 is essentially a story of two 
section stewards: one located in the hardening shop; the other in 
the fitting bays. But their contest with managerial power had a 
wider relevance. It was one which demonstrated the character of 
state intervention through the shadowy presence of the National 
Arbitration Tribunal (NAT); highlighted some important features 
of the gang system; and provided a few hard lessons for trade 
unionists at Edgwick on the boundaries of factory politics and on 
the more covert techniques of managerial control.
The story begins with an apparently unrecorded dispute in the 
hardening shop. Piecing together the tale from Shepherd's 
logbook, it seems that in January the hardening shop gang 
complained about low piecework earnings and that, at the end of 
February, their grievance was heard at a Works Conference. From 
his notes, it seems that one outcome of the Conference was an 
agreement to re-time a job because, at a meeting on 4 March, one 
of the shop managers, Kelway, accused the section steward,
Clarke, of encouraging his mates to take "longer than necessary" 
on that operation.100
At the same meeting, Nixon (Horton's successor as works convenor) 
questioned Kelway on some aspects of rate-fixing: when was a 
worker entitled to have a job re-timed? Did the labourers' bonus 
affect piecework prices, and what effect did the presence of four 
women dilutees have on the gang rate? He also complained that
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while Clarke had been blamed for all the troubles in the 
hardening shop, the fault lay with the chargehand and foreman. 
Kelway gave only the most general answers on rate-fixing and 
promised to "have a word" with the foreman about the "troubles" 
in the shop.
4 March marked a confused start for the stewards. While the 
senior AEU shop stewards seemed undecided on tactics - could they 
successfully challenge the "unco-operative" chargehand, or was it 
best to aim for marginal improvement in the piecework prices? - 
it was clear that Clarke had already made up his mind. The 
minutes of the shop stewards' committee held that evening 
recorded Clarke's report: "feeling was running high", he said, 
"and the gang refused to work with (Game) in his present position 
as chargehand."lox
Perhaps Clarke chose this rather ‘adventurist' line because Game 
had suddenly fallen ill and been replaced temporarily by a more 
pliant chargehand. But, at any event, the ripples from the 
"troubles” in the hardening shop quickly spread across the plant 
and reached the chargehands' committee. In mid-March, its 
secretary approached Nixon with a proposal to convene a joint 
meeting of shop stewards and chargehands. It is not recorded what 
they wanted to discuss, but when the request was put to the shop 
stewards, they proposed two items for the agenda:
"1/ Definition of scope and responsibilities of Charge Hands 
"2/ Definition of duties and responslbilties of Shop
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Stewards.**0*
In the last week of March, Game returned to work and immediately 
became the subject of a protest meeting. Despite Clarke's absence 
at that time, a delegation was quickly formed and despatched to 
inform the shop manager of the gang's refusal to accept Game back 
as chargehand. Kelway received the delegation and promised to 
investigate their allegation that Game had "robbed both the firm 
and the men"; but he also made it clear that he would not "submit 
to dictation from the gang". Instead, he persuaded the men to 
give the chargehand a month's trial.10»
Shepherd's lengthy account of the meeting is instructive for the 
impression it conveys of Kelway as a "hard gaffer" and, more 
importantly, for the insight it offers into the politics of 
Herbert's gang system. Shepherd's notes make it clear that while 
senior management knew of, and accepted, the chargehands' 
informal practice of keeping a kitty of bonus earnings, some 
pieceworkers were so ill-informed that they suspected they were 
being "robbed".
Kelway's success in stalling a decision on Game's future did not 
end the "troubles". Instead, once again, piecework prices became 
the focus of the gang's grievancies. On 26 March, the gang 
refused to do "certain lead pot jobs" which they considered to be 
priced too low. The news was relayed to management by the senior 
AEU stewards who, unaccompanied by Clarke, promised to get the
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ban lifted if management agreed to a price review.104 This was 
the first occasion Shepherd recorded this kind of industrial 
action, and it seemed to alarm the senior stewards almost as much 
as the managers. Next day, the senior stewards - this time 
accompanied by Clarke - argued for the gang's right to negotiate 
piecework prices. Not surprisingly, Kelway "emphatically" 
rejected this proposal. As he pointed out, it was an 
unprecedented demand since pieceworkers did not even have the 
right to know what prices their chargehands had accepted.10* (At 
a Works Conference held two years earlier, it was agreed that 
"any man has the right to know the time allowed for any job".10* 
Shepherd's notes also indicate that Kelway had stated the 
company's formal position. In practice, the managers and 
chargehands gave some details on prices, though at their 
discretion.) After a brief argument, the convenor registered a 
"failure to agree". It was predictable that, as a consequence of 
this impasse on piecework prices, the chargehand should become, 
once more, the subject of the gang's grievancies.
On 30 March, Clarke led a 20 strong delegation to impress the 
shop manager with the gang's determination to remove Game. But 
the protest quickly crumbled. With little apparent difficulty, 
Kelway persuaded the workers to wait until the end of the "trial 
period" (still some three weeks away).10* It was to prove the 
turning point in the hardening shop "troubles".
Two days earlier, Nixon and Varr suffered a similar humiliation
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when they met the works manager, Lloyd, to complain at the 
privileges enjoyed by the chargehands' committee. Why, they 
asked, were the chargehands allowed to discuss their sectional 
interests during company time and in secret? In reply, Lloyd 
countered with his own complaint about the "considerable amount 
of lost time in the hardening shop owing to matters raised by the 
stewards";xom and pointed out that, despite the absence of a 
closed shop, the stewards expected all the pieceworkers to bear 
the costs of their involvement in negotiations with the company. 
Lloyd adamantly refused to withdraw any of the chargehands' 
privileges, even though, by the end of the meeting, the stewards 
had scaled down their demands: no, he insisted, he would not ask 
the chargehands to disclose the agenda of their meetings.
On 1 April, the stewards received a letter from the AEU district 
organiser. The minute records his advice to apply for a Works 
Conference on piecework prices, and admonished the committee "not 
to let the hardening shop fight it alone". They resolved to 
convene a "special piecework stewards' meeting" to discuss this 
issue.10* But at the next meeting, on 15 April, only one reported 
on piecework prices in his section, and it seemed that the 
hardening shop was indeed being left to fight it alone.110 
Meanwhile, Game's "trial period" was drawing to a close.
On 20 April, a small deputation from the hardening shop returned 
to Kelway's office. Significantly, the group was led by one of 
the gang members and not the section steward though he was
present. "Clarke and his associates", Shepherd noted, "were not at 
ease." Despite the fall in the gang's bonus - which Kelway 
attributed to time-wasting disputes - the men reported 
satisfaction with the chargehand. Shepherd observed that the 
militants had "lost any support they may have previously had on 
the gang." As if to confirm this point, Clarke informed the 
manager that he had applied to the National Service Officer for 
his release (which Kelway immediately endorsed).xxx
/
The explanation for Clarke's sudden and crushing loss of support 
is not immediately apparent from the records. However, Shepherd 
does provide one clue in his reference to the fall in the bonus 
payments. As I mentioned earlier, Kelway attributed this to 
disruption caused by the "dissatisfaction" in the shop. Yet, if 
the account of a then young rate-fixer who was sent into that 
shop at the end of March can be believed, the truth was very 
different.
Phil Barnes, the young man in question, recalls that he quickly 
realised the gang, including the section steward, had little idea 
of how their earnings were calculated. He also noted that their 
work generated a large number of piecework tickets each week.
Given these facts, Barnes decided (apparently on his own volition 
though presumably with at least the tacit approval of his 
seniors) to bring matters to a head by secretly holding back a 
bunch of tickets each week; not enough to be noticed, but 
sufficient to cause a serious, cumulative effect on the gang's
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earnings. When the workers realised, towards the end of April, 
that their monthly bonus was going to be considerably lower than 
normal, they blamed Clarke. After all these years, Phil can still 
remember the moment when he had to wait discreetly outside the 
hardening shop while the gang vented their collective anger and 
confusion on their section steward.lxa
The deputation of 20 April effectively marked the end of the 
hardening shop disputes. Although it was a topic at several talks 
in the closing weeks of April, the issues were marginal and came 
to nothing. Clarke himself attended one more meeting with 
management and then vanished from the records.
The available documentary evidence suggest that in the months 
immediately following Clarke's "release", the managers 
successfully exploited his denouement as a lesson to others. Even 
by the autumn, when sectional activity began to revive, piecework 
disputes remained timid and infrequent affairs. In late 
September, for example, there was a complaint that a chargehand 
was running a gang from his sickbed and hoarding piecework 
tickets to improve the next months's balance; but management 
replied that they saw nothing wrong, or even unusual, in these 
practices.XX3 So the matter was dropped.
The campaign to challenge the power of the chargehands' committee 
also dwindled a way to nothing. In August, after months of 
prevarication, representatives of the committee finally met the
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senior stewards and members of the AEU district committee. No 
records of that encounter are available, except for a brief 
reference in the stewards' minutes which indicates a certain 
amount of frustration on their part: the chargehands were advised 
"to put themselves in order first by joining the union"XX4
When the news of the NAT's decision on piecework bargaining.
Award 249, reached the stewards on 21 September, it contained no 
surprises. The Tribunal found that while a gang had no right to 
negotiate prices, they were entitled to know the prices accepted 
by the chargehand on their behalf. This was no more than the 
unions had secured in 1940 and were offered again in May 1942, 
and probably did no more than formalise the status quo for some 
of the better organised gangs at Edgwick. As Tolliday observed in 
the case of Ford's stubborn resistance to the unionisation of its 
Dagenham plant, Award 249 "illuminates how little pressure the 
Government was prepared to exert in a context where the unions 
did not prove able to help themselves".**■*
Earlier, I had attributed Clarke's fall to the wiles of a 
rate-fixer. But, of course, the success of Barnes' dirty tricks 
only begs the question: why did the gang turn on their section 
steward and not the chargehand? One answer may be that Clarke 
simply presented a more vulnerable target for his mates' anger; 
that he was simply the victim of scapegoating. But that is not a 
sufficient explanation. It also has to be said that Clarke 
appeared to make himself especially vulnerable because of his
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relative adventurism. Encouraged by the powerful sense of 
grievance in his gang (perhaps it is worth mentioning here that 
the working conditions in this shop were particularly arduous and 
that since it was a relatively new section, its semi-skilled 
workforce would have responded to the situation without the 
weight of tradition on their backs), Clarke apparently decided to 
organise his work mates around objectives which, in the context 
of factory politics at Herbert's, represented a radical challenge 
to managerial authority on the shopfloor. Equally important, he 
ignored the dangers of his growing estrangement from the other 
shop stewards - particularly the senior AEU stewards - who chose 
more circumspect tactics. I would suggest that it was Clarke's 
evident isolation which probably tempted one of the most junior 
members of management, a rate-fixer, to set him up.
When Clarke left that summer, he would not have been consoled 
with the thought that he had reminded other activists of some 
basic lessons in factory politics; but it is evident that 
Williams, one of seven AEU stewards in the fitting shop, was 
careful to avoid Clarke's mistakes.
If Williams shared Clarke's readiness to use industrial action to 
pursue his objectives, he was unlike Clarke in the care he took 
to select grievancies that were within, or on, the boundary of 
the possible at Herbert's. He was similarly cautious in his 
approach to the other lay and full-time officials in his union.
In the remaining months of 1942, Williams probably caused
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management as much concern as did Clarke earlier that year;1** 
but he was not isolated and obliged to seek his "release".
In November, Williams was accompanied by three senior stewards - 
Warr (the new convenor). Spinner and Marston - when he complained 
to Lloyd, the works director, about "bulk prices". The subject 
had been raised some weeks before by a gang of toolroom workers 
and, as before, the managers explained that over the years 
chargehands and rate-fixers had found it convenient to negotiate 
one price, a ‘bulk price', for a series of operations such as 
erecting a machine. Unlike the toolroom workers, Williams was not 
satisfied with this explanation and the managers agreed to price 
all new jobs on an individual basis.XXT
On 8 December, Williams, this time accompanied by the convenor, 
claimed the right to be informed of all the pay data communicated 
to the chargehands in the monthly summary sheets. After hurried 
consultations with senior management. Shepherd conceded this 
claim.xxm However, there is an important qualification to be made 
to this ‘victory': the concession did not include details on how 
the gang's bonus was divided between members of the gang; Warr 
agreed that this element of a pieceworker's earnings was a 
personal matter.xx* (As you may recall from my earlier 
description of the gang system, the size of a worker's 
entitlement to a share of the gang bonus was determined by his or 
her base rate plus any discretionary awards.)
At the end of December, Williams informed management that a gang 
on his section had decided to leave a particular job "on the 
floor" until offered a better price. Not only did Williams make 
this statement in the presence of his senior stewards, but he had 
done so after securing the "moral support" of the shop committee 
on this issue.1*® This was the first record of industrial action 
at Edgwick since the hardening shop "troubles" (and only the 
second occasion for this kind of tactic to be mentioned in 
Shepherd's diary). But, unlike in Clarke's campaign, the senior 
stewards could not intervene and lift the ban. Consequently, the 
managers were forced to concede the claim early in the New Year.
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Pieceworkers' base rates and the limits of change
Alongside efforts to increase pay by challenging the politics of 
the gang system, the section stewards in the fitting shop tried 
another, more direct means to raise pay at Edgwick, namely, by 
pushing for an increase in pieceworkers' base rates.
The matter was first raised at a shop stewards' meeting in May 
and advice sought from the district committee. But it was not 
until September when, with the DC's approval, they decided to 
convene a district-wide meeting of machine tool fitters. That 
meeting, due to be held on 15 October, collapsed through the 
indifference shown by the other convenors. And it was not until 
30 December when the shop stewards finally approached management.
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Shepherd's notes of those talks illuminate not only management's 
"tough" stance on pay issues, they also show how ready the 
managers were to debunk the myth of Herbert "craftsmanship" when 
it suited their purpose. For example, in one passage Shepherd 
recorded his own retort to the stewards' arguments that the 
exceptional abilities of Herbert's skilled employees deserved 
higher remuneration:
"In reply I stated that we had several women on skilled work 
both (sic) in Fitting Department, on die-heads, and on 
machinery.1,1,1
In the absence of any kind of pressure through industrial action, 
the negotiations dragged on without any progress until 4 January 
1943 when Lloyd put the matter to rest (for the moment) by 
pointing out that the higher earnings of fitters elsewhere in 
Coventry were due to higher piecework earnings and not higher 
base rates. In the circumstances the shop stewards must have felt 
that this was a gratuitous insult. As a compromise, Lloyd offered 
the only kind of pay increase that was possible within Herbert's 
"patriotic" wages policy: individual merit awards. Though the 
stewards "intimated" they might consider "certain steps" as a 
result of their "disappointment", the offer was accepted 
eventually.
Despite all this, there was a wage drift of sorts at Herbert's. 
Vhile management held the line on the actual piecework prices.
their "liberalism" on claims eventually led to a situation where, 
at the end of the War, they made up some 40% of wages for at 
least one group of pieceworkers.x”  However, as management's 
records make explicit, in the first instance this drift was a 
conscious response to the flight of workers to other, 
better-paying firms; later, as EWO regulations largely prevented 
the free movement of labour, I would suggest that the wage drift 
continued in a more insidious way as the managers tried to buy 
workers' co-operation for more production. The records offer very 
little evidence to support the argument that collective action on 
the shopfloor had other than a marginal impact on management's 
pay policies. To explain why this was the case I believe 
Tolliday's observations are apposite.
In his revision of the conventional périodisation of the 
development of shopfloor organisation in the British motor 
industry, Tolliday argues that the attempt to generalise from the 
cases of Standard Motors and some of the smaller motor firms in 
and around Coventry has resulted in a very misleading picture. He 
claims that despite conditions that favoured union development 
during the War - the drive for production, tight labour markets, 
growing union confidence and government policies which tended to 
mitigate employer hostility, such as cost-plus contracts and the 
priority given to conciliation - the advances that took place in 
the motor industry, especially in what he called the "core motor 
factories", were "restricted and partial".**4 In his explanation 
of this paradox, Tolliday draws attention to circumstances which
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can be directly compared to the situation that existed at 
Herbert's.
In common with Tolliday's "core motor factories", Edgwick was an 
established plant, not a shadow factory, with a workforce largely 
inured to the factory politics of the 1930s. Similarly, Edgwick's 
product line and production techniques, largely unchanged from 
the pre-war years, denied the opportunity for aggressive 
piecework bargaining. To this I would add that management at 
Herbert's was jealous of its authority on the shopfloor and most 
certainly not prepared to concede shopfloor controls and grant 
high wages in return for higher productivity. Finally, as 
mentioned earlier, the Government pursued a manpower policy which 
effectively excluded any radical state intervention in those 
situations where, as Tolliday put it, the unions were too weak to 
help themselves.
Experimenting with individual piecework
In the previous chapter I argued that the political dynamics of 
the gang system created a hostile terrain for the development of 
the shop stewards' organisation, so it is worth commenting on the 
fragmentary evidence which indicates that, during 1942, 
management tried to introduce an individual piecework payment 
system (IPW).
The hardening shop "troubles" and the potentially more 
challenging activities of the fitters may have contributed to 
management's decision to experiment with IPW; but it seems that 
the main impetus for change was the byzantine character of the 
gang system itself. With its arbitrary rules and ad-hoc 
agreements, it had created a costing system which could not be 
replicated elsewhere - not even at Herbert's own "dispersal 
factories".ia* However, it appears that the managers were not 
encouraged by the results of the experiment. When they introduced 
IPW at No3 Factory (Exhall) at the beginning of December, they 
quickly encountered shopfloor resistance which persuaded them to 
restrict the system to sections of female labour.1** 
(Unfortunately, the union records provide no explanation for this 
resistance, though it is likely that it was sparked off by the 
activities of the rate-fixers.) Perhaps more importantly, 
complaints about the rise in scrap rates made it clear that, 
unless a well-established policy was reversed and more money 
spent on inspection, any hoped-for benefits of the system could 
be quickly nullified. In addition, the managers must have been 
conscious of Sir Alfred's reluctance to abandon the gang system - 
a reluctance made explicit three years later when the experiment 
was resumed with greater determination.1**
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Forms of subordination
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In the previous section of this chapter I tried to explain in 
some detail how, despite their early successes in the 1930s,
Herbert's stewards were still marginalised in the piecework 
bargaining process in 1942, a time when the shopfloor 
organisation was approaching its wartime peak. If this account 
provided the only insight into the shopfloor organisation at 
Edgwick, it would evoke a dismal view indeed and, more 
importantly, it would seriously misrepresent the character of 
factory politics at Herbert's during the war. The managers were
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certainly "hard gaffers", as one worker described them, but their 
response to the stewards' activities could not be simply 
characterised as repressive.
Earlier, I had mentioned management's "liberal" attitude to 
claims under the piecework system as a means of raising pay 
without abandoning the structure of pre-war prices. This same 
"liberalism" extended to the shop stewards, as Tom Batchelor 
recalled:
"Stewards hadn't used to be paid for trade union business.
Vhat happened was when you worked on a gang, you got your 
money out of the gang. Of course, if you were away a long 
time, then the people in your gang used to start 
grumbling...Well, there was ways and means of - but you've 
got that (tape recorder) going and I wouldn't like to say; 
but if you erase what I tell you - you see, what happened was 
if you were away a long time and it was important to the
gang, then the chargehand used to go to the foreman and say: 
'Look, Bill's been away two or three hours here, working on 
this, or working on that.' And he'd say: 'Veil, alright, book 
some extra sets.'"
I would suggest that the purpose of these seemingly covert 
arrangements was to make the stewards feel a strong sense of 
obligation to firstline management and so, indirectly, draw them 
into their employer's patronage. Shepherd's notes suggest other 
ways in which management could have patronised the stewards. Over 
a wide range of issues - usually over relatively marginal 
questions such as working conditions which were also congruent 
with Sir Alfred's self-image as a caring, Christian employer, or 
questions such as the registration of dilutees which exposed 
management to "third-party scrutiny" - the managers demonstrated 
a readiness to accomodate the unions. As I have shown already, 
the entries in Shepherd's logbooks - typically where they deal 
with more central issues relating to managerial authority and 
some aspects of pay - also contain abundant illustrations of 
Herbert managers as "tough gaffers"; but the point is that 
contradictory forms of subordination, accomodation and 
repression, have to be brought together to construct a more 
representative image of factory politics at Herbert's in 1942.
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No Stakhanovltes at Edgwick - not exactly.
For the first years of the war, it is possible to discuss labour 
relations at Edgwick without any reference to the politics of the 
War itself. As I mentioned earlier, when an anti-Communist 
hysteria swept through the country and provided the excuse for 
the victimisation of hundreds of union militants, there is no 
evidence that any union activists were dismissed by Herbert's. 
The War was, in that sense, an external event which impinged on 
factory politics at Edgwick but was not part of it. In 1942 this 
relationship was radically altered and the politics of the War 
merged with the politics of work. During that year the 'People's 
War' was at its height and, as Croucher put it, "a red haze" 
settled over British politics. In engineering factories across 
the country, the Communist Party was able to establish a 
political base (and its largest ever membership), Hinton claims, 
by successfully channelling working class hostility towards the 
bosses into a political campaign for a more vigorous war 
effort.1** Herbert's, too, was shrouded in this "red haze"; but 
the stewards' stance on discipline and their motives for joining 
the campaign for Joint Production Committees were, as I hope to 
show in the following pages, rather more mixed than some accounts 
of the period would suggest.
There is evidence that, to some degree, the stewards supported 
the drive for more production as part of the war effort. For 
example, on one occasion, the convenor and a section steward
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informed management that two men in the experimental department 
were poor time-keepers and "not pulling their weight in the 
gang".1-9" (Incidentally, the AEU district committee not only 
approved this action, they asked to be kept informed of the 
conduct of the two culprits.) At another time, the senior 
stewards felt it necessary to remind one manager that they had 
intervened in several disputes to prevent stoppages.1*0 (This may 
have been their wish rather than the practice in every instance; 
but it was a significant statement for all that.) On another 
occasion, the managers were able to use the stewards' concern for 
discipline by trying to get them to police their colleagues. 
Shepherd's minute reads:
"Spinner (an AEU senior steward - KG) said men were 
complaining bitterly regarding notice to close the shops 
during meal intervals (Note. This was due to damage to work 
caused during meal times) After consulting Mr Lloyd it was 
decided to withdraw the notice and stewards were asked for 
their influence to be used to discourage such action as is 
likely to cause damage."1*1
But they were no Stakhanovites, not exactly. Unlike Arthur Bxcell 
and his comrades at Morris Motors, they formed no shock 
brigades;1** nor did they try to persuade colleagues to abandon 
custom and practice in any other ways to achieve greater 
productivity. On the contrary, during 1942 the senior stewards 
negotiated a cut in working hours (the agreement gave "good 
timekeepers" Saturday afternoon off once a fortnight); obtained a
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"5 min early finishing for women"; and they complained when 
workers were suspended for minor infringements of discipline such 
as their presence in the canteen at "unauthorised times", and 
objected when a foreman told an apprentice that his work would 
have been treated as "sabotage in the occupied countries".3-33
On a number of occasions during 1942, the stewards complained 
when work was disrupted as a result of material shortages or 
production bottlenecks. However, it is not clear if their 
complaints were motivated by their members' pecuniary worries or 
a patriotic concern over the war effort (or a combination of 
both). All that can be said is that, again unlike some workers 
elsewhere at that time,*** there is no evidence to suggest that 
they ever accused the managers of deliberately sabotaging the war 
effort or tried in any way to discredit the managers' competence 
- least of all to secure popular support for a JPC. But then, 
good reasons for this lay in the character of Herbert management.
In May 1940, Herbert himself had talked about the "scandal of 
idle machines". In an article, which was, in essence, a call for 
full night-shift working in engineering factories across the 
country, he claimed that:
"Ever since the beginning of the war I have been a voice 
crying in the wilderness, trying...to rouse public opinion to 
the need for sweeping away all peacetime restrictions, 
whether imposed by the Home Office or the Trade Unions, so 
that the full use should be made of the only available
labour, of which thousands still remain unemployed."130 
He concluded with a rhetoric that Communist militants would not 
have been ashamed to use just one year later:x**
"If Government had known the fine gualities of our workers as 
I know them they would have said - this is a time for 
sacrifice and for service to the full and I know the 
sacrifices would have been made willingly and joyfully just 
as indeed they are being made now at this eleventh hour."137
As I hope I have shown, Sir Alfred was not slow in calling for 
such "sacrifices" from his own employees. However, the "fine 
qualities" of his workers did not persuade him to let them share 
in the government of his factories.
The JPC •campaign'
Nationally, the campaign for Joint Production Committees gathered 
momentum in the summer of 1941, immediately after the Nazi 
invasion of Russia. Despite this, engineering employers, both 
nationally and locally, kept up a fierce resistance for many 
months. In Coventry, it was not until March 1942, after Standard 
first broke rank, that JPCs got well under way.x,B Not 
surprisingly, the same issue was not raised at Herbert's until 
late March - in the train of the local successes. When 
management's initial response came in April it was not 
encouraging.
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Lloyd did not dismiss the proposal out o£ hand. He argued that, 
while he accepted JPCs in principle, at Herbert's the works' 
suggestion box was "an existing, satisfactory machinery" for 
consultation. He added the observation that there was a 
widespread "reluctance (among Herbert's employees to)...disclose 
information to production engineers" which convinced him that the 
flow of information would be one way at a JPC. "Many men", he 
said, "appeared to have no faith in management." (Needless to 
say, these frank remarks were never expressed in the Alfred 
Herbert News. They were hardly compatible with the myth of the 
"Herbert Spirit".) Harston, the TGWU's senior steward, countered 
with the opinion that "the men would give more support to 
production speed-up if (they) were represented on the 
Committee. "x"  When the subject was debated again, on 25 April, 
Warr elaborated on that theme by providing a few ideas on how to 
improve production.140 This may have been sufficient 
encouragement for the managers - though I suspect they were more 
persuaded by the possibility of arbitration141 - for, on 18 May, 
Lloyd tabled the constitution for a JPC. But this victory, 
ostensibly based on productionist arguments, carried its own cost 
as the shop stewards quickly discovered. When they complained 
about the low attendance payments, Lloyd answered that if the JPC 
achieved the kind of productivity gains they claimed then its 
representatives would soon be compensated by higher piecework 
earnings.14* Subsequently, the unions encountered other incidents 
which signalled management's opposition to this new partnership
with labour.
In June, on the eve of the first elections, the managers tried to 
put a safe man on the Committee and only relented when the shop 
stewards made it clear they would take the matter through the 
disputes procedure. On one occasion, in October, a JPC rep' was 
peremptorily ordered off a section.X4a A month later, when the 
convenor raised a question about representation of the Exhall 
plant. Shepherd replied that management would not accept an 
additional representative, "nor was it thought necessaiy that 
there should be a separate JPC for Exhall as this would mean 
another half day's time wasted."X44
Much later. Sir Alfred himself made clear that his opposition to 
JPCs was based on strong, ideological grounds. In February 1943, 
the Daily Telegraph published a letter in which he complained of 
the attempt by the Labour and Communist parties to "distract our 
minds by a series of attacks on our most tried and valued 
institutions." The focus of Sir Alfred's attack was the 
newly-published Beveridge Report; but he had these comments to 
make on JPCs:
"Even the Joint Committees, which industry has been forced to 
accept, approach very closely in many aspects to Soviets, and 
are continually seeking to usurp more and more of the true 
functions of management."149
Given these varying levels of managerial opposition, the stewards
at Herbert's - contrary to Arthur Excell's experience at Morris 
Motors - were never in any danger of being incorporated into the 
drive for the war effort through the JPC. Instead, the few 
fragmentary references in the minute books suggest that the 
stewards more frequently used the committee as a means to pursue 
objectives other than increased productivity.
In essence, it seems that the stewards tried to use the JPC as 
another forum for collective bargaining and a means of raising 
the status and authority of the shop stewards' organisation. 
Initially, some stewards appeared prepared to test the limits of 
that new authority on the shopfloor. This is certainly suggested 
in the quarrel I mentioned earlier, which ensued after one JPC 
representative was ordered off a section by front-line management 
because he had failed to "have a word in the office" before his 
visit.x*m But this was an isolated dispute and it seems that the 
JPC quickly settled down to its more modest role as an adjunct to 
the centralised, collective bargaining process. For example, the 
minutes for the shop committee meeting on 21 July 1943 contain 
this reference to JPC business:
"Matters referred to at last meeting were Ventilation which 
the firm promised to improve"
"Working hours Firm stated that there could be no reduction 
under the present hours which were fixed by Min. of Labour." 
Similarly, in February 1944, the shop committee accepted a 
recommendation from the AEU's District Secretary that the JPC be 
asked to consider the complaint that the canteen had stopped "the
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sale of tea and cakes to none but those living in Hostels".X4y
Possibly like many others in Coventry, the JPC at Edgwick quietly 
faded away. As the last reference to it in the minute books is 
dated 23 February 1944, this suggests that the committee met 
barely 20 times. Its silent demise could have been the product of 
several factors: management's hostility; workers' disappointments 
at its minimal achievements; and the onset of redundancies as war 
production slackened and rendered the committee obsolete.
Hinton has argued that, once established, JPCs "did more to 
contain than advance working class pressure on the frontier of 
control in the workplace".*4m This may have been the case in the 
aircraft factories or in plants re-fitted for war production; but 
I would suggest that elsewhere in the engineering industry, 
particularly in workplaces like Herbert's, where product and 
technique remained essentially unchanged, JPCs can hardly be said 
to have been constraining and may even have made a modest 
contribution to "working class pressure on the frontier of 
control".
•Red days' at Herbert's?
The year of 1942 was, Croucher claims, "the heyday of the 
Communist engineer".*49 From the previous summer until the end of
the 1942, a "red haze" settled over British politics. Membership 
of the Party peaked at 56,000, and at the beginning of 1943, he 
claimed, it had 33 factory branches in Coventry alone. Croucher 
explains that the Communist Party's popularity was, in part, a 
reflection of the very broad support for the Soviet Union, then 
engaged in a stubborn resistance to the Nazi invasion. The CP 
also gained strength through the success of the campaign for 
JPCs; a campaign led by Communist engineers. Lastly, Croucher 
argues, it was not coincidental that the period between the 
summer of 1941 and the end of 1942 was one in which skilled 
labour was "diluted up to almost the wartime maximum".190 
However, the little information available suggests that the "red 
haze" which settled over Edgwick may have concealed rather more 
than it revealed of the character of factory politics at 
Herbert's.
The stewards' support for the Coventry Anglo-Soviet Unity 
Committee is on record and,1*1 on one occasion, their enthusiasm 
for the Soviet Union prompted them to support the proposal that 
£500 from the local Air Raid Distress Fund should go to the 
appeal for medical aid to Russia;1-** an idea which was later 
rejected by the ARDF Committee itself. But this identification 
with the Soviet Union's struggle should not be interpreted as a 
sign of their political alignment with Russia. It is important to 
bear in mind that, despite the "tireless attendance of the local 
Communists",x** the Anglo-Soviet Committee was a popular, and not 
a class-based, organisation. Formed on the initiative of men like
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Alderman Sidney Stringer, George Briggs and George Hodgkinson, 
the Committee attracted attendance from the local EEA, the 
Chamber of Commerce, the WEA, the BMA and local councillors.
Hinton asserts that in 1942 the CP had "a significant presence" 
in 40 Coventry factories, "including all the larger ones". The 
phrase "significant presence" suggests that Communist militants 
were influential in shaping the politics of the shop committees 
in all those plants. But the evidence from the Herbert case study 
does not support this claim. In the oral testimony of former 
workers and managers, there is nothing to suggest that Communists 
enjoyed even a marginal presence in shopfloor politics at 
Edgwick; and in the stewards' minutes, the evidence indicates 
that, if anything, shopfloor politics had shifted to the right by 
1942.
You may recall that in the late 1930s, Bert Horton, Edgwick's 
first AEU convenor, supported Popular Front politics with 
considerable enthusiasm; and that, in one instance, this was 
endorsed by the other stewards when they barred a fascist 
activist from membership of the AEU. But in 1942, the new senior 
stewards who had replaced Bert - and the other early activists 
who quit Herbert's at the beginning of the War - were very 
different. For example, on 12 August, at about the time when the 
DC was pressing its convenors to organise "mass meetings" on the 
question of the delayed Second Front, the shop committee at 
Edgwick decided to write to the DC to protest at bi-monthly
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district meetings "being used for other things than union 
business" - right-wing Labour's customary oblique reference to 
political debate.xm* Similarly, the Trades Council's invitation 
to attend a meeting on "Women in Industry" was simply noted 
without comment in the minute books. In themselves, these 
fragments do not clearly establish the political character of the 
shop committee; but, given the absence of any minuted debates on 
left-wing politics, they suggest that during Britain's and 
Coventry's "red" days, right-wing Labourist politics were 
dominant at Edgwick.
If these observations are accepted, then I would also suggest 
that there is a need to revise the conventional account of 
Coventry's industrial politics during those ‘red days'. The best 
descriptions of that period come from Croucher and Hinton; but 
both writers were rather more concerned with following the shifts 
in the fortunes of the CP {and correlating them with changes in 
the class character of its policies) than in trying to 
characterise factory politics in engineering shops across the 
city. This, I believe, is particularly true in Hinton's case. He 
provides an uncritical account of the CP's early successes 
because he is concerned with making a point about the Party's 
politics and how its abandonment of class-based policies in the 
closing years of the War was largely responsible for its 
similarly rapid decline. Hence, both writers talk of the CP's 
dominance of the AEU District Committee and the "entrenched 
opposition of a well-organised right-wing leadership" without
explaining the latter's survival.XBB Vas it simply a guestion of 
fixing the organisation, as Hinton's phrase implies, or was there 
a political base for that opposition within the local engineering 
factories? I would suggest that shopfloor organisations such as 
that at Edgwick provided a durable political base for the union 
officials.
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Women at Herbert's
Another major theme in both Tolliday's and Croucher's accounts of 
the engineering industry during the War is the political impact 
of the presence of female dilutees. The available material on 
Herbert's in 1942 is too thin to explore this theme here in all 
but a summary fashion.
The evidence suggests that it was an unexceptional year for women 
workers at Herbert's. They were infrequently mentioned in the 
records of either the shop committee or management, and in those 
rare references they usually embodied long-standing problems for 
both sides. The "two girls at Exhall", who put their hats on five 
minutes before time, were one more illustration of the 
disciplinary problems women posed for management; and in October, 
when the shop stewards were asked if their members would continue 
to oppose the extension of "women in the toolroom",XBB they were 
reminded of the role of women workers as an instrument of
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dilution and as a threat to the skilled status of male workers.
I would argue that it is possible to exaggerate women's 
contribution to the plant's disciplinary problems. They may have 
found it difficult to accomodate themselves to the long hours of 
repetitive, tedious labour that were expected of them; but it 
appears that their resistance was confined to an absenteeism 
which was identified as a major problem with married women. 
However, at a very early date the managers themselves recognised 
this was largely due to the pressures of domestic labour.XB7 In 
the following year the records detail some minor breaches of 
discipline at work such as getting ready for home early 
(mentioned earlier) or extending the work breaks by a few 
minutes;XB# but, there is nothing to indicate management ever 
felt inclined to emulate Morris Motors and encourage the 
unionisation of women as a means of controlling them, or even to 
ask the stewards to "use their influence" for that purpose (as 
they did when it came to disciplining other sections of the 
workforce).XB*
Similarly, I would also suggest that it is possible to exaggerate 
the role of women as dilutees at Herbert's. Labour force 
statistics, fragmentary though they are, suggest that, despite 
the early introduction of female dilutees, by 1940 women still 
constituted a relatively small proportion (perhaps 10%) of the 
workforce at Edgwick.1*0 Their presence in the toolroom, the 
AEU's stronghold, may have sent shock waves through the Union and
constituted a major grievance throughout the War; but there is no 
evidence to suggest management was able to exploit them 
successfully as a means of de-skilling craft work. Instead, I 
would argue that it was much more a reflection of the 
heterogeneous character of work in that section.
If women workers did not pose any substantial problems for the 
shopfloor organisation - either as reluctant conscripts to the 
war effort or as dilutees - it seems that the shop stewards' 
response to women's grievancies was miminal and patronising. For 
example, they negotiated a five-minute early finish for women and 
in the following year they also persuaded management to hire the 
services of a hairdresser for the night-shift - a concession 
quickly withdrawn because of lack of trade.1*1 Also in 1943, the 
TGWU stewards raised a grievance about the low pay rates of women 
on gang piecework. Marston complained that women's piecework 
bonuses were calculated on a base rate of 16/- when it should 
have been nine shillings more. Management asked him to await the 
outcome of a Works Conference on the same dispute at Standard 
Motors; but he was also told that "to use (the higher base rate) 
for gangs would mean that the women would benefit at the expense 
of the men".** Though the records are ambiguous, it seems the 
Union accepted the status quo "until such time as individual 
piecework is extended" to all women workers.x**
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Surviving the Peace: 1944-49
As early as October 1943, the peak year of production, senior 
management began discussions with government officials on 
"subtantial reductions of output".xm* These meetings probably 
deepened the managers' fears of a repetition of the depression 
that followed the First World War.x*B However, the evidence 
indicates that relatively few jobs were lost at Edgwick, and six 
months after the War management and unions had to cope with the 
consequences of a quite unexpected problem: chronic labour 
shortages.
The fragmentary statistics available suggest that between July 
1944 and February 1946, there was a small but steady loss of jobs 
at the main works. From 5518 in July 1944, the labour force 
dwindled to 4686 in November 1945 (a monthly job-loss of 52), and 
to 4429 by February 1 9 4 6 . In those last four months, the rate 
of job-losses had accelerated to 64 per month; but this may have 
been due to the lifting of the EWO regulations and the 
consequent, voluntary flight of labour from Herbert's. The 
financial data does not exactly match these trends. The fact that 
the costs of "net shop labour" in May 1945 were 33% lower than 
the monthly average for 1943-44 suggests that many more workers 
left Herbert's before the conclusion of the Warfxmy but this 
discrepancy may be explained by the redundancies at the dispersal 
factories at Cosby and Earl Shilton. By January 1946, all 
production had ceased at Cosby and some of the plant removed from
Earl Shilton, its closure only delayed by the lack o£ space at a 
newly-acquired site on Red Lane, Coventry.(Expansion also 
took place at Exhall to accomodate the work from Cosby;ia* but 
there is no other information on redundancies at that or at the 
Lutterworth plant which was also retained by Herbert's.
Similarly, there is no information on the fate of the plants at 
Warwick and Glasgow.)
No labour force statistics are available for the remaining years 
of the 1940s; but the absence of any reference to redundancies in 
management's records, or in the shop stewards' minutes, after 
January 1946 shows that redundancies were not an issue for either 
side from that date, and lends support to the view that if any 
job-losses took place at Edgwick at all they were few in number. 
This relatively uneventful transition to peacetime production was 
probably due to two factors: first, apart from some warning signs 
of a conservatism in both product design and technique,170 
management did not need to change either of these to accomodate 
the post-war markets; second, (and clearly related to the first) 
defence orders continued to provide Herbert's with a substantial 
buffer against "normal, commercial conditions" throughout the 
1940s. Two other features of the war-related redundancies at 
Edgwick are worth commenting on here: they were applied unevenly 
and they were complex in origin.
In some sections of the machine shop, individual workers were 
being made redundant, following a decline in orders, as early as
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June 1944.1-71 A year later, a chronic shortage of labour in the 
foundry - where it was calculated that output could be increased 
40% - prompted management to put in a request for Italian war 
prisoners on one occasion.1-71 There is also evidence that the 
managers went to some trouble to retain skilled workers at the 
expense of other grades,1-71 and tried to substitute women workers 
for semi-skilled, male operators.1-74
The causes of the cutbacks were similarly complex. Despite 
warnings about "substantial reductions" in orders, this factor 
seems to have had a marginal impact on jobs at Edgwick. Instead, 
at the beginning of 1944, management forecast reductions in 
output as a consequence of the conscription of workers for the 
Second Front,1-79 and these ‘redundancies' took their toll at a 
steady rate throughout the closing years of the War. Further, it 
appears that other redundancies were caused by something 
management had not anticipated (or perhaps refused to discuss): 
war weariness.
In August 1945, the finance director complained that, while 
orders were higher than in the previous six months, the value of 
production had fallen by 46% during the same period.1-79 This 
decline was left unexplained; but its effects could not be 
ignored. Six months later. Sir Alfred complained of "having to 
reduce our fitters because the supply of work for them from the 
Foundry and Machine Shop is insufficient".1-7-7 I attribute much of 
management's difficulties in this area to a kind of war weariness
for what are perhaps the obvious reasons. Many workers had 
experienced "excessive and systematic overtime" at Edgwick since 
the late 1930s (some even earlier than that); for the most part 
their work was repetitive but demanding; many employees (not just 
the women) felt they were Herbert's conscripts; and yet, despite 
all this, disciplinary problems were raised relatively 
infrequently. If the workers at Herbert's were not Stakhanovites 
exactly, they had made their own kind of contribution to the war 
effort. Now that the hostilities in Europe were coming to an end, 
many employees were no longer prepared to continue making the 
same sacrificies. I would suggest that evidence of this attitude 
is contained in one minute which recorded a director's 
observation, in August 1945, that while he had resorted to using 
overtime in the machine shop to balance work across the plant, 
"our workpeople do not like it".xrm However, I would not argue 
that war weariness was the only reason for opposition to overtime 
during that period. Some machinists must also have resented 
management's refusal to countenance the unions' request to cut 
the working week to 52 hours while colleagues were being made 
redundant.iym
From a very early date, possibly the first months of 1946, the 
documentary evidence suggests that management became far more 
concerned about how to recruit and retain labour - especially 
skilled labour - than with redundancies. As I indicated earlier, 
it seems that, initially, this problem was localised around a few 
sections, notably the foundry; but oral testimony, and references
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in the stewards' minutes (which record instances of the voluntary 
departure of section stewards and complaints about low gang rates 
in the machine shop which arose from a high turnover of labour) 
suggest that labour shortages became more widespread very 
quickly. One immediate response to these difficulties was to 
increase overtime despite its unpopularity with the shopfloor at 
that time; another was an attempt to expand the night-shift - 
which the managers recognised as even more unpopular;x"° and a 
third remedy was to retain some female dilutees. However, it 
seems that, to some extent before the conclusion of the War, 
management had anticipated the flight of skilled labour from the 
plant after de-regulation and took steps to develop a longer-term 
response, namely, reform the piecework payment systems.
One reform was the changeover from a monthly to a weekly bonus 
system which was phased in from the end of 1945. However, the 
principal change was the move to scrap the gang piecework system 
and re-introduce the experiment with IPW. As mentioned earlier, 
the first attempt had ended very quickly for reasons not entirely 
clear from the records. This second attempt was more successful 
and its initial progress rapid. Commenced shortly before the end 
of the War, it appears that by October 1945, the Exhall plant and 
all female piece-workers at the main works had moved onto IPW.X"X 
However, this pace was suddenly lost when management extended the 
new payment system to gangs of male piece-workers at Edgwick. The 
stewards' minutes suggest that it took a full year to put the 
first section. Bar Lathes, onto IPW;1"* Surface Grinding followed
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in January 1947 and Factory Bar Lathe later that same year;1-3 
the changeover for the Chucking section did not take place until 
February 1949.x"4 The available records provide no further 
details on the extension of individual piecework, so I cannot say 
whether it eventually covered the all pieceworkers in the machine 
shop. It is clear, however, that management made no attempt to 
extend IPW to the fitting shop. The story suggested by these 
scattered references is supported by the recollection of Bernard 
Vail, one of the few rate-fixers involved in re-timing jobs for 
IPW during those years. He recalled an occasion at the end of the 
1960s when a consultant told a works meeting that he would "put 
Edgwick on a proper basis" in rather less time:
"And this Jimmy Houston, he stood up and said: 'I'm going to 
do the whole lot in three months.• Well, it had took us about 
three years to do one bay. Ve laughed; we actually laughed at 
his face! So ridiculous!"
I suggested earlier that the re-introduction of IPW was part of a 
response to labour shortages. However, minutes of the directors' 
debates suggests that the senior managers hoped to fulfil a 
number of objectives through individual piecework, some of which 
were contradictory and reflected conflicting interests within 
management.
There appears to have been unanimity on the need to rationalise 
the payment system, that is, investigate piecework prices "very 
thoroughly" and "re-consider" the Rate Fixing Department.X"B The
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policy of maintaining pre-war job-prices in a period of 
wage-inflation had produced a situation in which, in Sir Alfred's 
words, "it was impossible to get work done by what I call 
legitimate piece-work"; piecework had become "merely day work 
plus a bonus".xmm However, these were not new discoveries for 
senior management. In the early years of the War, it was known 
that the gang system had produced a costing system which was 
untransferable either to Herbert's sub-contractors or even its 
own dispersal plants. What were new reasons and gave management 
sufficient incentive to abandon gang piecework were: firstly, the 
increasing pressure from women workers for a more equitable 
piecework bonus system (which, as the managers themselves had 
insisted in earlier talks with the unions, would only be achieved 
through transfers to individual piecework); secondly, the 
anticipated labour drain after de-regulation; and, lastly, the 
need for economies in response to the austerities of the post-war 
world. Not surprisingly, differences emerged within management, 
especially over these last two issues. While the finance manager 
gave priority to the drive to eliminate the "excessive claims", 
the covert "subsidies"1"-* 'suddenly' discovered within the old 
payment systems, one production manager expressed an enthusiasm 
for higher piecework prices (as the means of achieveing higher 
productivity),1"" and another appeared positively sanguine over 
the prospect of employing more works staff as a consequence of 
the change-over to IPW.1"" There were also differences over the 
pace of change: the production managers were keen to report 
progress; but others, notably Sir Alfred, called for
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"moderation".
These points of consensus and conflict help to explain the uneven 
progress of IPtf at Edgwick. Progress was rapid in women's 
piecework gangs because, I would suggest, change could be 
obtained cheaply: the new prices and supervisory costs would have 
been relatively low. It was a bonus for management that the new 
payment system could also be presented to the women as the 
solution to their grievancies over the iniquitous division of the 
gang bonus. Following this logic, it could be said that the 
remarkably slow spread of IPW among male pieceworkers - despite 
the fact that the pay system was tested out with gangs of 
semi-skilled machinists first who, presumably, had relatively 
little power to manipulate events in their favour - was largely a 
consequence of an internal, managerial conflict, a reluctance by 
important sections of management (including the "Sole Governing 
Director") to endorse an approach which required higher job 
prices and an expansion of supervisory staff.
The same tangle of conflicting objectives is evident in 
management's attitude towards the workplace organisation at 
Edgwick. In a variety of ways, the senior managers made it clear 
that the state-sponsored corporatism of the *People's War' was at 
an end. At the first opportunity, the stewards were informed they 
would no longer be paid for their time while on trade union 
business.x,° In January 1946, and again in June that same year, 
several prominent stewards were dismissed in circumstances which
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suggested they had been "victimised" for their trade union 
activities.x*x Then in May that year, the convenor was obliged to 
go onto the night-shift for five weeks.x** This new attitude to 
the shop committee was also reflected in a host of less direct 
ways. For example, in August, management re-introduced "pre-war 
practices" on the treatment of late arrivals without any prior 
consultation with the unions.x*" However, management's 
counter-offensive did not amount to an attempt to smash the 
shopfloor organisation. Instead, it seems that the senior
/
managers tolerated its continued existence for two reasons.
Firstly, there was no real need to do otherwide: past or present, 
the stewards' committee at Edgwick was not a major threat to 
managerial power on the shopfloor. Secondly, as I explained 
before, the transition to peacetime production at Edgwick was 
relatively uneventful. In contrast to Austin's aero works.
Radiator's subsidiary where Arthur Excell worked, or Morris'
Metal Produce Recovery Department at Cowley where peacetime 
conditions obliged managers to close units or radically transform 
their product-line, Herbert's management faced a product market 
that encouraged them to keep disruption to a minimum. In this 
context, it is easy to imagine the managers calculated that a 
drive to smash the shopfloor organisation could become 
counter-productive. It risked a further decline in productivity, 
an increase in the flow of skilled labour from the plant, and 
deprived management of one (albeit unreliable) gauge of workers' 
attitudes. (I would suggest that broadly similar circumstances 
persuaded other engineering employers in Coventry to temper their
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offensive against the unions during the transition to peacetime 
production and so acquiesce in the survival of the shopfloor 
organisations in their plants.)1*4
Though management tolerated the shopfloor organisation, the 
stewards must have been discouraged by the new politics of 
post-war Edgwick. The response of section stewards who, like Bro 
Cobble, resigned and sought work elsewhere was entirely 
rational:1*9 after May 1946 (the date when EWO regulations 
formerly came to an end), they were free to seek higher wages and 
a less authoritarian managerial regime elsewhere. Warr's response 
was also understandable. At the beginning of 1946, he stood down 
as works convenor (though the records suggest he remained a 
powerful ‘fixer' in shopfloor for the duration of his apparent 
retirement). Warr explained that he felt that he should devote 
more time to his new duties as a Labour councillor in 
Nuneaton.x** This (partial) escape from the unpromising struggles 
of the factory to the wider opportunities of municipal politics 
can be compared with Tommy Harris' political career many years 
before. Hinton's study of Labourism suggests that it was a 
predictable line of retreat for a right-wing Labour politician.
The national fuel crisis in the winter of 1947 gave the stewards 
a brief respite. During those few months, management suddenly 
discovered an uncharacteristic enthusiasm for factory-based 
corporatism. For example, in January 1947, the managers summoned 
a "special meeting" of the JPC. It was probably the first time
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this august body had met since 1944. IC so, the experiment paid 
off handsomly, for on that occasion the convenor proposed a 
reduction in shop températures.1-*'' Vhen emergency power cuts were 
imposed, from mid-March to May, this new politics seemed to 
blossom: the stewards were invited to hold their meetings in the 
factory's reading room, granted exclusive use of a noticeboard1** 
- something the committee had requested on a number of occasions 
since 19381** - and consulted over the implementation of district 
agreements on overtime.
Though these concessions were modest when compared with those 
offered by a later generation of Herbert managers, they were 
significantly better than any granted either before or during the 
Var. Perhaps they were prompted by fears of demands for further 
sacrifices from industry up to, and including, nationalisation. 
After the Beveridge Report, Sir Alfred made frequent references 
to that "sinister plan" to extend "totalitarian principles" to 
the control of industry and Attlee's nationalisation programme 
could only have confirmed his worst fears.900 However, I would 
suggest that the managers were prompted by more domestic 
considerations.
In the previous year there had been (re-assuring) signs that 
right-wing politics had become further entrenched in the shop 
committee's discourse. Por example, in June 1946, they wrote a 
protest letter on the AEU's decision to support the Communist 
Party's affiliation to the Labour Party.901 Then, in August, they
agreed to let "He on the table" a letter from the Trades Council 
on "Franco Spain".)303 There must have been other, less tangible 
signs which suggested that, if approached correctly, the senior 
stewards would be more than sympathetic to management's 
difficulties; that they would tolerate - sometimes even propose - 
a cut in shop temperatures, an increase in the night-shift and a 
combination of excessive overtime in some sections with short 
time in others.
Whatever the motive, it is clear that the senior managers decided 
not to antagonise the unions for the duration of the emergency. 
However, immediately the crisis had passed, the old order was 
restored. The stewards were obliged to vacate the reading 
room;*03 management resumed its studied indifference to union 
complaints about violations of the overtime agreement and the 
continued presence of a dilutee in the toolroom; and the JPC 
disappeared as quickly as it had come. Understandably, morale 
within the shopfloor organisation resumed its downward slide: in 
June and July several meetings were inquorate; and in October,
Bro. Buxton, Edgwick's new works convenor, staged his own form of 
protest. Complaining bitterly that "management had let him down 
rather badly", he resigned.30* A few weeks later, Buxton was 
persuaded to resume his duties and, indeed, he stayed in office 
until December 1949; but it seems that the situation did not 
improve significantly during those last two years. The turnover 
of both section stewards and committee officers remained 
exceptionally high - which prompted Buxton to complain of a
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"falling off on the numbers of shop stewards representing our 
members at AH Ltd"*09 - and the leadership appeared increasingly 
bereft of ideas. The minutes of committee meetings during those 
closing years of the 1940s suggest that the organisation was 
simply marking time, waiting for happier moments. Shortly after 
Cadraan - significantly, a section steward from the ‘factory’ and 
not the toolroom - became convenor, the committee held a "lengthy 
discussion on...the low rates of wages being paid at AH in 
comparison to other firms in the City".3om In June 1950, a 
"special meeting" of the shop stewards marked the start of a "low 
wage campaign".30"7 However, by this time the senior managers had 
reached the same conclusion over pay and also recognised the need 
to revive, to a very limited extent, the corporatist politics of 
1947; but this will be discussed in the next chapter.
Conclusions ;
While it is true that the unions made only "restricted and 
partial gains" at Edgwick, the War did have a major impact on 
factory politics there. The senior managers were obliged to make 
a series of concessions and mould the company's variant of 
employer paternalism to incorporate the existence of a shop 
stewards' organisation. Given the unchanged character of the 
production process at Edgwick and the strength of the paternalist 
ideology - buttressed by the politics of the gang system - in the
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minds of large sections of the workforce , these concessions 
should not be belittled. Nonetheless, they were certainly less 
spectacular than the gains secured by engineering workers at some 
of the other, large factories in Coventry, and must have 
discouraged the militants who had rebuilt the shop stewards' 
organisation in the mid-1930s. The fragmentary evidence suggests 
that by 1942 most of these early activists had either quit 
Herbert's, or accepted transfers to neighbouring plants and, in 
so doing, took with them their own kind of leftist politics.
Those who remained, and emerged as the organisation's new 
leadership, were men who could more readily accomodate themselves 
to the peripheral role management was prepared to offer the 
unions.
After the War, the managers quickly rolled back some of those 
gains, limited though they were, and encouraged the departure of 
several activists. But no attempt was made to smash the shopfloor 
organisation, probably because it was not worth risking a further 
decline in productivity and exacerbating the firm's labour 
shortages. In the early months of 1947, a form of corporatism 
briefly flourished once again. Unprecedented concessions were 
made to secure the senior stewards' support for cuts deemed 
necessary to survive the crisis caused by shortages of fuel and 
materials (and possibly appease a threatening Labour government). 
Immediately after this crisis had passed, most of those 
concessions were snatched away and the workplace organisation 
relapsed into a crisis of confidence. Signs of a recovery of
morale were not evident until 1950; but by this time, the senior 
managers had also begun to re-appraise their attitude towards the 
unions.
Though suggested, relatively little attention was given in this 
chapter to the resilience of a certain set of relationships 
between managers and skilled workers and between the latter and 
other sections of the workforce. Despite the shocks and 
challenges it suffered - the politics of the new activists who 
re-built the organisation outside the craft enclave of the 
patternshop; the war and the attempts at dilution and forms of 
state-sponsored corporatism that came with it; followed by 
redundancies and the restoration of pre-war practices - this 
structure endured. Its submersion in this chapter is not intended 
to reflect its significance in an assessment of the character of 
workplace politics at Edgwick. On the contrary, I would argue - 
and the purpose of the next chapter is to demonstrate - that this 
structure or set of relationships provides another important clue 
to the frail and quiescent character of the shop stewards' 
organisation on into the 1960s and beyond.
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CHAPTER SIX: DECLINE AND CHANGE IN A POST-VAR VORLD.
Introduction
The previous chapter outlined the development of the shop 
stewards' organisation and the broad features of its politics 
during its early years at Edgwick. The "limited and partial 
gains" the organisation made during the war and the right-wing 
politics of its leadership were contrasted with the conventional, 
celebratory accounts of shop stewards' activities during the war. 
These findings were explained, principally, in terms of features 
of the fragmented character of the labour process, the anti-union 
stance of the employer, and the character of state interventions 
in industry. Though suggested, little attention was given to the 
influence of the set of relationships between managers and 
skilled workers and between the latter and other groups of 
workers at Edgwick and its resilience in the face of various 
shocks and challenges. Continuing the narrative into the 1950s 
and 1960s, this chapter will explore that those relationships in 
some detail through an analysis of the sectional distinctiveness 
of the labour process and union organisation. In particular, I 
will try to show that the weak shopfloor organisation and 
"somnolent" character of the workforce reflected the Interests of 
those sections at the top of the plant's labour hierarchy.
This task is attempted in four parts. The first sets the scene by 
pointing out the main features of Herbert's product market and 
management's response to it during the 1950s. The second 
discusses the shop stewards' response to management's cautious 
moves towards an accomodation with the workplace organisation.
The third part looks in some detail at the various sections 
within the workforce to explain its apparent "somnolence" and its 
tenuous links with the shop stewards' committee. The fourth and 
final part evaluates the significance of certain shifts in 
shopfloor politics as the dominance of the toolmakers is finally 
broken. Overall, then, the chapter seeks to provide a cumulative 
account of the interplay between management policies, the 
sectional character of both work organisation and shopfloor 
unionism, and the long stability and eventual partial re-casting 
of the stewards' organisation during the 1960s.
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A Management-Created Terrain 
Herbert's product market
During the early part of 1950s, Herbert's continued to enjoy a 
boom that had started twenty years earlier. The company 
benefitted from a set of uniquely favourable circumstances that 
brought an 'Indian summer' to many machine tool firms in Britain, 
namely: the revival of the defence industry; the dismemberment of 
the German machine tool industry and the temporary elimination of
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other rivals in a war-devastated Europe; and the fact that 
machine tool builders in both the USA and the USSR were oriented 
towards their own vast internal markets.x Years later, a sales 
executive told Williams "semi-Jocularly" that the company's 
attitude to its customers then was thus:
"We told them they could have a machine if they were prepared 
to wait a year for it and if they promised to look after 
it.”
But it was a false complacency. By the middle of the decade, the 
revival of the European industry was well under way, a number of 
American firms were establishing manufacturing subsidiaries in 
Britain as part of a drive to expand sales in western Europe, and 
there was concern that the Soviet Union would inevitably switch 
some of its enormous productive capacity to export markets." 
Herbert's products, increasingly uncompetitive both at home and 
abroad, were taking a declining share of those markets.4 But the 
fact that it was still a relative decline helped Sir Alfred to 
follow his own inclination and resist pressure for change. Plans 
for the introduction of group technology were deferred 
indefinitely; there was minimal investment in new plant and 
machinery; and reports on the technical obsolescence of Herbert 
designs were ignored. Sir Alfred's complacency during those years 
contrasts strongly with those celebratory accounts of his early 
years which describe his appetite for innovation, his readiness 
to exploit new designs, new techniques and new commercial 
opportunities." The Chairman justified his conservatism by 
pointing to the backlog of orders and the continuing accumulation
of profits; but other factors may have influenced his judgement. 
To a limited extent, it may have been a product of the 
technological conservatism of Herbert's domestic customers, 
especially the British car industry. But I would argue that the 
founder's private circumstances, his patriarchal ideas on women's 
roles, and the 'masculine' ideology of the industry were more 
important factors.
By the 1950s, Sir Alfred was in his eighties and without a son to 
inherit control of the business. It is unlikely that he ever 
considered his daughter, Gladys, as a suitable heir to the 
business, though not simply because of his own attitudes on 
gender roles. Contrary to the impression given in an essay by 
Thoms and Donnelly,* Sir Alfred was prepared verbally to 
challenge stereotypes about women's potential abilities as 
engineering workers. For example, in one of his house journals, 
he cited approvingly the case of a munitions factory manager who, 
during the 1914-18 War, dismissed all the turret lathe operators 
and "replaced them with hefty women, who produced about twice the 
output. *.T However, he was very much a conformist in practice.
The women among his employees were confined to the traditional 
occupations: cleaning, cooking, routine office work, packing, and 
performing machine work that required "fine perception and manual 
dexterity*.* More Importantly, the women in his family conformed 
to roles prescribed by a rigidly patriarchal system such as 
visiting sick employees, attending local church services and 
various social functions organised by the firm. Davies has argued
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that Sir Alfred consciously used both wife and daughter to 
portray his business as a caring, family firn. But even if he had 
been prepared to free his daughter from the strait jacket of that 
ideological role and considered training her for management, he 
would have been inhibited by the attitudes of his employees and 
fellow employers, and his own ideas on management training which 
involved a lengthy apprenticeship on the shopfloor. Given, then, 
his age and the absence of a suitable heir, it is hardly 
surprising that Sir Alfred appeared to have little interest in 
the long-term prospects of his company.
Transformations of corporatism at Herbert's
At the conclusion of the previous chapter it was noted that 
during the immediate post-war years - except for a few months 
during the national fuel crisis in 1947 when something 
reminiscent of the state-sponsored corporatism of the war years 
seemed to flourish once again - the shop stewards had to treat 
with a management determined to restore "pre-war practices". 
Piecing together the story from both the shop stewards' minutes 
and those of the Herbert directors, it is clear that management 
maintained this 'tough' line so long as it remained preoccupied 
with making adjustments to the austerities of the post-war world. 
However, towards the end of the 1940s, circumstances changed 
again when the Government revived its defence programme and the
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international product markets, briefly free of any serious 
competition from Herbert's major rivals abroad, expanded in 
response to the demands of Europe's post-war reconstruction. The 
new orders reversed Herbert's fortunes and, once again, the 
managers had to cope with a desperate shortage of labour, 
particularly skilled labour, at Edgwick.
At the beginning of 1950, management's initial response to the 
problem of labour shortages was to push for an increase in 
Edgwick's night-shift; but this tactic was quickly abandoned when 
the directors realised that it actually increased the exodus of 
skilled labour from the plant.* Another tactic was to 
sub-contract work;10 but this, too, proved unsatisfactory. There 
were a number of technical difficulties and later complaints that 
the sub-contractors' products were "costing a great deal more 
than making them In our own works".11 Eventually, and with 
obvious reluctance, the board reached the conclusion that it 
would have to offer higher pay to its employees.1*
The shop stewards' minutes show that these deliberations 
coincided with a gradual softening in management's stance towards 
the trades unions. In July 1950, the works director, Harrison, 
appeared at a meeting of the shop committee and spoke about the 
company's intention to Implement a new bonus scheme which would 
significantly raise earnings at Edgwick. The available records 
suggest this intervention was unprecedented. After a vague sketch 
of the proposed payment scheme, the director concluded his speech
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by expressing the hope that his visit would not be the last as 
"he was prepared to meet the stewards at any of their monthly 
meetings and hoped by so doing to create that goodwill between 
Management and men which was so necessary for the benefit of 
both."*-3 For some reason, Harrison did not fulfill his promise; 
but the shop committee quietly waited for further news until 
October when the convenor warned that the "men are getting 
impatient”.19 This appeared sufficient to prompt two directors 
and the "industrial officer" to attend the very next meeting and 
present the final arrangements for the pay offer - which the 
committee promptly accepted.
During the 1950s the senior managers attended only a few more 
committee meetings; but on each occasion they intervened on key 
issues. In August 1957, they attended one gathering to outline 
(and presumably justify) changes in the pay structure.19 Exactly 
a year later, they returned to explain why redundancies were 
necessary.19 They came once again in February 1960 to present 
their plans for another major revision to the pay structure.17
In addition to their attendance at committee meetings, there were 
other visible signs of the managers' 'softening' attitude towards 
the unions. In the early 1950s, the works convenor began to 
receive pay for time spent on union business. Shortly afterwards, 
the same concession was granted to the shop committee's 
secretary.
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The motives for this rapproachment are not recorded on any 
available management records. However, it is not difficult to 
imagine ways in which such a reconciliation could have proved 
very useful to the managers.
Though Sir Alfred had reached his eighties by this time and 
visited Edgwick less and less frequently, he remained very much 
the firm's "Sole and Governing Director". The other directors, 
all veteran Herbert employees, were careful to operate within the 
constraints set by his managerial philosophy. One of those 
constraints was Sir Alfred's determination to keep a tight 
control on piecework prices, even in the face of strong 
competition for labour. During the Var, his managers had tried to 
resolve this contradiction by being "liberal" on claims for 
non-productive work.** Roger Williams' research shows that the 
shop bonus, or "Alfred Herbert Award" as it was called, was used 
to fulfill the same function in the 1960s. He found that 
increases in the shop bonus kept pay within "striking distance" 
of the district average.x* Prom the fragmentary data available in 
management and union records, it appears that this same device 
was used from T950 onwards.*°
Of course, none of this explains why management 'awarded' those 
increases through negotiations with the unions. They could have 
raised the shop bonus without recourse to the shop stewards - but 
this would have been an unprofitable line to follow for three 
reasons. First, the increases were far too small to persuade
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workers non-unlonlsm ‘paid'. Second, it suited management to 
maintain its "hard gaffers" front - to keep tight control over 
job prices and a host of other labour issues - and that was more 
easily achieved if the pay increases were seen to be the product 
of tough bargaining with the unions. Third, and last, if the 
increases could be used to purchase an accomodation with the shop 
committee or, more precisely, with key members of that committee, 
then that opportunity was not to be missed. In fact, the records 
indicate that the senior managers fostered a special relationship 
with the AEU at the expense of the TGWU, and with a few shop 
stewards at the expense of others, in a way that must have been 
calculated to re-inforce the sectional divisions between workers 
and disable the shopfloor organisation.
Shortages of skilled labour lay behind the limited accomodation 
with the stewards of skilled men, but management remained hostile 
to unionism among other workers throughout this period. For 
example, Phil Barnes, a middle-level manager, described the 
packers in a way in which sexist attitudes were tangled with 
ideas about hierarchies of skill:
"They were only in TGWU, or something - all the rest were in 
AEU, you see, skilled men, you see...There were two distinct 
unions, you see...None of the poles would meet. The women In 
the packing were just in TGWU - the scrubbers' union..."*1-
Hore tangible evidence of managerial opposition to the 
"scrubbers' union" is provided by the firm's refusal to pay for
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any o£ the trade union activities of the deputy convenor - a 
position normally occupied by the senior TGWJ steward - until 
sometime in the 1960s despite the fact that the convenor and 
committee secretary, both members of the AEU, enjoyed this 
concession from the early 1950s.
In addition to their opposition to the TGVU, the managers also 
acted in ways that strengthened the position of the two senior 
AEU stewards, Feltham and Varr, within the shopfloor organisation 
at the expense of the other shop stewards. The firm refused to 
compensate the section stewards for loss of earnings when they 
attended committee meetings. Shopfloor collections for charities 
- always an excellent excuse for stewards to get out and talk to 
their membership during company time - were banned. Even the more 
'legitimate' forms of self-activity were discouraged. Vic Brown, 
a section steward in the main fitting shop, recalled:
"they didn't like the blokes leaving the shopfloor, even the 
shop stewards to go up, you see. But (the convenor) was in 
the toolroom, and he could get up there."**
But Vic did not question how this situation arose. The favoured 
status of the convenor seemed a matter of convenience. It 
appeared easier for management to treat with the convenor and the 
secretary - and pay them for loss of earnings while in 
negotiations - because both officers worked in the toolroom which 
had switched to a daywork system in 1950. Nonetheless, Vic felt 
frustrated by the limited scope to his work as a representative: 
"you'd get nowhere. No natter what you took up, they took no
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notice of you; they would a convenor, but the shop steward 
didn't have a lot to say."
If management's intention was to undermine the section stewards' 
self-confidence as members of a collective organisation and make 
them dependent on the negotiating skills of the convenor, it 
appeared to work extremely well. On routine grievances, Varr was 
allowed to approach works management on his own, and even on 
major issues, such as the shop bonus, he was expected to fix some 
kind of deal. As Vic Brown put it, Warr was "a cadger" who would 
"give a bit to take a bit":
"He used to go up after something.. .and you didn't expect 
anything; but he'd come back with a little bit, enough to 
satisfy. And I think that he had a rapport with the 
management. They knew, you know.. .They knew what the other 
was prepared to give and take, you know."
Prom management's position, Herbert's rather restricted form of 
employer-sponsored corporatism was essentially a pragmatic 
response to the chronic shortage of skilled labour experienced by 
the company throughout the 1950s. It involved a recognition of 
workplace organisation at Edgwick; but a recognition that was 
very much on the company's terms. It suited the managers to 
encourage the "sober trade unionists"*" within that organisation, 
those with a preference for conciliation rather than 
confrontation, those with an individualistic 'mister fix-it' 
approach to factory politics. Prom the little Information
provided by the minute books and the recollections of other 
workers, it appears that Freddy Warr, who resumed office as works 
convenor in 1950 and stayed there for the next 11 years, seemed 
to match management's needs more than adequately.
The Stewards' Response
Varr was, as Vic said, "a cadger". He had a knack of securing 
compromise deals that were sufficient to avoid a dispute and, in 
some of the incidents I shall relate later, it is clear that he 
sought to undermine his colleagues' resolve to take strike action 
when his own skills as a "cadger" failed. In addition, there is 
no doubt that, irrespective of the considerable status he enjoyed 
as a long-service toolroom worker and an experienced Labour 
councillor, Varr was also very competent as a political 'fixer'. 
His influence was evident even during the immediate postwar years 
when he was formally ‘out of office'. Last, and certainly not 
least, Warr was positively enthusiastic over management's 
gingerly embrace of the shop stewards' organisation, as the 
following incident suggests.
In May 1959, Valter Shepherd resigned as Herbert's first 
Industrial Relations Officer. At that time, the machine tool 
industry was in the depth of a trade recession and Herbert's had 
already dismissed several hundred workers at Edgwick (with plans 
for more to follow). But this did not discourage the committee
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from marking Shepherd's (voluntary) departure with the 
presentation of a stainless steel tray; nor did it marr the 
cordiality of the occasion. In his acceptance speech Shepherd 
said "he was very p leased of this opportunity to thank the a for 
the way they had conducted their business when he was on the 
Other Side of the Table”. Varr replied in kind with the comment 
that "the firm was wrong in letting Mr Shepherd go as he believed 
that a useful job could have been done on both sides."*”
The minute books also hint that very occasionally, Warr's, and 
his closest colleagues', enthusiasm for this new politics created 
some embarrassing situations. Por example, there was an occasion 
when the convenor devised a "Profit Sharing Scheme" (to replace 
the output bonus) which management promptly rejected.*” On 
another occasion, at a committee meeting, the secretary asked for 
a vote on a pay offer while the directors were still present. The 
minutes read:
"This procedure was objected to by Bro Doughty.. .On (their) 
withdrawal the vote was taken. 23 for 6 against and the 
scheme was declared carried. On this Bro Doughty made a 
statement regarding the integrity of the secretary. He 
replied that he would ignore anything that the Bro had 
said."*•
Doughty's vocal opposition to management's presence during the 
vote probably gave the senior stewards a sharp reminder of the 
limits within which this kind of factory-based corporatism
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remained compatible with the traditions of cra£t unionism. It 
also registered a rare note of dissent. For much of his period of 
office, Varr dominated the shop committee. There were perhaps no 
more than three or four occasions - some of which I will discuss 
later in this chapter - when his leadership was openly challenged 
by other members of the shop committee.
Despite these 'hiccups', the managers must have been well pleased 
with the character of factory politics at Edgwlck during the 
1950s. During that period, the shopfloor organisation 
demonstrated an extremely tenuous relationship with its 
membership which appeared to discourage it from organising 
collective action - either against Herberts' low pay policy in 
the early 1950s or redundancies in the latter part of the decade. 
Yet there was also a near-absence of sectional strikes.
Evidence of the tenuous links between the shop committee and its 
membership is suggested, first of all, in the fact that during 
the 1950s the minute books recorded few debates about sectional 
issues. Instead the notes reinforce the impression given by 
informants such as Vic Brown that the works convenor was usually 
left to resolve sectional grievancies where possible or notify 
the district officials so that they could process the complaints 
through the formal disputes procedure. Another, and perhaps more 
telling way in which the minutes demonstrate the frallity of that 
relationship is through its chronicle of the committee's 
financial difficulties.
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Until 1959, when a tote was organised to raise funds, the 
committee experienced recurring difficulties in levying enough 
funds from its membership to re-imburse section stewards for 
attending its meetings during company time. The minutes record 
frequent arguments about how often and how much money should be 
requested. One solution, or one straw, grasped by the committee 
gives some idea of just how serious this problem was:
"Treasurer gave a report and stated that the S.S. Fund was in 
the red to the amount of about £30. Proposal that we ask for 
6p per month of members was defeated and an amendment that we 
made an appeal on the notice board was carried."*7 
Apparently, this appeal failed and a rather anxious committee 
subsequently instructed the convenor to ask management "for a 
weekly stoppage from wages of lp".*" After that request was 
rebuffed by management - a response that must have been 
anticipated - the issue became so critical that it eventually led 
to a split in the committee.
Vhen the TGWU stewards decided to make contributions compulsory 
and, in July 1958, secured a ballot of their members in favour of 
this proposal, the shop committee voted to suspend "any member of 
the Committee whom agrees of the operation of the new T*G Shop 
Stewards Fund".*• The effect of this decision was to almost halve 
attendance for the remainder of the year. The split was not 
healed until the next AGH when a "unity meeting" agreed to raise 
funds through a monthly tote. Fortunately, where appeals to
loyalty had failed, greed succeeded. Vithin six months,*° the 
treasurer found it necessary to set up a bank account in the 
committee's name and, two years later, the shop stewards could 
afford to grant themselves an allowance of 10/- an hour which was 
just short of the district average at that time and rather better 
than standard hourly earnings at the plant.*1
Given these observations on the weakness of the shop committee as 
a collective and the section stewards' dependence on "cadger" 
Varr, it is not surprising to find that the minutes evoke the 
image of a shopfloor organisation that was reluctant to organise 
strike action. In the postwar years up to 1961, there were a few 
"demonstrations" over the shop bonus which usually took the form 
of walk-outs for works meetings or sit-down strikes, and there 
were one-day strikes instructed by the Confed. Similarly, given 
the observations on the committee's frail links with its 
membership, it is not surprising to find that when the shop 
stewards did organise stoppages, they frequently encountered an 
even greater reluctance from some sections of their membership. 
Por example, in November 1953, a "Round Robin" against one 
stoppage called by the Confed was circulated around the Ardoloy 
shop. On another occasion, the committee decided to cancel a 
works meeting over the shop bonus because:
"The Stewards had not the confidence that the works were 
behind them. Following the poor demonstration on Sat Jan 28th 
over the National Issue."""
However, the near absence of sectional stoppages certainly could
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not be explained so easily. In a plant where the piecework 
payment system was riddled with anomalies and wage rates kept 
below the district average, an observer would expect a weak 
shopfloor organisation to result in a noticeable level of 
sectional activity. Instead, the records suggest that overtime 
bans, walk-outs and other forms of stoppages occurring at a 
sectional level were similarly rare events. Between 1945 and 
1961, the minute books record only seven such protests, the press 
reported one other, and none of them lasted more than a few days. 
This suggests that management's strategy towards the unions, 
successful as it was, cannot offer a full explanation for this 
apparent somnolence. Similarly, I would argue that the fraility 
of the shop stewards' organisation and the character of its 
leadership - while consistent with management's objectives - 
cannot be attributed wholly to the managers' political skills. 
Instead, I would argue that management's industrial relations 
success was largely based on other factors which inhibited the 
development of a collective consciousness within the workforce, 
and fractured it into hierarchies of gender, age, race and skill 
- hierarchies in which its elites, in the circumstances that 
confronted them during the 1950s, were not inclined to support 
the politics of militant unionism.
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Sectionalism, Hierarchy and ‘Somnolence1
My Intention in this section is to examine in some detail the 
patterns of sectionalism and hierarchy which characterised 
Herbert's in the 1950s and 1960s, to provide a fuller 
understanding of the context and character of management 
initiatives and steward responses in this period. In developing 
this account I have drawn from a variety of fragmentary evidence 
in the stewards' minutes, in personal testimonies, in management 
documents and from published and unpublished studies (including 
some internal reports on similar settings or adjacent periods, 
but which provide the basis for informed extrapolation). A major 
analytical concern has been to provide a comprehensive 
exploration of the patterns of sectionalism and hierarchy, and in 
particular to uncover the often taken-for-granted or ‘invisible' 
presence of women and Asian workers in such settings as 
Herbert's.
In an examination of shopfloor hierarchies at Herbert's, it may 
help to think of Bdgwick as two plants instead of one: a 
medium-sized foundry complex, and a large engineering factory.
The foundry complex, which occupied the north section of the 
site, was composed of a pattern shop (and stores), two small 
foundries and a fettling shop. These units mirrored the power 
structure within the workforce. Unfortunately, the divisions 
within the engineering ‘plant' are less distinct topographically. 
Though it would not be apparent from a site layout, engineering
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workers at Edgwick often thought of the ‘plant' as two seperate 
factories: the largest building, a quarter of a mile in length, 
housed the main machine shop, fitting bays, toolroom and despatch 
department; alongside its vest wing and "upstairs” was another 
building known as the "factory" which, in addition to a large 
number of semi-skilled sections that gave it its nickname, 
contained several enclaves of craft labour.
At a technical level, all these units came together in a form of 
vertical integration. The foundry complex produced the major 
castings for the machine shop, which in turn produced the 
finished components for the fitting bays. In the "factory", the 
majority of the workers were involved in machining the tools and 
accessories for the machine tools assembled in the main fitting 
shop (though others were also involved in the assembly of 
drilling machines and the simpler forms of boring machines). 
However, despite this apparent integration, the way production 
was organised and paid for created distinctive work environments 
which separated people between and within each unit.
The double marginalities of the foundries
The foundry complex employed a relatively small part of the 
workforce at Edgwick. Figures provided by Roger Williams' study 
and those from oral evidence, suggest there was anything between
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200 to 300 foundry workers at Herbert's: a figure roughly 
equivalent to only 10% of the total manual workforce on the site. 
In addition to its size, the foundries were also marginal in the 
sense they had very little effect on the shopfloor politics 
experienced by most of the workers at Edgwick. This double 
marginality may well be the main reason why the foundry complex 
is completely ignored in two recent case studies of Herbert's 
(and little discussed in earlier chapters of this work).*4 Yet it 
deserves some attention because it was a part of Edgwick in which 
the divisions between workers both contrasted with and paralleled 
the patterns that existed elsewhere on the site. Contrary to the 
experiences of the engineering workers at Edgwick, inside the 
foundries the hierarchies of pay and skilled status did not 
neatly correspond; and yet, as in the engineering shops in the 
plant, Asian men were confined to the lowest levels of the adult 
male labourforce. There were also parallels in the treatment of 
women: inside the engineering shops sexism restricted women to 
the lowest levels of the labour hierarchy; in the foundry 
complex, the same processes completely excluded them from the 
shopfloor. The aim of this section is to look at those factors 
that made the structure of power in the foundries both different 
from and similar to workplace politics in the engineering shops.
The patternshop: "a little protected world"
In the 1950s, the patternshop was a small but significant enclave
of craft labour. According to oral evidence, it employed nearly 
40 patternmakers, "a feu real class cabinet-makers", and about 
seven craft apprentices.9* It seems to have been well organised 
from the beginning. Even during those years when the rest of the 
plant was a trade union desert, the United Patternmakers' 
Association (UPA) kept it a closed shop. There were regular 
elections for two "committee men" plus a shop steward who, acting 
as a kind of senior steward, attended meetings of the Joint Shop 
Stewards' Committee and assumed responsibility for the first 
stage of negotiations with management over pay and individual 
grievancies. The UPA exercised tight control over entry into the 
trade. Barry Doleman recalls that when he applied for an 
apprenticeship at Herbert's patternshop in 1950, he had to sit an 
entrance examination; that some of the successful applicants were 
later "weeded out" during their first months at Edgwick; and of 
those who completed the five years' training only one in three or 
four were offered a permanent job at Herbert's. Also in line with 
the classic model of craft regulation, management appeared to 
exercise very loose control over work itself, even with the 
apprentices. Unlike the experiences of engineering workers Inside 
Herbert's toolroom, there is no evidence that management 
attempted to simplify the craft of the patternmakers, or impose a 
division of labour that enabled some tasks to be performed by 
semi-skilled operatives.
Throughout the post-war period, the patternshop remained an area 
where skilled workers could take an intense pleasure in their
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work:
"I used to love to go to vozk in the mornings, and some 
nights I'd be loath to go home, really. And I wasn't the only 
one. There was a tremendous fellowship amongst the guys. A 
lot of respect for each other's skills."3"
Not surprisingly, this pleasure was associated with a strong 
sense of pride:
"the old chap I was apprenticed to initially, Len Randall, 
who was a gentleman - they were all old gentlemen, they'd all 
got collar and ties in those days; they used to have a 
starched front - and he'd tell you when you could call him 
Len."33
And after serving an apprenticeship, Barry observed, "the old 
gaffer never recognised you as a patternmaker until you were 
about 25."
The patternshop was, for all these reasons, "a little protected 
world".3" Yet, despite the high level of union organisation in 
the shop, which was "so well respected by management in those 
days"; despite the tight control on entry into the trade; despite 
the undoubted truth in Doleman's claim that "of all the hand 
trades, it's probably...the most skilled": despite all this, the 
evidence suggests that the patternmakers earned significantly 
less than the other white workers in the foundries. Wage data for 
the 1950s are unavailable; but from Williams' figures, and 
Doleman's account of the struggle to restore differentials in
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1964, it seems that only the Asians, confined to the grade of 
general process workers, earned less than these craftsmen. An 
explanation for this paradox cannot be attempted until something 
is said about the other sections in the foundry complex.
Enclaves of semi-skilled labour
In the 1950s there were just two foundries at Edgwick: Nol, which 
produced relatively large castings such as headstocks and beds; 
and No2 which produced gears, spindles and some of the other, 
smaller components of machine tools. In both foundries, Herbert's 
probably employed something between 60 to 70 skilled moulders and 
core-makers.** Despite their 'skilled' status, they possessed 
few, if any, of the attributes of craftsmen. It is possible that 
most were members of the Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers; 
but there is no evidence to suggest that by the 1950s they had 
organised a closed shop at Edgwick. The available evidence 
suggests that the union exercised very little formal control over 
entry into these two trades. An apprenticeship system still 
operated for the moulders - the core-makers had trainees only - 
but this did not hinder management's recruitment of 
'non-indentured' moulders. Their skills had become de-based from 
the days when hand-moulding was a genuine craft. Now the 
difference between a good moulder and a bad one was, as Riiuaer 
observed in his study of the Birmid foundries, a few months' 
practice on the job.40 Core-making, if it had ever been a skilled
occupation, had long since lost that status in other foundries in 
the Midlands.*x Instead, the job was probably ascribed with a 
'skilled' status by management to justify the core-makers' high 
pay-rates. In essence, both occupations were no more than 
repetitive, semi-skilled work.
Not surprisingly, the oral accounts provide no evidence of a 
craft pride. On the contrary, the high scrap rates - estimates 
range from 18% to 30% - suggest something rather different.*2 
Yet, as mentioned earlier, their earnings were probably 
significantly higher than those of the patternmakers during the 
1950s. Wage data for this period are unavailable, but if it is 
assumed that earnings were comparable to those in 1964 and 1967 - 
and there is some support for this assumption in the oral 
evidence - then it could be claimed that these two small sections 
of 'skilled' labour stood on the apex of Bdgwick's pay pyramid.
In 1967, for example, the coremakers' standard hourly earnings 
were 15/4 d and the moulders' were 14/9 d, compared to 13/3d 
received by the patternmakers and 14/6d gained by the toolroom 
operatives who were the best-paid engineering workers on the 
site.42
The level of the moulders' and core-makers' earnings was, 
firstly, a product of management's response to the difficulties 
of labour recruitment. Work in the foundries was dirty, hazardous 
and subjected to great extremes of temperature. Better working 
conditions could be found easily elsewhere, and Herbert's was not
Page 274
Page 275
the only firm where the managers felt compelled to offer higher 
earnings to recruit and retain semi-skilled foundry workers.44 
This contrasted with the labour market for patternmakers where it 
seemed management enjoyed strong competition for the few craft 
apprenticeships it offered - Dolemen recalled that he sat the 
entrance paper alongside "boys from Bablake" - and the firm 
experienced no apparent difficulties in keeping the "old 
gentlemen” who had gained their indentures at the firm. (How many 
patternmakers left Herbert's and later returned as "old 
gentlemen" is an interesting question, but one that cannot be 
pursued here.) The second, and major reason for the moulders' and 
core-makers' relatively high pay is linked to the question of pay 
differentials.
The small group of semi-skilled operatives who worked in the 
fettling shop - whose jobs entailed no more than sanding the 
burrs off castings - also earned significantly more than the 
toolroom workers. Probably numbering less than twenty, the 
fettlers ranked amongst the best-paid pieceworkers at Edgwick.
(In 1967, they were the best-paid. Their standard hourly earnings 
were 16/3d, 12% more than the toolroom elite's pay. Oral evidence 
indicates that these figures were partly the product of excessive 
overtime. Nonetheless, they must have disturbed both the moulders 
and core-makers who, if Rimmer's observations are applicable, 
would have been concerned to maintain some kind of pay 
differential which reflected their 'skilled' status.
At the Biraid foundries, Riramer detected "an internal system of 
earnings differentials that was entirely the outcome of informal 
understandings shared by management and workers." He also found 
that "one group would be happy so long as their earnings exceeded 
those of another group: the exact size of this difference was 
less important".*" Perhaps the reason for this was that among the 
direct production workers in the foundries earnings were so 
unstable that the 'skilled' workers could not hope to be exact 
about the differentials that would satisfy them.
Rimmer noted that a large part of this instability was 
attributable, both directly and indirectly, to the character of 
the production process combined with the use of a piecework 
system. He argued that because the flow of work was essentially 
erratic, particularly vulnerable to stoppages caused by faults or 
unavoidable accidents, the use of a piecework system would lead 
directly to sharp fluctuations in earnings. The erratic character 
of the production process and the piecework payment system also 
contributed indirectly to the instability of earnings. The 
relatively high turnover of labour - caused by working conditions 
that were, in the context of a tight labour market, rather 
unattractive - made it difficult for any particular occupation 
affected by that turnover to establish group norms on pay and 
effort. Rimmer found that each worker's ability to control his 
piece-work earnings depended, to a large part, on his length of 
service. Over time he would have found it easier to "fix 
acceptable piece-rates with a management which comprised (his)
promoted fellows", or ensure he had his share of the easier jobs 
and higher piece-prices, "to yield high earnings".4y Rimmer found 
this situation to be more applicable to the skilled pieceworkers. 
I would suggest that at Herbert's it applied to the semi-skilled 
fettlers, too.
These observations suggest that one should not place too much 
importance on the size of the differentials at any one time. As I 
said earlier, in 1967 the semi-skilled fettlers were the 
best-paid pieceworkers in Herbert's foundries; but only three 
years earlier they were ranked behind both the moulders and the 
core-makers. Host likely there were significant flucuations 
between these rankings through the 1960s and into the next 
decade.
More importantly, these movements in pay put a different 
perspective on the patternmakers' relatively low earnings. Their 
income may have been the lowest among the skilled foundry 
workers; yet they probably acquiesced in this situation not only 
because their work was infinitely more pleasant and ascribed with 
higher social status than the other forms of foundry work, but 
also because their earnings on a day-rate system were very 
stable. Pay was not dependent on fluctuations in the work load, 
on shifts in "informal understandings" about differentials, and 
the availability of excessive overtime. Barry may have been 
reluctant to go home because he gained such enjoyment from his 
work as a patternmaker; but for other foundry workers -
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especially the general process workers - their reluctance to 
return hone after a day's work was linked to economic need.
Racial segregation in the foundries
It is not known exactly when Herbert's began recruiting Asian 
workers. During the Second World War a few Indians worked in the 
main machine shop. However, it seems they were either technical 
apprentices or engineering students and their presence was a 
temporary one. By 1953, Asian immigrant workers were employed in 
sufficient numbers at Edgwick - both in the machine shop and the 
foundry complex - to cause unrest among the white employees and 
their shop stewards; but I suspect that the appearance of a few 
black workers would have been enough to trigger racist hostility. 
All that can be said with any certainty is that when Williams 
visited the plant in 1967, clear lines of racial segregation had 
been established in both the engineering shops and the foundries. 
In the latter, Asian workers were confined to all the unskilled 
and the poorer-paid semi-skilled occupations (ie not fettling).
If he had asked, Williams would also have found that they were 
excluded from all supervisory posts though a number of the 
primary work groups were all-Asian.
In his study of the Birmid foundries, Rimmer observed that black 
workers were most numerous in the "simple direct production jobs, 
which are easily controlled and require few instructions".*9 He
argued that this could be explained by "language barriers" since 
there were few who could speak English. However, the details of 
his own research suggest that the distribution of black workers 
across the job hierarchy was fundanentally determined by the 
turnover of white workers. Thus, he found at one foundry that a 
high labour turnover had "opened the skilled grades (excluding 
patternmaking - KG) to immigrant entry".90 Poliowing this line of 
argument, the exclusion of black workers from the better-paid 
semi-skilled jobs, as well as all the 'skilled* ones at Edgwick, 
suggests that there was relatively little turnover of labour 
there. The stark character of racial segregation in Herbert's 
foundries also encourages the suspicion that these outcomes of 
the labour market were aided by tacit understandings between 
firstline management and workers that certain jobs were reserved 
for whites.
Williams' wage data also give some indication of the strength of 
racism in the "informal understandings shared by management and 
workers" on pay differentials in the foundries. For if the 
'skilled' moulders and core-makers had difficulties in 
determining relativities with the semi-skilled fettlers, they 
experienced no such problems with the general process workers. In 
both 1964 and 1967, Asian workers remained very firmly at the 
bottom of the pay hierarchy, though they did achieve a 
significant reduction in differentials in that period. For 
example, in 1964, their standard hourly earnings at 7/ld were 
equivalent to 52% of the moulders' pay; three years later, at
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10/3 d, they had increased to 69*. Thus, while it is quite likely 
that this success is linked to the more turbulent shopfloor 
politics inside Herberts' engineering shops during the 1960s, 
which are reviewed later, the indications are that in the 1950s 
the Asian foundry workers did little to challenge these patterns 
of discrimination.
There are a number of possible reasons for this apparent 
quiescence. First, many were recent immigrants grateful for any 
employment they were offered. Besides, the availability of a 
phenomenal amount of overtime - double shifts and regular night 
work - offered some compensation for the poorer piece-rates they 
were given. Second, if they were recruited by a small number of 
English-speaking Asians who acted as ‘go-betweens' - one form of 
labour recruitment at this time - this is likely to have had the 
initial effect of discouraging militancy by splitting people up 
into small ethnic groups each dependent on one or more 
‘go-betweens' who had a material interest in maintaining a 
passivity among their ‘clients' .9X Third, until 1967 when 121 
(56%) of the 218 foundry workers were Asian, black workers 
probably constituted a minority of the labour force. The racist 
conduct of the other workers must have made them feel that they 
were very much an oppressed minority. There were the routine acts 
of harassment such as the display of racist graffiti, racist 
taunts, and the habitual use of clock numbers or racist tags such 
as "Sooty" or "Onion" as names for Asian workers. There were 
also, occasionally, acts of physical violence against black
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workers.”2 In the absence of examples of protest elsewhere, it is 
hardly surprising that they chose to keep a low profile. Instead, 
they quietly joined the TGWU - rather than the AUFW to which 
their white colleagues belonged - and waited for better times.
Page 281
Workplace politics In the engineering shops
The "factory" was a relatively small engineering shop situated 
alongside and "upstairs" from the main machine shop. It is 
probable that nearly two hundred workers were located in this 
building. The "factory" acquired its nickname from the common 
perception that it was the location of much semi-skilled, 
repetitive machine work in which tools and accessories were 
produced in batches numbering hundreds instead of tens. However, 
the nickname hid some basic similarities this unit had with much 
of the engineering work in the main building: the "factory" 
contained pockets of skilled labour, such as in the factory tool 
store; work on semi-automatic machinery, like capstans, was no 
more unskilled than on the same machines in the main building; 
and the payment systems were identical, namely, a day-rate system 
for the indirect workers, individual piecework for the machinists 
(see the discussion below), and Herbert's variant of collective 
piecework (the gang system) for the fitters.
Over two thousand people worked in the main building. It is
I
tempting to describe it as the largest jobbing shop in the world 
partly because, along with its size, this part of the site housed 
a bewildering range of productive activities. The breadth of the 
product range can be imagined from the fact that in 1974, shortly 
after a major rationalisation programme, this unit still produced 
21 different types of lathes, in addition to a range of milling 
machines and rock-pulverising machines. There was a similarly low 
level of standardisation of component production. During the 
introduction of group technology in 1972, when the technical 
staff began to code over 40,000 different types of components 
made at Edgwick, they found, for example, 347 different screws up 
to 1" diameter and length, and 896 different spacer-type parts 
between 1" and 2" diameter and up to 1" length.*’ The phrase 
'jobbing shop' also conveys something of its occupants' 
self-image. Distinguishing themselves from their colleagues in 
the "factory", many machinists and fitters in the main building 
saw themselves as members of a craft elite. And yet, for many 
workers, the reality was rather different from the myth. For, 
despite the range of products, much of the machine work had long 
been no more than "boys' work",m* and even among the skilled 
workers in both the fitting bays as well as the machine shop, the 
stability of the product designs over the decades meant there was 
a considerable routinisation of production in which workers could 
"rap out machines" without much mental effort. Nonetheless, the 
undoubted craft skills of a core among the skilled workers 
allowed the majority to set themselves apart from the workers 
"upstairs" in the "factory".
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Within the main shop management operated different payment 
systems. Host of the indirect workers - the crane drivers, 
storemen, labourers and toolroom operatives - were paid on a 
day-rate system in which earnings were supplemented by a 
plant-wide production bonus. Among the direct workers, the 
fitters were paid under Herbert's variant of the gang system, and 
some of the machinists - perhaps all of them - were paid under a 
form of individual piecework (IPW).
Surprisingly little is said in either management or union records 
about the introduction of IPW at Edgwick's engineering shops. As 
I have mentioned elsewhere, the shop stewards noted its 
snail-pace progress across the main machine shop during the 
immediate post-war years. (Their minutes suggest that it took 
management four years to bring IPW onto as many sections.) In the 
late 1940s, the subject was raised at several directors' 
meetings. However, the absence of any written record of the 
system's progress in the 1950s - matched by the complete silence 
on the subject in the available oral evidence - prompts some 
interesting speculations. It could be that very few machinists 
went onto IPW during the 1950s - though this seems unlikely from 
Williams' account of the payment system he found at Herbert's in 
1967 - or that most machinists felt IPW brought no major changes 
to their working lives because the absence of a significant 
number of new jobs meant they had very little to negotiate with 
the rate-fixer, or that, because the gang system was restored in
the machine shops after 1960, IPW literally occupied a very small 
part of the history of people's working lives at Edgwick. 
Similarly, the directors may have maintained a discrete silence 
because they were disappointed - or embarrassed, given the 
Chairman's initial opposition to the scheme - about how little 
had changed since the introduction of IPW. This is a neglected 
area of Herbert's history which deserves closer attention. All 
that can be said here is that the entry of IPW did not have a 
dramatic impact on factory politics at Herbert's.
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Forms of segregation in the engineering shops
Earlier I mentioned that two recent essays by Davies and Tolliday 
managed to discuss workplace politics at Edgwick without any 
reference to the foundry complex. I speculated that this due to 
what I called the foundries' double marginality, that is to say, 
they employed a relatively small number of workers who had little 
influence on the politics of the rest of the site. Among 
Herbert's engineering workers, white women and Aslan men were 
doubly marginal in almost the same way. They were proportionately 
few in number and apparently of little consequence to the trade 
union organisation inside the engineering shops. It is not 
surprising, then, that both writers give correspondingly little 
attention to them. In Davies' essay, blacks are invisible and 
women are only mentioned in situations where, along with
"handymen and boys", they were seen as a threat to the skilled 
workers' fragile control over pay and conditions. Tolliday 
acknowledges that the subject of his study - the predominantly 
white, male skilled and semi-skilled piece workers at four firms, 
including Herbert's - were "at or near the top of the tree" among 
Coventry's engineering workers and that women and blacks were 
placed somewhere near the bottom.However, he fails to follow 
up this observation with any discussion on how this labour 
hierarchy shaped workplace politics in his case studies. This is 
an unfortunate omission because, as I hope to show in the course 
of this chapter, the marginalisation of women and blacks was very 
much part of the kind of politics that made the union 
organisation at Edgwick so ineffectual. But my first step is to 
discuss why, given their position within the labour hierarchy, 
women and Asians were so quiet at Herbert's during the 1950s.
A marginal sex
It is difficult to know how many women worked on the shopfloor at 
Edgwick during the fifties. In February 1946, 738 out of a total 
of 4429 employees (ie 17%) were female; but the stewards' minutes 
indicate that 199 women had left the plant in the previous twelve 
months and that the fall was continuing.■■ However, with the 
revival of the defence industry in the late 1940s and the 
emergence of a chronic shortage of labour, women were recruited 
once more to take the places of absent men or,07 to be more
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precise, to take the places of youths who, before the Var, were 
recruited as 'trainees' and then confined to the hundreds of 
semi-skilled jobs at Edgwick. From the fragmentary information 
available,*" it seems likely that some women were recruited as 
capstan operators in the main machine shop, which was a 
traditional area for 'trainee' labour. However, the scale of this 
recruitment drive appears to have been relatively modest. 
Williams' study suggests that by 1964 women represented only 4\ 
of the manual workforce. While there is no doubt that this is a 
serious under-estimate, as he did not count the women who worked 
in the gantry cranes, in the machine wiring gangs and the packing 
section or the canteen workers and cleaners,** nonetheless, it is 
obvious that during the 1950s the number of women who worked on 
the shop£loor at Edgwick continued to decline both absolutely and 
as a proportion of the labour force. Indications that the 1950s 
also witnessed a rise in the average age of women who worked at 
Herbert's provides further evidence that the recruitment 'drive' 
was very modest indeed.*°
If women workers were an ageing population, then the security of 
employment this implies was an important improvement in their 
working conditions. Before the War, women at Herbert's, as in 
most other engineering firms in Coventry, were expected to leave 
the factory after their marriage. Women had commonly regarded 
waged work as an Interlude between school and marriage.*x Now it 
was assumed that they would combine employment with the 
responsibilities of raising a family. However, the other side to
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this new-found job security was that it demonstrated the 
resilience of the processes of sexual oppression. None of those 
who were recruited and trained as semi-skilled machinists to 
substitute for scarce (white) male labour - either during the Var 
or in the early 1950s - ever gained skilled status. Most of these 
machinists probably worked in the "factory" where much of the 
machine work was highly repetitive, with little opportunity for 
promotion to more skilled jobs. But, as I shall explain later, a 
similar group of men could not have been treated in this way 
without provoking serious unrest in the factory. It was a 
testament to the durability of sexism that this inequity was seen 
as unremarkable, a part of the 'natural order' of things in the 
engineering industry.
Similarly 'natural' was the practice of paying female machinists 
lower wage rates than males of comparable age and skilled status. 
Unfortunately, the only wage data available relate to the 1960s; 
but there is no reason to suspect that the situation was better 
during the previous decade. Williams claims that in 1964, the 
standard hourly earnings of women who worked as semi-skilled 
machinists was equivalent to 71% of that for male capstan 
operators and only 58% of the pay of skilled turners. According 
to the shop stewards' minutes, matters had not improved by 1969 
when the unions negotiated a scale of base rates for female 
semi-skilled dayworkers which was significantly less than the 
rate for male labourers.•* One more point to note is that women's 
pay remained abysmally low not only as a result of this form of
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industrial apartheid, but also because they were less likely to 
participate in that "great money spinner", overtime, due to 
family commitments.
Obviously, women workers at Edgwick had no material interest in 
maintaining the status quo during the 1950s. Why, then, the 
absence of militant action by women in this period? Women's 
subordination in employment is the subject of a large and growing 
literature, so all that I propose to do here is sketch out some 
of the factors that discouraged sectional action by women at 
Herbert's.
Women made up a relatively small part of the manual workforce. 
Though restricted to a small range of jobs, they still remained a 
minority in sections such as machine wiring and the capstan gangs 
in the main shop. In other sections where the jobs were 
exclusively or predominantly held by women, there was either very 
little scope for militant unionism, such as in the "factory's" 
piecework gangs (more will be said later about the politics of 
piecework at Herbert's), or the work was regarded as peripheral 
to the production process, such as that performed by canteen 
workers, cleaners and packers. It was not until the early 1960s 
that the women in the packing department discovered by accident 
just how effectively they could disrupt production. The women who 
worked in the gantry cranes must have been among the few who were 
conscious of management's dependence on their 'goodwill and 
co-operation'. That is why, I suspect, they were the only ones
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who enjoyed equal pay with their male colleagues.
Women were also discouraged from militant action by the absence 
of a tradition of female protest in the engineering industry. By 
and large, women had accepted their role as members of a reserve 
army of labour to be drafted into waged work at moments of acute 
need.*4 During the War, acts of protest by women workers were 
frequently based on the assumption that their stay in employment 
was going to be short if unpleasant.■*
-  .  /The ambivalence of their male colleagues in the shop stewards' 
organisation was undoubtedly another factor. In 1947, before the 
issue became tangled up and then forgotten in national 
negotiations, the shop committee at Herbert's did press 
management for equal pay;** and it is possible that this prompted 
the firm to make that unique concession to the crane drivers.
However, the traditional view of women as a subordinate part of 
the workforce to be displaced when men's employment is threatened 
remained there too. For example, shortly after a recession which 
resulted in hundreds of job-losses at the end of the 1950s, the 
minutes record this expression of male privilege:
"Re crane drivers
it was proposed we ask management to employ 
only male labour in future. This was carried."*T
A marginal race
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The patterns of racial inequality in the engineering shops 
broadly paralleled those in the foundry complex in that Asian 
workers were confined to the jobs least attractive to white, male 
workers. In 1967, Williams found black workers were excluded from 
all skilled jobs and those categories of semi-skilled work which, 
through custom and practice, provided a route to skilled 
status."* This meant that while Asians could work as crane 
drivers and storekeepers, they were not acceptable as 
semi-skilled machinists. Also, as in the foundries, there were no 
black supervisors, even though all three hundred of the workers 
in one section of the workforce, the machine shop labourers, were 
of Asian origin. Similarly, Williams found that pay was 
commensurate with the low status of these jobs. Por example, at 
6/10d, the crane drivers' standard hourly earnings were 
equivalent to only 60\ of the earnings of the lowest paid among 
the skilled workers, the machinists.""
Given these patterns of inequality, the question that was raised 
in the discussion on women at Herbert's has to asked here: why 
was there an absence of sectional action by black workers during 
the 1950s?
Some of the answers are identical to those given in the earlier 
discussion on racism in the foundry complex. Firstly, excessive 
and systematic overtime provided a way of overcoming the problem 
of low wage rates. For workers, like Ernie Digger, whose pay was
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not determined by a low day-rate, the appetite of some Asian 
labourers for overtime was a source of wonder and amusement.
Ernie recalls an occasion when "old Biker Mejig" said:
"'Mr Digger, I could sleep on bench. No need for me to go 
home. I could have food in canteen.1 That’s what he wanted to 
do."TO
Secondly, during the 1950s there were no examples of successful 
industrial action by black workers elsewhere in the country that 
could encourage those at Herbert's to challenge discrimination. 
Thirdly, they faced the same racist attitudes from their 
colleagues. Perhaps the character of that racism was different in 
degree. There is no evidence of racially motivated attacks 
against Asian workers in the engineering shops; and Ernie's 
paternalistic comments about "old Biker Mejig" - which where not, 
I think, intended to be offensive - are probably representative 
of the way a large number of the skilled engineering workers 
thought and spoke about their black colleagues. If this was the 
case, it was understandable; afterall, "old Biker" had no chance 
of ever subverting the master-servant relationship by becoming a 
machine tool fitter himself. Racism was more brutal in the 
foundries, I would argue, because the white workers there 
recognised that their control over access to the more lucrative 
jobs was based on nothing more than a tacit understanding with 
the managers.
The black workers were also confronted by a hostile shop 
stewards' organisation. Again, the forms of racism may have been
different from those experienced in the foundries. The hostility 
was usually discrete. Por example, when Rajmal Singh, a machine 
shop labourer and the first Asian shop steward at Herbert's, took 
up his place on the shop committee in 1955 he was not given the 
customary welcome by the chairman. The shop stewards were 
similarly discrete when they voiced the racist anxieties of the 
semi-skilled. At a works conference in June 1953, Warr threatened 
strike action if any Asian workers were upgraded from labouring 
to semi-skilled machinists' jobs, and in reply the managers gave 
an informal assurance to maintain the status quo;TX but no part 
of these talks was even mentioned in the shop stewards' minutes. 
It was not until the Asian workers themselves challenged the 
colour bar that the whole matter came into the public domain - 
and even then the works convenor tried to place a fig-leaf over 
the committee's politics.
In the summer of 1961, Rajmal clashed with the committee after he 
wrote to management to ask about "the possible prospects for 
advancement of non-Europeans within the company." The request may 
have been prompted by management's exceptional efforts at that 
time to recruit and train semi-skilled labour and Rajmal probably 
wrote the letter as secretary of the local Indian Workers' 
Association, not as a TGWU steward; but the shop committee 
demanded a "full and frank discussion".T* At the following 
meeting the letter was duly censured and Peltham, committee 
secretary for the previous twelve years, formally moved that:
"It is the opinion of this Cttee that the majority of our
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members would resent strongly any extension of coloured 
labour on to semi-skilled work other than what they are now 
doing."
Perhaps mind£ul of the adverse publicity this decision was going 
to receive, the convenor, alderman tfarr, proposed as an 
amendment:
"That in opinion of this Cttee there would be no objection 
from the workpeople to non-Europeans with correct 
qualifications being accepted as apprentices. "ra 
The duplicity of this proposal was not appreciated immediately by 
the other stewards. He had to wait until the committee's next 
meeting before his motion was approved. If Varr had feared press 
coverage of this issue, his worries were soon justified. In 
October, the local paper carried the story of Rajmal's abortive 
appeals to both the Trades Council and the AEU District Committee 
to overturn the shop stewards' decision. The same article also 
carried Warr's denial that there was a "colour bar" at 
Herbert's.™
It is worth noting here that Rajmal did not attempt to organise 
any kind of industrial action to press his demand for racial 
equality. Of course, it would have been extremely difficult for 
him to call successfully for a strike against a decision taken by 
the shop stewards' committee; but that apart, I would suggest 
that the Asian workers would have been reluctant to take 
industrial action because, like the women workers, they felt 
relatively power les1» -in the production process. Confined to jobs
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which serviced the direct workers and were commonly regarded as 
menial or, at best, peripheral, such feelings would have been 
understandable. However, events in the early 1960s were to 
demonstrate just how disruptive a strike by indirect workers 
could be.
Changing roles of young workers
As I argued in an earlier chapter, during the pre-war years 
Herbert's labour policies were based on a "vast apprenticeship 
system" which both (a) annually replenished Herbert's skilled 
workforce with a relatively small number of young men who were 
thoroughly socialised into the workplace culture at Edgwick, and 
(b) legitimated a thinly disguised form of super-exploitation 
that confined many hundreds of youths to semi-skilled work at low 
wages and with precious little job security. Herbert's chronic 
shortage of skilled labour - created first by the demands of the 
War and, later, by management's tight control over wages™ - did 
not eliminate the worst abuses of this system by the 1950s but it 
did reduce their magnitude.
It seems that from the early post-war years relatively few youths 
were "released" by Herbert's after the completion of their 
training. The rarity of these events is suggested in the fact 
that in 1950, the dismissal of an apprentice after the completion
of his training became the subject of a works conference. 
Unfortunately, the only available statistics, shown in table 1 
below, relate to the period from 1965 onwards. Nonetheless, they 
give some indication of the level of job security enjoyed by 
craft apprentices prior to that date.
Page 295
Page 296
Table 1. Apprentice Intake and ’Releases' At Herbert's, 1965-71
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Intake 128 144 116 54 60 94 59
Rel'sd 9 16 6 1 2 6 10
Source: Herbert JSSC Secretary's minute of meeting with managers 
on 27 May 1971.
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The figures for the intake during 1965-67 are remarkably similar 
to the guesstimates for the pre-war years (Bill Elliston, you may 
recall, had talked about "650 lads going through the shop at any 
one time", and Bernard Vail had estimated "an intake of 100 
apprentices a year") but continuing employment was clearly the 
norm.
Furthermore, tighter state regulations on vocational training, 
which obliged the company to send all apprentices to technical 
college one day each week and set up a training centre inside the 
plant to provide some form of induction training,77 limited the 
opportunities for the super-exploitation of this young workforce.
The available evidence suggests that premium apprentices worked 
on the shopfloor until the early 1960s;7" but they were likely to 
have been few in numbers and, from the mid-1950s, may not have 
paid a "premium” to work at Herbert's, as senior management 
decided to waive that condition "if it was n deterrent to 
obtaining good apprentices”.7*
Vhat happened to male trainees after 1945 is very much a matter 
of speculation. The first references to them in the available 
documentation were recorded at the end of the 1960s. This silence 
suggests the War ended the mass recruitment of youths as 
trainees. Young women had taken their place during the War, and 
afterwards management must have found it could not restore the 
practice to its former magnitude because of the combined impact
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of national service, legislation on education and vocational 
training, the resumed growth of the motor industry and the 
gradual decline in Coventry's population growth. However, the 
fact that in 1968 there were still over two hundred "junior 
males" at the plant,"° indicates that they were remained a 
substantial proportion of Edgwick's workforce. Given the 
company's chronic shortage of labour throughout the post-war 
period, it is probable that these white young men - like the 
craft apprentices - enjoyed a new-found job security and could, 
if they worked in the machine shop, safely anticipate the 
eventual acquisition of skilled status.
White, semi-skilled workers: on the escalator
According to Roger Williams' figures, in 1964, out of roughly 
2,200 engineering workers at Edgwicx, 706 (33%) were graded as 
semi-skilled. This number included 104 women machinists and some 
200 storekeepers and crane drivers. Machinists made up the 
remaining 57% of the semi-skilled engineering workers.mx They are 
the main focus of this section; but first some comment is needed 
on the white men who worked as storekeepers and crane drivers at 
the plant.
They were day-workers and their earnings low. If Williams' data 
is a useful guide, and there is no reason to suspect the
contrary, their pay was roughly equivalent to 80% of that for 
direct workers in the same grades.** They may have experienced 
this as a grievance, but other factors discouraged them from 
taking industrial action. One factor used to explain the 
quiescence of the women and Asian men in these same jobs also 
applied to the white men, namely, their consciousness of a double 
marginality: that they were a small part of the workforce; and 
that though they could disrupt production through industrial 
action, they could not stop it. In addition, there were two 
others factors which applied to them specifically as white men. 
First, many were veteran Herbert employees who were, in a sense, 
cashing-in on Herbert's renowned paternalism for their decades of 
loyal service to the company by being employed, well beyond the 
age of retirement, in jobs that were seen as steady and 
undemanding.*9 The extra-ordinary sense of loyalty or gratitude 
that these men felt - or were supposed to feel, which is equally 
important - is evoked poignantly in a phrase which emerged 
several times in oral testimony about workers "dying in 
harness".*4 Second, and this applied equally to the younger white 
men who were recruited directly into these grades, the 
opportunities for promotion into supervisory posts were greatly 
enhanced by the growing presence of black workers in their 
section. In this instance, they were, or were expected to be, 
beneficiaries of the colour bar "informally" agreed between 
management and the shop committee.
Marginalised and, in many cases, the beneficiaries of Herbert's
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paternalism or racism, this group of white men were unlikely to 
de-stablise shopfloor politics at Edgwick. But what about that 
other section of white semi-skilled workers, the machinists? Vhy 
were they so quiet?
During the 1950s, the white men who worked as semi-skilled 
operators on milling machines, drilling machines, grinding 
machines or lathes, were certainly not marginal to the production 
process. In 1967, Williams found that they constituted one of the 
largest sections of the workforce at that time. The figures he 
was given show that they outnumbered the fitters and equalled two 
thirds of the skilled, direct workers.■■ Having accepted the 
conventional image of the machine tool industry as a centre of 
craft excellence, Williams was surprised by this finding; but the 
number of these workers at Edgwick, both absolutely and as a 
proportion of the total workforce, must have been even higher 
during the 1950s. Company records indicate that at the beginning 
of the decade semi-skilled workers outnumbered their skilled 
colleagues by as much as 4:1.•• If the majority of the former 
group were machinists, as they were when Williams visited the 
plant, then Herbert's must have employed twice as many 
semi-skilled machinists as skilled workers. Given this evidence 
of their numerical dominance, there can be no doubt about the 
centrality of semi-skilled labour to the production process at 
Herbert's - despite the account in Davies' case study which gives 
a rather different impression of the composition of the 
workforce. This is echoed by what is reputed to be the
conventional wisdon among skilled engineering vorkers in northern 
England; that Herberts occupied the "rough end" of the 
industry.*7 Yet, despite evidence of their numerical and 
technical importance and, perhaps more significantly, despite the 
gains made by semi-skilled pieceworkers elsewhere in Coventry, it 
appears that this group occupied a subordinate position in the 
firm's internal wages league.
In the 1960s Villiams found that the structure of pay 
differentials broadly reflected the hierarchy of skills, that is 
to say, the toolroom workers enjoyed the highest wage rates, 
followed by the skilled machinists, the fitters, then the 
semi-skilled machinists, and so on down to "women's rates" among 
the unskilled day-workers. In 1964, for example, Villiams 
calculated that the standard hourly earnings of the semi-skilled 
millers were equivalent to 83% of those for their skilled 
counterparts, and 73% of those in the toolroom. While comparable 
wages data for the 1950s are unavailable, there is strong 
indirect evidence to support the claim that the structure of pay 
differentials was broadly the same. First, there is Williams' 
observation that Edgwick's shopfloor was "an ageing workforce" 
which had developed very strong norms on questions of pay, 
including differentials.** Second, there is the testimony of the 
shop stewards' minutes which show that on each occasion during 
the 1950s when the shop committee initially campaigned for "an 
all-round increase”, they invariably settled on "pro-rata" pay 
raises. Obviously, if all these calculations are correct, they
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raise some interesting questions. Why did the shop stewards for 
the semi-skilled machinists allow the toolmakers' representatives 
to retain the leadership of the shop committee throughout the 
1950s when the interests of the former group was so poorly 
served? And why was there so little sectional activity among the 
semi-skilled machinists as a consequence of the shop committee's 
failings? Of course, exactly the same questions could be asked of 
the fitters and the skilled pieceworkers in the machine shop 
since their earnings were, as I said, significantly lower than 
the day-rate earnings of the toolroom operatives.
These questions are particularly interesting because in some of 
the other, local engineering firms the situation was rather 
different. As Tolliday writes:
"Toolmakers relied for their pay increases not on bargaining 
but on the automatic operation of the (Coventry Toolroom 
Agreement) and in many firms the organisation of Toolmakers 
became weak and quietlstic. The highest paying piecework 
firms paid their Toolmakers much less than their pieceworkers 
but came under almost no pressure to remedy this."*9
I propose to tackle this anomaly in the next section by looking 
at the common experiences of the skilled and semi-skilled 
pieceworkers inside Edgwick's engineering shops. However, before 
concluding this section, some comments should be made about one 
aspect of work experienced by the white, male semi-skilled 
machinists in the post-war years which encouraged them to
identify more closely with the skilled elites than with the women 
machinists and the Asian men who worked in the other semi-skilled 
occupations, namely, the opportunities for re-grading.
The vast majority of the male semi-skilled machinists at Edgwick 
could, in common with labour practices at other engineering firms 
in Coventry, expect to gain skilled status in five years or less. 
The shop stewards' minutes record that ball bearing drillers were 
"the only grade of (male) direct machinists who (did) not 
automatically have the opportunity of progressing directly 
through the semi-skilled grades to a skilled grade."90 To a large 
extent, re-grading depended on the attitude of the workers' 
immediate supervisors; but the union records provide testimony to 
the strength of the conviction among adult, male semi-skilled 
machinists that they had a right to that chance. These high 
expectation were justified because Herbert's chronic shortage of 
skilled labour virtually guaranteed re-grading for those prepared 
to stay with the firm. This is reflected in data which indicate 
that a major change i the ratio of semi-skilled to skilled 
labour took place during this period: from 4:1 in 1952 to 1.2:1 
in 1 9 6 8 . Therefore, it would seem reasonable to suppose that 
this particular section of labour would have been less concerned 
about pay differentials based on skilled status than those kept 
off the skill escalator (though the evidence suggests that the 
pay differentials between the male skilled and semi-skilled 
pieceworkers were anyway less marked than those between the 
skilled elites and the women and Asian semi-skilled workers).
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Skilled and semi-skilled engineering pieceworkers at Bdgwick: 
common experiences
To explain how the common experiences of skilled and semi-skilled 
engineering pieceworkers offered little succour to militant 
unionism, a useful starting point is Tolliday's article. Though 
his case study of Herbert's is brief, it touches on most of the 
key issues.
In the case study, Tolliday partly attributes the marginal 
position of the unions to a combination of factors: management's 
determination to run a "classic anti-union paternalist shop"; the 
regularity of employment (which contrasted with the marked, 
seasonal nature of work in the motor industry); and management's 
"unadventurous approach to product innovation" which provided few 
opportunities for workers to raise earnings through piece-price 
bargaining. I would contest none of these points. But, Tolliday 
does not consider the political impact of the distinctive 
features of the social and technical organisation of work in the 
machine tool industry (a curious omission since Herbert's was the 
only machine tool plant in his four case studies); his account of 
the firm's "idiosyncratic payment system" misses the mark in 
several important respects;*a and there is no comment on the fact 
that Herbert's toolroom operatives did not conform to his
generalisations about the toolmakers in Coventry's engineering 
industry. This section will explore these claims as a way of 
trying to explain the "somnolent" character of the shopfloor 
organisation during Varr's term of office.
Unlike the three motor firms in Tolliday's study, but in common 
with most machine tool factories at that time, the production 
process at Bdgwick was highly fragmented. Thousands of different 
types of components were machined and assembled in small batches 
and, because of the layout of the plant and machinery, 
transported many miles back and forth across the shopfloor in the 
process. Machines were grouped together by type and not according 
to their function in the production process. In addition to the 
costs of internal transport, this layout increased management's 
already considerable difficulties in synchronising production. 
Inevitably, this resulted in long lead-times and a high volume of 
work-in-progress which incurred more financial pénalités.
However, it had some saving merits for management. It was easier 
to organise work-loads for individual machines and obtain certain 
economies of scale. Compared with group technology, supervision 
under this system was also a relatively simple task. In addition, 
it created a difficult terrain for workplace organisation.
By splitting the workforce into seperate skill groups, the 
organisation of work fostered divisions between workers. The 
material basis was there to encourage a sectional consciousness 
as opposed to a factory consciousness. This form of organisation
also made it difficult (if not impossible) for any one section of 
the direct workers to effect an immediate disruption of 
production. The fitters demonstrated this lesson later, in 1968, 
when a 5 week-long strike by their shop - involving over 100 
workers - caused management to lay-off no more than 150 
operatives across the rest of the factory; but this point was 
even more relevant to the semi-skilled pieceworkers in the 
machine shops. Unlike some of their skilled colleagues, they 
could not always rely on the labour market to keep their pay 
close to the district average; and unlike the track workers in 
the local motor firms, they could not threaten powerful sanctions 
to press their sectional interests. They needed an alliance with 
the skilled workers. Indeed, one strategy that was open to them 
was to depend on the skilled elites, particularly the toolmakers, 
to secure pay rises which then became the subject of claims over 
differentials. This point will be considered again when I discuss 
the dominance of the toolmakers at Herbert's.
Earlier, I claimed that a second flaw in Tolliday's study of 
factory politics at Herbert's was his discussion on the firm's 
"idiosyncratic payment system". I would suggest it contains three 
errors. First, it misconceives the politics of the gang system. 
Second, it misunderstands why this form of piecework resulted in 
low productivity in the post-war years. Third, there is no 
reference to Herbert's experiments with Individual piecework 
between 1945 and 1960, though this system probably covered all 
the semi-skilled, engineering pieceworkers during the 1950s.
Tolliday argues that, in contrast to the local motor firms, 
Herbert's management kept firm control of the shopfloor. This 
gives a misleading impression, however, for any control they 
exercised arose on a quite different footing from the strenuous 
efforts made by such firms as Ford to gain accurate measurements 
of, and secure detailed control over, the labour process. Despite 
some reforms at the end of War, piecework prices at Herbert's 
remained "extremely phoney"9* and, as late as 1967, Williams 
found the rate-fixing department distinctly ill-equipped to 
remedy that situation:
"The personnel.. .are all from the shop floor. Not one has had 
any formal training in work study techniques. The stopwatch 
is very rarely used on the shop floor and prices are 
generally agreed by a straight-forward bargain between the 
rate-fixer and the chargehand. "•*
Instead, I would argue that while management had a hard, 
authoritarian "style" on questions of work discipline, the 
control of work itself was delegated, as far as possible, to the 
chargehands. This is an important distinction, particularly when, 
as in Tolliday's case, the analysis of factory politics at 
Herbert's hinges on an account of the firm's variant of the gang 
system.
Under this form of collective piecework, the chargehand was 
responsible for the allocation of work, supervision, and the 
negotiation of piecework prices. He also had a major influence on
recruitment and dismissals within his gang, though, oC course, he 
had no formal powers in this area. Furthermore, his financial 
responsibilities to the gang went much further than Tolliday's 
brief account implies. In addition to negotiating job-prices with 
the rate-fixer, he was expected to keep a record of work 
completed over a given period and ensure a stable and high level 
of bonus earnings from month to month. Often this involved the 
guasi-covert practice of keeping a kitty - getting the rate-fixer 
to put aside some money when bonus payments were high to 
supplement lower earnings at other times - or, more rarely 
(partly because it was a dismissable offence), booking unfinished 
work.
In an earlier chapter,** I identified some of the advantages 
management had gained from this form of piecework. Firstly, it 
offered some of the benefits associated with internal 
sub-contracting, namely, it was a delegated mode of control which 
generally reduced the costs of production control and labour 
administration, and provided a route for the upward mobility of 
key workers. Secondly, it had facilitated the exploitation of 
youth labour which had formed such a substantial section of the 
workforce before the War. Thirdly, it was a system which 
encouraged every man to be a ’supervisor* to his colleagues and, 
because the bonus was shared out unequally with the actual 
supervisor receiving the largest portion, gave that person a 
direct interest in increased production. Indeed, as I mentioned 
in chapter four, when Schloss described such a system in 1892,
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the concern was that, unless certain checks were imposed, the 
chargehand became "a bully and a sweater": forcing the pace 
regardless of workers' health and safety; producing "scamped 
work”; and deceiving the employer about the amount of work 
produced. To keep these excesses in check, Schloss advised 
employers to appoint "superior officials" who were "in receipt of 
fixed salaries"; in Herbert's case these "officials" were foremen 
and inspectors. Pourthly, it was technically suited to specific 
elements of the labour process, such as fitting, where the 
calculation of individual piecework would have been "special, 
elaborate and troublesome". Lastly, the gang system aided 
management in keeping down labour costs without provoking serious 
oppositional activity among the pieceworkers. As I argued in 
chapter 4, workers were divided by the hierarchies within the 
gangs as well as between them; the tensions created by the low 
wage policy were frequently mediated through the chargehands - 
Ernie Digger, for example, complained that he "had kicks from 
anything between 10 and 20 men, plus kicks from the foreman and 
manager" - and, by keeping together the formal and informal 
systems of job control, it limited "the potential for the 
emergence of rival work-group leadership, such as...shop 
stewards".
Tolliday's failure to grasp the distinctive politics of this form 
of collective piecework leads him into errors about its effect on 
productivity. He argues that the gang system "had little to do 
with incentives" because the pieceworkers were excluded from the
pay bargaining process and, through a complex grading system 
which individualised earnings, "the main beneficiaries seem to 
have been the chargehands and the skilled workers".9*
These are plausible arguments; but they are not strongly 
supported by the evidence. First, during the 1950s the gang 
system was confined to the fitting shops, so it unlikely that all 
but a few semi-skilled pieceworkers could have been exploited in 
this way by their skilled colleagues. Secondly, instead of 
cherishing a deep resentment at their exclusion from piece-price 
pay bargaining, there is considerable evidence to support the 
claim that many pieceworkers did not want to solve its mysteries. 
They were content to let their chargehands assume this 
responsibility so long as the bonus payments remained stable and 
at a level they regarded as fair. This would explain why, when 
given the chance through an agreement reached in 1966, workers in 
only 14 out of 78 gangs exercised their right to have a gang 
member be present during pay bargaining between the chargehand 
and rate-fixer.99
The conditions which made Herbert's variant of the gang system 
viable as a form of labour management in the past had 
considerably weakened by the 1950s. Firstly, the opportunities 
for employment elsewhere in Coventry made skilled pieceworkers 
less tolerant of any bullying tactics. Secondly, the 
opportunities for the super-exploitation of youth labour - which 
provided all the adult male pieceworkers with an interest in the
Page 311
unequal division of the gang bonus - were increasingly limited 
after the War: Herbert's no longer attracted young workers in the 
numbers experienced before 1939; there were new government 
controls on vocational training; and the company needed to ensure 
that enough apprentices gained sufficient training to replenish 
its skilled workforce. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the 
system offered little real incentive, but for reasons other than 
those emphasised by Tolliday. The collective piecework system was 
supposed to be a form of payment-by-results which, to operate 
effectively, required the chargehands to show that increased 
effort resulted in bigger bonuses. Yet, since senior management 
appeared more concerned about keeping control over labour costs 
than encouraging increased production, there was little scope for 
this form of incentive. To retain their skilled employees in a 
tightening labour market, the managers discovered they were 
compelled to keep piecework earnings close to the district 
average, but because of Sir Alfred's fierce opposition to higher 
job-prices, this had to be achieved, principally, through 
increases in the shop bonus - the Alfred Herbert Award - and 
systematic overtime. As the former caused piecework earnings to 
become a diminishing proportion of workers' pay - both under IPW 
and the gang system - and the latter practice encouraged workers 
to pace themselves, it seemed inevitable that these ’solutions' 
would transform the gang system into a weakened form of piecework 
which resulted in relatively low productivity.
Effort in many of the skilled jobs was extremely difficult to
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measure. Williams relied on subjective impressions - he thought 
the work pace "looked" slower than at Wickmans - and such 
indirect evidence as the fact that scrap and rectification costs 
varied between 1 .6% and 2% of total direct wages compared to 
8-10% at Wickman's.*" Other, soft evidence of this unhurried 
approach to work is suggested by Vic Brown:
"You had to keep at it...but you didn't have to rush to 
sacrifice a Job, you know. It had to be done dead 
right...nothing bodged up or anything. It had to be done dead 
right."
The available evidence indicates that senior management 
recognised this problem at a very early stage. Some attempt was 
made to introduce individual piecework in 1942; but it collapsed 
quickly for reasons that are not entirely clear and it was not 
until 1945 when a more determined approach was adopted. By the 
1950s, it seems, an IPW system covered all the pieceworkers in 
the two machine shops; and so it remained until 1960 when the 
gang system was suddenly restored across the plant.
Despite the apparent scale of the these changes, Tolllday's 
silence on the IPW interlude is understandable. There is only 
passing reference to it in Williams' study, and even the primary 
documentary sources say remarkably little on the subject.
However, it is an unfortunate omission as the story provides 
further evidence that the gang payment system was not the crucial 
feature of factory politics at Herbert's.
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As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the initial signs 
suggested that senior management envisaged major reforms in 
labour relations through the introduction of IPV: the production 
director argued for a policy of higher productivity through 
higher wages and higher supervisory costs; and Sir Alfred himself 
complained that the old system had become "merely day work plus a 
bonus". However, it seems that other arguments about achieving 
economies through the elimination of "excessive claims" and 
hidden "subsidies" soon prevailed in the boardroom - with
/
predictable consequences for the pace and character of the 
changes that took place on the shopfloor over the next four 
years.
The shop stewards' minutes suggest that it took a full year to 
put the first section. Bar Lathes, onto IPV. Surface Grinding 
followed in January 1947 and then Pactory Bar Lathe later that 
same year. The changeover for Chucking did not come until nearly 
two years later. As the new payment system was inched across the 
shopfloor, it must have become apparent to the pieceworkers that 
despite their new-found role in piece-price bargaining - matched 
by a decline in the chargehand's authority - they would gain few 
tangible rewards from the changeover to IPV. A combination of 
management's determination to resist any form of internal wage 
drift and the relative scarcity of new product designs made sure 
of that. Essentially, it seems to me, the reforms meant no more 
than the substitution of one weakened piecework payment system
Page 314
for another. Instead of chasing higher earnings through greater 
productivity, it is likely that the severe constraints imposed on 
the new system encouraged workers, as in the gang system, to 
develop strong norms over the effort bargain as they became 
accustomed to achieving a certain level of earnings without much 
mental and physical effort.
There is no evidence that this outcome of the pay reforms 
disturbed senior management. Taking their cue from the Sole and 
Governing Director, the managers seemed prepared to accept low 
productivity as a consequence of the wages policy. (Complaints 
about the rate-fixing department persisted, however, and I would 
speculate that this prompted the decision to close the IPV 
experiment in 1960. Vith a few, modest improvements in the 
product range coming through, a return to the gang system made 
the best use of an inadequate organisation and provided a cheap 
and convenient way of pricing the new jobs.) During the 1950s, 
particularly the first half of that decade, management's 
tolerance of their employees' unhurried approach to work was 
understandable. If the work rate was low, it only meant that the 
customers had to wait a little longer for a Herbert machine; and 
if they grew tired of waiting, it hardly mattered as there were 
many more prepared to join the queue. This mood of complacency - 
the product of an economic boom that, for Herbert's, had 
stretched across three decades - characterised this aspect of 
factory politics and provided the dynamic for that relationship 
between managers and engineering pieceworkers at Edgwick. Phil
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Banks-Price, a former manager, expressed it this way:
"If you can make a thing and sell it at a reasonable price 
and a reasonable profit, and the people who are making it are 
used to making it, and it doesn't require much effort on 
their part - they can rap them out quite nicely, they've got 
everything weighed up with regard to piecework prices and 
that - it's a hell of a job to change it, you know."
A third flaw in Tolliday's argument is the failure to observe 
that the toolmakers at Herbert's did not conform to his general 
statement that "in many firms the organisation of toolmakers 
became weak and quietistic" because they could rely on the 
automatic operation of the Coventry Toolroom Agreement (CTA) to 
secure their pay increases. The situation at Herbert's was not so 
simple. It is probably true that the toolmakers became 
increasingly 'separatist' in their outlook towards the other 
engineering sections at Edgwick, especially after they went onto 
a daywork system in 1950 - an event which signalled management's 
(tardy) recognition of the incompatibility of Herbert's piecework 
systems, both collective and individual, with the operation of 
the CTA. Also, it is certainly true that the toolmakers 
embarrassed their section representatives on several occasions 
during the 1950s when they refused to participate in industrial 
actions - or, more accurately, token demonstrations - organised 
by the shop committee. But it is also clear that for much of the 
post-war period, and most especially during the 1950s, their 
section stewards dominated the shopfloor organisation at Edgwick,
and that until the mid-1960s the section itself remained a major 
power block in shopfloor politics. This area is worth some 
exploration, not only to correct Tolliday's account, but also 
because an examination of the toolroom's dominance provides one 
more key to understanding the distinctive character of unionism 
at the plant.
Herbert's toolmakers did not conform to Tolliday's generalisation 
for two reasons. Firstly, their recent history had not encouraged 
them to be "guietistlc". Secondly, they were placed in a dominant 
position through their status as a skilled elite in a plant where 
the craft ethos (Coventry-style) was particularly strong, through 
their union representatives, and through the political impact of 
the CTA on Herbert's tight wages policy.
As Tolliday reminds us, management ran a "classic anti-union 
paternalist shop" until the mid-1960s. Herbert's grudging 
tolerance of workplace unionism in general, and fierce hostility 
to the CTA in particular, meant that the toolmaker could never 
rely on "the automatic operation" of any agreement to secure the 
pay and conditions they regarded as legitimate. During the War, 
for example, they had experienced a prolonged industrial conflict 
over the employment of female dilutees in their section. 
Immediately after the War, they found management extremely 
reluctant to remove a male dilutee. Relations later improved, but 
it is significant that the toolmakers had to wait until 1950 
before they were put onto day-work. Given these and other
examples of management's approach as "hard gaffers", the 
toolmakers must have felt that they could not afford to become 
"quletistic".
Also unlike toolmakers In many local engineering firms, those at 
Herbert's remained a dominant influence on the shopfloor long 
after the signing of the CTA. Earlier, I attributed this to 
several factors including the strength of what I called the craft 
ethos. The notion of the ’craft ethos' at Herbert's is inevitably 
somewhat vague, for it is an attempt to put a label on the way 
engineering workers, both inside the factory and outside in the 
local community, felt about the character of the production 
process at Edgwick. It represents a confusion of ideas about 
skilled work itself and also about the "quality" of Herbert's 
products - for many ’skilled' workers, I would suggest, gained 
their craft pride primarily through their association with the 
product rather than the process.
In other engineering centres, Herbert's may have been dismissed 
as occupying the "rough end" of trade, but there is no doubt that 
many local workers felt the plant was a centre of craft 
excellence. In part, this contradiction can be explained by the 
general character of engineering work in the city. Coventry was a 
major centre of the light engineering industry, and probably 
contained the greatest concentration of motor production in the 
country. In these factories the vast proportion of the work was 
semi-skilled in nature. Against this general picture, it is not
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surprising that many people viewed work at Herbert's as highly 
skilled. Besides, this image was not totally misleading. In 
comparison with the motor firms in Tolliday's case studies, 
Herbert's toolroom was proportinately much larger than average. 
Indeed, during the 1930s management claimed that it possessed the 
largest toolroom in the country, employing several hundreds in 
that section. It seems that this claim was based on a very wide 
definition of toolroom work - subsequently the financial 
implications of the CTA persuaded management to seek a much 
narrower definition - nonetheless, it is probable that twenty 
years later there were still 80-100 toolmakers at Edgwick. This 
reflected the fact that the production process was far more 
craft-based than at Rootes, Jaguars or Standards. Probably as 
much as 40% of Herbert's pieceworkers had skilled status, so the 
toolmakers represented a sizeable elite within an elite that was, 
itself, comparatively large.
Linked to their status as craft workers, the toolmakers were also 
regarded as the custodians of trade unionism in the engineering 
industry. In an earlier chapter, I described the leading role 
played by the toolroom in reviving the shopfloor organisation at 
Herbert's in the 1930s, and how, during the Var - despite the 
departure of their more militant activists - the toolmakers 
maintained their dominance through new section stewards, such as 
Varr and Feltham. Even the crisis that overtook the shop 
committee in the immediate post-war years seemed to enhance the 
toolroom representatives' authority as this gloomy period
coincided with Warr's temporary withdrawal from shop committee 
politics. When he was re-elected as works convenor at the end of 
1951, it must have been interpreted as a sign that the toolroom 
intended to resume its customary role as the moral leadership of 
the workplace organisation. Of course, it cannot be assumed that, 
through their representatives, the toolroom's interests directed 
the twists and turns of the committee's policies. As I indicated 
earlier, the senior stewards did not always pursue objectives 
that matched the sectional interests of their immediate 
constitutency. However, it is reasonable to assume that the 
toolmakers took advantage of the fact that their section stewards 
were the only ones who could take up grievancies with management 
during company time, and that their specific interests and 
general perspective on factory politics would carry considerable 
weight with the senior stewards and, consequently, with the shop 
committee as a whole.
Perhaps most important of all, the toolmakers dominated factory 
politics at Herbert's by virtue of the fact that they were the 
only section of engineering workers to escape the full effect of 
the firm's wages policy, for the CTA made them Edgwick's pay 
leaders. This had particular relevance to the skilled and 
semi-skilled pieceworkers. All the problems of sectional 
organisation discussed earlier made it an extremely unlikely 
project for any one group of employees to breach Herbert's tough 
pay policy through industrial action. Instead, it was easier for 
the skilled and semi-skilled pieceworkers' representatives to
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exert collective pressure to ensure that the shop committee 
negotiated for 'pro rata’ increases based on pay rises the 
toolmakers had secured through the CTA. Similar organisational 
difficulties, together with pressure from the coalition of 
pieceworkers, must have persuaded the other sections lower down 
the labour hierarchy - the crane drivers, storemen, labourers and 
women workers - to bend to the inevitable. Thus, on each occasion 
during the 1950s when the committee 'campaigned' for "an 
all-round Increase" to end low pay at Herbert's, the final 
settlement involved "pro rata" rises.
In the mid-1950s, the hegemony of the toolmakers must have seemed 
a permanent fixture of factory politics at Edgwick. The mass 
resignation of the committee's executive in 1956, prompted by the 
toolmakers' rejection of a deal fixed up by the works convenor, 
demonstrated simultaneously the sectional power of the toolroom 
and the autocratic attitude of a senior steward who 'happened' to 
be a toolmaker as well.** It was one more illustration of a 
political tradition that seemed to stretch back to the 1930. 
However, their dominance rested on an alliance that was not as 
enduring as it often looked. Some changes that took place during 
the 1950s may have favoured the toolroom's dominance. In 
particular, the rise in the proportion of engineering 
pieceworkers who secured skilled status is likely to have caused 
a similar rise in the support for traditional craft union tactics 
(which encouraged pay bargaining on an individual basis within 
the context of a district organisation) and reliance on
toolmakers as the pay leaders. But other changes threatened the 
status quo. Though few figures are available, it seems the 
toolroom continued to dwindle in size during the 1950s. By the 
end of the 1950s management was about to terminate the IPV 
experiment and restore the gang system across the two machine 
shops. Lastly, and probably most importantly, a trade recession 
towards the end of the decade made it apparent that the interests 
of the skilled pieceworkers and day-workers were being protected 
at the expense of the semi- and unskilled employees, and that the 
representatives of the skilled workers were unwilling or unable 
to effectively protect the interests of the semi-skilled. The 
next section will look at this particular episode in some detail.
The Redundancy Crisis and Shifts in Shopfloor Politics
As early as August 1956, major redundancies in the local motor 
firms prompted a debate among the shop stewards about the likely 
impact on jobs at Herbert's. But the minutes conveyed no sense of 
urgency and it was not until October 1957, when news came of 
redundancies at another local machine tool firm, Vickman's, that 
the shop committee began to consider what action to take. Even 
then the tactic chosen - writing a letter to the Confed asking 
for a meeting on the machine tool industry - seemed remarkably 
diffuse in its objective.1-00 This reflected the pecularity of the 
crisis at Herbert's. There had been no redundancies at the plant
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by that time and there were none for the remainder of 1957. It 
seems that the voluntary departure of several hundred workers 
through 'natural wastage' - prompted, no doubt, by major 
reductions in overtime - had enabled management to avoid Issuing 
any dismissal notices thus far. However, as the recession 
deepened, even this rate of job-loss was deemed insufficient and, 
on 8 January 1958, management announced the first of many 
dismissals.101
Despite the early warnings, when the crisis finally broke the 
shop stewards were still without a plan. Earlier, they had called 
on the Confed to "get a report from all machine tool factories 
before calling a meeting and asking the MPs to attend"102 and had 
agreed to "review” the situation on a monthly basis;10* but, 
ignoring advice from the new TGWU district, Harry Urwin, "that 
the shop floor was the best level of approach and that works 
conference seldom succeeded In these matters.",104 the shop 
committee remained bereft of any ideas that drew on its own 
resources rather than depended on external agencies, such as the 
Confed and the House of Commons. As the crisis unfolded, and the 
workforce continued to decline - in January 1957 the total 
workforce numbered 4386, two years later it had dwindled to 
3347x0» _ the shop committee remained ineffectual. Telegrams were 
sent to Transport House and the Ministry of Labour,10" more 
appeals were made to the Confed to organise a meeting of shop 
stewards in the machine tool industry;107 but the call for a 
one-day strike, proposed by Raj Singh, one of the TGVU stewards.
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was out-voted.xo" Instead of co-ordinating shopfloor resistance 
to management's plans on the basis of the Confed's minimal 
demands of no redundancies where short-time working was viable, 
the committee only "approved" or "deprecated" the actions of 
individual sections when they respectively supported or rejected 
the Confed's policy. Instead of attacking the miserable levels of 
severance pay - three weeks wages for those with over ten years 
service, for example10* - the senior stewards brought managers 
into committee meetings on two seperate occasions in an effort to 
demonstrate a common concern about the crisis.110
Despite their customary brevity, the stewards' minutes provide 
enough detail to illuminate the difficulties the shopfloor 
organisation faced, and so enable the reader to identify some of 
the reasons for the committee's inaction on the shopfloor.
It is clear, first of all, that the impact of the crisis on the 
shopfloor was extremely uneven. Some sections of the machine shop 
and foundry were quickly plunged into either or both short-time 
working and redundancies. Other sections, such as machine wiring, 
continued to experience systematic overtime throughout the 
crisis.111 This situation would have challenged the efforts of 
stewards within a highly organised workplace; but for an 
organisation marginalised by "hard gaffers" and kept permanently 
weak by a dependance on a powerful district organisation, a tight 
labour market for skilled workers and individual bargaining 
skills, the project was virtually impossible. Furthermore, it is
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apparent that the redundancies had a direct and damaging impact 
on the committee’s frail structure: appeals for new 
representatives were made“ 2 as the turnover of section stewards 
rose from 29% in 1957 to 62% in 1958 and 68% in the following 
year; and in 1958 elections for committee chairman had to be held 
three times. The recession also prompted a major political crisis 
within the committee when, as I have already noted, the shop 
stewards found it increasingly difficult to raise funds through 
voluntary contributions from their membership (though, as shall 
be claimed later, the resulting split proved very convenient for 
the senior AEU stewards). However, the union records do not 
illuminate one factor which must have been the principal reason 
for the shop committee's ineffectual stance on the redundancies, 
namely, the conflict of interests between the skilled workers and 
their semi- and unskilled colleagues over the issue of short-time 
working. For that insight the reader has to turn to the 
directors' minute books.
Notwithstanding their ‘tough' attitude towards the unions, it 
seems that during 1958, the managers did not challenge those 
sections which supported the Confed's demand for short-time 
working before, or as an alternative to, redundancies. However, 
there is no evidence that this managerial inaction was motivated 
by anything other than the justifiable fear that, after the 
recession, the firm would find it extremely difficult to attract 
back its former employees, especially the more skilled workers 
who could secure better-paid jobs elsewhere relatively easily.
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Unfortunately, it seems that short-time working did not achieve 
the aim management desired. On 2 December 1958, Sidney Huirhead, 
then works director at Edgwick, informed the Board that despite 
further cuts in production which had resulted in four-day working 
in the foundries, machine shop and Factory, and continued 
redundancies - "69 people left the works last month, 32 being 
wastage and 37 redundant" - the plant was now "very short of 
skilled labour".xxa Two months later, senior management came to 
the conclusion that, instead of helping to "hoard" skilled 
labour, short-time working was largely responsible for the 
voluntary departure of these workers. The consequence of this new 
insight was predictable. On 18 February 1959, the new Chairman of 
the Board, Colonel Clark reported:
"Short-time working had to be withdrawn as many skilled 
workers had obtained other employment (with) members of the 
Employers' Association."xx*
Clark argued that these unfriendly acts by fellow employers would 
necessitate a "review” of Herbert's "responsibilities to the 
Association in respect of the (eventual) re-employment of this 
labour". More importantly, he also recognised that the decision 
to end short-time working would result in "further redundancies 
in due course".xxm
The decision to revoke the sectional agreements on short-time 
working could not have surprised the senior stewards. They must 
also have realised that management's intention was to retain a 
relatively small number of skilled workers chiefly at the expense
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of a larger number of their semi- and unskilled colleagues. Yet 
no attempt was made to win broad-based opposition to management's 
plan. Instead, when the end of short-time working was quickly 
followed by the announcement of a further 46 redundancies, the 
senior AEU stewards persuaded the committee to "agree that the 
Negotiating Committee take up relative points on Redundancy or 
S/T working when they arise".xx* It was a formulation that 
effectively confused and dis-organised the semi- and unskilled.
Without direct evidence, it cannot be claimed that this was 
deliberately intended. What can be said is that it was a 
convenient outcome for Varr and the senior AEU stewards whose
/
immediate constituents were workers who would have given the 
strongest support to management's unilateral decision on 
short-time working. Similarly, there is no evidence that the 
senior stewards manipulated events over the membership levy 
controversy to ensure a split in the shop committee from July 
1958 to January 1959; but, again, the outcome must have been 
convenient. The exclusion of the TGVU stewards from committee 
meetings effectively ostracised the chief advocates of a 
shopfloor campaign during a crucial moment in the redundancy 
crisis; and the consequent reduction in attendance figures - 
basically, the numbers were halved - also provided the AEU 
stewards with a ready-made excuse for the committee's inaction.
The redundancy crisis of 1958-59 demonstrated that the senior AEU 
stewards were unable to break through the narrow sectional 
interests of the skilled elite and defend those of the majority
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of the membership. Consequently, it shook the domain assumption 
in factory politics at Herbert's that the interests of the 
toolmakers (and other fragments of the skilled elite) broadly 
coincided with those of the majority of the membership. That 
assumption received a further blow in 1960 when the senior 
stewards agreed to the restoration of the gang piecework system 
in the machine shops.XXT The deal created a new supplementary 
bonus, called the Special Alfred Herbert Award; but this was only 
intended to guarantee the earnings of those who had been 
high-fliers under IPW, principally the chargehands and a few 
skilled machinists.xx* Remarkably, it seems that the semi-skilled 
gained nothing from this agreement to compensate for any loss 
they may have incurred as a result of the restoration of the 
chargehands' authority to negotiate all job-prices.
I would argue that the redundancy crisis also signalled the end 
of Herbert's traditional style of management. The long boom was 
over and the employees were reminded that the myth of 
*jobs-for-life' had always been contingent on economic 
circumstances. Later, only months later, the managers dismantled 
another feature of Herbert's employer-paternalism: the 
non-contributory pension scheme for the shopfloor. It has been 
claimed that this decision effectively wiped out all the 
contributions for employees under 37 years of age,xx* if so its 
political impact across all sections of the shopfloor is not hard 
to imagine. (There is some evidence to support this claim in the 
minutes for September 1960 which note, albeit rather tersely, the
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opposition of some stewards to management's new pension 
scheme.)x*°
The toolmakers' dominance of the shop committee did not survive 
these changes for long. At the end of the decade, Herbert's began 
re-employing large numbers of those dismissed a year before or 
even later. Ron Doughty was among those called back. He returned, 
probably like many semi-skilled machinists, with a smouldering 
resentment at his treatment by management and some suspicions 
about the role of the senior stewards. As a veteran opponent of 
Varr's corporatist approach to factory politics, Ron had strong 
personal reasons for espousing a conspiracy theory to explain his 
dismissal in 1959. On his return in May 1960, he immediately 
resumed that oppositional role in the shop committee; but this 
time he could no longer be marginalised as an occasional nuisance 
and embarrassment. He quickly found allies on the shop committee 
in his challenge to the leadership. In part this was due to the 
factors outlined above. It has also been suggested that it was 
because he offered a clear alternative to "cadger" Varr's style 
of leadership. As Vic Brown put it:
"Ron Doughty was —  what’s the word I'm looking for? Freddie 
Mart was flexible and Doughty stuck to the rules. Freddie 
Harr was a cadger. He would give a bit to get a bit. Doughty 
wouldn't, you know. He was straight down the line."
At any event, Doughty's successes came quickly. In February 1961, 
he replaced Feltham as committee secretary,x*x then in November 
he was elected works convenor and thus ended Varr's
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eleven-year-long period of office.1”
A ‘palace revolution'
Though he was a semi-skilled grinder, Doughty's election was not 
a sectional triumph for it did not fundamentally alter the fabric 
of workplace politics at Edgwick. Nonetheless, his success must 
have given particular encouragement to the semi- and unskilled 
workers in the plant. Thus, when, shortly after the election, a 
series of strikes by clerical (and semi-skilled manual?) workers 
disrupted production in some of the local engineering factories, 
Herbert's management must have expected some kind of industrial 
action from those same sections within Edgwick's workforce. But I 
doubt whether anyone anticipated the size of the strike wave that 
rolled through the plant.
At first, the strikes were very limited affairs, both in terms of 
the numbers of participants and their duration. On several 
occasions in April 1962, the pinkers and sprayers struck for more 
pay - though only for a few days each time and never long enough 
to cause any lay-offs.x”  In May, 23 storekeepers went on strike 
for two days to press their pay claim.1*4 But then, in September 
that year, 140 shop clerks - progress chasers, stock control 
clerks and storekeepers - walked out, demanding an end to the
¡rit award system and an Increase that would reduce the widening
differentials with the production workers.1* 9 They did not return 
"for meaningful talks" until 39 days later, by which time about 
half of the shopfloor was laid off.1*9 A year later, 39 shop 
clerks in the despatch department stopped work over the demand 
for a closed shop.1*7 This strike lasted 70 days. During that 
time, it was reported, a third of the hourly-rated workforce - 
principally the semi- and unskilled day workers - had either 
joined the strike or been suspended for taking sympathetic 
action.1*9
Apart from the effect on production, the psychological impact of 
the packers' strike on management must have been considerable, as 
Phil Barnes' rather acerbic comments about these workers 
suggests:
"The women in the packing department were just in TGWU - the 
scrubbers' union - and one woman was a shop steward. She had 
a big mouth. And one woman wasn't in the union. (The steward) 
went and told her that she'd got to be in the union. Veil, 
the silliest thing you can do is to tell a woman she's got to 
do something. Of course, she turned round and told (the 
steward) that she'd please herself..
"So, eventually, the women walked out. And that went on for 
13 weeks, you know. You'd be surprised how that disrupted 
work. Couldn't get the stuff away. Foremen, managers, anyone, 
were working in the packing department..."
"All I was concerned about was that I was getting complaints 
from my customers. I used to write back, telex back, saying:
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'Regret strike action in the packing department.' They were 
only a load of scrubbers anyhow, this lot, but they did cause 
some disruption."
In addition to these strikes, other forms of industrial action 
taken at about that time demonstrated that a new mood was 
stirring among the semi- and unskilled dayworkers. For example, 
in April 1963, TGWU workers refused to unload an Umbrako lorry 
because it was driven by a strike-breaker from that firm.1**
On a few occasions, this new mood touched even the skilled 
workers, though it seems the effect was hardly dramatic. For 
example, in April 1962, the test bay workers rejected a review of 
merit payments as a response to their wage demands.1*® Just over 
a year later, anger in a fitters' gang over piece-prices 
encouraged the section stewards to raise the demand for a veto 
over piecework prices;1*1 and during the shop clerks' strike in 
October that same year, the repair fitters narrowly voted against 
strike action over their pay claim.1**
The evidence, such as it is, also indicates that despite the 
unprecedented scale and character of the dayworkers' strikes, 
those directly involved usually gained very little benefit from 
them. The immediate outcome of the packers' strike, for instance, 
was a doubtful commitment by management to "favour" all employees 
being members of a trade union; and in the wake of all the other 
incidents, there may have been a general increase in union
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membership In some sections. Williams' study indicates that some 
women workers enjoyed a modest improvement in pay over the next 
few years. Between 1964 and 1967, the standard hourly earnings of 
female machinists rose by 2/3d to 8/4 d - 3d more than the income 
of male labourers though this still only represented 76% of the 
lowest rate for male semi-skilled machinists. If the Asians 
reaped any gains, they were less tangible. Certainly, there were 
no improvements in pay; though it is possible that the shop 
committee's decision to request the reinstatement of an Asian 
worker who was probably the victim of a racial attack was linked 
to Asian participation in the strikes.1»* Again, despite this 
upsurge of militancy, it is also evident that key features of 
shopfloor politics were unchanged.
On the surface it seemed the strikes had merely disturbed 
temporarily the "somnolent" character of factory politics at 
Edgwick. Over the next four years only one sectional action - by 
foundry workers - was recorded in the minutes; none was recorded 
in the local press. Despite its new left-wing leadership, the 
shop committee organised no factory-wide demonstrations over pay. 
Ironically, after 1966, its new politics may have even 
contributed to this apparent inertia when a Labour Government 
imposed a wage freeze, for the convenor used all his persuasive 
skills to pledge his committee's loyalty to this measure.1*4 It 
was also clear that the strikes did not cause a shift in the 
locus of power or influence within the shop committee from the 
skilled to the semi- and unskilled workers. I would suggest that
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all this was because of the identity of the new militants.
The upsurge in industrial action was not a ‘revolt' of all the 
semi-skilled workers. The records suggest that, apart from the 
plnkers and sprayers, the semi-skilled pieceworkers ‘slept' 
through it all. Perhaps this was because of the ‘escalator 
effect' of custom and practice which, in Herbert's circumstances, 
virtually guaranteed their rise to skilled status, to occupations 
where, as I shall later argue, workers had little cause to 
support militant action in those early years of the new union 
regime. But whatever the reason, there is no doubt that the 
hundreds of lay-offs, the massive disruptions to both production 
and distribution at the plant were caused not by white, male 
semi-skilled machinists, but, among the manual workers, by white 
women workers and Asian daylabourers.
Before the strikes, these two groups had occupied the lowest 
levels of the labour hierarchy and were, politically, the most 
peripheral elements of the labour force. As they were isolated 
from the other semi-skilled workers during the strikes, it is not 
surprising that, afterwards, their situation should remain 
unchanged. In the case of the Asian workers, it seemed that the 
politics of their oppression remained as powerful as ever. For 
example, in November 1965, when it seemed probable that more 
black workers would be recruited to ease the firm's desperate 
shortage of labour, racism re-surfaced in the union records. They 
read, somewhat cryptically:
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"IMIGRENT LABOUR - REQUEST GONE TO COY"x30 
Two months later that request was plainly (mis)spelt out at an 
Annual General Meeting:
"RE COULER IMIGRENT'S COY WOULD NOT ACCEPT OUR PIONTS NO 
MORE WAG"333
I have already suggested why the semi-skilled engineering workers 
were ‘somnolent* at this time. Given the fragmentary character of 
the available information, the reasons why the skilled sections 
also stayed relatively untouched by these stirrings of militancy 
can only be guessed. From Williams' study and from a few entries 
in the union records, the following story is suggested.
At the start of 1960, the internal transport workers went on 
strike for an "all-round wage increase". *■*■» Warr persuaded them 
to return for negotiations on a new wage structure. Then, in 
March, the skilled workers gained a sizeable pay increase which 
brought their average rate close to the district average or, as 
Williams put it, left "a negligible difference" between the two. 
In part, this was achieved through the Special Alfred Herbert 
Award: a bonus payment that was introduced to secure support 
among the chargehands and skilled workers for the restoration of 
the gang system. The deal must have caused some embarrassment 
among the shop stewards representing the skilled sections 
because, in April, the shop committee minuted the decision that, 
while "thanking" the company for the new wage structure, it would 
try to reduce the differentials by negotiating a 10\ pay increase
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for semi- and unskilled workers.1** No doubt, the senior 
stewards' failure to win such an increase contributed to Warr's 
demise as convenor the following year; it must also have fuelled 
a discontent which ignited into strike action after Doughty's 
election.
Vhen the strikes came. Doughty was probably both unable and 
unwilling to emulate Varr's tactics. As a semi-skilled grinder 
and a new boy at Herbert's - he started work there in 1950 - 
Doughty lacked the authority ascribed to men such as Warr, who 
was both a long-service toolmaker and an experienced Labour 
councillor. Also unlike his predecessor, Doughty was not a 
"cadger". He was not prepared to try and fix some kind of quick, 
compromise deal. He held a principled approach to factory 
politics. Furthermore, he endorsed the strikers' objectives: he 
was concerned about the low pay suffered by the shop clerks, 
women workers and manual dayworkers; and he saw closed shop 
agreements as a vital objective in trying to build an effective 
workplace organisation.
The discontent felt by some of the skilled workers, as they went 
through the unprecedented experience of being laid-off through 
strikes - and, furthermore, strikes organised by people who 
occupied the lowest levels of the labour hierarchy - can be 
imagined. While it lasted, this mood must have sustained the 
tremendous pressure Doughty experienced in those first years of 
office.1** However by 1964, after the ‘revolt' of the dayworkers
had passed. Doughty quickly regained sufficient allies among the 
AEU stewards to harry tfarr's attempt at a come-back. In January 
that year, the former convenor stood for the post of committee 
chairman. Eventually, he secured the post; yet only through the 
intervention of a district union official, and after this 
‘victory' he never won another election. Later, Warr retired from 
union politics when he took a foreman's job.1-0
The managers' reaction to the new leadership, and the strikes 
that quickly followed, was also predictable. Their tentative 
efforts to accomodate the stewards were swiftly ended. In May 
1962, immediately following the pinkers' strikes, the shop 
committee was informed that the noticeboards were not to be used 
for "Union Propagander".141 Then, in September, restrictions were 
imposed on the movement of the TGWU senior steward1-* and in 1963 
the managers decided to "tighten up custom and practice" on the 
movement of all the senior stewards.1-* Though linked explicitly 
to the disputes, the restrictions were still in force as late as 
January 1967 when the convenor was refused access to a visiting 
factory inspector.1-- For their part, the shop stewards decided 
(by 20 votes to 9) to quit the practice of making presentations 
to retiring managers.1-*
In addition to tightening up on "custom and practice", it seems 
that the managers did the same on pay. When he compared the 
average income of skilled workers at Herbert's with the district 
rate, Williams observed that "a negligible differential In
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earnings in December 1960" had "widened to 1/3 p.h. in April 
1965" and that at "the present time (October 1967) this gap is 
1/7 p.h.".x*m For the latter years, the Labour government's pay 
laws provided a ready-made excuse for the widening gap: the 
managers had only to conform to regulations when the wage freeze 
was imposed in 1966. But there is no such excuse for the earlier 
period. It is evident that in response to Doughty's "straight" 
leadership - his disavowal of Warr's cosy, personalised and 
guasi-secretive way of conducting pay talks, and his explicit 
recognition of conflicts of class interests - and the surge of 
strike activity, the managers became more reluctant to concede 
increases on both piecework prices and the shop bonus. Despite 
the introduction of several new machine designs - chiefly, 
programme sequence control machines - which exposed, once again, 
the serious inadequacies of the rate-fixing department, Williams' 
data suggest that the managers were able to out-Herbert Herbert. 
Piecework earnings declined as a proportion of the skilled 
workers' total income: from 45% in 1960, they slipped to 40% in 
1965 and 37% at the end of 1966. This was matched by a 
corresponding rise in the proportion of earnings accounted for by 
the Alfred Herbert Award: from 28% in 1960 to 35% six years 
later .X*T
In response to this situation, there is no doubt that a large 
number of skilled workers quit Herbert's and sought better pay 
elsewhere. According to Williams' figures, between 1964 and 1967 
there was a net loss of 176 (15%) skilled, direct production
workers.14* The turnover of labour must have been considerably 
more than this because, in 1966, the managers felt obliged to 
seek the shop stewards' co-operation to set up one month 
intensive courses for semi-skilled workers in the apprentice 
training centre. Varr's response to the proposal probably 
typified the attitudes of many of his colleagues:
"PRO(POSED BY) BRO WARR, WE REFUSE TO ALLOW THIS. AS IF GOOD 
WAGES WERE PAID THIS WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. "1‘* 
Characteristically, the shop committee tried to exploit 
management's difficulties by pressing the demand that all 
trainees should be union members.1*0 Equally characteristic, the 
managers were prepared to defer the scheme, while the issue went 
through the disputes procedure, rather than accept this 
condition.
Among the skilled pieceworkers who chose to remain at Herbert's, 
many were probably the "satisficezs" Williams described in his 
study: men who valued job security, a regular income and a 
relatively low level of mental and manual effort, above the 
possibility of being among the top earners in the district. But 
there were also those who felt increasingly dissatisfied with the 
situation. The campaign by the fitters' stewards to secure a veto 
over job-prices, mentioned earlier in this section, reflected 
that dissatisfaction and anger at management's tough stance.
It appears that from about 1966 that anger grew among the 
"satisficezs" as the plant managers de-stabllised the effort
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bargain by introducing, in quick succession, a new range of 
radically different machine designs. That de-stablisation was 
achieved in two ways. First, the rush of new jobs exposed the 
technical inadequacies of the rate-fixing department and the 
apparently arbitrary structure of piece-prices that had 
flourished under the gang system. (In his fieldwork, conducted 
during the autumn of that year, Williams found numerous examples 
of new job prices that were either far too high or too low in 
relation to the pay norms the chargehands were accustomed to.) 
Second, as Williams put it, the pieceworkers were "faced by the 
mental stimulus of new work, new methods and new approaches". In 
January 1967, Williams forecast that, in consequence, "the 
predictability of the environment will decline and with it 
perhaps the somnifacient (sic) atmosphere".*91
Crisis, reform and the emergence of a new shopfloor elite
The new designs were part of a drive by corporate management, 
headed since 1964 by a professional manager who was not a Herbert 
veteran, to wipe out decades of conservatism and "re-model" the 
firm in accordance with the latest ideas in management theory. 
More will be said about this later. Here it will suffice to say 
that though part of this "re-modelling" included labour relations 
at Edgwick, this item was placed at the bottom of the agenda for 
change, perhaps because of the apparent "somnolence" of the 
workforce. If so, the managers soon had a rude awakening of their
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own.
At the close of 1967, preliminary steps were taken to devise a 
productivity scheme; but short-time working held up this work 
until Nay 1968. When the talks were resumed, the managers seemed 
in no haste to conclude a deal. Then, in July, the crisis finally 
broke. Exasperated over management's delays, some 200 production 
fitters in the main shop struck work to press their demand for a 
daywork system and a pay increase that would raise their earnings 
to the district average. They stayed out for five weeks, 
sustained to some degree by a "Fighting Fund" hastily organised 
by the shop committee. I
I believe that the sectional identity of the strikers could have 
been predicted, too. The production fitters were the largest 
section of skilled labour (where entrance was restricted to 
‘time-served' craftsmen) at Edgwick. In the minutes they appear 
to have been the most combative of the skilled workers. It was, 
for example, a long-running dispute over piece-work prices in the 
fitting shop which, in 1966, forced management to amend the gang 
system by granting workers the right to nominate a "price-fixer", 
a ganger who accompanied the chargehand in job-price negotiations 
with the rate-fixer. Indeed, it seems that by this time the 
fitters had displaced the toolmakers - now reduced to less than 
50 men - as the dominant power in shop committee. And yet, none 
of these factors prevented a deterioration in their relative 
position as wage earners at the plant. Williams' figures show
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that between 1964 and 1967, the production fitters slipped from 
third to fifth place in his six ranks of pay for skilled 
workers.1**
When they struck, in that summer of 1968, the fitters 
demonstrated one of the paradoxes of skilled labour in the 
engineering shops at Edgwick, namely, that despite their position 
in the labour hierarchy and the fact that shopfloor politics 
mirrored their interests, most skilled engineering workers were 
very poorly placed to press their demands throught industrial 
action. The fitters' strike lasted five weeks; but it seemed to 
have little effect on production. During the dispute only 150 
workers were la id-off, and another 30 suspended for taking 
sympathetic action; and when they returned to work, they did so 
on management's terms. They were promised substantial pay 
increases under a productivity scheme for which even the "road 
maps" were lacking;1»* and granted an interim pay award that left 
them still well behind the district average.
This paradox was central to the character of factory politics at 
Edgwick. Varr's "cadgerIsm", if I can call it that, was probably 
based on a pragmatic acceptance of that paradox; a recognition of 
the fact that, for the sections he represented, a strong 
workplace-based organisation was a doubtful prize to wrest from a 
management fiercely opposed to shopfloor bargaining when those 
same sections were so poorly placed, strategically, in the 
production process and when a reliance on the workings of the
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labour market and the interventions of the union's district 
organisation secured a level of pay and conditions which kept his 
constituents reasonably happy. It was safer and economical of 
effort. Furthermore, the absence of a strong and assertive 
workplace organisation could actually benefit the skilled 
sections at the expense of the others. The practical 
demonstration of this point came during the trade recession in 
the late 1950s. A powerful factory-wide organisation, committed 
to the Confed's policy on redundancies, could have dissuaded 
management from revoking the agreement on short-time working. 
Instead, the shop committee did nothing to stop management from 
sacking hundreds of workers so that some skilled men could 
continue to boost their pay with overtime earnings.
Conclusions
The defeat of ‘cadgerism', symbolised in Doughty's election in 
1961, did not radically change shopfloor politics at Edgwick. As 
I said earlier, Doughty's repudiation of Varr's cosy, 
quasi-secretive style as a negotiator, his rejection of the ‘old 
guard's' accomodation with management and his support for the 
•revolt' of the dayworkers, brought an end to the old Herbert 
managers' limited variant of employer-sponsored corporatism; but 
much else remained the same. The foundry complex remained locked 
into its own politics. In the engineering shops, it was certainly
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the case that Varr's defeat marked a turning point in the 
political influence of the toolroom - over the next few years, 
its power diminished to a size commensurate with the diminutive 
number of workers it contained - but those who were kept at the 
bottom of the hierarchy before Doughty's election, the women 
workers and the Asian dayworkers, were still there even after the 
strikes in 1962 and 1963 had astonished everyone, and probably 
themselves too, with their ability to wreak havoc on the 
shopfloor. That power could have radically re-shaped politics at 
the plant. If those strikers had not been isolated by the 
traditional practices and ideologies of their oppression; if the 
shop committee had linked their grlevancies with, for example, 
the test bay workers' opposition to the merit system and the 
fitters' complaints about piecework prices, then the outcomes 
could have been very different. The struggle could have forged a 
powerful shopfloor organisation which management could not have 
continued to marginalise. Instead, the strikers remained isolated 
in their confrontation with managers who, being long-service 
Herbert employees themselves, resorted to the "hard gaffers" 
approach to labour relations in their moment of crisis. 
Consequently, as I have shown, once the strikers' anger was 
spent, Edgwick's "somnifacient atmosphere" was quickly restored 
and the shop committee forced to labour on in a political 
environment reminiscent of the late 1930s.
The focus of this chapter was firmly fixed on sectional workplace 
experience and the shop stewards' organisation, particularly
changes in its leadership, as it discussed some of the challenges 
to the 'somnolent' character of workplace politics at Edgwick.
The next chapter will re-examine that narrative by looking in 
more detail at managerial reforms during that same period.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: HERBERT'S RE-MODELLED: MANAGEMENT REFORM AND THE 
RUSH TO INNOVATE.
Introduction:
When academics from IMEDE, the international business school at 
Lausanne, Switzerland, visited Herbert in 1962, management seemed 
more than satisfied with the company's performance and confident 
of its future prosperity. Typical of the statements made to IMEDE 
is this comment from Victor Brailsford, the then commercial 
director:
"To maintain our current prominence in the industry, we have 
strong research, design and manufacturing groups and a 
powerful marketing organisation. With the start we've got, I 
don't think there's any doubt that 25 years from now we'll 
still be relatively strong as we are today. "x
This statement reflected a genuine pride in the company's 
"current prominence"; but it also put a brave face on the 
problems that threatened its very survival. The previous chapter 
touched on some of those problems when it discussed challenges 
‘from below' to the character of workplace politics at Edgwick.
This chapter will demonstrate management's consciousness of the 
need for reform and discuss how policies changed in response -
changes which subsequently led to a major challenge to workplace 
politics ‘from above'. My account for this period falls into two 
sections. The first begins immediately after the death of the 
Sole and Governing Director, when the incumbent managers made a 
generally cautious approach to reform. This leads into the second 
period when, during a brief span of four years, an "outsider" 
tried to "re-model" Herbert's. In all this time - 1957 to 1968 - 
labour management seemed a peripheral issue and was subjected to 
only partial changes. Yet major reforms had only been postponed 
and, as I hope to explain, the strange progress of those later 
changes can only be understood within the context of the wider 
managerial crisis that Herbert's slid into as the unintended 
consequences of reform combined with an unexpected trade 
recession.
Reform Under the ‘Old' Herbert Managers
At the beginning of the 1960s the parent company had four 
factories - at Lutterworth and Exhall on Coventry's perimeter, 
and at Red Lane and Edgwick inside the city - and one plant at 
Letchworth which had belonged to Herbert's only subsidiary. Sigma 
Instruments Ltd, since 1951,* and produced inspection and 
measuring equipment. The total workforce was probably no more 
than 5000 employees, with the majority (possibly 3000) located at 
Edgwick.*
Despite the fact that Herbert's produced a wide range of machine 
tools and tooling accessories, and also received a considerable 
income by factoring the products of other machine tool companies, 
the firm could justifiably claim be a specialist lathe 
manufacturer.4 Very little original design work was done on other 
types of machines - instead management chose to remain dependent 
on licensing agreements - and the company's largest plant, 
Edgwick, was geared to the batch production of capstan and turret 
lathes (CTLs). Though reliable figures were unavailable, it seems 
likely that during the 1950s an average of 2000 CTLs were built 
each year at Edgwick.9 Consequently, senior management must have 
been particularly disturbed to record a steady decline in 
Herbert's share of the domestic market for CTLs during those 
years.
At first, there was only a relative decline as overall demand 
expanded rapidly; but from the mid-1950s the decline was absolute 
in a stagnating domestic market.9 The revival of machine tool 
production in Western Europe made Herbert's lathes increasingly 
uncompetitive in international markets.7 Furthermore, towards the 
end of the decade, there was a growing concern within the company 
that the volume production of standard machine tools in the 
Soviet Union would be switched to export markets now that its own 
economy had gained self-sufficiency in a wide range of machine 
tools.9 Added to these immediate concerns, members of senior 
management were clearly anxious about the likely fate of 
Herbert's if they continued to ignore current innovations in the
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technology of metal-cutting. For example, in 1954, one director, 
Schofield, asked the Board to bear in mind "the fact that Warner 
6 Svasey had designed a completely nev range of capstan and 
turret lathes with double the horsepower to cater for the 
expected development of better carbides".9 And less than a year 
later, when Schofield complained that "our chucking automatics 
are in no way comparable with (those produced by) Grldley, New 
Britain, Montforts, etc" the minute reads:
"In the discussion which followed various members of the 
Board stressed the need for looking to the future and not 
waiting until we are short of business before we get on with 
new designs; the need for more emphasis on development was 
very real."10
The material conditions that fostered Herbert's technological 
conservatism in the early 1950s - a massive defence programme,xx 
the near destruction of the European industry and the fact that 
in both America and Russia producers were stretched to respond to 
domestic demand - had created an 'Indian summer' for many British 
firms; but the onset of the recession from 1957 signalled the 
approach of a less hospitable economic climate.
Shortly after Sir Alfred's death in 1957, the directors began to 
respond to these cumulative pressures. Towards the end of the 
decade there were some signs of increasing expenditure - albeit 
from a very low base - on research and development. In 1959, for 
example, a "special shop" was attached to the design department
at Edgwick.xa Two years later, this was expanded into an "Applied 
Research Department" which was housed in a new building of its 
own.xa By this time, the fruits of these efforts had begun to 
appear. The available evidence indicates that by 1961 Herbert's 
had developed plugboard controls, or "static switching" as they 
called it, and fitted them to their smaller lathes.x* In the 
following year, the company launched a De Vlieg jigmill with a 
Herbert-designed NC control system,x* and in 1963, "co-ordatrol 
tape control systems" - another Herbert variant of NC - were 
fitted to Herbert drilling machines.x* It is also likely that, at 
about this time, design work was commenced on a new range of 
plugboard lathes.
Those early years in the 1960s also witnessed some efforts to 
renew capital equipment at Edgwick. For example, in 1961, an 
electrical foundry - later known as the "white iron foundry" - 
was commissioned; and the "Light Engineering Department" was 
built on the same site to accomodate management's plans for the 
"flow-line" production of tools and accessories.xa
Similarly, little time elapsed after Sir Alfred's death before 
the directors began to use some of the company's reserves to 
finance a series of acquisitions. Holbrook Machine Tool Co., a 
precision lathe manufacturer based at Harlow, Essex and 
Stratford, London, was purchased in December, 1958. Then, in 
1960, I.L.Berridge - a sub-contractor for Herbert's smaller 
machines and based at Sanvey Gate, Leicester and Vigston - was
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acquired. A year later two more subsidiaries joined the Group: 
Mudies' Electrical Co., a small component manufacturer based at 
Birmingham; and Vm.Whiteley of Huddersfield which built planers 
and textile machinery. One measure of the scale of this expansion 
is provided by the number of the Group's employees: in 1958 there 
were probably some 4000 employees; by 1961 there were 7350 
"operatives" at the Group's nine factories.x*
Though not inconsiderable in themselves, all these efforts to 
respond to market pressures were cautious and unimaginative when 
compared to management's approach to the reform of office 
administration. In 1962, the company purchased an IBM 1401 to 
deal chiefly with its wages and accounts. Costing approximately 
£8000, the computer had a random access memory (RAM) capacity of 
4K - a diminutive figure compared to the power of home computers 
available just 20 years later, but at that time only two other 
IBM machines in Britain were as large: one was located at the 
Harwell Atomic Energy Centre, and the other at Lloyds Central 
Policy Office in London.x* Doug Howell, a senior member of the 
computer staff at that time, recalled how senior management took 
the decision to take the lead for British Industry. The machine, 
he claimed, was bought on the strength of a few wall diagrams, a 
film show, and some effective sales patter. He remembered that at 
one point in the meeting with the IBM representative, the 
salesman threw out a huge tail of computer print-out and 
triumphantly announced that all of it - some 30 feet in length - 
had been churned out by the printer in so many minutes. The
directors were so impressed that this demonstration clinched the 
deal, despite the fact that it meant violating a principle 
adopted after being caught out on the previous purchase of a 
Powers PCC, namely: "Don't buy if you can't see It for 
yourself”.*0 If any problems were encountered with this computer, 
it did not discourage management from spending over £10,000 on a 
larger machine, an IBM 1400 with 8K RAM and discs, in 1964; by 
which time, Herberts employed some 42 computer staff.**
In addition to all these initiatives, in May 1958 the Board 
capitalised £5.5m of its reserves which represented roughly one 
sixth of Herbert's total assets. This move was probably motivated 
by the directors' worries about a takeover by any of several 
conglomerates, though both publicly and privately the directors 
also expressed some worry about the Labour Party's debate on the 
nationalisation of the machine tool industry. For example, in 
January 1958, Gimson reported on the Finance Committee's 
deliberations on "hiving off parts of the business to protect the 
Co as far as possible against the effect of nationalisation." It 
had concluded there was "no defence" against "Mr Gaitskill's 
scheme to acquire shares in various industries” (then mooted in 
the Labour Party as an alternative to total public ownership).** 
The managers' concern seemed credible at that time because both 
the company and the industry were in the depths of the worst 
recession since the war and felt particularly insecure; but they 
may have exaggerated the dangers for reasons of self-interest, as 
the following minute suggests:
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"Mahler said that the threat of nationalisation was real 
and... urged the Board to give early consideration to the 
establishment of an adequate pension scheme for directors and 
senior staff."93
The Entry of the Professional Managers
At the beginning of 1965, Richard Young, formerly Chairman of 
Raleigh Industries and a managing director of Tube Investments, 
was appointed as an executive director and Deputy Chairman. The 
following year he became Chairman of the Board.
It is claimed that his appointment was largely on the insistence 
of Sir Halford Reddish,*4 Herbert's only non-executive director. 
If so, presumably it was with the support of the Herbert family 
since they were the major shareholders at that time and Sir 
Halford had been a close friend and business associate of the 
company's founder.
There is no doubt that Young was a radical choice as the third 
Chairman to follow Sir Alfred. Young's predecessor, Colonel 
Clark, was an ex-Herbert apprentice and a man who, with over 50 
years service to the company, personified the "Herbert Spirit". 
By contrast. Young was an "outsider" both to the company and the 
industry. Apparently, his chief recommendation was his
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"background In Industrial administration at the highest 
levels".** However, I would suggest that, given the Board's 
earlier response to market pressures - its attempts to up-date 
product designs and capital equipment, and its remarkable efforts 
to modernise office administration - it is likely that most of 
the directors welcomed Young's appointment. What they all failed 
to anticipate was the breadth and pace of change Young himself 
envisaged. Within four years - 1965 to 1968 - the new Chairman 
strove to "re-model" Herbert's.** From company livery to 
corporate structure, from logos to product lines, nothing was 
either too small or too large to escape the sweep of change.
At a very early stage. Young had decided that industrial 
relations at Herbert's, especially at its largest plant, Edgwick, 
also needed "re-modelling"; but he postponed reforms for nearly 
four years. This delay is significant in itself as it suggests 
that he saw the firm's labour problems as peripheral to Herbert's 
difficulties, or rather, a product of them: Young's primary 
target for change was management and not labour. His early 
initiatives included: the rapid growth of Herbert's through 
takeover and joint-venture; the rush to develop new machines; the 
continued expansion of the company's computer facilities; and the 
re-organisation of senior and middle levels of management.
Within the first year of Young's appointment, negotiations were 
finalised on both the acquisition of the machine tool division of 
Birmingham Small Arms Ltd (BSA) and a joint-venture with
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ingersoll Hilling Machine Co. (Ingersoll). In total, the BSA 
acquisitions represented an enormous expansion of productive 
capacity. Seven plants, occupying a total of one million square 
feet of factory space and employing some 4000 workers, were added 
to virtually double the size of the Herbert Group.*T It was, 
however, the sort of expansion that seemed justified at that 
time.
During the mid-1960s, British machine tool builders were enjoying 
a record-level of orders.** Furthermore, despite the fact that 
the overall trend could only be described as one of a "gently 
rising volume of orders",** the Government's National Plan 
encouraged a sense of optimism. To match the demand for both 
domestic orders and exports, the Plan advised UK manufacturing 
industry to increase capital expenditure at an average rate of 7% 
each year in real terms over the period 1964-70."° In 1966, the 
Bullock Committee - a working party of industrialists and senior 
civil servants drawn together by the Ministry of Technology 
(Mintech) to review the problems arising from the cyclical 
pattern of machine tool orders - also judged an expansion of 
capacity to be "desirable to improve the industry's ability to 
compete with imports at the peak of the cycle" and "a necessary 
pre-condition of further penetration into export markets". **■ One 
member of that working party was ‘Cliff' Harrison, then Herbert's 
Joint Managing Director. The merger with BSA was also Implicitly 
encouraged by the same committee's appeal for a "concentration of 
the industry into stronger units", ■* as well as by similar
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recommendations contained in the Economic Development Council's 
"action programme"*" and in the Mitchell Report.*4
Besides these exhortations from the state, the merger was 
encouraged by the action of rival firms. For example, in 1966 
Tube Investments used the compensation obtained from the 
nationalisation of its steel interests to purchase the Charles 
Churchill Group of machine tool companies."9 Also that year, 
Herbert's was compelled to end its long-standing agency 
agreements with both James Archdale & Co. and George Richards & 
Co. as a result of their takeover by Staveley Industries."9 
Between 1964 and 1966, this conglomerate increased its holdings 
in the machine tool Industry from four to 18 separate 
companies.*T It is worth noting, also, that during the mid-1960s 
the American machine tool industry moved rapidly towards 
increased concentration of capital ownership."9
Herbert's merger with the BSA companies afforded much more than 
an enlarged capacity and a wider product range. It also offered, 
on the cheap, an advanced design in turning machines. The 
Bastchmatic 50, exhibited at the Olympia Show in 1968, was a NC 
lathe developed by engineers at Mackadown Lane, Birmingham. This 
machine represented a new concept of the batch-type production 
lathe - one promoted by the National Research Development 
Corporation (NRDC) in late 1964."• There is some argument over 
the claim that it was the world's first NC lathe.90 Nonetheless, 
it was a technically advanced design which, as a result of
careful market research,41 remained a commercially viable product 
for a decade.4*
The joint-venture with Ingersoll was also intended to combine an 
expansion of productive capacity with a move towards high 
technology, and to judge from the annual reports. Young's 
enthusiasm for the deal was unqualified. In April 1968, he wrote: 
"No part of our activities holds greater promise for the 
future than this joint enterprise with our partners, the 
Ingersoll Hilling Machine Company of Rockford. We believe 
that we can together develop profitably the clear trend of 
demand and of technique for flexible high and low volume 
special purchase machinery and workhandling systems."4* 
Herbert-Ingersoll, the product of this joint-venture, was in his 
opinion, "much more than a manufacturing organisation". He 
continued:
"It specialises in the study and analysis of whatever 
metalworking methods will yield to each user the highest 
profitability. Its team of experts in engineering and other 
relevant disciplines, is now capable of co-ordinated work 
with other sectors of Industry to offer advance on a broad 
front of versatile, tailor-made and automatically controlled 
machinery and workhandling systems."44
The Herbert-Ingersoll plant was built on a greenfield site at 
Daventry to a design of its American parent and the consultant 
engineers, W.S.Atkins and Partners, which was in advance of any
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comparable plant in Europe.4* It used the largest automated 
equipment and handling devices, mainly to make specialised 
transfer line machinery for the motor industry. Here, too. 
Young's vision reflected the same consensus within industry and 
the state that encouraged the merger with BSA. As well as the 
familiar exhortations to respond to the projected demand for 
advanced designs, there was now direct financial inducement as a 
result of the introduction of investment grants in January 1966.
In 1967, senior management began to rationalise its rambling 
'empire'. In September, the rump of Wm.Whiteley & Sons - which 
had already ceased to build textile machinery - was closed down. 
Next month, a similar fate befell Hudies' Electrical Co. and the 
remaining electrical and control gear subsidiaries amalgamated 
under Herbert-BSA Electrics.4* Production of tools and equipment 
in plants at Rotherham, Coventry, Redditch and Birmingham was 
rationalised with production at a "new factory at Falmouth".**
But in the following year, there were further expansions to the 
Group's capacity. An extension factory for the Churchill 
subsidiary was opened on a development site at Runcorn, and the 
Ardoloy sudsidiary of GEC-AEI at Rugby was acquired that year to 
become part of "an inegrated tungsten-carbide operation for 
cutting tools" which was intended to supplement production at the 
Rotherham plant.4*
Soon after taking up his appointment, Young must have noted the 
Group's minimal expenditure on research and development,4* and
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that this kind of 'economy' was stretching out product 
development time to five years.90 However, instead of commiting 
substantially more resources to this area, it appears that he 
decided to take advantage of another form of government aid that 
became available at that moment.
In June 1965, the Minister for Technology, Frank Cousins, 
announced details of the Pre-Production Order Scheme. This 
provided for the purchase by the Mintech of the proto-types and 
pre-production models of orginal and advanced machine tools and 
equipment which were then placed in industry. The purpose of this 
arrangement was to foster the design of NC machines and their 
wider application in manufacturing industry. The scheme was based 
on a provision of the Science and Technology Act 1965, and became 
effective towards the end of that year when the first 
applications were received for the original Elm allocation. Less 
than a year later. Cousins announced another scheme which had a 
similar purpose. Under the provisions of the Development of 
Inventions Act 1965, the National Research Development 
Corporation, through Mintech, was allowed to dispense Elm to 
induce firms to place orders for technically advanced machinery. 
Under this scheme, the user was able to purchase machinery on a 
trial basis. Both schemes were in line with the recommendations 
of the Mitchell Report, published in 1960, and the EDC's "action 
programme". However, while it seems that the "trial period" terms 
of the NRDC's scheme were unattractive to industrialists, the 
popularity of the Pre-Production Order Scheme persuaded the
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Government to allocate a further £5m in April 1967.81
As I said, it seems likely that Young tried to use the Mintech 
scheme as a cheap and quick way of restoring Herbert's 
pre-eminence as a designer and builder of lathes, for while the 
Group's expenditure on research and development was kept below 2\ 
of turnover - and this included NRDC support - the subsidy of 
£1.4m from Mintech enabled Herbert engineers to develop the 
proto-types of eight different machine designs in readiness for 
the Olympia Show in 1968. All of them were turning machines - 
lathes or machining centres - built at Edgwick.82 One former 
Mintech official described some of those designs, such as the 2M 
and 3M (both plugboard machines), as traditional configurations 
attached to electronic control systems; but the same criticism 
could not be levelled against the V6 Automatic (a six-spindle 
vertical, numerically controlled chucking lathe) or the Machining 
Centre. On the contrary, it was the technical novelty and 
complexity of these designs which eventually led to their 
commercial failure;8* a point to which I will return later.
In "re-modelling for the seventies", changes were not confined to 
the creation of a "new generation of machines". As might have 
been expected, the expansion of the Group's computer facilities 
was accelerated enormously. Hardware costs rose from £18,000 in 
1964 to £805,000 in 1968; and within that period the number of 
staff was more than doubled to 93 employees. Two years later, 
running costs were estimated at £407,000.88 All of this was not
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intended solely to ease the burden of the wages and accounts 
departments. Amongst other things, there were plans to 
computerise activities such as invoicing and stock control 
(though it was not until 1970 that the stewards at Edgwick also 
learnt of senior management's intention to computerise the shop 
scheduling systems).
Young's determination to re-cast the management organisation was 
not put into effect until 1968, when it coincided with the urgent 
need to rationalise and "align" managerial staff following the 
recent acquisitions and closures. During that financial year. 
Group services were restructured into four seperate divisions - 
management services, marketing, purchasing and finance - and from 
October 1968, Herbert's 23 operating companies were re-organised 
into seven. Each was planned to deal with a single range of 
machines or equipment. Each was given an executive board and 
managing director with "wide autonomy” on policies ranging from 
design and development to manufacture and selling.
Re-organisation on this scale entailed the recruitment of "some 
senior executives...from other industries"am who, in turn, 
recruited others into their management teams. Reliable figures on 
the numbers of new management personnel are unavailable; but 
anecdotal evidence"-7 and the official statement that the 
"immediate added development expenses" of this exercise came to 
£300,000 suggests there was a considerable increase of staff. In 
addition to those "development expenses" it was recognised that 
the re-organisation of management would entail considerable costs
In terms of executives' time. Yet Young decided to press ahead 
with the last component in his ’package' of reforms: "a major 
revision of industrial relations".9*
Initially, Young reported that all was going well:
"all levels co-operated with good understanding, for which 
special tribute is due to foremen and supervisors and to the 
union representatives, all of whom took part vigorously in 
special courses".99
Next year, however, he had to admit to some "difficulties - 
Including some interference of output by stoppages".90 The next 
chapter will explore those "difficulties" in some detail. In the 
remaining section of this chapter I hope to show some of the 
links between management's problems in this area and the problems 
encountered in other areas of "Herbert re-modelled".
The acquisition of the BSA companies was an asset to the Group, 
but its purchase had been costly. In addition to issuing 3.2 
million B ordinary shares at par, Herbert's spent £2.5m to 
provide working capital for the new subsidiary.*1 Furthermore, 
the Churchill Machine Tool Co., itself acquired by BSA in 1961, 
quickly proved a liability for management.**
The Herbert-Ingersoll joint venture also proved expensive.
Besides subscribing 51% of the shares, Herbert's provided all of
the initial finance which amounted to £3.5ra.*a The press 
described the venture as doubly miscalculated. The high-cost 
approach to the plant layout meant that it had to work impossibly 
close to its nominal £6m a year capacity to make a profit - at 
its highest turnover of £3.3m in 1970, the plant lost just under 
£lm.*4 - but, at any event, the anticipated upturn in demand 
from the motor industry never came. Since Young had made this 
venture his personal project - even to the point of excluding the 
other Group directors from Herbert-Ingersoll's management by 
making it an "independent subsidiary"*" - its accumulating 
deficits must have been particularly embarrassing.
The Mintech's Pre-Production Scheme proved similarly disastrous 
for Herbert's. The officials who designed the scheme had assumed 
that machine tool companies - the larger ones, at least - 
carried out a certain amount of market research. Later they 
discovered their mistake. Only "a small percentage of 
manufacturers”, Hintech officials reported,
"carried out any serious scientific market research...the 
general practice being to collate information from the sales 
organisation, compare this with competitor's designs and then 
produce a new product and hope to sell it."**
Herbert's was not among that "small percentage" and none of the 
machines developed under the Mintech scheme became a major 
product line for Herbert's. Most failed to survive as marketable 
commodities into the 1970s. A few, such the V6 Automatic and the 
Machining Centre, even proved difficult to give away as
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proto-types.,T
Another difficulty with the Mintech scheme was one of its 
intended virtues, namely: that machine tool builders were 
encouraged to exhibit their new designs in time for the 1968 
Olympia Show. For the first applicants, this meant a three year 
interval; but, clearly, this was not enough for almost all the 
companies. By March, 1969, only one company had completed the 
operational trials and begun to sell its machine. It is possible 
to detect a sense of irritation in Mintech's observation on this 
question:
"The time scale for these activities could be from three 
years if the manufacturer was faced with severe competition 
in one product, up to five years if events took their normal 
course.
When this performance is compared to the aerospace industry, the 
Ministry's impatience was understandable. But, unlike the 
aircraft corporations, machine tool builders did not enjoy the 
kind of state patronage in which massive sums of public money 
were used to subsidise research and development through cost-plus 
contracts. It is also worth recalling that the early development 
of numerically controlled machine tools took place in America 
precisely because of a considerable state involvement there.••
It can be argued that one of Herbert's chief mistake was in 
accepting Mintech's preferred pace, and exhibiting all the new 
designs at Olympia, despite the considerable developmental
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problems the engineers had encountered; but it has to be said 
that management was also anxious to put its "new generation of 
machines" on display as quickly as possible. In the case of the 
V6 Automatic and the Machining Centre, this haste had no serious 
long term consequences since these designs did not advance beyond 
the proto-type stage. However, with those machines that were put 
into production runs - such as the 3M and the 3 Programauto - the 
effects were disastrous.
Stocks and work-in-progress accumulated as sales of the new 
designs did not reach the projected figures. Build programmes - 
already complicated by the introduction of production runs for 
six new machines - were frequently interrupted by design 
modifications as the engineers eliminated the numerous technical 
‘bugs'. Sid Birch recalled:
"...we were doing mod's on mod's on mod's. I think I've done 
mod' 91B. 91....! How far do you mod' a thing before you 
re-design it?"TO
Besides increasing the accumulation of work-in-progress, there 
was an erosion of ‘goodwill' as the modifications delayed 
shipments to customers. Obviously, there was a further 
deterioration of ‘goodwill' when customers found that more 
modifications were necessary after they had purchased the 
machines. These design changes became so frequent that management 
eventually encouraged some of the service engineers to form 
"modification teams" and perfect a routine in their work. Sid
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Birch again:
"They gave me a bit of scope at Herbert's. They knew I were a 
trier. I had an electrician and a fitter - well, matter of 
fact, I had two fitters. I tried to get an apprentice because 
it would do him good.. .Then I had a third man who would help 
me with a car and a van...We'd go in, rip the turret slide 
straight off as a unit, bang it in the van and send him off 
with it...And while he'd got back there, I was modifying the 
whole machine.. .We had a one day turn-around on the turret 
slide unit...We got going in the end.We'd got a team, an ace 
team."
In addition to discovering organisational talents he had never 
imagined, Sid found the job provided other unexpected 
opportunities:
"The 3M - brilliant (concept)I But it kept (breaking 
down)...Oh, the 3M took me round the world twice. I ’ve got a 
lot to thank the 3M for. But it used to break my heart, 
though, knowing the old Herbert's and the new..."
All these problems - the costs of scheduling production without 
reliable market intelligence and coping with frequent design 
modifications both in production runs and at the customer's works 
- would not have been so critical if they had been confined to 
one or two machines. But these problems were encountered with 
almost every Mintech-sponsored design - on top of the design 
problems encountered with the 2 Programauto, one of the few
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plugboard lathes developed prior to the Mintech scheme.
As I said earlier, all these difficulties had to be dealt with in 
addition to the problems of simultaneously organising the 
production of six new machines. Dr. Austin, one of the designers 
of the Batchmatic and later a senior technical officer within the 
Herbert Group, believes this was too much for production 
management to handle:
"Herbert's was a big company, of course; but, even so, eight 
totally new machines - not slight modifications of existing 
products but totally new - is an awful lot to swallow in one 
go. And that was the problem. The manufacturing, production 
engineering capabilities just couldn't cope with that number 
of machines."
Here, Dr. Austin was referring to all the technical and 
organisational problems involved in the manufacture of thousands 
of bits and pieces and of their assembly into new designs. 
However, these were not the only difficulties that confronted 
production management for there were also problems linked to the 
politics of production. To put it in management's terms, it 
represented a considerable threat to the stability of the effort 
bargain.
In an earlier chapter, I cited Phil Banks-Price to describe this 
kind of stability during the 1950s and in 1967, Williams found 
the situation largely unchanged:
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"...there have grown up strong norms concerning what is a 
reasonable level of earnings...Some chargehands will even 
take back a price which is too high and ask for a 
reduction.. .Many of (the shopfloor workers) have been at 
Herbert's for 20 or 30 years, working on the same jobs, 
secure in their employment and their earnings. "T1
The unchanging character of the product mix at Edgwick, Williams 
argued, was one reason why management had been able to prevent 
internal wage drift in a situation that normally would have been 
"a shop steward's delight". He noted:
"The Ratefixing Department is poor, method study 
non-existent, training in work-study techniques non-existent 
and (there are) sufficient Inequities and anachronisms to 
generate a multitude of 'invidious comparisons'."y* 
Logically, then, an onrush of new designs would be expected to 
dispel this "somnifacient (sic) atmosphere". Shopfloor workers 
would be faced with the demands of new work, new methods and new 
approaches coupled with an uncertain level of earnings. For some 
this would be a threatening situation. For others it opened up a 
rare opportunity to re-negotiate the price of their labour power 
(as Tolliday observed in the case of the shadow factories in 
wartime Coventry).7* Whatever their response, though, the 
consequences were likely to be the same: a new wage militancy 
based on a growing bargaining awareness among some sections of 
the shopfloor.
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The re-organisation of management also entailed considerable 
costs - and not only those mentioned by Young himself, namely, 
the "immediate added development expenses" of £300,000 and the 
"loss of executive's time".™ There were the financial costs of 
consultancy fees. The total bill was never publicly discussed; 
but one journalist suggested the largest single fee was in the 
region of £250,000.T* There is no doubt that the re-organisation 
also had an adverse impact on morale within senior and middle 
levels of management. Some of the 'old Herbert* managers felt 
that the new executive appointees - "mangement consultants and 
not machine tool people", as Dr.Austin put it - devalued their 
skills and experience. The new managers, he observed,
"were no fools, but I think they ought to have spent some 
time listening to people at Herbert’s who knew a lot of the 
problems, a lot of the history, and got years and years of 
machine tool experience there, and distilled from that new 
methods, new thinking. They should have tried to blend the 
two - which they didn't do."
For their part, the new executives must have resented the 
"outsider" tag and, given the timing of their entry, it is 
understandable why they blamed the veteran Herbert men for the 
company's difficulties.
In happier circumstances, it is probable that this situation 
would have resolved itself; but the crisis had become all too
apparent by the late-1960s and, as it deepened, those tensions 
inevitably increased. At the tine, the initial signs of this 
factionalism seemed innocent enough: the resignation of Derek 
Allen (the company's only surviving link with the Herbert family) 
due to "ill-health" in 1967;T" and the retirements of Hugo and 
Badnadge from the Board. Only years later did those divisions 
become public knowledge when a succession of crises brought the 
company to the brink of collapse.
The annual report for 1966/7 gave the first official indication 
to shareholders that the programme for "Herbert re-modelled" was 
going wrong. In his statement. Young felt obliged to justify the 
continued expenditure on managerial innovations "in spite of the 
present low level of earnings" and a continuing fall in sales. 
"Meantime," he declared, "we are sticking to our guns."ym
The following year. Young reminded the shareholders of the 
"logic" of "Herbert re-modelled":
"If there was a temptation, because of the prevailing trade 
circumstances, to defer this effort, which we knew would be 
costly in terms of money and executives' time, it was 
resisted in the conviction that remodelling for the seventies 
could not be left until the seventies began. All the logic of 
what we had done so far called for this immediate step."T"
The report for 1968/9 broadly carried the same message, though 
this time there was a recognition that the year had been
Page 378
particularly "grim" for Herbert's because of the combined effect 
of trade recession and re-organisation. Nonetheless, the 
prescription seemed unchanged. For Young the crisis only 
confirmed "the urgency of the work in hand to restore essential 
profitability and to secure the company's full efficiency and 
share of markets."mo
By that time, though, the malaise was self-evident even in the 
annual accounts. In 1961, the Group's general investments stood 
at £6m: by 1966 they had fallen to £1.6m. Bank overdrafts had 
increased from £325,000 in 1962 to £8 .9m in 1968. Current 
liabilities had risen from £6 .6m to £19m in the same period.*x 
Also during those years, the accumulation of stock and 
work-in-progress as a proportion of capital employed had climbed 
from 36.7% to 67.6%.•* In 1966, the profit rate reached an 
all-time high at 18.5%. The following year, it had slipped back 
to 1 1 .8% - probably an unremarkable result given the rapid 
expansion of capital at that time. But in 1968, the profit rate 
fell to 5.6% which meant that on sales of £39.7m, Herbert's made 
a trade profit of only £1.9m (or £0 .8m after the shareholders had 
taken their cut). From an inspection of the annual accounts of 
some of Herbert's competitors, the shareholders could have noted 
that in 1968 the "most successful" machine tool firms achieved a 
profit rate of 20% or more on turnover and more than double 
Herbert's profits per employee.**
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Inevitably, the value of Herbert's shares - which had steadily
declined in the early 1960s - quickly deteriorated. Ordinary 
shares, which had reached their highest price in 1961 when they 
were valued at 80/3d each, had slipped to 68/ld by 1966; and by 
1969, they had fallen to 51/9d."4 However, by then the spending 
spree was over. Young continued "remodelling for the seventies" - 
major innovations in managerial policies in such areas as 
industrial relations and production control were still pursued - 
but now there was a firm check on finance. Probably as a result 
of pressure from the banks and insurance companies, who had been 
quietly replacing the Herbert family as the major shareholders, 
the immediate priority was to restore the company's liquidity - 
an objective Young found easier to achieve and relatively 
quickly.
Bank overdrafts were cut from £11.5m in 1969 to £7m a year later; 
current liabilities declined from £2 2.6m to £16.9m in the same 
time;"* and if one's attention was confined to the indices of 
liquidity - such as the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities (the working capital ratio) and the ratio of quick 
assets, debtor and cash to liabilities(the liquidity ratio) - it 
seemed Herbert's was beginning to perform very well compared to 
even the "most successful" companies.Meanwhile, the value of 
plant and machinery (in current prices) declined from £6 .5m in 
1968 to £4.7m in 1970;"T the Group's total workforce declined by 
600 to 10,955 employees in the same time;"" and expenditure on 
product development fell to less than 1% of sales (in fact, more 
was spent on renewing licensing agreements).""
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From his earliest days at Herbert's, Young had decided that 
management's paternalistic labour policies were antiquated and 
inefficient. Though labour costs had been kept relatively low, 
the main plant had an ageing, supernumerary workforce and an 
apparently poor productivity record.*0 In 1967, Williams came to 
much the same conclusion. In particular, he argued that the gang 
piecework payment system had created a factory of "satisfleers" 
rather than "maximisers":
"Because Herbert's do not lose their labour to other firms 
(despite a current £3 pw differential between its average 
earnings levels and those of the district) it is reasonable 
to hypothesise that the type of employee the firm attracts 
and retains is not motivated by the prospect of financial 
gain. If the effort bargain is consistent with this state of 
affairs, the firm is obtaining a correspondingly low return 
of effort."*x
One of the consequences of the spate of product development in 
the mid-1960s was that it became apparent that reform could not 
be delayed very much longer. As I mentioned earlier, Williams 
argued that the stability of the effort bargain was already being 
undermined by the new jobs. The byzantlne nature of the gang 
piecework system - which had served management so well in the 
past - was fast becoming a liability. Williams concluded his 
report with this warning for management:
"At the present time Alfred Herbert's is poised for a 'great
leap forward' in the modernity of its machine range, (and) it 
is likely that a substantial amount of *control' will be lost 
as long established norms are overturned by the substantial 
changes this will entail."9*
It seems reasonable to assume that Young also feared this loss of 
control, and that it was one factor which prompted him to 
implement his plans for a radical reform of Herbert's labour 
policies at that time. However, as I hope to show in the next 
chapter, those plans were soon disrupted and distorted by the 
combined effect of the trade recession and the new limitations on 
spending. Prompted by Herbert's corporate crisis, the labour 
reforms quickly became another of its victims.
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Conclusion
This chapter has detailed how management, after the death of the 
company's founder, struggled to implement much-needed product and 
management reforms to reverse the trend of the firm's declining 
share of the product markets. Industrial relations was not 
regarded as a priority until the consequences of some of those 
reforms began to de-stabilise the effort bargain at the firm's 
largest plant and demonstrate how little control management had 
over production. This account of Herbert's developing crisis sets 
the scene for the next chapter which will look in detail at 
Young's efforts to drive through a comprehensive productivity
scheme - an initiative 
challenge 'from above' 
Edgvick.
that represented a direct and major 
to the character of workplace politics at
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CHAPTER BIGHT: PRODUCTIVITY BARGAINING AND THE ONSET OP THE 
CORPORATE CRISIS.
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued that Herbert's corporate crisis 
raised the urgency of the refora of labour aanageaent at the 
coapany's largest plant, Bdgvick. The need to iaprove liquidity 
and deal with the de-stabilising effect of the new jobs on the 
plant's pay norms gave Young some powerful arguaents for change.
In this chapter I intend to exaaine the character of the changes 
that took place, largely through a close exaaination of the 
stewards' ainutes as they provide, for those years, an unusually 
rich conteaporaneous record of events (and the only one available 
to ae). Through that detailed review I hope to achieve three 
principal objectives. First, I intend to deaonstrate the radical 
scope of Young's reforas; how, through the abolition of the gang 
systea and the introduction of a productivity payment scheme, 
senior manageaent sought both aore direct control over the 
shopfloor and Increased productivity through aeasured daywork and 
the coaputerlsation of production control. Ny second objective is 
to detail how, as the very depth of Herbert's crisis persuaded 
senior aanageaent to find quicker and cheaper ways of 
iapleaenting this strategy, those comproaises effectively
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underlined Its alas, even though the aaln thrust of the reforas 
still succeeded in turning workplace politics inside out by 
drawing the stewards into a central position in a highly 
foraalised and centralised bargaining system, and pushing the 
chargehands, formerly the "kingpins of management”, out to the 
periphery of the fira's new regiae and ’bureaucratising' thea 
through the coaputer. The final ala of this chapter is to show 
the stewards' active response, first to the proaise of the 
productivity scheae and its new eaployer-sponsored corporatism, 
and then to its distortion and eventual deaise as Herbert's 
entered a decade of crises and redundancies. It thus provides a 
further case study of both the truth and the complexity of the 
claia that management policies shaped the terrain of workplace 
unionism. In doing so it also extends ay account of the shifting 
and contradictory features of managerial strategies and the 
active character of union responses.
The chapter is structured by the chronology of events. The first 
section deals with the last days of the gang system at Herbert's: 
froa July 1967, when the Labour Governamnt introduced 
productivity criteria into pay bargaining, through to January 
1969 when the senior stewards signed the productivity agreeaent. 
The second section discusses events during the first phase of the 
new pay scheae. The third section takes the narrative forward 
froa October 1969 to April 1970 when the scheme went through its 
second, ’transitional' phase. The final section deals with a 
period which instead of witnessing the last phase of the
productivity scheae and the introduction o£ Measured daywork, saw 
the collapse of the pay scheae as the coapany entered a decade of 
decline.
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•Road Maps* to the Bnd of a Gang Systea
For one year froa July 1967 the Governaent's pay policy dictated 
that all pay increases had to be based on low pay or productivity 
criteria.x Yet it was not until Deceaber 1967, when the senior 
stewards at Edgwick were notified that the newly-created 
Manageaent Services Division would soon begin "activity sampling" 
on the shopfloor, that aanageaent took the first tentative steps 
towards the iapleaentation of a coaprehensive productivity 
scheae. The record suggests the shop stewards were told little if 
anything about the purpose of "activity sampling". They were 
certainly not inforaed that it was a preliminary to detailed work 
studies and the eventual iapleaentation of a long deliberated 
scheae. However, after taking this first step, aanageaent stalled 
for five aonths as the "unusually long recession"• in the aachine 
tool trade took its effect on production. Of course, froa one 
viewpoint it made little sense to begin work studies while aore 
than half the shopfloor was on short-tiae - as was the case by 
March 1968 - but while the directors waited for better tlaes, 
other clrcuastances changed for the worse.
The last tine there had been a plant-vide pay Increase was In Nay 
1967 - and that was a payment deferred fro* October 1966 by the 
Government's pay policy.* This had the effect of widening the gap 
between the district average and pay at Bdgwick. In October 1967, 
the difference was l/7d per hour, that is, more than £3 per 
week.* By May 1968, the fitters claimed their pay was 2/1 d per 
hour less than the district average.* On top of this grievance, 
most production workers must have experienced sharp fluctuations 
in pay during the period of short-time working in the early 
months of 1968. Probably few direct workers were put on 
short-time for very long, but many would have experienced cuts in 
overtime which, as I mentioned earlier, was regarded as the 
"money spinner”. Predictably, as the numbers on short-time began 
to decline, these grievancies came to the surface in a series of 
sectional wage claims. In Hay, the fitters submitted a claim for 
a day-rate equivalent to the district average. Sectional pay 
claims from the patternshop, the pre-production department and 
internal transport quickly followed, but management appeared 
unconcerned. No formal response was made to these sectional 
demands. Instead, plant-level management waited until 10 July to 
present the senior stewards with the first outline of a 
factory-wide productivity deal.
The details in the stewards' notes are unclear; but it seems the 
managers initially offered nothing more sophisticated than a 4% 
pay Increase in exchange for an agreement on 'flexibility' and 
'mobility' of labour." This suggests that, even at this late
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stage, senior management was prepared to further delay major 
reforms in industrial relations and make do with a more 
conventional productivity scheme such as those agreed with two 
minor sections of the workforce only a month later. Given the 
circumstances, the offer was perceived as an insult. It was 
immediately rejected by the senior stewards, and the fitters 
decided to press their own claim by taking strike action.7 On the 
following day, the JSSC endorsed the senior stewards' position 
and agreed that the fitters' claim had to be settled before talks 
could be resumed on any plant-wide productivity deal. The 
committee also decided to levy the membership for the strikers' 
"Fighting Fund".
The fitters stayed out for five weeks. It was an extra-ordinary 
act of wage militancy and group solidarity for a section of 
skilled Herbert employees, and it demonstrated the pre-eminence 
of the fitters in Bdgwick's shopfloor politics. Paradoxically, 
the strike also highlighted their strategic weakness within the 
productive process. For during those five long weeks, the absence 
of some 200 skilled direct workers prompted management to lay off 
no more than 150 employees and suspend another 30 for taking 
sympathetic action.* The shop stewards must have been equally 
disappointed with the response to the "Fighting Fund". Only 
£1,400 was raised when the target was probably double that sum.*
As a result, the strike was resolved very much on management's
terms. The fitters accepted a deal in which the major portion of 
their pay increase would cone through a factory-wide productivity 
schene as yet undefined by the company. Furthermore, the senior 
stewards were obliged to put their signatures to a formal 
"Declaration of Intent" though they were promised no more than 
"road maps" to the scheme by mid-October and given merely a 
verbal assurance from a management consultant, called 'Jock' 
Houston, that the deal "could be worth 2/6, 3/-".xo The only 
tangible consolation the fitters could take from the deal was an 
interim payment of l/5d per hour which compared favourably with 
the 1/- obtained by the patternshop and the 34/- per week 
accepted by internal transport in guite separate productivity 
deals negotiated shortly after the fitters' return to work.xx The 
fitters also left the talks with the impression that their demand 
for the district average would be met by April 1969; but this 
would become the subject of a later dispute.
James ('Jock') Houston, formerly director of Production 
Organisation Services at Fairfields (Glasgow) Ltd. and the 1968 
winner of the Gilbreth Award, was managing director of Higher 
Productivity Ltd. (HPL), a management consultancy established 
after the untimely demise of the 'industrial experiment' at 
Fairfields.x* (More will be said about this 'experiment' later.) 
Houston's appearance at the pay talks showed that corporate 
management was directly involved and concerned to push ahead with 
a rather special kind of productivity scheme - though nothing was 
said at that time about how extra-ordinary it was going to be.
Meanwhile the fitters' modest gains seemed to encourage other 
skilled sections to pursue their sectional interests before the 
"road maps" of HPL's productivity scheme were finally drawn up.
In September, skilled workers in the tool stores, factory fitting 
and repair fitting submitted separate pay claims. Sensitive to 
the threat these sectional demands posed for centralised pay 
bargaining, the senior stewards quickly secured the JSSC's 
support for a claim of l/5d for all hourly-rated workers.xa 
However, senior management continued its preparations, apparently 
indifferent to the new mood among its hitherto 'somnolent' 
employees.
In September, the stewards were granted exclusive use of an 
office with an outside telephone line, and then invited to attend 
a one-week course at Bsher "to understand and believe the 
tremendous proposals the co. have committed themselves to".*-4 
Also during that month, senior management and their consultants 
met the full committee to explain the philosophy of their scheme. 
But crucial details still seemed absent. When Varr, for example, 
asked how they intended to measure productivity, the managers 
replied that they did not yet know. All they could do was 
re-assure the stewards that "the Board have decided that we are 
on the bottom of the crest (sic)... (and) by 1969 this can be 
reversed".*■•
These first halting steps towards a new corporatism and promises
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of ‘jam to-morrow' Called to impress those who had not secured 
the fitters' l/5d. On 17 September, a month after the fitters' 
return to work, some 30 test bay fitters walked out over their 
pay claim. Hours later, they were followed by a similar number of 
machinists from the factory tool stores over the same issue. Next 
day, they were joined by 12 repair fitters who demanded the 
•District Average and the abolition of merit"; while 32 skilled 
workers in the pre-production and applied research departments 
submitted a joint application for "nothing less than the fitters' 
1/5". Again, these events seemed to put more pressure on the 
senior stewards than divisional management which, while 
complaining about the strikes, made it clear that the company did 
not have the funds to offer any more interim payments and, at any 
event, there was "no hope of getting DEP to sanction more without 
productivity".*" Thus, on the eve of a further "seminar" with 
senior divisional management and HPL consultants, the senior 
stewards made an abortive appeal to regional officials of the 
Department of Employment and Productivity to "sanction" their pay 
demand.1T
At the "seminar” itself, held at Montford Hotel, Kenilworth, the 
senior stewards were told that the pay scheme would create 
earnings close to the district average in less than nine months, 
possibly even more pay within 15 months, and that the plethora of 
differentials would be removed in two years.1" After the rebuff 
from the DBP, this seemed sufficient to persuade the senior 
stewards to try and end the strikes. Next day, 26 September, a
works Meeting agreed to suspend strike action until 10 October, 
the date Management had promised to produce its "road maps" for 
the productivity scheme. By 2 October, there was a complete 
return-to-work. Eight days later, as promised, the senior 
stewards were finally presented with the programme for HPL's 
Productivity Payment Scheme (PPS).
They were told that the existing payment systems would be 
scrapped. The "six broad systems and 143 variations" of gang 
piecework involved "too many calculations for management" and the 
"men distrust(ed) it". In its place, a measured daywork system 
would be developed over the next 14 months. The proposed schedule 
is shown in table 2 below. This is worth comparing with the 
schedule, in table 3, which Houston and his colleagues at 
^airfields developed two years earlier.
Table 2. The Schedule Por Herbert's Productivity ScheMe.
Phases Schedule
Vork Study November 1968
BstiMated Target PayMent ScheMe (BTPS) July 1969
Measured Target PayMent Scheme (MTPS) DeceMber 1969
Source: Herbert JSSC, Minute of Meeting on 10 October 1968 
Table 3. The Schedule Por Fairfield's Productivity ScheMe.
Phases Schedule
Activity SaMpling and Work Study March 1966
BstiMated Target PayMent ScheMe June 1967
Measured Target PayMent Scheme June 1968*
Source: Alexander and Jenkins, Fair fields (London: Allen Lane, 
1970).
*Note: the third phase of the schese was abandoned after the 
Pairflelds Merger with UCS in Pebruary 1968.
The origins of PPS: "the Fairfields project'
At this point I think the "Pairfields' project" needs some 
consideration. In October 1965, the Glasgow-based shipbuilders. 
Fairfields, announced their closure. Concerned with the wider 
political implications of this event, the Labour Government 
funded a temporary 'rescue package' for the company and 
commissioned an enquiry into the future of shipbuilding on the 
Clyde. The 'rescue' deal included the unions' agreement to 
provide some financial backing and the workforce's acceptance of 
a comprehensive productivity scheme proposed by the prospective 
management team, headed by Sir Iain Stewart (a prominent local 
Tory and Chairman of Hall-Thermotank). Two years later, the 
Government merger of the company with the neighbouring shipyards 
(to form the UCS) prompted Sir Iain's resignation and those of 
his closest aides, including 'Jock' Houston.*° However, during 
that interregnum, Fairfields' innovative, corporatist approach to 
the management of skilled workers had attracted considerable 
attention in business circles.*1 It seems likely that Young, 
himself an enthusiast of managerial Innovation in engineering, 
learned of, and decided to emulate, this "industrial experiment” 
even before Houston and his colleagues had quit Fairfields.
This background would explain the use of identical terminology in 
the two schedules. But what about the differences in timing? I 
would suggest there were several reasons which persuaded Houston
to draw up a much tighter schedule for Bdgwick. Firstly, finance 
was far more restricted at Herbert's than at the shipyard - 
partly because of the former's drive to "restore liquidity", and 
partly because it simply did not have the generous state 
patronage that Fairfields once enjoyed. Secondly, Young lacked an 
important political advantage which Iain Stewart held over his 
workforce: he could not present their endorsesent of the 
productivity scheme as a prerequisite to Herbert's survival.”  On 
the contrary, management had to respond to both an unprecedented 
level of sectional strike activity at Edgwick (and in such a way 
that did not increase the ebb of skilled labour from the plant or 
risk the co-operation of those who remained to deal with the flow 
of new jobs on the shopfloor) and a shop stewards' committee 
which, despite its obvious failure to shape events according its 
liking, appeared to be thriving under these changed 
circumstances. Attendance at JSSC meetings rose from 33, at the 
beginning of July, to 55 two aronths later,aJ and the minutes, 
through their length and richness of detail - in which an 
unprecedented attempt was made to provide verbatim notes of some 
internal debates as well as negotiations with management - 
clearly convey a sense of enthusiasm and self-confidence which 
were reminiscent of the "red days" of the war. An illustration of 
these quite crucial differences between the Fairfields' 
"experiment" and Herbert's is provided by the Esher episode.
At the end of October 1968, Herbert's management despatched the 
shop stewards' committee to a week-long course at the BBTPU's
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college at Bsher to learn the Mechanics of activity sampling and 
work study. All expenses were paid, including the beer, as 
Pairfields had done two years earlier. However, on that occasion 
the shipyard workers went to ‘school' some Months after work 
study had begun. Herbert's revision of the "Fairfield project" 
was obviously in response to the particular financial and 
political circumstances it faced; but the outcome did not help 
management's cause. Some shop stewards, including the works 
convenor, returned from Bsher with the firm conviction that, 
despite the mathematics and the pseudo-scientific jargon, work 
study measurements were based on subjective assessments of effort 
and were, therefore, negotiable.Furthermore within days of 
their return from Bsher, the senior stewards had to respond to 
more sectional activity at Bdgwlck - this time Involving 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers.
On 5 November, a group of about 10 fettlers stopped work for a 
day in protest at their working conditions. Six days later, 
nearly 200 machine shop labourers agreed to submit a claim for a 
"substantial increase in wages"; and some 40 skilled workers in 
the pre-production and applied research departments resumed 
strike action over their pay claim. Four days later, on 15 
November, the same group of fettlers stopped work again, and were 
joined by 25 final inspectors who had decided to press their own 
pay claim.
Despite the fact that these actions could have caused no more
Page 403
than minimal disruption to production, management appeared to be 
alarmed. "If we wish to kill the PPS, this is the way to do it," 
the plant managers warned. "These demands are a sabotage 
exercise, " they said, and advised the senior stewards to 
"withdraw (their) support".** Once again the senior stewards felt 
obliged to try and end a number of sectional strikes in defence 
of the broader interests of the membership. On 21 November, a 
works meeting endorsed the Executive Committee's demand for "1/5 
across the board" and an end to strike action as management could 
not be expected to negotiate "under duress"; but this time, three 
sections remained defiant. The final inspectors, pre-production, 
and applied research department workers only returned to work a 
week later, after it had been made known that corporate 
management had approved plans for progressive lay-offs across the 
plant.
How to share out •savings' of £600,000
Negotiations on the productivity scheme were not resumed until 
mid-December - two weeks after the latest strikes had ended. The 
shop stewards' counter proposals were dismissed as unrealistic - 
particularly the claim for "1/5 across the board". At first it 
was claimed that the DBP would not sanction it, then it was 
argued that the company simply could not afford it. Eventually a 
scale of pro rata payments - based on skill grade, gender, race 
and age - was offered as an alternative. These payments were also
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to be spread over all three phases of the scheme at a cost of 
£600,000, which, management claimed, was equivalent to two thirds 
of the total "savings" anticipated from the scheme. Three days 
later, the JSSC instructed the Bxecutive Committee (BC) to 
negotiate for no transitional stage to the scheme, that is, no 
ETPS, and "an all-round pay increase". This position was close to 
the proposals originally endorsed at a previous works meeting; 
but, from the secretary's notes, it is clear that the BC no 
longer treated this as a serious negotiating stance. Instead they 
seemed preoccupied with calculations on how £600,000 could be 
fairly distributed among the membership - ’fairly', that is, 
according to the traditional hierarchies in the plant - over the 
next 13 or 14 months.am
It is significant that the senior stewards experienced little 
apparent difficulty in persuading the JSSC, and then the 
membership, to approve this turn of events. On 10 January, 1969, 
the company's proposals were approved at a works meeting; and six 
days later (and nearly two months behind schedule) a joint 
agreement on PPS was finally signed. The agreed pay scales, 
detailed below, suggest management had made some concessions on 
pay - (adult, white male) skilled pieceworkers were guaranteed an 
increase of 3/- per hour instead of 2/6d over a 14 month period - 
but the hierarchical character of the increases remained intact, 
signifying once again the hegemony of craft labour over the 
egalitarian impulse in the stewards' approach to pay bargaining. 
The data shown in table 4 below, extracted from the signed
agreement, can only give a limited Impression of that complex of 
hierarchies because: (a) they detail the bonus payments to adult 
workers only and payments for those under 21 varied according to 
age and sex; and (b) the colour bar which confined black workers 
to certain jobs was (necessarily) covert.
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Table 4. The Scale Of Bonus Payments Por Bach Stage Of PPS.
Work Study ETPS MTPS Total
Skilled d/vorkers l/3d 7d 1/- 2/10d
■ p/vorkers l/3d lOd 1/- 3/-
semi-skilled d/v (male) 1/- 3d 6d l/9d
• p/v * 1/- 6d 9d 2/3d
" building workers 1/- 3d 3d 2/-
female workers and lab's 9d 6d 6d l/9d
Source: Productivity Agreement, Herbert Machine Tools, Edgwick, 
13 January 1969.
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Before concluding this section it is worth noting that the 
productivity agreement retained the original schedule for PPS, 
though the Managers expressed the hope that the first phase (work 
study) could be reduced to six nonths while the old payment 
systems continued. It was also accepted that during BTPS, that 
is, the transitional stage, earnings would be based on the 
average earnings of a mutually agreed period; and that the final 
phase, MTPS, would be a form of measured daywork based, where 
relevant, on the existing gang structure. Lastly, there was an 
agreement that no new pay claims would be submitted until six 
months after the cosmencement of MTPS, that is, sometime between 
July and September 1970. In the following sections I want to 
explore the continued transformation of shopfloor politics as 
each stage of the productivity scheme unfolded and became 
entangled in Herbert's corporate crisis.
Work Study at Bdgwick: The First Phase of PPS.
The shop stewards had hoped that this first phase of the 
productivity scheme would be completed by June; but within days 
of signing the agreement it became clear that October was going 
to be the deadline since, in those nine months, management 
ostensibly set out to achieve four major objectives: to negotiate 
a new pay structure for all hourly-rated workers at Edgwick
(Including those groups, such as the patternmakers and Internal 
transport, who had previously negotiated their own productivity 
deals); to devise provisional or "estimated" job-times for all 
work in the machine shop, the fitting shops and the three 
foundries; to negotiate the ground rules for industrial relations 
under BTPS, the transitional stage to measured daywork; and, 
lastly, seek ways of raising productivity through the 
re-organisation of work. Even under ideal circumstances - 
'ideal', chat is, from management's perspective (such as those 
enjoyed by Iain Stewart in his first months at Pairfields) - 
these aims would have been ambitious for any management; but at 
Herbert's circumstances were far from ideal. A formerly 
'somnolent' workforce stubbornly refused to go back to sleep, and 
the wider corporate crisis was beginning to seriously disrupt 
production and compel further 'short cuts' to measured daywork.
During those nine months the senior stewards faced their own kind 
of difficulties. PPS opened up a new kind of shopfloor politics 
at Bdgwick, which promised the stewards' organisation 'a place in 
the sun* and higher earnings for their members; but the promise 
was always less than the reality, and the senior stewards had to 
respond to pressures both from an Increasingly impatient 
membership and a crisis-ridden management.
In addition to providing a shopfloor perspective on that crisis, 
the stewards' minute books also offer some useful clues as to the 
nature of management's strategy behind the productivity scheme.
Behind the plan to scrap Herbert's variant of the gang piecework 
system and replace it with a form of gang-based measured daywork, 
it can be seen that senior management's central aim was to take 
direct control of production. Thus, alongside the major technical 
tasks of developing job-times on a more systematic basis and 
exploring ways of increasing productivity by the re-organisation 
of work, management had set itself the twin political objectives 
of bureaucratising the chargehands and placing the shop stewards 
at the centre of a formalised collective bargaining procedure. 
Among other things, this strategy represented a radical challenge 
to traditional managerial attitudes towards the unions. In place 
of the grudging tolerance of the stewards' presence, HPL plans 
positively asserted the virtues of plant-level corporatism.
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Early revisions to HPL's brand of corporatism
On 22 January 1969, one element of HPL's corporatist package was 
unveiled: "worker representatives". The senior stewards were 
invited to nominate up to 12 section stewards who, after an 11 
week crash-course, were expected to mediate in disputes over 
job-times as part of their duties as temporary work-study 
engineers. Initially, the senior stewards expressed some concern 
about the possibility of "poaching" by Management Services 
Division; but the idea was received enthusiastically by the JSSC, 
and over the next four weeks 22 nominations were put forward."7 
Despite this response, management soon began to amend its
proposals. Towards the end of April the senior stewards were 
informed that the company wanted only eight worker 
representatives who would receive Just five weeks training.
Later, they were also told that these new posts would be seconded 
to Management Services for only six months instead of 18.** Then, 
in May, management stated its intention to bring in 20 industrial 
engineers from three separate consultancies because, it was 
argued, the incumbent staff of 31 industrial engineers was 
insufficient to ensure the scheme stayed on schedule. For the 
same reason, management later justified the use of "group timing 
techniques" - ignoring the shop stewards' protests that there had 
been no mention of this form of work study at Esher.*•
It is important to recognise that these were not minor revisions 
to the "Falrflelds Project". At the Clydeside shipyard, Houston 
and his colleagues had tackled this Initial phase of PPS by 
re-constructing the industrial engineering department from the 
top down, and with the broad involvement of the hourly-rated 
workforce. After twenty senior managers were recruited outside 
the company, they, in turn, appointed and trained 72 junior staff 
drawn exclusively from Fairfields' own shipyard workers.*0 
Following this the shop stewards were asked to nominate 150 
worker representatives - one in twenty of the employees - who 
were given exactly the same training as the junior industrial 
engineers.** Some of the thinking behind this reform was 
explicitly stated in two studies of Fairfields. The advantages in 
recruiting almost all the industrial engineers from the workforce
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were twofold: first, having done everything possible to 
appropriate its employees' knowledge of work, management would be 
more likely to obtain an accurate measurement of effort; second, 
internal recruitment took away workers' principal justification 
for their resistance to work study, namely, that the engineers 
were "outsiders” who had little or no practical knowledge of the 
industry. **
These amendments effectively sabotaged the political strategy 
behind the consultants' attempt to reform the work study 
department at Bdgwick. The incumbent rate-fixers, though retitled 
"work standard engineers” (and probably re-trained to a limited 
degree) had no greater credibility than before, either among the 
shop stewards or the membership in general; and eight worker 
representatives, given merely a ‘taster course' on work study, 
were unlikely to persuade anyone that the character of the 
department was going to change as a result of their 
Interventions. Lastly, the use of a previously unmentioned work 
study technique and the recruitment of ‘outside' industrial 
engineers was bound to raise worries about management's 
incompetence or ill-will though it seems likely that Herbert's 
revisions of the "Fairfields project" were largely the product of 
expediency in the face of growing cash shortages and shopfloor 
militancy - urged on, perhaps, by the ‘old* Herbert managers who 
strongly objected to HPL's "fraternisation" with the unions, as 
one former director put it.*"
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At the saae time such developments did not represent a total 
repudiation of HPL's version of plant-level corporatism by senior 
management. During April the negotiations on the so-called "Grey 
Book" - the rule book on collective bargaining under PPS - 
formalised the exclusion of chargehands from any meaningful 
involvement in negotiations over job-times. Among the crowded 
events of this period it is important not to miss the 
significance of this detail. Through management initiative - in 
particular, through Young's new senior executives and supported 
by the consultants - Bdgwick's political world was being turned 
inside-out: the stewards were being pulled into the centre of 
factory politics and the chargehands pushed towards its 
periphery. What had been a trade union objective since the early 
war years was suddenly granted by management fiat.
At the end of Hay, the stewards' notes recorded another token of 
this determination to stay with HPL's corporatist strategy - as 
well as the resistance of some of the 'old' line managers to the 
new regime - when it was announced that Edgwick's assistant 
general works manager was being transferred to the Mackadown Lane 
site as a result of continued complaints from section stewards 
about his "arrogance" and "dogmatic attitudes".*4 An additional 
such token came at the beginning of June when the senior stewards 
were offered, and accepted, a "gentlemen's agreement” on a 
post-entry closed shop. (Vhen this agreement came into effect, 
the BC promptly received a formal protest from 17 section 
stewards. Unfortunately, the notes are not specific about the
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nature of their protest: perhaps the ideology of employer 
paternalism retained some support within the stewards' 
committee.)
What I have described as the 'bureaucratisation' of the 
chargehands commenced a few months later. In mid-August, a 
representative from Computer Services Division talked to the 
senior stewards about the new paperwork that would be introduced 
with the next stage of PPS. Prom the union papers, it seems the 
stewards were told that the computer would be used to record the 
"labour performance" of each production gang.*- Five days later, 
the chargehands were shown the same paperwork and told that, from 
September, they would have to run it in tandem with the manual 
system for a month, after which the computerised system was 
expected to operate on its own.** Here, too, the corporatist 
strategy was in evidence for both the sequence of these events 
and the senior stewards' presence at the chargehands' meeting 
would have been unthinkable in Sir Alfred's day, or even 
immediately prior to PPS. These events suggest that management, 
shop stewards and chargehands were assuming a radically different 
relationship to each other from those days when "the chargehand 
was the king pin" at Bdgwick. Mow the post was becoming a junior 
supervisory position bereft of any kind of privileged status 
within the management structure and even, perhaps, dependant on 
union representation to protect the incumbent's interests.
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Slow progress on other elements of the ’package'
The stewards' Minute books provide very little evidence to 
suggest that during this first phase of PPS management put much 
effort into raising productivity through the re-organisation of 
work. On 14 May, the senior stewards were informed that the 
Pre-Production Department was going to test out a flow fitting 
technique for new-build assembly work and, on 25 May, they were 
told that the New Projects Department - the first reference to 
this organisation in the stewards' minutes - recommended the 
closure of the Packing Department as one means of dealing with 
the problem of the shortage of floor space (created by the 
accumulation of stocks and work-in-progress). When the stewards 
complained about the lack of consultation, they were assured that 
the "plan was in its Infancy". Oral testimony confirms the 
impression that many plans to re-organise work did not mature at 
this time.*T
The negotiations over the new pay structure - another of 
management's key objectives for this period - seemed to fare 
little better. Their progress, slow at best, was suddenly 
interrupted by strike action when, on 16 June, a Central 
Conference recorded a 'failure to agree' over the fitters' claim 
that, after the strike in August 1968, they were promised a pay 
rise in April 1969 which would bring their level of earnings up 
to the district average. (While the managers did not contest this 
interpretation, they argued that this agreement had been
superceded by the deal signed on 13 January 1969 which stipulated
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that the next pay increase for all hourly-rated workers - 
including the fitters - would not be due until the introduction 
of ETPS, namely, October 1969.) However this second strike by the 
fitters ended more quickly than the first. After only ten days, 
they returned when management conceded the legitimacy of their 
claim and offered another 'interim' pay award. The outcome of 
this strike is noteworthy for two reasons. Pirst, though hardly a 
major victory, this new deal re-affirmed the fitters' dominance 
of sectional politics at Edgwick. (Other evidence of their power 
during this period can be taken from the fact that between 
January and October 1969, 12 out of the 30 sectional Issues 
discussed with management related to fitters' grlevancies, and 
that when the JSSC secretary resigned to become a worker 
representative, his place was taken by Jim Rollaston, one of the 
fitters' stewards.) Second, and perhaps more importantly, it 
brought to the fore Herbert's growing managerial crisis since the 
fitters only accepted the compromise deal so quickly because of 
the threat of Bdgwlck's closure. Prom this point the company's 
perilous state was to have a direct and overwhelming Influence on 
the shape of PPS politics.
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Crisis
Earlier signs of a managerial crisis had been evident on the 
shopfloor: the decline in orders;** the frequent disruption of 
production caused by design modifications;** problems with 
component suppliers who "seemed indifferent to orders placed by 
us";"° and acute labour shortages in some sections. Then on 19 
June, the third day of the strike, John Lambert, at the time 
Herbert-BSA's managing director, made a personal intervention in 
the talks to tell the senior stewards about his division's "grin 
two weeks on profitability" which now placed both Mackadown Lane 
and Bdgwlck "in deadly trouble". He accepted that this crisis was 
partly of management's making - the directors had "tried to 
change too many things at the same time" - but it did not matter 
how blame was apportioned. What mattered now was that with 
Bdgwick poised "on the brink of closure", the issue which had 
prompted the strike was irrelevant. The works convenor's retort 
was that "the company cannot sell us poverty"*4 and, three days 
later, he even appealed to *Jock' Houston to intervene on their 
behalf.** However, as I have said, by the end of the week the 
fitters returned to work on terms far short of their initial 
demand. Instead of receiving an increase of 2/- per hour - the 
figure calculated to bring their earnings up to the district 
average** - they accepted interim pay rises of lOd for skilled- 
and 9d for semi-skilled workers.
This central message of the strike was underlined when, only a
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few days later, Herbert-BSA's production director outlined a 
programme of compulsory retirements for Bdgwick's veteran 
employees. At that time, there were 94 men and 37 women over 
retirement age and another 51 due to retire within the year. This 
represented approximately 7% of some 2,500 hourly-rated workers 
at the plant.*4 This "supernumerary workforce", as Young had once 
described them,** had long been identified as one of the costs of 
employer paternalism, an anachronism in Herbert's new era, and an 
obvious target for reform. But, given the circumstances, it was 
not surprising that the senior stewards interpreted this 
initiative as a form of "hidden redundancy"*• and demanded 
corresponding payments. Management decided to drop the issue for 
the moment. (A programme of compulsory retirements - with certain 
financial inducements attached - was not negotiated until 
November 1969, and accepted in a works ballot the following 
month.)*7 But the message remained clear: the productivity scheme 
would probably never provide a route to high earnings. I would 
suggest that after these events, the senior stewards placed even 
more importance on achieving the only objectives that remained 
open to them: a coherent and relatively equitable pay structure 
based on a form of daywork; and a formalised collective 
bargaining procedure which enshrined the principle of 
"mutuality". The former task preoccupied both sides in the 
remaining months of the first phase of PPS.
•Fixing' the new pay structure
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Negotiations on the new pay structure under BTPS focused on what 
were called the Pall Back Rates (FBRs), or base rates, for each 
grade. These talks began in Nay, but were soon disrupted by the 
fitters' strike and were not resumed until the end of August, 
which left barely more than one month for both sides to reach a 
final settlement. It is difficult to understand why it took so 
long to re-open negotiations on this particular subject, unless 
both sides were concerned about its potential for sparking off 
another angry summer of sectional disputes. Certainly, the minute 
books suggest that the senior stewards presented the proposed 
rates to the membership in a way which was designed to minimise 
those disputes. Through September and into early October, the 
proposed FBRs were put to a series of meetings which brought 
together people who were intended to share a common scale of base 
rates. For example, there was one meeting for all semi-skilled 
day workers and another for millwrights, garage fitters, 
boiler-house fitters, ardoloy demonstrators, skilled 
cutter-grinders, skilled building trade workers and maintenance 
electricians. The response of the membership to this 'fix' is 
revealing about the character of inter-union politics within the 
JSSC and the relationship between the senior stewards and 
sections of their membership.
The patternmakers and foundry workers - whose unions were not 
represented by the three senior stewards - rejected the new pay 
rates and forced more bargaining. The maintenance electricians.
while similarly unrepresented, did not have the power to prevent 
the senior stewards accepting a provisional rate on their behalf. 
(The electricians had to wait until after the BTPS deadline 
before the senior stewards were prepared to re-negotiate better 
rates.) The majority of workers within the TGWU and AUBV 
passively accepted the 'fix', though some sections registered a 
protest."This is not the right deal," complained one section 
steward, "the company are pulling a fast one."*" Another worker 
warned "Brother Rollaston not to try and use (the) bulldozing 
tactics he had been accused of at previous meetings."*"
The women workers could not complain of "bulldozing tactics". On 
the contrary, the minutes suggest that they were given every 
encouragement to press for better rates. Even as late as 6 
October, one week before the deadline, the senior stewards were 
advising them to reject the proposed FBRs. This concern over 
women's pay was also evident earlier in the year when the senior 
stewards attempted to secure "equal pay for egual effort"."° 
However this concern over women's pay did not reflect a radical 
change in attitudes towards the status of women workers, either 
among the women themselves or their male colleagues for the 
'equal pay' campaign focused on the demand that:
"Vomen machine operators should get at least the lovest 
semi-skilled rate of a male.""*-
Not surprisingly, there is no record of any protest action when 
management insisted that the issue had to be settled at a 
national level first. Seven months later, when the company
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refused to sake any significant concessions to women on the FBRs, 
the works convenor eventually advised acceptance of the new rates 
though they were not, as he put it, "an answer to a maiden's 
prayer. "*a
Paradoxically, the stewards' efforts also demonstrated women's 
marginality in factory politics. I an sure the senior stewards 
were concerned about the abysmal wages of this section of their 
membership; but they also knew that a dispute over women's pay 
would never jeopardise the productivity scheme. Unlike the 
packers in 1964, these women showed no signs of taking direct 
action over their grievancies.
If women's pay was a politically marginal issue for the senior 
stewards, there can be little doubt that, during the six or seven 
weeks of talks over the FBRs, their chief concern was over the 
base rates of the white male, skilled and semi-skilled 
pieceworkers in the main shop. This is evident, for example, in 
the way the convenor presented the new pay structure to the 
workers as "an attempt to reduce the number of rates from 124 to 
20".•• These figures only applied to the 88 piecework gangs in 
the main shop.*4 If Doughty had included all the other sections 
affected by the pay talks, he would have counted over 40 new base 
rates.** This same preoccupation with the piecework gangs is also 
suggested in the order with which the rates were negotiated.
First, the shop stewards established agreement on the broad 
principle that skilled pieceworkers shared a common base rate.
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They then negotiated rates for the male semi-skilled 
pieceworkers, as well as other sections in the machine shop. Last 
of all came the three foundries and the patternshop.
Broadly, the new pay structure (which excluded the toolroom) had 
been determined by 17 October 1969 and was as shown in table 5 
below:
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Table S. The Hew Base Ratea Agreed Under PPS, October 1969.
~  ------------ ----
(A) In the main factory and patternshop:
chargehands' differential £2.10.0
male skilled pieceworkers £30
" " day workers £27 - £31
" semi-skilled p/w £23.6.0 - £27.8.0
■ ■ d/w £20.6.0 - £24.8.0
" labourers £18.10.0
female semi-skilled p/w £18 - £19
• • d/w £19.15.0 - £17.5.0
apprentices £9 - £20
junior males p/w £8.4.6 - £21.18.6
" females ■ £9.10.0 - £16.5.0
■ ■ d/w £8.10.0 - £14.10.0
(B) In the three foundries
skilled p/w £35.10.0 - £41
semi-skilled p/w £25.6.0 - £26.6.0
process workers £22.6.0 - £25.6.0
semi-skilled fettlers £32.8.4 - £36.10.7
Source: Herbert JSSC, minute dated 17 October 1969.
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BTPS: the Troubled Transitional Phase.
It did not take too long before aanageaent's handling of this 
second phase of PPS precipitated a fresh crisis in industrial 
relations; one which illustrated the divisions within senior 
aanageaent, the frail links between stewards in neighbouring 
Herbert plants, and the senior stewards' anxieties of a possible 
'backlash' froa the aost privileged sections of the workforce.
The new pay structure at Red Lane
Negotiations on the base rates continued until Priday, 17 
October, 1969, which aanageaent insisted was the last possible 
aoaent for the new wage data to be fed into the coaputer. A few 
days after this deadline, news broke of the new pay structure at 
Herbert Associate's Red Lane plant.•• The details that concerned 
the BC, when it aet that aorning, were the rates for Red Lane's 
94 skilled pieceworkers and 18 chargehands for they drew 
unwelcoae attention to the gains foregone by soae sections as a 
result of the senior stewards' support for a more equitable pay 
structure. Only later did the shop stewards note that 
seal-skilied and unskilled workers at Red Lane had lower base 
rates than their counterparts at Edgwick.”7
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The base rate for a skilled pieceworker at Red Lane was 10/- more 
than at Edgwick; "light merit" could increase that basic to 
£31.5.0, and "high merit" to £32; the "Junior chargehands" 
enjoyed a £2.10.0 differential over workers on "high merit•; and 
"senior chargehands" had a base rate of £36 which represented 11% 
more than any Machine shop chargehand at Bdgwick.** As Doughty 
had had to cope with threats of physical violence from some of 
the highfliers among Bdgwick's chargehands following the pay 
talks,** and given the fact that the two plants were seperated by 
barely more than one Mile, the senior stewards' immediate 
reaction was understandable. At a meeting with plant management 
on 22 October, they complained that nine months of bargaining had 
been "destroyed" and warned of "Imminent Industrial action" by an 
uncontalnable membership. However, apart from the protests of a 
few chargehands, the workforce seemed remarkably quiescent and, 
at the end of the week, the BC was relieved to find that it may 
have "over-emphasised this problem"."0 If the senior stewards had 
exaggerated some of the internal, political consequences of the 
news from Red Lane, there is nevertheless no doubt that the 
incident demonstrated to them a serious weakness in 
communications between shop stewards working in near adjacent 
factories under common ownership. It was a problem they tried to 
tackle over the next few weeks.*x
The news of the deal at Red Lane also illustrated the ineptitude 
of group management's de-centrallsed pay policy. To allow
Page 426
divisional management at one of the Group's smallest companies, 
Herbert Associates, to devise a pay structure which would 
obviously cause anger and resentment among key sections of 
firstline management at another plant which was not only the 
largest in the Group but also the pilot for major reforms in 
industrial relations,•* was politically ill-considered to say the 
least. It was also, I suspect, one more sign of the division 
between the ‘old' and the 'new' executives, for the managing 
director of Herbert Associates was Sidney Hulrhead, a Herbert 
veteran, and a man politically comfortable with the paternalist 
pay structure negotiated at Red Lane.
Muddling on
Prom this inauspicious start, ETPS seemed to muddle on from one 
crisis to the next. After only a few weeks, the estimated times, 
which were supposed to determine bonus payments for the next six 
months, proved so contentious that the stewards threatened to 
quit the scheme. Herberts' "old ratefixers", as the stewards 
called them, were confronted by a shopfloor ban initiated by a 
chargehand. The worker representatives proved of doubtful value 
to both the company and the shop stewards, while management's 
desperate efforts to contain the symptoms of the corporate crisis 
continued to disrupt Industrial relations at the plant. The only 
area where management appeared to face little opposition was in 
the implementation of the next phase of the Computer Loading and
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Scheduling System (CLASS).
Estimated tines: a •disgraceful pup'
Payment under ETPS phase began on 20 October. On 4 November, the 
senior stewards complained that the new, estimated times were "a 
disgrace"*3 and on 18 November, the JSSC resolved to quit the 
productivity scheme unless management guaranteed a minimum 
payment based on a 98% pay performance. This threat had its 
desired effect. Next day, the company agreed to guarantee the 
productivity bonus at 94% until the end of the year. However this 
decision only won a temporary respite for management. A month 
later the senior stewards protested to Maurice Ruck - the newly 
appointed Joint Managing Director of Herbert-BSA - that "In ETPS 
we bought a pup", and they presented him with the results of 
their own attitude survey on the estimated times to demonstrate 
the widespread dissatisfaction with this aspect of the scheme. 
Ruck congratulated the shop stewards on their poll and voiced his 
own criticisms of PPS. Estimated times were, he said, "worked by 
a conversion factor on (the) old times” and he knew "there would 
be problems right from the start which would cause disharmony 
between men and management. "m* At the end of December management 
felt obliged to continue guaranteed bonus payments for the 
remainder of BTPS, and when, on 8 April 1970, negotiations began 
on the arrangements for the bonus system under MTPS, it was 
settled that performance would be guaranteed at 95% for a further
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six months or until 50% of the job-tines were measured and 
agreed, whichever was sooner. One consequence of this settlement 
was that the start of the final phase of the productivity scheme 
passed without notice in the shop stewards' records. Indeed, as I 
will later show, HTPS itself appeared to be no more than a 
continuation of the same muddled arrangement.
These difficulties over estimated times also aided the shop 
stewards' in their claim for "mutuality" over measured times. 
Management finally accepted the "general principle” of 
"mutuality" in March 1970.•• However, as I will show later, this 
was only the beginning of another long procedural wrangle.
"A human problem"
Shopfloor discontent with progress on the productivity scheme 
took a new form when, in mid-Pebruary, a chargehand spotted a 
work standard engineer recording "jigs and fixtures” on the 
shopfloor and promptly ordered him off the (vertical milling) 
section. Doughty defended the chargehand's action: "the methods 
! used are our members", he claimed, and even warned of a
"re-action from the shopfloor" if the "rate-fixers" re-appeared 
and "asked questions" about production techniques."" At first, 
management challenged this position. Afterall, it was hardly 
consistent with the shop stewards' formal support for PPS. But at 
the works conference, held on 7 April, the company accepted the
J
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union official's view that the dispute was "a human problem" 
which had to be settled domestically. In effect, the "problem" 
was put to one side to save the scheme.
In addition to a general discontent with PPS I would suggest that 
this dispute reflected a particular dissatisfaction with the 
former "rate-fixers”, who were now thoroughly discredited by 
their association with the Infamous estimated times, as distinct 
from the outside industrial engineers. The maxims of the 
"Fairfield project" were proved right, but apparently for the 
wrong reasons: management's use of "outside" engineers had 
provoked shopfloor resistance because their presence legitimated 
the shop stewards' complaints about the incompetence of Herbert's 
own work study department.
I also think it is significant that it was a chargehand who acted 
in defence of his section's ‘craft controls'. In one way it 
suggests the Ideology of the old gang system was still very much 
alive. There were, it seemed, some chargehands who still regarded 
themselves as akin to sub-contractors in their relationship to 
plant management. In another way, the incident could also be 
interpreted as one more piece of evidence of the progress of the 
chargehands' political re-alignment. More, albeit Indirect, 
evidence of the chargehands' disaffection came on 20 February 
trhen management complained that people were leaving work too 
early. This was the first occasion the senior stewards had 
recorded such a complaint since the early war years. Bvents such
as the negotiations over the "Grey Book" and the introduction of 
CLASS, which I will discuss later, were forcing the chargehands 
to realise their interests were best served by a closer alliance 
with the shop stewards.
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Mutual doubts about worker representatives
Meanwhile, both managers and stewards were finding their separate 
reasons to doubt the value of worker representatives. Sensitive 
to the danger of "poaching" by Management Services Division, the 
BC had decided, as early as November 1969, that it would meet the 
worker representatives on a weekly basis. To a certain extent, 
these meetings proved useful to the shop stewards. At one such 
meeting, one of the representatives complained that "he was 
deliberately detained in the office on menial jobs". At another 
meeting, the BC was told that "arbitrary allowances are now being 
built into MTPS t i m e s " . Unfortunately, all these complaints 
came from one person, Bro. Grubb, who had served as the JSSC's 
secretary before this latest appointment. The other 
representatives voiced no grievancies and seemed unperturbed by 
the managerial tactics that angered Grubb. There was a very real 
danger that these men could be "poached", or co-opted, by 
management. Confirmation of this came soon enough. On 23 March 
1970, the BC decided that two of them, Vildsmith and McNaught, 
"should be relieved of their foundry responsibilities and 
transferred to Fitting" as a result of persistent complaints from
colleagues.
The impact of the corporate crisis on the shopfloor
During BTPS, the shop stewards recorded sore evidence of 
Herbert's deepening crisis, which in some cases had a direct 
impact on industrial relations at the plant. Por example, at the 
beginning of December, workers in Electrical Commissioning 
organised a one-day strike, followed by an overtime ban, to press 
their claim for staff status comparable with the service 
engineers. Initially, management opposed the demand, arguing they 
had been in "a very non-typical position through major changes in 
the last 18 months...(where) machines had been put out before 
being fully proved"; but the claim was conceded a month later.*" 
Simultaneous with news of Hulrhead's sudden death on 8 December 
1969, the senior stewards were informed of Vormauld's "departure 
from the company". As Vormauld had been director of Management 
Services Division, his exit could be interpreted as one more sign 
of the increasing Irrelevance of PPS in the face of Herbert's 
corporate crisis. This interpretation is supported by a note 
dated 16 December which recorded Ruck's statement that production 
had been disrupted by shortages of parts and scarcity of "the 
right sort of labour”. In the New Year, management blamed "an 
acute labour shortage" when the shop stewards threatened to 
withdraw their members' co-operation in training school-leavers 
if the company continued to flout BITB standards for
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traineeships;** and two months later, management had to accept 
similar criticisms of its recruitment of young workers for the 
foundries. The secretary's notes make it clear that both plant 
management and senior stewards viewed these practices as 
desperate remedies. The former admitted to a certain "unease" 
about this particular solution to their labour shortages and felt 
obliged to accept the shop stewards' demands. Vlth regard to the 
foundries, management agreed to stop the recruitment of 
school-leavers and pay the adult rate at 18.70 As for the machine 
shop, the youths were given the opportunity to take the entrance 
tests for an apprenticeship after a compulsory seven-week crash 
course in engineering practice.74
Computerisation: an apparent success story
In contrast to the disputes over the shopfloor presence of work 
standard engineers, or about estimated times and the recruitment 
of young workers, management seemed able to continue to implement 
its plans for the computerisation of the shop scheduling system 
largely at its own pace. In November 1969, some chargehands had 
complained - through the shop stewards - about the excessive 
paperwork generated by the new system; but management clearly 
felt no need to respond to this criticism until January 1970 when 
it unveiled its plans to computerise production planning in the 
machine shop from 10 February (followed by the "factory” machine 
shop in June and stock control at the beginning of 1971). Sven
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then, the managers were able to stall talks on the chargehands' 
grievance, for the remainder of ETPS, by proposing to bring in 
work study engineers to analyse the paperwork of three selected 
chargehands.
Aware of the adverse employment effects this new expansion of 
CLASS could have, particularly for clerical workers in progress 
and stock control, the BC registered a "strong protest at the 
lack of prior consultation. "7a Again, though, the "protest" did 
not seem to worry the managers. They gave vague assurances that 
redundancies as a consequence of computerisation were not 
anticipated "in the immediate future", and, for the next four 
months, there the matter rested.
HTP8: the Pinal Phase of PP8, April 1970 to Decesfrer 1971.
Unlike the earlier phases of the productivity scheme, MTPS is 
difficult to periodise partly because, in a sense, it never 
happened. Measured daywork across the entire plant remained an 
elusive goal for both managers and stewards. Its scheduled start 
date was postponed until 13 October 1970; but even then only the 
maintenance electricians, in a separate productivity scheme, went 
onto measured daywork, and it was not until some time after 
Pebruary 1971 when two turning sections piloted measured daywork
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under HTPS proper. Similarly, there are difficulties in 
identifying the conclusion of this period if it is linked to the 
demise of PPS. On 8 December 1971, a works meeting accepted a pay 
deal which included an agreement to negotiate an alternative to 
PPS after March 1972, but the minutes suggest that before that 
date a number of machine shop gangs had gone onto an ordinary 
daywork system following the re-organisation of their work under 
group technology or, as it was called then, "cell production".7* 
(Unfortunately, the minutes for the period from 15 December 1971 
to 6 March 1973, are unavailable and oral testimony is not 
detailed enough to help reconstruct key events during that 
period.) In any event, a fitting conclusion to this period should 
not be sought in possible dates when the project of measured 
daywork was finally abandoned. Long before its formal demise, PPS 
had ceased to have any relevance to shopfloor politics. Instead, 
the series of redundancies that racked the membership from 
Pebruary 1971 onwards offer a more appropriate ending to this 
period for they brought an end to most of the hopes both the 
managers and stewards had put into PPS. The only difficulty with 
choosing such an ending is that it runs into another story that 
j could be told/for those redundancies also marked the start of
profound crisis of morale within the stewards' organisation which 
lasted until 1974 when the election of a Labour government 
suddenly held out the prospect of a state-sponbred rescue. With 
these considerations, then, this section will confine itself to a 
discussion of events between April 1970 - the date that should 
have marked the commencement of measured daywork - and December
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1971 when ten months of negotiations and arguments over 
redundancies made their own unmistakeable mark on the character 
of the stewards' records. Within that périodisation I will 
address two main questions: why management abandoned the 
productivity scheme, and how the stewards responded as events 
radically transformed the political terrain once again.
Different goals
As with an earlier phase of PPS, in April 1970 both sides agreed 
to the postponement of HTPS for at least the next six months. 
During that interval, most of the talks were concerned with two 
issues: the formalisation of the grading structure for 
semi-skilled workers; and the rules for disputing and accepting 
measured times.
Despite their past disappointments with the scheme (over such 
matters as worker representatives, estimated times in the machine 
shop, and, above all, the failure of the scheme to raise pay to 
the district average both for the present and the forseeable 
future), the senior stewards continued to demonstrate a 
remarkable enthusiasm for PPS. When, for example, the number of 
worker representatives had declined to four, half their initial 
number - chiefly as a result of promotions into supervisory staff 
- only the senior stewards seemed concerned to find 
replacements.74 (In the event, another worker representative left
in the following year.) On another occasion, the senior stewards 
actually coaplained that "line management (had) seemed hell bent" 
on Measured times, but "now things have gone dead".T" A similar 
grievance was recorded over the negotiations on the grading 
structure.rm Even as late as January 1971, in the middle of talks 
over redundancies, the shop stewards still appeared anxious to 
see the introduction of MTPS, initially on a six-month long pilot 
basis, in the turning sections of the machine shop and "factory". 
I would suggest that this was the case because they believed the 
scheme still offered some tangible political benefits to the shop 
stewards' organisation.
The process of collective bargaining over three years had moved 
the shop stewards into a central position in shopfloor politics, 
but they must have been aware of the vulnerability of that 
new-found authority: what senior management had granted could, 
almost as easily, be taken away. Despite the apparent growth of 
the JSSC and despite the flurry of sectional strikes which 
alarmed management in those early days of the PPS talks, 
incidents recorded in the minute books suggest that, as a 
superstructure, the shop stewards' organisation still rested 
uneasily on the bedrock of the membership. For example, in Hay 
1970 the convenor complained that he had seen a semi-skilled 
worker operating a machine in a "skilled area”. Five months 
later, a section steward warned management during talks on 
toolroom merits that the "present position could result in (the 
company! losing the younger m e m b e r s and so demonstrated an
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awareness, which the convenor shared, that the drift of labour 
and not industrial militancy was still the chief mechanism which 
produced higher pay at Bdgwick.T* Against such a background I 
would argue that the senior stewards were keen to see the 
realisation of MTPS, if only in a few sections, because it would 
confirm the deaise of Herberts' variant of the gang system and 
foster a form of shopfloor politics more akin to that of the 
other, large engineering plants in Coventry.
Despite the senior stewards' enthusiasm to see the introduction 
of measured daywork it was obvious, as the deadline for new pay 
talks approached, that MTPS was not going to be the central 
issue. Vith less than 5000 measured job times out of 200,000, the 
implementation of the last phase of PPS must have seemed a 
distant goal. At any event, the negotiations dealt only with the 
size of the pay award and how it should be divided up. In August, 
the shop stewards submitted a claim for a 14% increase in October 
exclusively on the base rate - equivalent to a rise of £4.15.0 
for a skilled worker at Bdgwick - which, they calculated, would 
bring pay in line with the district average. On 6 October, the 
managers responded with an offer of £1 that month and a little 
less than £2 in stages over the next 18 months, linked to 
agreements on mobility between skilled areas, multi-machine 
manning, and the involvement of work standard engineers in the 
(job-times) disputes procedure.
Contrary to a stated determination to ignore management's pleas
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about the company's difficulties ("c/o financial difficulties 
none of my concern, none of my making" Doughty told a works 
■eeting),7* the EC quickly scaled down its deaand to £3: £2 in 
October and £1 in April 1971. Vhen Ruck, then Managing director 
of Herbert-BSA, gave his "word" that the coMpany was in serious 
difficulties - his "word" had to suffice for he refused to "open 
the books" as the stewards had requested - the convenor found he 
was powerless to dissuade either the EC or the Membership to 
reject an even snaller offer, namely, £1 that month and £2 in 
April.
/
Another significant feature of these pay talks is that, while the 
senior managers seemed to place much importance on the role of 
the work standard engineers, they readily admitted that the 
productivity scheme was "no use to the (trade unions) and not 
much use to the (company)","0 and so agreed to link 10/- only to 
the productivity bonus. The explanation for this apparent 
inconsistency, I believe, is that their objectives were rapidly 
shifting. Instead of trying to increase productivity by offering 
higher pay on tighter job-times, they now had a vague hope of 
achieving that aim through an undefined mixture of 
rationalisation involving a considerable number of redundancies, 
some changes in the organisation of work, and an intensification 
of labour largely imposed by the threat of more redundancies. I 
say it was a 'vague hope' because the stewards' minutes suggest 
that the senior managers did not have a clear alternative to PPS.
Instead there was a confusion of ideas. There were plans to use
CLASS to make the build programmes more responsive to short-term 
changes in the market - in one manager's words: "(the company) 
should build machines according to the market (and) not along the 
lines of the old production system".*1 The senior engineers had 
plans to introduce group technology (though they had to wait 
until 1972 before being allowed to implement them - after the 
"debacle of the 1968 era", the engineers' prestige was very low 
within senior management). Some new machines were due to be moved 
onto the shopfloor.** There were also the customary ideas about 
'imposing' mobility of labour and changing the manning on 
semi-automatic and automatic machinery as a condition for pay 
rises; but nothing more was said on this point after the stewards 
offered acceptance on a voluntary basis.
The relatively unformed character of management's strategy at 
this time is reflected in the confused way the plant managers 
moved towards the Implementation of a major redundancy programme 
(though I would not deny that management may have used such 
confusion to disarm the stewards). At the end of November, after 
the senior stewards referred to "rumours in the shop of (a 
company) statement", works management denied one was being 
prepared and assured them that there would not be a "surplus of 
direct labour" if the build programme could be stabilised.
However, "detailed investigations by HSU" did indicate the need 
for redundancies among the indirects."* This news was enough to 
persuade the senior stewards to convene a special meeting of the 
JSSC and a works meeting, so that when the managers later
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broached the Idea o£ a redundancy procedure £or indirect», the 
senior stewards were able to threaten a range o£ sanctions short 
o£ striking. Almost apologetically, management promptly agreed to 
restore the 'status quo' and take the matter through the 
(national) disputes procedure. Later, at a Works Conference on 9 
December, management suddenly claimed that the need for 28 
redundancies among the indirects arose "from circumstances 
outside PPS"; but, even at this stage, it is clear that the 
stewards had very little information to indicate corporate 
management was actively considering more radical changes.
"A drastic exercise in sheer survival*
After the Works Conference in December 1970 had ended in a 
'failure to agree', the redundancy issue seemed to be put aside, 
almost forgotten. There was one occasion, early in the Mew Year, 
trhen the senior stewards asked about rumours of redundancies in 
the "factory"; but they were given a bland denial"" and 
collective bargaining seemed to resume its routine fare of 
sectional grievancies and the seemingly interminable arguments 
over the disputes procedure on measured times."*
Thus preoccupied with efforts to see the implementation of MTP8 - 
even as late as 22 January the senior stewards were pressing for 
some sections to go onto measured daywork on a trial basis - it 
is notable that Neale Raine's appointment as Herbert's first
Page 441
Chief Executive vas not even Mentioned in the minute books until 
25 January when, in a request on behalf of the AH Group Stewards' 
Committee to see the main board, works management advised they 
write to him. Raine, "a new, to ugh, managing director"**, was 
appointed by Sir Richard Young in December 1971, largely, it has 
been claimed, as a result of the banks' dissatisfaction with the 
company's progress in reducing its debts.*7 On his appointment, 
Raine presented the board with a five year plan. It was a 
"drastic" one. He aimed to reduce "overheads" by centralising the 
seven Herbert companies into one, and rationalising the Group's 
activities by closing down 13 or 14 of its 17 factories, and 
reducing the product range from 300 to 200 different types of 
machine tools. The Sunday Times commented:
"Raine's 5 year plan is clearly a desperate exercise in sheer 
survival and, as such, will probably be successful. "mm
Of course, at the time none of this was put to the stewards. On 
the contrary, the minutes show that their anxious enquiries about 
the possible truth of shopfloor rumours of imminent, massive 
redundancies were deflected with more bland assurances. However, 
by their own means the senior stewards were able to gather some 
facts on Raine's career which re-inforced their fears. In 
particular, they discovered that in his previous appointment at 
Associated Engineering he was responsible for pushing through a 
major programme of redundancies in the face of fierce trades 
union opposition.** Perhaps it was this knowledge which prompted 
the stewards to convene a works meeting on 4 February 1971 and
call for strike action if "butcher" Raine attempted to implement 
compulsory redundancies at the plant. With only three votes 
against, the membership supported the motion.
This strike decision seemed to bring matters to a head. For, the 
next day, Friday, 5 February, the company announced its intention 
to carry out 810 redundancies throughout the Group, 443 of which 
were to take place at Bdgwick. Senior management invited the 
stewards and staff representatives to negotiate details of the 
plan on Monday, 8 February; but it was made clear that individual 
notices would be issued on that same day and the whole exercise 
completed by 10 March. Immediately after this consultation, the 
JSSC decided to convene a works meeting on Monday morning and 
press for strike action without waiting for the first dismissals 
as the redundancy notices, however "tentative", were seen as 
potentially divisive.
At this second works meeting, the senior stewards and staff 
representatives (from DATA) faced hostile and anxious questions 
from their membership: "Are you trying to bring this company to 
its knees?", asked one; "Are you a communist?” another asked the 
convenor. But Doughty secured the decision he wanted after 
arguing that management was only prepared to re-consider cases of 
hardship and the redundancy notices would set "man against 
man".90 However, at the end of the week a third works meeting had 
to be convened as a result of the "collapse" of the staffs 
unions' opposition. The minutes show that Doughty desperately
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sought to continue the strike. He claimed, incorrectly, that 
manageaent refused to consider volunteers, criticised the ASP 
officials' statements on the redundancies as "double-edged" and 
dismissed the staff unions' deal as no aore than a reiteration of 
the company's original offer. It was a futile stand. By a 
majority vote, the membership decided to return to work."x
Despite its swift conclusion, the strike probably persuaded 
management to give the shop stewards at Edgwick more time to find 
volunteers for redundancy. Initially, the deadline was extended 
for three days to 18 February, the date of the Local Conference, 
then it was extended a further week to 26 February. Elsewhere in 
Coventry, Herbert's employees were notified of their dismissal on 
Friday, 19 February.
The initial press statement explained that the redundancies were 
an attempt to "reduce overheads because of weakening world 
markets and continuing cost inflations".9" Later, management 
elaborated on part of this terse statement by expounding on the 
new-found ‘sins' of vertical integration. The company, the 
stewards were reminded on one occasion, had an "obligation to 
employees and shareholders to become profit-making"; but 
management was hindered by the fact that this former "engineering 
firm was now (involved) in haulage, carpentry, fabrication. If 
investigation shows savings could be made by using specialist 
labour, {then it would be a) common-sense thing to do".99 At 
other talks, this intention to sub-contract out as much indirect
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work as possible (including the toolroom and patternshop) was 
referred to as a "change of co. policy" which became lumped 
together with statements about plans to "lop off" £2 million from 
"overheads""* and the dismissal of seven directors.••
The second part of management's explanation for the redundancies 
was about the need to respond to declining orders. Significantly, 
this strand of the argument was repeated more frequently. Indeed, 
sometimes it was presented as the sole reason for the cuts. For 
example, at the Local Conference on 18 February, the trade unions 
were told that the company was "dealing with large scale 
redundancies due to (the) order book". I would suggest that this 
imbalanced presentation of the crisis was politically calculated. 
It was intended to convey the impression that the redundancies 
were essentially the product of something outside management's 
control. Hence the absence of any reference to Raine's five-year 
plan, his "desperate exercise in sheer survival" which - the 
Sunday Times reported after the event - involved "lopping off"
£5m from overheads by closing down thirteen or fourteen 
factories.
The shop stewards were conscious of senior management's 
disingenuousness. This is strongly suggested in one minute which 
records the managers' statement that the unions would have been 
consulted "if (there had been) cost reductions in one department 
as opposed to five". Certainly, they were not persuaded that 
contracting out work would save much money, and they realised,
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froa past experience of Bdgwick's production difficulties, that 
the cuts had to be related to more fundamental issues. However, 
it seems the stewards were not aware of the full scope of Raine's 
"desperate exercise”, though the minutes suggest that on one 
occasion the senior managers revealed more than was politic.
At that initial meeting on 5 February, when the staff 
representatives and senior stewards were told that the 
redundancies included seven directors. Ruck remarked on the 
"magnitude" of the problem. This provided the opportunity for 
Doughty to comment that the "cost of (the) seven Companies must 
have been colossal". However Lambert, another senior executive at 
the meeting, promptly cut off that line of discussion as he had 
no Intention of encouraging speculation on the causes and likely 
extent of the redundancies. They were "not here to talk history", 
he said, but "to talk facts". Not surprisingly, this did not 
discourage Doughty from telling his membership later that the 
cuts were the product of an "inept" management and, more 
specifically, linked to the costs of managerial re-organisation 
in the late-1960s. Three years ago, he told a works meeting on 8 
February, there were 12 directors. Now there were 73. The "seven 
companies must have cost a fortune", he concluded.
It is quite clear then, that the shop stewards had anticipated 
major redundancies, but it did not seem to help them prepare 
stouter defences when the crisis broke. At Bdgwick their 
"solidarity" with the staffs unions collapsed almost within hours
J
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In the three days prior to the Local Conference on the 
redundancies, the senior stewards at Edgwick organised 15 
separate, sectional meetings. They presented management's "hit 
list", which detailed the number of redundancies sought in each 
occupation within each section, and then recorded the names and 
clock numbers of all volunteers. After 19 February, when the 
deadline was extended another week, the section stewards were 
asked to continue this compilation. On 23 February, it was 
minuted that 163 workers had volunteered for redundancy of whom 
114 had been accepted by management. The absence of any later 
figures on volunteers suggests that, on 26 February, some 200 
hourly-rated workers were issued with notices of their compulsory 
redundancies. Given the news of other redundancies in Coventry at 
that time and the rather small ex-gratla payments the company was 
offering to volunteers, this outcome was hardly surprising. The 
sums involved ranged from £25 for those with less than 10 years 
service to £125 for employees with over 40 years. These figures 
should be compared with the Coventry district average which was 
then £40 per week.
The aftermath
The psychological impact of these job cuts cannot be overstated. 
Though, as I explained in earlier chapters, *jobs-for-life' was a 
myth for sections of semi- and unskilled workers at Bdgwick -
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they had been exposed to compulsory redundancies as recently as 
the late-fifties - for many skilled employees that kind of job 
security had been real enough. For then the cuts meant the end of 
a very powerful paternalist tradition which had given them a 
sense of their own worth, their own dignity. Also, oral evidence 
suggests that the redundancy notices were issued in a 
particularly insensitive manner. John Davies, then a draughtsman 
at the Exhall plant, recalled that in his office the process 
seemed to take hours as the listed men were summoned, in turn, to 
a personal interview with the section manager. Angered and 
shocked by this experience, John wrote a poem about the 
redundancies. Ten years later, when I met him, John could still 
recall the opening verse:
"Sir Dick, as you lie snug and rich in your bed 
Think over your actions and what you have said 
What you caused by the stroke of your elegant pen;
As you dream, you'll remember 810."
The minute books offer a more prosaic record of the psychological 
impact on some section stewards. At a JSSC meeting held 
immediately after the strike had been called off, the secretary 
noted tersely:
"Duties being lapsed by some (shop stewards)."""
Towards the end of this redundancy 'exercise', that is in late 
February and early March, the minutes suggest that most talks 
with (plant) management were concerned with disputes over the
;
transfers of supervisory staff onto the shopfloor. In most cases, 
the grievancies related to the movement, or deaotion, of 
assistant foremen to chargehands In the fitting shop. The shop 
stewards coaplained that staff were being given preferential 
treataent or that some of their colleagues were being disaissed 
to allow these "transfers" to take place. The fitting shop 
aounted the only recorded resistance where there was a brief ban 
on CLASS paperwork.•T However, one transferral which particularly 
angered the senior stewards concerned the movement of an 
assistant foreman onto the grinding section in the toolroom. The 
minutes record these comments by Doughty:
"Would use all possible means to prevent this move, the 
principle stinks but...at this stage we cannot marshall the 
forces to fight this"9"
The shop stewards' fury suggests that the assistant foreman, 
formerly a long-service toolroom worker called Varr, was none 
other than Doughty's predecessor.
In addition to demonstrating the anger and frustration felt by 
the shop stewards about the redundancies, the row over these 
transfers suggests that plant-level management had also been 
surprised by the extent of the cuts sought by the corporate 
executives. Other evidence to support this idea was mentioned 
earlier, namely, the way the magnitude of, and rationale for, the 
redundancy programme suddenly changed. Hore evidence is contained 
in the shop stewards' detailed notes on management's "hit list".
It shows that in the foundries, "factory" and machine shop, the
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company intended to dismiss 29 trainees, many of whom had been 
recruited only months earlier and (as I have shown) despite some 
opposition from the shopfloor.
When the negotiations over PPS were resumed on 9 March, the 
atmosphere was less than cordial. The senior stewards informed 
management that the membership would be advised to challenge all 
unsatisfactory measured times and do so under the "National 
Agreement" as a result of the continued absence of an agreement 
under PPS. The managers replied that their efforts to respond to 
the shop stewards' proposals on the grievance procedure had been 
"overtaken by events", and took the opportunity to complain that 
some workers were leaving "the job on the floor" as a first 
resort. This could not have happened on many occasions as both 
sides subsequently accepted that there were only 50 disputed 
times out of the 8000 measured thus far.** Nonetheless, it was 
one tentative sign that some former pieceworkers were beginning 
to adopt the industrial tactics of their counterparts in other, 
more militant plants in Coventry.
A few weeks later talks over the maintenance electricians' 
separate productivity scheme became snarled up in arguments about 
the role of section stewards in the procedure for disputing 
measured times. But almost as soon as collective bargaining had 
returned to these familiar topics, works management broke the 
news of a fresh redundancy crisis. As a result of a further 
decline in orders, they explained, there would be another round
of job-cuts within the Group. The Sanvey Gate plant at Leicester 
was to be closed down with the loss of some 180 hourly-rated 
jobs. Though this work was to be transferred to Bdgwick 79 
redundancies (including 55 hourly-rated jobs) would take place at 
that plant, followed by a brief period of short-time working.*-00 
As before, the senior stewards were invited to find volunteers.
On this occasion, they were told individual notices would be 
issued at the end of the week.
Apparently, there was no resistance to this second programme of 
cuts. The ainutes only recorded the JSSC's decision not to 
convene a works meeting on the issue. The deadline for the 
notices passed without a mention.
The demise of PPS
By April 1971, there were clear signs that the senior stewards 
had reached the limit of their patience over the slow progress of 
PPS. On 5 April, the EC decided to recommend to the JSSC that all 
measured times which did not produce 100% performance should be 
disputed, and that if management could not tackle these 
grlevancies efficiently then they should be asked to devise "an 
alternate pay system". Three days later the senior stewards 
accused management of avoiding agreement on "mutuality" and 
deliberately protracting work on measured times so that it could
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continue to pay on estimated times. Notice was given that the 
JSSC would reject "PP3 and all related natters" if there was no 
improvement by October.
Towards the end of the month, John David, a newly-appointed 
director of Herbert-BSA (and one of Raine's closest friends and a 
former colleague at Associated Engineering)101 tried to re-assure 
the stewards that, though PPS seemed to have "lost its way a 
bit", senior management was still committed to the scheme. He 
told them that PE consultants had been drafted in to see if there 
was some way measured job-times could be established more 
quickly.loa If this news did not mark the end of HPL's 
involvement in Herbert's affairs, it certainly foreshadowed it. 
tflth the patronage of an erstwhile colleague who was now 
Herbert's Chief Executive, PE became increasingly involved in the 
repair work on Bdgwick's productivity scheme. This meant that 
even if the senior managers genuinely wanted to introduce 
measured daywork - and there was little likelihood of that given 
the imminence of short-time «forking - they intended to do so 
without carrying HPL's corporatist baggage. Nevertheless, it is 
probably apt that this detail was given no special significance 
at that time by the senior stewards. They were more concerned 
with the continuing effects of Raine's "desperate exercise in 
sheer survival". On 16 April, management gave notice of 
short-time working for 580 hourly-rated workers at Edgwick and, 
on 3 Hay, details were given on further manpower cuts within the 
Group.
Page 453
However, even at this late stage the senior stewards seemed 
reluctant to abandon PPS. After their meeting with John David, on 
23 April, they decided to give the company a month to improve 
some features of the scheme; but when management submitted 
entirely new proposals on the disputes procedure two weeks later, 
the EC decided to "go into procedure".
The Vorks Conference took place on 24 June. The AEP official, 
Butler, recited the dismal facts: the average pay for a skilled 
pieceworker at Edgwick was now nearly £4 below the district 
average (£36.13 compared to £40); only 8000 of some 200,000 jobs 
had been measured so far; and the scheme still remained without 
an agreed disputes procedure. In reply, management admitted the 
initial plan to introduce measured daywork after six months of 
ETPS had been "unrealistic"; but now a new consultancy service, 
PE, were looking into the matter and Herbert's own productivity 
services was being de-centralised. The unions' claim for a 
"compensatory payment" for the failure of the productivity scheme 
and "mutuality” in the disputes procedure were both rejected.
When the Local Conference was held nearly two months later, on 17 
August, the debate seemed almost ritualistic. Butler talked about 
"spurring" the Company on to improving the scheme; but nothing in 
the minutes suggests that anyone had any fresh ideas on the 
subject. This apparent indifference was hardly surprising since 
events between the two conferences could only have confirmed the 
view that, for both sides, PPS had become totally irrelevant.
On 5 July 1971, divisional management had warned the shop 
stewards that a continuing decline in orders made more 
redundancies likely. A month later, and only seven days before 
the Local Conference, the senior stewards were asked to find 
volunteers within "certain broad areas".
Negotiations on the "challenge procedure" had made no further 
progress. On 7 July, management had tabled another draft of their 
"challenge procedure" which was promptly rejected because it made 
no mention of the shop steward's role in disputed tines. It was a 
rather basic omission which must have discouraged the senior 
stewards. However, when works management complained that, without 
using (the notorious) synthetics, it would take five months to 
complete a time study of the assembly of such new machines as the 
5 Auto, the stewards exploited this situation by offering an 
agreement on synthetics if management accepted their demand for 
"mutuality".*0* In their turn, the managers must have imagined 
similar wrangles over other new designs and the work being 
transferred from Vigston.
On 7 July, the managing director told the EC about plans to 
re-organise Edgwick's shopfloor into "cellular units". Dismayed 
by the falling pay performances - it was claimed that over a 
third of the gangs had failed to reach 85% of their target 
earnings - the senior stewards must have been concerned that the 
introduction of "cell production" would result in serious
disruptions of production and so lead to a further decline in pay 
bonuses.
Further evidence of the irrelevance of PPS cane only two days 
after the Local Conference when, on 19 August, Management 
announced plans for a further 100 redundancies. On this occasion, 
the shop stewards had no difficulties in finding volunteers - the 
JSSC reported 153, although not enough were acceptable to 
management - whose numbers were probably encouraged by short-time 
working, the overtime ban and the declining pay bonuses. The 
senior stewards, therefore, could hardly have been surprised with 
the form of management's initial pay offer for 1971/72, namely:
£1 on the basic rates (pending the outcome of the national pay 
talks); and the formation of a joint working party to carry out a 
wide-ranging review of pay and conditions which Included the 
possibility of scrapping the productivity scheme in March 
1 9 7 2.1°« as if intent on underlining the message about the 
proposed abandonment of PPS, the managers offered a safety net of 
the shop average plus 6% or 92%, whichever was the highest, to 
protect the £1 increase.xo*
PPS was dead and with it management's promise of raising pay at 
Herbert's to the district average. In the post-Fairfield, 
post-Donovan era, the shop stewards were asked to accomodate
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theaselves to a new economic reality: "any extra on the wages 
bill could bring about further redundancies", they were told.x°" 
The JSSC's claim for £5 on the base rate and 100% pay performance 
until March 1972 was dismissed as hopelessly unrealistic in a 
world where jobs were balanced against pay rises Masured in 
pennies: "if (the) £1 (rise) went to £1.50", the stewards were 
advised, it "would mean (more) redundancies".xor In the 
succeeding years, it was to become a familiar precept, 
eventually, on 8 December, the pay talks were finally settled 
when a works Meting accepted an offer of £2 on the base rates of 
skilled pieceworkers (pro rata for the others) with a performance 
"safety net" of 94%. The minutes suggest that manageMnt wasted 
no tiM in demonstrating the equation between pay and jobs, for 
the saw works Meting was asked to support the stewards' demand 
for sore time and higher ex-gratia payments to deal with the 
imminent closures of both the Light Engineeering Department and 
the "factory".
Even without the aid of the minutes, it is not difficult to 
iMgine the negative impact these events had on the stewards' 
organisation at Bdgwick. At any plant, the sudden collapse of a 
strike followed by a succession of redundancies (and sore 
threatened) would be expected to generate the s a M  effects: the 
vicious circle of a declining morale among both section stewards 
and Mmbership which then posed serious difficulties for the 
senior stewards to convince MnageMnt that the organisation 
remained capable of imposing and Mintaining any form of
sanctions - especially those that directly affected members' 
earnings - which, in return, reduced morale even further. The 
minutes provide the outward signs of this pattern: the declining 
attendance at JSSC meetings; the EC's recorded "disappointment 
and dissatisfaction" with sections which ignored the overtime 
ban; the rush of managerial initiatives which, seemingly, 
encountered little resistance on the shopfloor though there was 
little, if any, prior consultation with the stewards (such as the 
introduction of new technigues in the paint shop, the closure of 
other departments, and the transfer of work between sections).
However, the minute books also provide evidence to suggest that 
this deterioration in shopfloor morale was not all to 
management's benefit. For example, on one occasion there were 
complaints of persistent lateness in the grinding section;10* 
and, at another time, when management suggested an investigation 
into the falling productivity of the turning sections, Rollaston 
observed: "this is an overall sickness; you want an overall cure, 
not investigations in isolated cases".xo"
A moral opposition
The same records also provide evidence of a continuing resistance 
to the redundancies. On the shopfloor, the overtime ban was 
continued and, even if not observed by all sections, did 
inconvenience management at times;110 and the threat of "non
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co-operation", especially with the paperwork for CLASS, 
frequently persuaded management to re-consider tactics on such 
matters as the transferral of potentially redundant staff and 
changes in work practices. One former Herbert employee, a DATA 
representative who left the Company during this period, has 
argued that the source of this residual power came from workers' 
moral objection to compulsory redundancies:
"They did sustain the sanctions, I mean, the overtime ban 
stayed on. That was important in terms of winning the 
(struggle over) subsequent redundancies...They accepted the 
union's position perhaps on moral grounds. It reflects the 
nature of the people who worked there, part of the 
paternalism, the acceptance that they had responsibilities to 
other people who worked there...In a sense that moral 
argument is a legitimate part of trade unionism. They (had) 
that concept of class solidarity. "xxx
I would suggest that in addition to sustaining some form of 
resistance on the shopfloor, this moral opposition provided the 
base for Doughty's efforts to continue resistance at another 
level. The minutes offer glimpses of Doughty's attempts to 
politicise the issue of redundancies by making it a subject for 
state intervention. In July, when works management intimated more 
redundancies were imminent, the JSSC decided to lobby the local 
HPs on "the machine tool situation”. After the summer break, the 
senior stewards asked management if Maurice Bdelman MP could be 
allowed to meet the JSSC during company time to:
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"discuss the deplorable state of the (machine tool) industry 
and try to develop some political pressure."xxa 
Lastly, two Months later, Richard Hoss, the Group Personnel 
Director was asked for financial assistance to send all shop 
stewards in the Group, sone 120 workers, on the TUC's National 
Lobby on Uneaployaent on 24 November.
Dick Scroop, the DATA representative quoted above, linked his 
former colleagues' opposition to compulsory redundancies to "that 
concept of class solidarity". However, the minutes indicate that, 
at this extra-factory level, political opposition was not based 
on any class concept. Instead it had much closer associations 
with notions of employer paternalism (which Dick himself 
mentioned) and a classless, corporate society. This is why I find 
it significant that the stewards invited management to attend the 
parliamentary lobby against unemployment (though the minutes 
indicate that the stewards excluded some from their kind of 
corporatism: when the stewards said an MP wanted to address the 
JSSC and the managers suggested a tripartite meeting with the 
senior executives, including Raine, the offer was rejected). 
Corporatist or not, Doughty's efforts to politicise the "machine 
tool situation" failed to spur any kind of state intervention. It 
was not an occasion when Tory government ministers were prepared 
to consider rescuing "lame ducks", such as Herbert's, from the 
vicissitudes of the world market.“ *
The failure of this last desperate bid probably deepened the
sense of hopelessness among some of the shop stewards. If so, Jim
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Rollaston, the JSSC's secretary during this period, must surely 
have been among them. During those final months of 1971, his 
minutes were full of omissions and comparatively terse. His very 
last entry for that year was pencilled in and decorated with 
d o o d l e s.Shortly afterwards, he refused to stand for 
re-election at the AGM and did not resume the secretary's post 
until Harch 1973. It may be a coincidence that the minutes for 
that same period, December 1971 to Harch 1973, are unavailable; 
but, compared to those first, heady days of the productivity 
scheme, it was a ‘dark age' for Bdgwick's JSSC.
Conclusions
Reconstructing events largely through the use of the stewards' 
records, this chapter has detailed how, within the span of four 
years - 1968 to 1972 - management attempted a major challenge 
'from above' to the character of workplace politics at Edgwick in 
an abortive effort to raise productivity and gain more direct 
control over production. That 'challenge' brought about some 
important changes, in particular, the end of the gang system and 
the replacement of the 'hard gaffers' approach to labour 
management with a highly formalised collective bargaining system 
that was dismissed by some critics (among the 'old' managers) as
"fraternisation" with the unions. Paradoxically, the limitations 
of that challenge were demonstrated in the difficulties 
encountered by the senior stewards.
In detailing the stewards' response to these reforms, this 
chapter has shown that they were broadly welcomed, even though 
they encouraged, initially, an unprecedented level of sectional 
activity which tested the leadership's authority. The 
inauguration of a new company-based corporatism, modelled on the 
Fairfields' "experiment", was quickly followed by a doubling in 
the number of section stewards on the shopfloor. The senior 
stewards' enthusiasm for PPS persisted even when the scheme 
failed to prevent a relative decline in pay - let alone raise it 
to the district average - both because they enjoyed their new 
roles within what had suddenly become a highly centralised and 
formalised collective bargaining system and because they were 
conscious of the continued fraility of their organisation. That 
fraility was cruelly demonstrated when corporate management 
announced a major programme of redundancies. The stewards' 
inability to organise any serious opposition to the cuts, and the 
subsequent rebuttal of appeals for state aid, was quickly 
followed by a collapse of morale and the gradual eclipse of the 
organisation as a political force on the shopfloor. The absence 
of any minutes for the period from December 1971 to March 1973 
was, in itself, a silent testimony to the profundity of the 
stewards' crisis.
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It is also at this point that this work concludes its detailed 
narrative of workplace politics at Bdgwick. The next chapter will 
only attempt a brief, selective account of events that linked the 
aftermath of the redundancy crisis with the plant's closure in 
1983. This is not because events during that final decade were 
insignificant - that cannot be said of episodes such the 
"participation period" during the mid-1970s - but because they 
add little to the main argument that has been developed here and 
in the earlier chapters.
/
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CHAPTER NINE: A DECADE OF CRISES
Introduction
This chapter provides a selective narrative that attempts to link 
the events surrounding the demise of the productivity scheme with 
Herbert's last days as the subsidiary of a small re-conditioning 
firm. Its aim is to do no more than highlight some of the 
continuities and changes in workplace politics during that final 
decade. In doing so, it will touch on a number of themes: the 
continued weak but centralised character of the shop stewards' 
organisation; the Impact of state intervention on shopfloor 
morale; and the strength of a factory-based corporatism in the 
stewards' politics.
Coming Out of Despair
Rollaston did not resume office, as secretary, until 1973. His 
entries from March 1973 confirm that Herbert's difficulties were 
only eased by a temporary recovery in the market, and that by the 
end of that year, the corporate malaise had returned in full 
measure. Unlike in previous years, however, the renewal of 
Herbert's managerial crisis was not reflected in the general mood 
among the shop stewards or, more precisely, among the senior 
stewards. On the contrary, Rollaston's minutes suggest that.
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particularly during 1974, they grew In confidence as the 
company's demise seemed more certain. The explanation to this 
paradox is that In the months leading up to Herbert's bankruptcy, 
the senior stewards had firm hopes of a government 'rescue'. By 
Hay 1974, the state-funded Plnance Corporation for Industry had 
already loaned Herbert's £6m which suggested the government had 
some stake in the company's survival. In June the senior stewards 
felt further encouraged after they had lobbied the new Secretary 
of State at the Department of Industry, Anthony Wedgwood Benn. He 
had responded to their appeal for more money by asking them how 
they would spend the additional state aid to restore the company. 
Benn made it plear that funds would be provided if the managers 
approached him for assistance, and that when that happened he 
would insist on the stewards' involvement in determining 
Herbert's survival.1
In the event, the managers did approach the Minister for more 
funds and, as promised, Benn responded by offering aid on 
condition that the company 'opened its books' and involved its 
employees in the formulation of "a new corporate plan". Raine 
appeared enthusiastic at the prospect of Herbert's becoming, as 
one business journalist put it, "the test bed for Mr.Benn'a pet 
theories on democracy and worker participation". He assured a 
gathering of government officials, trade unionists and managers 
that "there will be no holds barred with disclosure" and 
described the proposals as "one hell of a social experiment".*
Mr Benn's •Experiment in Industrial Democracy'
During what became known as the 'participation period', the 
managers did talk candidly about the policies and practices that 
had helped to bring Herbert's to the brink of bankruptcy. During 
the next six months, they provided more than enough evidence to 
confirm the stevrrds' long-standing belief that the crisis was 
due primarily to managerial incompetence. But the process of 
"worker participation" was given much less substance. Though each 
site had a joint committee of managers and workers' 
representatives (all of whom were shop and staff stewards) which 
reported up to a "group committee” (that included a senior 
official from the DI), "worker participation" was severely 
limited in two ways. Pirst, all but one representative, a TASS 
member, agreed to restrict the flow of information from the 
committees to the membership because of an ascribed commercial 
'sensitivity' of much of the data.9 Second, only workers in one 
union, TASS again, tried to formulate their own plans for the 
company's survival;” the others seemed content to limit their 
"participation" to criticising the plans devised by others: the 
managers and government's auditors. I
I would argue that, from the stewards' perspective, these were 
critical weaknesses which reinforced established features of 
their plant organisation. Since the "corporate plan" which 
finally emerged was largely devised over the heads of the vast
majority of the membership, they were unlikely to feel any sense 
of ownership towards it and be prepared to make great sacrifices 
to defend the "plan" if, or when, necessary. On the contrary, 
their very passivity almost guaranteed that they would react to 
any such threats with a hopeless fatalism. Those threats quickly 
materialised.
In Hay 1975, the same month when the "corporate plan" was 
presented to the DI, the Department appointed John Buckly as 
non-executive Chairman of the Board. The decision was interpreted 
as a move to "re-assure those in industry worried about Mr.Benn's 
intentions for those companies which have to seek government 
support.".3 Buckly, it was noted, had gained his reputation from 
the re-organisation of the Davy Ashmore group.* In August, Benn 
was transferred to the Department of Energy and his successor, 
Eric Varley, acted quickly. On 8 August, Raine was obliged to 
make a "surprise resignation"T and Walter Lees was appointed the 
following day. The background of this new appointee would also 
have re-assured 'worried' industrialists. Formerly MD of Tube 
Investment's Machine Tool Division, Lees was the chief architect 
of the rationalisation of the Division's Charles Churchill 
companies, a programme of redundancies that encountered spirited 
opposition from some unions." In an interview with "Sunday Times" 
journalists published two days after his appointment, Herbert's 
new Chief Executive signalled his intention to scrap the 
"corporate plan": "when he talks about (cutting) overheads", the 
article reported, "he means the wages bill. The labour force (for
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the Group) is down to 6,750...(but he) still needs to cut by 
approximately 1,500.""
When, in October, Lees began to implement his plans by announcing 
550 compulsory redundancies at Edgwick (and the imminence of 700 
more cuts at the Red Lane plant), the shop stewards responded 
with a call for strike action.10 That week, the front page of 
Socialist Worker carried the story of the workers' "no 
redundancies" pledge; but, before that edition was out, the 
senior stewards had accepted a programme of voluntary 
redundancies and called off the strike.11 Predictably, they then 
approached Varley for help.12 Unfortunately, his response was 
also predictable. Varley made it clear that he had no intention 
of "interfering" with the ‘day-to-day' management of the company 
even though it was on the eve of becoming the state-owned 
National Enterprise Board's first subsidiary.12
This cycle of events was repeated in 1976, 1977 and 1978. Each 
time, management presented the redundancies as part of a 
desperate remedy. Each time, the senior stewards protested 
against the cuts and sought the intervention of MPs, government 
officials and the NEB Chairman. Bach time, they were rebuffed 
with the argument that management must be allowed to manage, and 
each time the crisis was resolved by the discovery of a 
sufficient number of volunteers. Though the rationale for the 
cuts changed during those years - first, it was a question of 
reducing "overheads"; later, it was also as a consequence of
Herbert's necessary move into capital-intensive products*4 - the 
experience of the redundancies was no different and nor was the 
response of the workplace organisation. The section stewards 
became increasingly fatalistic while the convenor put more and 
more energy into an extra-plant organisation that was involved in 
a national lobby for import controls - the Coventry Machine Tool 
Committee.
In 1979, overseen by a hostile Conservative Government, the NEB 
decided to cease funding its "remaining unsolved problem 
company".1" At that time Herbert's was about to launch a new 
range of CNC lathe; but, on the basis of its own consultants' 
assessment of prospects in the high technology turning machine 
market, it was decided that additional funds would not be 
provided to see through the re-organisation.1*
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Catch-22: The Difficulties of Resistance in a ‘Problem Company'
Prom the moment the new Conservative Government took office in 
February 1979 the senior stewards knew the NEB was likely to 
abandon Herbert's. Ten months later this dismal prophecy was 
fulfilled when the company's main board announced details of a 
rationalisation programme which was made, as the Financial Times 
put it, "in the knowledge that the National Enterprise Board will 
not provide any more money."17
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News of the redundancies came at a crucial time in the annual pay 
talks at Edgvick. The pay date was less than a month away; but in
November the managers had made it clear that, because of
"cash-flow" problems, they wanted a pay freeze until April 1980
followed by a 5% rise for the remainder of the year. The senior
stewards considered some form of industrial action to press their 
claim for 20%; but as they expected another round of redundancies 
in the New Year - as a result of changes in machine tool design 
and market competition, as well as cash-flow difficulties - they 
felt trapped in a 'catch-22' situation: if they continued 
negotiations until the spring they would lose the membership's 
support for any kind of industrial action; but if they rejected 
the offer and imposed sanctions, management would be provided 
with a ready-made excuse for more redundancies. Ironically, news 
of the NEB's decision resolved their dilemma. Vith the company 
rapidly approaching bankruptcy for the second time in five years
- this time without a government prepared to make a ‘rescue bid'
- there was no hope of forcing a quick settlement through 
Industrial action. (Indeed, at least one senior steward held the 
opinion that the membership should "accept some of the burden" of 
management's difficulties.) So they decided to "go into 
procedure".xm
As a veteran of Herbert's recurring crises, Ron Doughty seemed to 
take this new threat in his stride. He anticipated management's 
next move - the quick sale of the company's more profitable
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subsidiaries - and soon began exploring the potential for 
parliamentary lobbies. As a collective, however, the EC was 
bereft of ideas. As one of them put it: "We've got nothing to do 
but wait." The news of the NEB's decision seemed to create a 
sense of shock among the section stewards to judge from their 
silence when the convenor reported back on the initial meeting 
with senior management.19
While the news undoubtedly created a sense of shock, it also 
seemed to heal the divisions among the membership over the senior 
stewards' handling of the Confed dispute during the previous 
summer. For months after the event a large section of the 
membership had felt aggrieved about being 'instructed' by their 
senior stewards to strike in support of the Confed's claim for a 
shorter working week. There was interminable speculation over 
likely resignations from the JSSC and the election of 'rebel' 
candidates, and even the convenor became anxious as his section 
delayed making their nominations until the very eve of the AGH. 
But when I returned to Edgwick at the beginning of January, I 
learnt that all but one of the stewards had been re-elected and, 
later, at the AGH itself, I witnessed the unopposed re-election 
of all the committee's officers and delegates.
Before the Personnel Director cut off my fieldwork I was able to 
attend one more EC meeting at the end of January. By that time it 
seemed that the senior stewards, particularly the convenor, 
appeared to be preparing for the redundancy talks by marshalling
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information to support three arguments: as a profit centre 
Edgwick was being ‘milked' by corporate management; it was 
suffering the additional burden of a production management that 
was thoroughly incompetent; and scarce funds were being mis-spent 
on ‘luxury' items (such as the notorious curtains for the LED 
block).
Resistance from an unexpected quarter
On 29 January, management announced plans to sell off the 
profitable parts of the Group to maintain a reduced workforce at 
Edgwick. This was quickly followed by the announcement of 
compulsory redundancies for both staff and shopfloor workers at 
the plant. In reply, the stewards demanded higher severance pay 
and voluntary redundancies. A few weeks later, management 
followed through its plan by selecting what was probably 
considered one of the weakest areas of union organisation, the 
catalogue store, to issue the first notices. The response must 
have caused as much surprise as the packers' strike nearly twenty 
years before. Vhen management tried to sack three workers, two 
eventually agreed to quit, but the third resisted and a 
combination of sabotage and more orthodox threats to ‘black' the 
catalogues persuaded management to withdraw the notice and 
transfer him to another section.*0
This display of militancy by clerical workers surprised the EC as
much as the managers. Nevertheless they quickly tried to build on 
this partial success by convening a works meeting to secure 
approval Cor plant-wide strike action in the event of further 
attempts by management to implement complusory redundancies. 
Management, in turn, responded quickly to this development by 
issueing on the eve of the works meeting, the names of those 
selected for redundancy. As anticipated, this tactic effectively 
split the membership and caused the majority to vote against 
strike action. Vhen, a few weeks later, the senior stewards tried 
to reverse the decision at another works meeting, the no-strike 
vote actually increased.
Despite these set-backs, resistance continued at a sectional 
level.*x On 1 May the foundry workers went on strike for higher 
severance pay - and then returned to work when a district 
official negotiated a £500 supplement to the statutory minimum 
payment.** Next day, staff walked out when two clerks were given 
one hour's notice of redundancy. A series of walk-outs continued 
for a week until two workers decided to volunteer for redundancy 
and management withdrew compulsory notices on three others. After 
this confrontation, management abandoned its tough stance and 
sought redundancies on a voluntary basis over the next two 
months.**
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End of an 'empire'
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By June, Edgwick and a spares section at Vilsons Lane were the 
sole renaining industrial sites of the Herbert 'empire'. The 
Tooling Division had been sold to Clarksons International; 
Numerical Control had gone to GBC; and Instruments purchased by a 
management consortium. The Machine Tools Division had all but 
disappeared in a series of purchases: the Lutterworth plant was 
acquired by DeVlieg; Mackadown Lane sold to Vhite Consolidated; 
and Red Lane to Tooling Investments, a small. Midland-based firm. 
Efforts to sell Bdgwick, however, repeatedly failed.
Consequently, on 2 July, management announced the plant's closure 
and gave 90 days notice to the 1000 workers remaining at the 
site.
Ron readily admitted he had no idea how to win the struggle 
against closure; but he was more than willing to try. Indeed, his 
enthusiasm contrasted strongly with the passive, depressed mood 
of the EC. Soon after the news of the closure was released he 
spoke on local radio and publicly invited Sir Keith Joseph, the 
new Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, to visit Bdgwick 
and see for himself the "world beaters" that were produced there. 
Subsequently, he approached the ITN with the idea of making a 30 
minute film on Herbert's; contacted the local MPs to seek their 
aid both in lobbying Government and identifying a potential buyer 
for the site; urged colleagues in the Spares Department to write 
to Herbert's customers, appealing to them to lobby the Government 
on their behalf or help find a buyer;*« and when the Workshop 
suggested he should consider drawing upon support from a wide
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range of organisations, including Coventry City Council, he 
immedlately telephoned the Leader of the Labour Group, Councillor 
Waugh and asked to meet the Mayor. Ron also used his local union 
branch to send a resolution to the AUEW Executive appealing to 
dockers to ban all machine tool imports for one week as a way of 
highlighting the industry's plight as well as Herbert's 
particular difficulties.*■
Some of these tactics, particularly the appeal to the dockers, 
suggest that it would be insufficient to describe the politics of 
Ron's campaign as pragmatic. There was, of course, a large 
element of pragmatism in his choice of options. Even if he had 
ranted to emulate the 'work-in' by shipyard workers at UCS, for 
example, or any other form of action that involved the broad 
participation of the membership, he could not ignore his own 
experience of workplace unionism at Herbert's or avoid a 
dispassionate assessment of the current situation at Edgwick: the 
low morale and near passivity of his senior stewards; his 
dependence on young stewards, mainly among staff workers, to 
carry through his ideas; the fatalism of many members who had 
experienced redundancy and re-employment at Herbert's twice or 
even three times in a decade;*■ and, last but certainly not 
least, the sectionalism of a membership which had already blocked 
several attempts to co-ordinate a factory-wide resistance to 
redundancies. But Ron's politics were not simply a pragmatic 
accomodation to a terrain hostile to more radical forms of 
resistance. From a very early stage in the crisis he seemed to
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put aside his criticisms of 'managerial incompetence' and, 
instead, focused his anger on imports. I recall one conversation 
in which he talked of imports as the main threat to jobs 
throughout the manufacturing sector in British industry. He 
clearly believed import controls were desperately needed: "If you 
get mugged in a dark alley, you don't turn the other cheek.", he 
said. As will be seen, the demand for import controls was to 
feature prominently in the Herbert workers' first and last 
political demonstration.
A trade union enquiry
On 14 July, the Workshop was given the opportunity to put forward 
its own proposals to the BC on how to respond to the imminent 
closure of the site. A ’trade union enguiry' was advocated which, 
though more radical than anything the stewards had tried thus 
far, could also claim to be pragmatic in the sense that it, too, 
assumed the passivity of the vast majority of the membership at 
Edgwick. In essence, the proposal was to ask the City Council's 
Economic Unit to carry out a social audit of the costs of closure 
and draw upon resources at TURU, Ruskin College, to enquire into 
the background to Herbert's latest crisis and formulate an 
alternative plan for the site. Similar to our involvement in the 
preparations for the CHTC's national conference, we were offering 
the stewards a campaign by proxy. All the stewards had to do was 
grant us permission to set it up, and yet, for reasons we did not
understand at the time, they were not enthusiastic (though before 
making a final decision, they asked the Workshop to contact 
sympathetic academics and find out exactly what help they could 
provide). Two days later, the situation became clearer when Ron 
telephoned to tell the Workshop he had decided to convene a 
meeting between the EC, the senior staff stewards and members of 
plant management to explore the possibility of forming a 'common 
front' to extract certain financial data from corporate 
management. The purpose of this information was unclear as Ron 
stated, on more than one occasion, that the latter body had put a 
viable plan to the NEB and, besides, he would not know where to 
start even if he had wanted to develop alternative proposals.
During the remainder of July, the Workshop continued to press Ron 
for a public enquiry. (This time it was suggested that it could 
be organised under the auspices of the City Council or Regional 
TUC.) Yet, it was obvious that Ron's chief hopes were that either 
a buyer would be found or the NEB persuaded to accept 
management's own scheme, even though the latest and "more 
restricted" proposals for Bdgwick's survival entailed the loss of 
800 jobs. It is in this context that Herbert's 'funeral 
procession' has to be considered.
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Ritual and politics
On 6 August one hundred workers marched in procession behind
Herbert's *co££in' from Hyde Park to the Department of Trade and 
Industry. Though it was a silent 'cortege', the posters and 
banners they carried protested at Bdgwick's imminent closure.
Some blamed Thatcher; most simply complained about "loyal" and 
■veteran" employees being suddenly "cast on the scrap heap”; but 
the banner that dominated the march portrayed a huge, grinning, 
yellow face looming over a gate below which the legend read:"Keep 
Him Out; Keep Herbert In".*7 At the Department Sir Keith was 
'unavailable', so an official received both the 'coffin' and the 
stewards' petition. This requested an extension of the notices to 
allow time for the company to find a buyer and for the workers to 
put forward their own proposals, seeking, as the petition put it, 
"to utilise the intelligence of the shopfloor"; and an increase 
in severance pay above the statutory minimum.** Though these 
demands' were modest, there was just the suggestion (or threat?) 
of a class-based 'campaign' to defend jobs if a buyer counld not 
be found.
The demonstration also conveyed more than one message. For its 
organisers, its main purpose was to support the parliamentary 
lobby by protesting, in a thoroughly responsible manner, workers' 
just grievancies at their undeserved fate. That is why the number 
of demonstrators was restricted, and offers of deputations from 
other local factories politely refused. This message of 
supplication was reinforced by those posters which testified to 
the "loyal service" of Herbert's "veteran" workers. However, the 
event had another message about the conflict between capital and
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labour. There was, afterall, something Irreverent, something 
mildly shocking about using the ritual of a funeral procession to 
stage a political demonstration. That is why the plant managers 
were instructed to find and snatch the 'coffin' before the day of 
the demonstration. For the workers who kept it safely hidden 
until that moment, class conflict was played out in a ritual into 
a game of 'hide and seek'. This message of protest and 
under-class rebellion was underlined by the smaller number of 
anti-Thatcher posters. There was also a third message which, in 
itself, was politically ambiguous: the demand for import 
controls. Simultaneously, it spoke of the stewards' attempts to 
find common cause with their employers and of their opposition to 
the corporate strategies once promoted by the TUC and Labour 
ministers. These contradictions may have suggested a potential 
for more radical politics;** but it was difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that this would not be realised in that particular 
struggle.
After the demonstration, the Workshop did not contact Ron again 
until mid-August when we learnt he had asked a benefits advice 
centre if they could calculate the total cost of social security 
payments if Bdgwick closed. As this coincided with news that the 
City Council was organising a seminar on unemployment, we felt it 
was an opportune time to raise, once more, the idea of asking the 
City Council to carry out a social audit. Before contacting Ron, 
we approached two Labour councillors who agreed to put as a 
formal motion at the seminar the request that the Council,
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through its Economic Unit, assess the full cost of Edgwick's 
closure. When we discussed these developments with Ron, he agreed 
to put the same request to the Council Leader. Two days later one 
of the councillors reported back. The proposal received no 
support at the 'seminar'; and when he mentioned the idea to the 
Council Leader, he had replied: "Good ideal Get the Workshop to 
do it."
This response provided yet another illustration of the 'Labourist 
fracture' discussed in chapter 5. The Labour Party had dominated 
Council politics for more than 20 years since the War; but the 
majority of Labour councillors saw no direct link between their 
work and the politics of the local engineering factories even 
though some of them had been, or were still, engineering workers. 
The reasons for this 'fracture' cannot be fully explored here. 
However, I would suggest that the Council Leader's dusty answer 
can be linked to the observation that the "dominant values within 
the local authority often seem to have been those of professional 
excellence rather than political choice. The (Coventry) City 
Council has in effect declared the end of ideology and developed 
instead a set of managerial values.".30 If the councillors held 
this classless, technocratic view of civic politics, then it 
follows that they would wanted to ensure the Council avoided 
participation in any situation, such as the crisis at Herbert's, 
where confrontation on a class basis could develop. Prom my own 
observations, it seems that the convenors shared the same view of 
municipal and class politics. For example, when they decided to
launch the Workshop's report at the Mayor's Parlour, drafting the 
Mayor's speech posed sone difficulties. They agreed that he could
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not attack imports (since this contradicted the report's main 
findings) or refer to the Workshop's analysis of the crisis (as 
this identified employers as the 'villains of the piece'). 
Eventually, they decided that it would be better if he simply 
praised the CMTC for their efforts to save local jobs - without 
being too specific about the politics of the campaign. Though Ron 
Doughty was not present at that particular discussion, it is 
likely that he would have concurred with this outcome. It 
accorded with his most strongly held views about the campaign. 
Similarly, while Ron did not talk about his conversations with 
the Council's Labour Leader, I am sure he appreciated the 
councillor's reluctance to get involved, for they shared broadly 
similar views on the politics of local government. If my 
assumptions are correct then lobbying the City Council to 
actively support a class-based campaign to defend local jobs 
would have been ruled out, dismissed as ‘impractical', in Ron's 
mind. It would also have been one more reason why he felt 
justified in clinging to the manager's 'rescue' plan (while 
hoping for the sudden appearance of a buyer). The outcome of the 
local authority seminar proved to be the final setback for the 
Workshop. By then it was late August and we felt that even if 
there was potential for a more radical kind of resistance, it was 
too late for it to succeed. Prom this point the Workshop turned 
its attention to the preparations for a national delegate 
conference of shop stewards in the machine tool industry
(mentioned in chapter one).
The •sit-in*
One reason why we were attracted to the idea of a trade union 
enquiry was that through it we could investigate the suspicion, 
held by the senior staff stewards, that the plant managers 
intended to purchase all production rights on Bdgwick's latest 
range of CNC lathes, the AL-76, and then transfer production to 
another, smaller site. This fitted in with the widely-held view 
that the fixed costs at Edgwick made unviable any plans for the 
annual production of 500 machines. The surplus production of 
components for the Husky and AL machines and the decision, as 
recently as July, to contract out work on the fitters' drawings 
for those machines were interpreted as indirect evidence in 
support of this theory.*1 Initially, the EC gave it no credence; 
but as the closure date approached they re-considered matters.
Towards the end of August, a prospective buyer finally emerged: 
Tooling Investments, a small, private company that had already 
purchased the Red Lane site. As the total capital of this firm 
(including its new acquisition of the re-conditioning shops at 
Red Lane) were worth rather less than the assets held at Bdgwlck, 
the news only strengthened speculation that the plant would be 
shut down. To put pressure on management over the demand for 
higher severance pay, both shopfloor and office organisations
felt they had no option but impose a 'blockade' by boycotting all 
work that involved the novement of parts or machinery out of 
Bdgvick. When, on 3 September (Day 63 of the 90-day notice) 
management suspended two staff workers without pay for observing 
the 'blockade', the stewards again felt impelled to take the next 
step - a sit-in.
The sit-in was not an occupation. Workers' wives or husbands did 
not approach the factory gates with sandwiches and thermos 
flasks. Instead, employees clocked in and clocked out and, in 
between, tried to find ways to kill time. Afterwards, some 
workers could recall moments of high drama when, for example, one 
staff worker decided to resume work and tried, unsuccessfully, to 
use the threat of physical violence to snatch some records for 
the managers.** There were also humourous incidents, such as the 
occasion when a 'loyal' worker watered plant containers which the 
'rebels' were using to conceal company documents.** Yet, for all 
the workers most of the time, the sit-in was a boring and 
depressing experience. A sense of defeatism took hold when 
management announced the new employer would only provide 500 jobs 
at Bdgwick, for it seemed the aim of the sit-in was merely to 
raise severance pay for half of the current workforce. 
Predictably, the local press added to the agony by telling its 
readership that the stewards were jeopardising 500 jobs 'saved' 
by the new employer.*4
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Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the 'sit-in'
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quickly crumbled. A few days after one clerical worker tried to 
resume work at Wilsons Lane, several clerks at Edgwick succeeded 
in breaking 'sanctions'. Soon, they were followed by members in 
TASS and ASTMS. Nearly two weeks after the start of the sit-in, 
the stewards were forced to negotiate some kind of settlement. 
They managed to secure payment for the duration of the action and 
the 'promise' that 500 jobs would remain at Edgwick.
When they had concluded the deal with the 'old' employer, the 
stewards knew that, with very few exceptions, their names would 
be on the "roll of honour", as one worker called it. One senior 
steward avoided redundancy by quitting the union. A senior staff 
steward was advised to quit the union if he wanted a job; but, as 
the managers could not find a replacement prepared to work on his 
salary, they withdrew the threat.»" The twist in the tail of this 
particular story was that, during the final days of the 90-day 
notice, the new employers transferred their 200 workers from the 
Red Lane site to Edgwick. This meant only 300 jobs were 'saved' 
at Edgwick and not 500 as promised.
New Herbert's: a Parody of the Old
After the 'sit-in' a few section stewards remained at Edgwick. 
Instead of merging with the shopfloor organisation brought to the 
plant by the Red Lane workers, they retained their own funds and
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elected among themselves a new convenor. Thus a plant of 500 
workers had the doubtful privilege of supporting two shopfloor 
organisations (one for new- and another for re-build). This could 
have been a serious error in other circumstances; but in the 
aftermath of the 'sit-in' it was of very little consequence. The 
most integrated organisation would probably have had little 
effect on the subsequent course of events.
At first, there was a general feeling of relief, that at last the 
company was in the hands of machine tool men and not a bunch of 
"outsiders" who were managing it on behalf of a state-run holding 
company. For a while, the new employers were even able to appeal 
to the "Herbert Spirit" by re-enacting the role of 
employer-paternalists. Soon after the takeover they granted a pay 
rise and at Christmas treated the workers and their families to a 
dinner-dance at the NBC. The stewards were told that there was 
really no need for a union as the firm had the workers' best 
interests at heart and would always give them the best deal.*" 
However, these tokens of paternalism were not matched by the 
traditional hostility towards the unions. On the contrary, the 
new convenor (for *new-build') was surprised to find a 
"co-operative management".*T These gestures - combined with the 
wide recognition of the precarious state of the re-launched 
company - encouraged people to suspend some controls over such 
areas as: flexibility, recruitment of temporary workers, and
overtime.
Page 491
Within a year, the iaood had changed. The flurry of activity to 
re-organise work - once regarded as a sign of the purposefulness 
of the new employers - was now re-Interpreted as the familiar 
antics of a crisis-ridden management. The theme of 'managerial 
incompetence' returned to stewards' accounts of work.** Workplace 
politics soured as the employers' unpredictability and 
allegations of crooked dealings** made collective bargaining 
increasingly fraught and formerly compliant workers became "lazy 
bastards".40 During the second year, the stewards increasingly 
felt they were living on borrowed time as they witnessed the 
rapid transformation of Herbert's new managers from 
self-appointed ‘saviours' to asset-strippers.41 Twelve months 
later Tooling Investments brought Bdgwlck to its third, and 
ultimate, collapse.4*
Conclusions
Through a selective account of events, this chapter has brought 
the narrative of the Bdgwick case study to its conclusion and, in 
doing so, pointed to the continuing limits of workplace 
organisation there. It also demonstrated how those limitations 
created a difficult terrain for the stewards and encouraged the 
leadership to keep within the established political horizons, 
though this effectively ruled out the possibility of organising 
any serious opposition to the steady attrition of jobs and the 
plant's eventual closure. The next chapter develops this argument
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by considering the corporatist politics of the CMTC combine - a 
combine largely initiated, and organised by, Ron Doughty - and 
the reasons behind the Workshop's failure to persuade the 
convenors to adopt a socialist response to jobs crisis.
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CHAPTER TEN: THE PINAL IRONY
Introduction
This chapter moves beyond the strict confines of the case study 
to situate Bdgwlck In the project of the CMTC combine. It looks 
at the senior stewards’ attempts at the three local plants - 
Herbert's, Hickman's and Webster t Bennett - to defend jobs 
through a campaign for Import controls In order to (a) elaborate 
on the theme of corporatism In the stewards' politics and 
Ideology and (b) consider some of the critical weaknesses In the 
Workshop's approach to shopfloor unionism. In terms of the 
narrative of this work, this means returning to that point where 
the Workshop was slBHiltaneously Involved In promoting a 'trade 
union enquiry' Into the threatened closure of Bdgwick and 
pressing the CHTC to organise a national conference of shop 
stewards In the machine tool industry. However, the story of the 
immediate outcome of that conference and the combine's eventual 
demise are detailed in Appendix 1 which also provides summary 
background notes on the shopfloor organisations at Hickman's and 
at Webster 6 Bennett. This chapter assumes that narrative to 
address two questions raised In the Introductory chapter. Why did 
the Workshop fall to engage the convenors in a genuine dialogue? 
And why did they persist with a campaign for import controls long 
after they had apparently accepted the Workshop had, as Ron 
Doughty put It, "reversed cause and effect” by showing the rise
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in imports to be the product o£ earlier redundancies.
The Pinal Irony
Before tackling these questions it is necessary to consider the 
political significance of the demand for import controls. The far 
left's critique of this demand asserted that: (a) it was 
'corporatist' because it assumed, and tried to build on, a common 
identity of interests between labour, capital and the state; (b) 
in so doing, it set workers of one nation against those of 
another and strengthened racist ideas in the working class; and 
finally, (c) as a politically mis-concelved strategy - 
capitalists and the state were intent on pursuing other 
strategies - it dis-armed workers in the face of the employers' 
real offensive.x The Workshop's perspective on the campaign 
demand was broadly similar but they noted two features that 
suggested the potential for a dialogue with the convenors, 
namely: (a) that the CHTC was an independent working class 
organisation (unlike some anti-import campaigns of the past, such 
as the textile industry's and the national media's 'Buy British' 
campaign); and (b) that the demand was politically ambiguous: 
from one perspective, it was implicitly corporatist; from another 
it also spoke of the conflict of classes. Import controls could 
be Interpreted as an emphatic rejection of the national 
corporatism of the "industrial strategy", promoted jointly by the 
TUC and the Labour Government, in which stewards were asked to
work alongside employers and the state to make the industry more 
'efficient', more 'competitive', by smoothing the way for changes 
in working practices and massive job losses.3 In contrast, the 
demand for import controls suggested the shopfloor could be left 
untouched and the industry's crisis tackled exclusively at the 
level of trading relations between firms.
As if reflecting this political ambiguity, the Workshop found 
that the campaign was a 'broad church' which provided room for 
stewards who Identified very closely with management (as in Alex 
Boyd's case) as well as those who held a class-conflict model of 
industry and were either critical (as in Ron Doughty's case) or 
suspicious (in Bert Kingham's) of management's actions. Not 
surprisingly, the dominant presence of the latter group of 
stewards encouraged the Workshop's hope that the campaign would 
eventually adopt explicitly socialist objectives. The Workshop 
was also encouraged when it found its analysis of the industry's 
job crisis was broadly acceptable to most members of the campaign 
committee. Indeed, a few stewards seemed to positively endorse 
our argument that the rise in imports was chiefly the product of 
a protracted process of rationalisation and dls-investment by the 
major employers. Why, then, did those same workers continue to 
lobby for import controls and ignore our socialist prescriptions? 
I would suggest that the most plausible explanation is that the 
stewards calculated that, while our class analysis resonated with 
their orientation towards shopfloor politics, the demand for 
selective import controls remained the most pragmatic strategy.
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Corporatism: a pragmatic accomodation?
The spark for the campaign itself, the decision of senior 
stewards and convenors at several plants in the city to combine 
for the purpose of lobbying government, was implicitly based on a 
political judgement which said that it was patently 
'impracticable' for even the most highly organised workforce to 
effectively resist a management that was determined to push 
through massive redundancies. At Bdgwick and Banner Lane - plants 
where the shopfloor organisations had already been weakened by 
the effects of economic recession - the senior stewards had 
learnt to accomodate themselves to certain 'facts of life*, 
namely: strike action was usually ineffectual in situations where 
workloads were very low (on the contrary, a stoppage could assist 
management); and that for reasons discussed earlier the dominant 
sections of the membership were, at best, ambivalent about 
resisting redundancies (in most cases, the threat to withdraw 
offers of severance pay was enough to bring recalcitrant stewards 
into line). In a situation where the stewards were unable to help 
themselves, the campaign could be seen as a plea for some kind of 
state 'rescue'.
Though the stewards never said so at the time, some may have 
differed with the Workshop's rather one-sided characterisation of 
state intervention in which successive governments were portrayed
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as the agents oC the industry's rationalisation and 
re-organisation. They may have considered it possible that, 
despite the validity of our observations (as far as they «rent), 
the Labour Government would ‘rescue' jobs if it was persuaded 
that the political costs of inaction were too high. After all, 
the loans to Herbert's and then its ‘nationalisation' under the 
NEB provided several of the key stewards in the campaign with 
first-hand experience of precisely that eventuality. Perhaps the 
calculation behind the anti-import campaign was that there was 
just a slight chance that it could work because it combined an 
appeal to British manufacturers' self-interest with the threat to 
government that further, massive redundancies in the Midlands 
could entail some political costs.
I would not suggest that all three convenors and their senior 
stewards had this pragmatic approach to politics, or even that 
any of the key actors were thoroughly pragmatic. The findings of 
the Herbert case study support those writings which stress the 
inconsistencies and contradictions of people's beliefs and 
attitudes.’ However, such pragmatism does at least offer a 
rational explanation for the apparent contradiction between the 
stewards' broad acceptance of the Workshop's economic analysis 
and their rejection of our political prescriptions. Por our 
alternative strategy was clearly ‘impractical' both in its 
approach to the state and, more importantly, in its assessment of 
the political potential of the stewards' organisations.
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Earlier I said that the Workshop's characterisation of state 
interventions was one-sided. We drew attention to those many acts 
which suggested government officials were concerned with finding 
ways of making firms more 'efficient', more 'competitive' in 
international markets; yet gave little account of those occasions 
when politicians and civil servants appeared to be prompted by 
concerns to avoid the political costs of a major redundancy. The 
accuracy of our assessment is debatable, but there can be no 
doubt that the strategy we drew from it was 'impractical' in the 
sense that it counselled the futility of negotiating with the 
only people in the state apparatus who had the power to change 
things. However, it was our assessment of the potential of 
workplace organisations that must have posed the greatest 
difficulties for the convenors and senior stewards (whether they 
pragmatically accepted the realities of the capitalist labour 
process or enthusiastically endorsed managerial strategies). Por, 
instead of confirming their assessment of the vulnerability of 
workplace organisations during periods of economic down-turn, the 
Workshop asserted the primacy of factory-based organisation by 
urging the stewards to build working class power from the 
shopfloor and establish a national shop stewards' movement in the 
machine tool industry.
Also, the 'short term' aim of our alternative strategy - "to stop 
further job losses of any kind" - must have struck them as 
incredibly naive or mocked their hard won experience of factory 
politics. Either way it would have seriously damaged our
credibility as would-be political advocates 1C, In other ways, we 
had not already demonstrated our 'innocence'.
With the gift of hindsight, it is easy to see that we 
under-estimated the significance of the sectional character of 
the workplace organisation. Ve did not regard the shop stewards' 
committees at both Banner Lane and Edgwick as products of fragile 
coalitions in which those sections which were dominant were also 
the least likely to support what could be called a *seige 
strategy' to defend jobs. Though we were aware of sectionalism, 
it was seen only as a 'problem', a threat to the stewards' 
organisation, instead of being, as Tony Lane put it, "inevitably 
produced by the nature of their practice; inevitably reproduced 
by the inability of that practice to be other than it was”.4 
This, in turn, led us to some misconceptions about the nature of 
steward leadership at the three plants as we became increasingly 
frustrated by the convenors' continuing delays in calling the 
'national delegate conference' - agreed to in principle months 
before the Workshop had produced its research report to the CHTC.
Our involvement in the campaign gave us much concern about the 
relationship between the leadership and the members. To be more 
precise, we noted signs of oligarchic behaviour in all three 
convenors. Though sometimes accompanied by members of their 
organisation's 'inner cabinet', it was clear that on a wide range 
of issues concerning the campaign (and other matters not directly 
related to pay and conditions at the plant), the convenors were
empowered to take decisions without even consulting their 
colleagues. Sometimes, their comments were equally disturbing.
For example, on one occasion when Bert allowed an outside speaker 
to address his committee on new technology, he later apologised 
Cor the limited debate that followed by saying: "90% of the 
stewards are too thick to understand". While observing all this 
(with some disapproval), we did not acknowledge the pressures of 
trade union activity on the shopfloor that made oligarchs of even 
the most politically conscious of the convenors. For broad, 
political theories counted for little in the daily routine of 
collective bargaining where the convenor learnt to value a stable 
bargaining relationship with management and take a jaundiced view 
of workers' efforts to shift the 'frontier of control'.* 
Pragmatism also taught the convenor how, in the interests of the 
organisation, it was necessary to learn 'the rules and rituals of 
the fix'* such as controlling the flow of information to the 
membership and, by drawing on his specialised skills as a 
negotiator, become adept at the 'put-down' to deal with the 
critic or rebel.y
In our discussions with the convenors we raised this delicate 
issue by pressing them to organise seminars and consider 
producing - with the Workshop's assistance - campaign news-sheets 
for the membership. This must have been regarded as another 
demonstration of the Workshop's industrial naivety. As Alex put 
it on one occasion when I pressed the matter rather too 
insistently: "You've a lot to learn about stewards". They were
never explicit on this question - on most occasions our proposals 
were simply turned aside or 'deferred* - but, given their 
circumstances, I would suggest that if they had offered an 
explanation in essence it would have been the same as that two 
national officials put to Tony Lane: political education is 
needlessly dangerous. 'Needless', because trade unionism is "a 
straightforward routine business" that does not prompt much 
reflection." 'Dangerous', because it raises the spectre of 
"creating a political consciousness amongst the active element of 
their membership who might eventually challenge them and their 
positions.
As a general explanation, these comments are probably sufficient; 
but it should be noted that some convenors regarded political 
education as more 'needless' than did others, and some had cause 
to believe it to be more 'dangerous'. Bert's politics were firmly 
rooted in the pragmatism of trade union activity. In a world that 
was, as VoodcocK put it, "as routine as peeling potatoes",10 
there was little purpose for political education. Por Alex, 
entangled in his senior manager's schemes for a practical 
industrial democracy' and the 'career development' of lay union 
officials, the proposal had much more sinister implications. Ron 
saw a link between his work as a convenor and his ideas on 
socialism, and his leadership was characterised by a more open, 
democratic debate than at the other two plants; but he made no 
efforts to challenge the political 'apathy' of his members.
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Our 'naivety' must also have been evident in our persistent 
advocacy of the national delegate conference. For, unlike the 
convenors, we over-estimated the potential for 'parallel 
unionism' in an industry characterised by small factories and a 
labour force already much depleted by redundancies. This was the 
initial cause for our unwarranted enthusiasm. Later, many 
frustrating months later, we began to see the national conference 
as a means of escaping the limitations of work with the local 
convenors and finding a more radical constituency. In the summer 
of 1980, when the surviving members of the CMTC's executive 
finally yielded to the Vorkshop's persistency and allowed us to 
gauge the level of support for, and organise, a national delegate 
conference on their behalf, we were pleasantly surprised to 
discover shop stewards - in Colchester, Halifax, Sheffield and 
even in the smaller plants in Coventry - who seemed to share our 
politics but they had either been victimised in recent 
redundancies, or were about to suffer that experience, or 
belonged to workplace organisations too weakened and too small to 
send delegates to an 'unofficial' conference during 'company 
time'. We also discovered that the overwhelming majority of 
stewards in the industry (whether politically sympathetic or not) 
shared the same difficulties in organising trade union opposition 
to redundancies. As I mentioned earlier, after contacting 77 of 
the factories owned by the largest firms in the industry, we 
found only nine stewards' organisations prepared to send 
delegates. But perhaps even more importantly, we found the CHTC 
convenors indifferent to this situation. In part, their attitude
Page 507
was based on a fierce jealousy of their campaign's independence 
from union officialdom (which led them to neglect calls for 
support - even at a district level where such aid would have been 
forthcoming). But their refusal to consider holding the 
conference on a weekend suggests that they were also concerned to 
demonstrate a certain autonomy from managerial control. I felt 
there was a kind of chauvinism in the way the convenors brusquely 
dismissed all suggestions aimed at broadening the campaign to 
smaller, weaker workplace organisations: "They're no use to us if 
they can't help themselves.", we were told. In a city with an 
unusual concentration of large engineering factories, this kind 
of big plant chauvinism should not have been unexpected but, for 
workers in the machine tool industry, it was a serious tactical 
error. It meant the CMTC could never be other than a very 
exclusive club for machine tool workers (and become even more 
exclusive as the recession deepened).
This inability to envisage a national movement that was anything 
other than an ad-hoc network of similarly 'autonomous' stewards' 
organisations fits with Beynon's observations on the 
"factory-based" consciousness of stewards in the car industry.11 
The stewards in the CMTC combine could only see the campaign as a 
direct extension of their own experiences of workplace politics. 
Thus, chauvinistic or not, the three convenors really could not 
comprehend how stewards in small, fragile organisations scattered 
across the country could help in their struggle. The idea was too 
ridiculous to consider or, to be precise, it seemed so when the
Workshop propounded it. Somehow, Cor a while, Benn's rhetoric 
gave them pause for thought. Por a few weeks, perhaps, we could 
sense that the hard-nosed pragmatists and 'practical industrial 
democrats' we had been working with for years really believed 
that the campaign could be revived through the call to 'prepare 
for power•. Por some unknown reason, his depiction of a close, 
collaborative alliance between an industrial combine committee, 
union 'officialdom' and the Labour Party looked plausible.
Perhaps it was his eloquence and his authority as an 
ex-government minister that caused the convenors to re-assess 
ideas they had long ago dismissed as 'impractical', the stuff of 
day-dreams and the talk of political activists outside the 
factory. This strange vision had not faded completely by the time 
the "steering committee" met at Sheffield. With a logic that 
violated all sense of pragmatism, the stewards agreed that the 
national combine should include representatives of the 
unemployed. But by then, some four months after Benn's speech, 
this decision was really no more than a sentimental nod to 
socialism since it was apparent that, despite all the talk, there 
would be no national combine of machine tool workers.
Another possible reason why the stewards found Benn's politics 
plausible is that by this time they recognised the bankruptcy of 
their own. It was noticeable that after Thatcher's electoral 
triumph, the convenors appeared to lose heart in their campaign. 
Though it was never discussed - at least, not at meetings where 
the Workshop was present - it is likely that the convenors
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recognised the new Government would not be even slightly 
sympathetic to their politically suspect form of corporatism. The 
'Iron Lady' had made it clear that she would not count the cost 
if her conviction in the freedom of the market resulted in 
thousands of redundancies - most certainly if the only ones 
appealing for selective import controls were a few stewards.
Also, some months before the October conference, the demand 
became doubly irrelevant when Hickman's secured a deal to produce 
Japanese-designed machines. The effect of this agreement was to 
split the combine committee. While Alex still supported the 
demand for import controls - and, indeed, continued a one-man 
'Buy British' campaign long afterwards - Bert and the other 
stewards at Banner Lane formed the opinion that their members' 
jobs depended on the continued flow of imports. At the Sheffield 
conference, when an unemployed worker tried to revive the demand, 
the stewards from TI Churchill voiced their opposition to import 
controls for the very same reason: their members' jobs also could 
be put at risk by such a policy. This dispute over imports was 
another demonstration of the stewards' "factory-based” 
consciousness, a consciousness that made the prospects for a 
national campaign - given the uneven development and diverse 
response of firms to the recession - extremely improbable.
It was perhaps the final irony of the stewards' campaign that 
when the convenors adopted the call for 'workers' control' (a 
moment the Workshop had worked so long and hard for) they used it 
as a pious resolution which both concealed the political
bankruptcy o£ their campaign and gave it a spirited ending. It 
was a resolution that echoed the conclusion to the ‘sit-in' that 
had taken place at Herbert's Bdgvick works just a few months 
earlier. After Fred Blackford, a staff steward and member of the 
draughtsmen's union for over 30 years made the concluding 
address, spontaneously people shook hands and sang a chorus of 
‘Auld Lang Syne'.
Conclusion
Briefly moving beyond the case study, this chapter has elaborated 
on the theme of corporatism in the stewards' politics and 
ideology by linking Herbert's with the CMTC's campaign for import 
controls, a campaign largely initiated and organised by Ron 
Doughty. It has also explored some of the critical weaknesses of 
the Vorkshop's approach to the combine and how they related to an 
over-optimistic appraisal of the radical potential of 
factory-based organisation in Britain's form of ‘parallel 
unionism' . In its review of the main findings of the case study, 
the next chapter compares these arguments with the analyses 
offered in other studies of British shopfloor unionism.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: WORKPLACE POLITICS AT BDGWICK, A REVIEW OP 
FINDINGS
Introduction
Previous chapters outlined the history of the shopfloor 
organisation at one machine tool plant in Coventry from its 
re-emergence in the early 1930s to its collapse fifty years 
later. This concluding chapter will attempt to review the main 
findings and consider their wider relevance to the study of 
workplace politics.
A number of findings emerge from this case study which will be 
listed briefly in the following way. First, the shop stewards had 
to operate on a political terrain shaped by the managers through 
their attitude to workplace organisation and, perhaps more 
fundamentally, through their response to the actions of other, 
competing firms and state interventions. Second, the technical 
and social organisation of work fostered a sectional 
consciousness within the workforce. Third, the shop stewards' 
organisation actively reproduced that sectionalism. Fourth, the 
domestic organisation was fragile and directly dependent on 
favourable conditions in the labour market, on the gains of the 
district organisation and on state interventions. Fifth, except 
for a brief period in the re-crmament period, the shop stewards 
kept a sharp separation between party politic* and trade union
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activity. Sixth, changes in the character oC the steward 
leadership reflected the instability of shopfloor politics. 
Finally, through its transformations, a factory-based fora of 
corporatism remained a powerful ideological force in the politics 
of the workplace organisation. I propose to discuss these themes 
in turn, but under six main headings.
A Management-Created Terrain
Chapter 4 pointed out that Herbert's fierce hostility towards 
workplace organisation was shared by the other major engineering 
employers in Coventry before the Second Vorld War. This hostility 
explains the modesty of the initial gains made by Herbert workers 
when they re-built the workplace organisation during the 
re-armament period. Again, this mirrored the tentative revival of 
trade unionism in Coventry's motor firms at that time.
In chapter 5, the discussion on the limited development of the 
workplace organisation during the war suggested parallels between 
Herbert's and what Tolliday called the "core motor firms”. In 
common with his findings on these companies, it was observed that 
at Herbert's, despite the most favourable circumstances in the 
labour market and the advent of state policies that set out to 
restrain employer hostility to the unions, the stewards very 
modest advances where linked to the relative absence of changes 
in product design and technique at Bdgwick as this restricted the
scope for workers to increase both their bargaining awareness and 
power over work.
Chapter 6 pointed out how an entrenched managerial conservatism 
continued to marginalise the shop stewards' organisation at 
Herbert's long after the war. By the 1960s this feature of 
shopfloor politics made Herbert's appear an industrial 
anachronism; but it was not, it was argued, as idiosyncratic as 
it seemed. Contrary to Tolliday's claim, Herbert's did not 
exercise tight control over work. Instead, as the same chapter 
observed, the distinctive feature of workplace politics at 
Herbert's was that management "delegated" control of production 
to the piecework chargehands, while some of the local motor 
firms, like Rootes and Standard, "abdicated" it to the shop 
stewards. For nearly two decades Herbert's was able to 
successfully exploit the gang payment system to keep Bdgwick 
locked into the politics of the early 1950s, largely because the 
dominant members of management were fiercely determined to 
maintain tight control over labour costs. Occasionally, the 
production directors voiced support for the conventional formula 
of ‘high wages = high productivity'; but their counsel went 
unheeded. Crucial to the success of this policy was the fact that 
most of the senior managers had an overly complacent attitude 
towards compe-ition in the firm's product markets. Hot only did 
this allow them to tolerate the relatively low productivity that 
resulted from the firm's byzantine piecework payment system, it 
also prompted few changes in either technique or product design.
Page 514
This combination of circumstances created the most favourable 
conditions in which shopfloor supervision could (1) consolidate a 
wage-effort bargain that made the majority of the pieceworkers a 
workforce of "satisficers” and (2) keep the stewards' 
organisation confined to the margins of shopfloor politics.
In chapters 7 and 8 it was argued that the appointment of a new 
Chairman, eager to "re-model Herbert's for the seventies", led to 
a radical transformation of workplace politics before the close 
of the 1960s. In his first years of office, the profound 
"somnolence" of the workforce probably encouraged the Chairman to 
're-model' other features of the Herbert empire; but when one of 
those reforms, namely the rush to develop and produce eight 
entirely new machine designs at the plant, exposed shortcomings 
in the rate-fixing department and de-stabilised the wage-effort 
bargain, attention was turned to the shopfloor. Modelled on the 
state-sponsored "experiments” at Fairfields' shipyard, the 
Productivity Payment Scheme turned workplace politics at Edgwick 
on its head. To introduce a measured daywork system that was 
regulated by a computerised production control system, management 
bureaucratised the chargehands and drew the shop stewards' 
organisation into a highly formalised and centralised collective 
bargaining system. Particular aspects of this "re-modelling" were 
unique to Herbert's. For example, the reforms were not prompted 
by concerns about 'wage-drift'; and the rush to computerise the 
control systems of what was a small-batch production process was 
not emulated by other local engineering firms for some time. But
key features of the scheme link it with the thousands of 
productivity bargains negotiated across British industry during 
the 1960s. Though it came at a relatively late date, when the 
Government's incomes policy already made some kind of 
•productivity' criterion obligatory in all pay deals, PPS 
exhibited features of productivity bargaining's earlier, "classic 
phase".1- The scheme was what was then called a 'comprehensive 
package deal'. While it was clear management intended to reach 
down and take direct control of production - through the 
introduction of measured daywork, the open-ended commitment of 
the unions to accept changes in working practices and the 
formalisation of the collective bargaining machinery - the new 
managers also bid for, in Nightingale's words, "an ideological 
acceptance of change"* by replacing the firm's customary, 
grudging tolerance of the shop stewards' presence with a 
corporatist embrace of the workplace organisation. A closed shop 
was quickly established through "a gentlemen's agreement", office 
facilities were granted, and the convenor allowed to assume his 
union duties on a full-time basis. As Terry observed in a general 
account of shop steward development since the 1960s," there is no 
doubt that such initiatives contributed to the rapid growth in 
the number of shop stewards that took place in the winter of 
1968/69.
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Lastly, chapter 8 touched on the failure of management's 
strategies in breaking through Herbert's slow decline and their 
contrary effect in accelerating the company's slide towards
bankruptcy. It detailed how, through a series oE redundancies in 
1971 and 1972, the corporate crisis radically re-fashioned the 
political terrain once again and precipitated a crisis of morale 
within the stewards' organisation that began its slow and erratic 
demise.
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The Reproduction of Sectionalism
Chapters 4 and 6 detailed ways in which the production process, 
mediated through management policies, fostered a sectional 
consciousness on the shopfloor. The earlier chapter achieved this 
by looking at the conflicting testimony of retired workers on the 
character of Herbert's "apprenticeship system". The later chapter 
reached the same objective by discussing the differing reasons 
for the shopfloor's quiescence despite the firm's low wage' 
policy.
The production of sectionalism through the technical and social 
organisation of work is a theme that has been extensively 
explored by other writers.* Similarly, there are also numerous 
accounts of how such sectionalism may endanger or hinder the 
development of an 'integrated' workplace organisation.* For 
example, in his celebration of "shop stewardliness" in which 
effective shop stewards are depicted as the "guardians" of unity 
and equity. Brown also notes the activities of "opportunistic
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senior stewards" who exploit a sectional advantage for their 
personal gain and thus, as Ton Lehrer put it, "do well by doing 
good".* However, less attention has been given to the ways in 
which an apparently integrated organisation can actively 
reproduce sectionalisn. In particular, the political significance 
of shop stewards' involvement in maintaining pay differentials is 
glossed over. Lazonick's study of workplace politics and 
technical change in Lancashire's textile mills during the 
nineteenth century (in which he shorn that the minders' 
domination over the piecers was sustained by, and 
institutionalised through, the union) is, I would suggest, one of 
the few exceptions.7 Usually, this activity is presented as a 
kind of patronage with the better organised sections being 
'restrained' by a centralised and integrated organisation "to 
stop the poor old labourer falling behind".* The Edgwick case 
study can provide quotations that express the same paternalism 
towards the lower levels of the plant's labour hierarchy. But, as 
chapter 6 points out, there were also occasions when the 
organisation's leadership extended a hand to keep the "poor 
(black) labourer” firmly in his place instead of helping him onto 
the proverbial coat-tails of his skilled colleagues.
Shop stewards' involvement in the maintenance of 'established 
inequities' can appear quite benign and unproblematic while those 
at the bottom of the labour hierarchy quietly accept their 
subordinate position. Vhen that is no longer the case, when black 
workers and women workers challenge the 'established inequities'.
then the senior stewards, hitherto portrayed as "custodians" o£ 
an "integrated" organisation, are seen to be protecting powerful 
sectional interests.
The same chapter identified two ways in which the toolmakers and 
the white, male pieceworkers ensured the workplace organisation 
generally served their interests rather better than the other 
sections. First, since the leading stewards came from the 
toolroom and the male piecework gangs, they were pre-disposed to 
view workplace politics from their perspective. (Though such 
leadership could be problematic. On a few occasions, for example, 
the convenor offered to resign as a result of the sectional 
actions of his immediate constituents.) Second, and more 
importantly, their interests were better served through the very 
character of the workplace organisation. The fragility of that 
organisation, its tenuous links with the membership and its heavy 
dependence on both a convenor who was adept at "cadging” minor 
concessions from management and on the power of the district 
officials to enforce local agreements, were not especially 
onerous for the skilled workers since, in the last resort, they 
could rely on the workings of the local labour market to maintain 
their pay and conditions at levels close to the district average. 
The reverse was the case for the Asian dayworkers and the women 
who worked in separate piecework gangs. They needed a rather 
different kind of workplace organisation than the one patched 
together in the engineering shops of Bdgwlck.
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Chapter 5 suggests that after the debacle over the redundancies 
at the end of the 1950s, quickly followed by a pay reform which 
widened differentials, the mood for change was strong enough in 
1961 to make the seemingly impossible happen: Warr's defeat and 
the election of a semi-skilled pieceworker as works convenor. 
However, Doughty's triumph turned out to be something of "palace 
revolution” in that he brought a new style of steward leadership 
to Edgwick, but not a radical change in the sectional character 
of the organisation. The locus of power only shifted from the 
toolroom to the piecework gangs in the fitting shop and machine 
shop. Thus, when the most marginalised sections of the shopfloor 
- labourers, crane drivers, packers and shopclerks - suddenly 
broke the quietude of the factory through a series of strikes of 
unprecedented duration and intensity, the stewards' committee 
acted as a spectator despite the fact that the call for a closed 
shop was one of the strikers' principal demands.
Lastly, through its detailed account of the progress of 
negotiations over PPS, chapter 8 provides copious evidence to 
suggest that the interests of the skilled pieceworkers continued 
to dominate the workplace organisation into the 1970s. Prom the 
demand for the "fitters' l/5d" through to the post-PPS pay talks, 
the senior stewards accepted pro-rata increases that widened 
differentials. However, the same chapter also qualifies this 
picture of the skilled workers' sectional dominance. When the 
stewards' minutes offer a glimpse of the pay structure negotiated 
simultaneously at a neighbouring Herbert plant - with its merit
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payments for skilled pieceworkers and chargehands and its wider 
differentials on base rates - It has to be said that the senior 
stewards at Edgwick were concerned to establish a more 
egalitarian pay structure than their counterparts at Red Lane.
Dependence on Favourable External Circumstances
The third finding of the case study, namely, the fragility of the 
stewards' organisation at Bdgwick, and its dependence on 
favourable external circumstances quite outside workers' control, 
is a theme that has been explored in a number of studies of 
workplace politics. Here, perhaps the essential difference 
between Edgwick and organisations in some British motor firms, 
such as Rootes and Standard, is that the Herbert stewards 
remained far more directly dependent on the workings of the 
labour market because those sections which held sway over the 
stewards' committee had, for many decades, enjoyed a set of 
circumstances which appeared to deny the need for a strong 
workplace organisation. Chapter 8 demonstrated that despite 
challenges 'from below’ (from leftist stewards and young workers 
in the 1930s and early 1940s, from Doughty's 'palace revolution' 
and the strikes by women and Asian workers in the early 1960s) 
and 'above' (from the policies of state corporatism imposed 
during the Second World War, and from the technocratic, 
company-based corporatism bought in by Young's new executives at 
the end of the 1960s) the accomodation between the skilled
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engineering workers and the 'old' Herbert managers had not only 
survived but remained a powerful force which largely determined 
the character of workplace politics at Edgwick. In particular, it 
ensured that the stewards' organisation remained a marginal 
political force on the shopfloor despite the managerial reforms 
that brought it into the centre of a highly formalised pay 
bargaining system. This political marginality was demonstrated in 
a clear and cruel fashion when Herbert's corporate crisis broke 
at the same time as the onset of a generalised trade recession, 
for the convenor's earnest endeavours could produce nothing more 
than token resistance to "butcher" Raine's programme of 
redundancies.
The 'Labourist Fracture'
Chapter 5 drew attention to another feature of the politics of 
the workplace organisation at Edgwick which other writers have 
observed as characteristic of British trade unionism, namely the 
separation between political work outside the factory gates and 
trade union activity within the plant. This "Labourist fracture", 
as Hinton called it, was exemplified at the level of the 
individual, in the political career of Tommy Harris, (that 
"staunch trade unionist" who became Coventry's first Labour Mayor 
largely through the good grace of his employer as a reward for 
"responsible" conduct on the shopfloor) and at an organisational 
level through acts such as the JSSC's complaints about guarterly
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district meetings becoming increasingly pre-occupied with 
"political matters". In chapter 9, the disabling effect of this 
split was suggested in Doughty's attitude towards the City 
Council during Edgwick's last sit-in. Though the local authority 
has been dominated by the Labour Party (and more particularly by 
Labour councillors who had worked in the local engineering 
industry) for many years, Doughty correctly assumed that the 
Council would not wish to damage its 'classless, technocratic' 
image.
Patterns of Organisation: Trends Towards Centralisation of Power?
The changes in the power and political orientation of the steward 
leadership, detailed in chapter 6, do not fit neatly into any 
thesis about the "bureaucratisation of the rank and file" which 
asserts an underlying trend towards centralisation within 
well-established shopfloor organisations." At Edgwick, power was 
more centralised during the 1950s than at any time before or 
since. In that decade Varr was able to make the office of 
convenor the supreme, decision-making body of the workplace 
organisation. His successor. Doughty, never enjoyed the same 
authority. Initially, his weaker position may have been due to 
the fact that his electoral triumph was the product of an uneasy 
alliance between the piecework gangs and the dayworkers, in which 
both factions were concerned to see how he would develop his role 
as convenor. In addition, he had to cope with a very determined
rearguard action from Warr1s supporters. Later, after memories of 
Herbert's own strike wave had faded and the hegemony of the 
toolmakers was finally broken, Doughty's authority still remained 
relatively fragile because of his style of leadership.
Batstone et al would probably have described Warr as a relatively 
successful "leader steward".xo For most of his years he secured 
an organisational unity, a kind of "social justice” and, most 
important of all, a stable bargaining relationship with 
management. Accomodating himself to the severe limits of 
workplace organisation offered by Herbert's, Warr exploited his 
relative autonomy from the stewards' organisation to secure 
managerial concessions that kept the dominant sections of the 
membership relatively satisfied. There is no evidence to suggest 
the other stewards objected to this 'personal approach' to 
collective bargaining. Indeed, as Batstone et al observed in 
another local case study, they may have expected him to act in 
this way so long as he could continue to "cadge" reasonable 
compromises.xx As management's 'tough' stance towards the unions 
created circumstances that provided little opportunity for work 
groups to achieve their goals independently, Warr's 'successes' 
were virtually guaranteed to reinforce his personal authority and 
consequently allow him to further exploit the structural slack in 
his position. "Cadgerism” proved a viable style of leadership for 
many years. However, at the end of the 1950s it became a 
liability. Seen as being too close to management, Varr could not 
avoid the blame for the committee's debacle over the redundancies
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and the inequities of the pay reforms introduced immediately 
after.
Doughty never acquired the same dominance. Initially, while 
management's firmness continued to limit the possibilities of 
effective sectional action, Doughty's position was weakened by 
his decision to challenge the limits of workplace politics 
through his "straight", class-conscious approach to collective 
bargaining. In effect, he seriously de-stabilised the bargaining 
relationship with management and brought an immediate end to the 
trickle of minor concessions that had been the rewards for Warr's 
more accomodative approach. Doughty's survival as works convenor 
during the last years of the 'old' Herbert management probably 
owed as much to the strength of the sectional antagonisms between 
the piecework gangs and the toolmakers as to his personal 
stamina. At the end of the 1960s, when new managers ushered in a 
'softer', corporatist approach to the domestic organisation, and 
weakened the control systems by 'bureaucratising' and 
consequently alienating a large section of firstline supervision, 
Doughty's authority was frequently challenged by work groups 
testing out the limits of change. Though a detailed consideration 
of the 1970s is outside the scope of this work, it is worth 
noting that the convenor's office only acquired some of its 
former power when economic crisis and decline once again severely 
restricted opportunities for successful sectional action.
One conclusion to draw from this narrative is that the shifts of
power it describes do not support general statements about trends 
in the internal centralisation of power. Ironically, Hyman's 
thesis draws particularly on a local case study which also 
describes the decline in the authority of the convenor's office. 
In their own review of that study, its authors, Batstone et al, 
claim they found no evidence to suggest the changes they observed 
favoured the posited trend. On the contrary, from the analysis of 
data on works conferences over a ten year period, they argue that 
in the late 1970s many domestic organisations underwent a 
fractionalisation of power. Their conclusion is that, while there 
may be "important underlying trends, the actual history of 
domestic organisations is crucially affected by factors which, 
from the perspective of grand developmental theories, can only be 
described as 'disruptive events'." From another perspective, of 
course, such 'disruptive events' typify the instability of the 
capitalist labour process (or, as they put it, "the fact that 
industry is subject to a series of crises and shocks which relate 
to the continuing process of development and change within our 
society.". However, Batstone et al do offer one generalisation 
(and then immediately qualify it) that appears to fit the Bdgwick 
case study, namely "that in times of economic crisis or 
managerial firmness of a major kind, the focus of decision-making 
tends to move up the union organisation" as "work groups are less 
able to achieve their goals independently".12
Corporatism: A Pragmatic Approach to the Limitations of Workplace
Politics?
Chapters 6, 8 and 9 explored the changing form of corporatism in 
the senior stewards approach to workplace politics at Herbert's 
through the post-war years. The same chapters rooted that 
description of corporatism in an account of the severe 
limitations imposed on shopfloor unionism by some of the factors 
discussed earlier in this chapter, namely: the sectional 
character of the workplace organisation; its fragility and 
dependance on external conditions; and the 'labourist fracture' 
between party politics and trade union activity. Chapter 10 
developed this argument by linking Edgwick with the corporatist 
strategy of the CHTC combine, and by exploring the reasons for 
the Workshop's inability to shift the convenors from their 
'pragmatic' approach to the redundancy crisis.
During the 1950s, the main focus of chapter 6, one form of 
factory-based corporatism was exemplified in the senior stewards' 
active embrace of the harsh realities of workplace politics that 
existed In the final phase of Herbert's authoritarian 
paternalism. It was a kind of corporatism that could be 
symbolised in the stewards presentation of the silver tray to the 
personnel officer. The same chapter also pointed to a number of 
occasions when both management and membership mark' 1 out some of 
its boundaries, such as the occasion when the managers rejected 
the convenor's profit-sharing' scheme and the time when a section
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steward objected to the managers' presence at a vote during a 
JSSC meeting. The force of this particular form of corporatism 
owed much to the strength of employer paternalism at Herbert's 
and its commonality with the labour policies of some of Sir 
Alfred's peers, though it probably owed more to the sectional 
character of the stewards' organisation. For it was an ideology 
which spoke of one aspect of the experiences of the skilled 
engineering workers at Edgwick. For reasons explained elsewhere, 
craft workers had little need for an ideology that sustained a 
combative shopfloor organisation. They did not need to identify 
and continually re-affirm values that evoked a conflict model of 
industry and asserted the primacy of the collective over the 
individual. The individualism of the craft worker, manifest 
particularly in his inclination to *play' the labour market 
rather than organise a collective challenge to managerial power, 
has been observed by other writers.x> At Edgwick, this tendency 
was reinforced by Herbert's wages policy which created a chronic 
shortage of skilled labour and so made management especially 
vulnerable to this tactic.
This variant of factory-based corporatism quickly waned after the 
redundancies in the late 1950s. But chapter 8 showed that, as an 
ideological force in the shop stewards' organisation, corporatism 
itself did not pass away. Despite the cruel disappointments over 
HPL's new, technocratic version of a company-based corporatism, 
it continued to influence the stewards' actions because, at its 
core, corporatism esibodied a recognition of the mutual dependence
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of employer and worker. I' was, for example, this assumption 
which, in 1971, prompted Doughty to invite senior management to 
support the TUCs lobby of Parliament on the issue of 
unemployment. Again, these are general features of trade unionism 
which have been observed by other writers,1-4 though given a 
distinct inflection from the history and character of Herbert's 
labour relations.
Chapters 8 and 9 could only hint at the way Herbert's malaise 
re-shaped this corporatist ideology. In previous crises, the 
stewards had appealed to the state to come to their rescue by 
providing additional orders or encouraging a general revival of 
the economy; but in 1974, the election of a Labour Government 
encouraged Doughty to place more hope in corporatism at the level 
of the state rather than the factory. Briefly, during Benn's 
interregnum at the Department of Industry, it seemed that the 
state would realise that hope; but Benn was quickly shuffled to 
another government post and the 'corporate plan' was abandoned in 
favour of continued job cuts. Despite this disappointment it is 
clear that Doughty did not review the situation. His Involvement 
in the CMTC's campaign for selective import controls, discussed 
in chapter 10, represented a major extension of this form of 
politics. In response to a succession of redundancies, the 
combine appealed directly to the state to rescue British industry 
from the encroachments of foreign firms.
Chapter 10 developed the theme of the pragmatic character of the
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stewards' corporatlst strategy by considering the factors that 
helped decide the failure of the Workshop's interventions. It was 
argued that, despite a broad acceptance of the Workshop's 
economic analysis, the senior stewards rejected our political 
prescriptions because they were clearly 'impractical' both in 
terms of their approach to the state and, more importantly, in 
their assumption of the radical potential of workplace 
organisation given (a) the determination of employers and state 
officials to push through massive redundancies and (b) the 
limitations imposed by some of the central traditions of British 
trade unionism.
Conclusions
The central conclusion to emerge from this review of the Edgwick 
case study is that while some aspects of the history of stewards' 
organisation were anomalous when compared with those located in 
the other, large engineering plants in post-war Coventry, they 
were not entirely aberrant forms of workplace trade unionism. 
Instead, this chapter suggests that such features as the 
unusually long period of domination of the toolmakers over the 
semi-skilled pieceworkers and, during the 1950s, the stewards 
accomodation to an authoritarian form of employer-paternalism 
rooted in the politics of the Edwardian era, were shaped by the 
same social forces and values that have been observed in other 
studies of British trade unionism: the dominant influence of
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managerial policies; the dependence on favourable external 
circumstances; the organisation's reproduction of the sectional 
experier.ee of work; the labourism that allowed active trade 
unionists to separate factory politics from those outside the 
plant and accomodate the corporatist ideology of their employer, 
state officials and local councillors. It was the outcome of 
those social processes that made Herbert's experience 
distinctive. The stewards 'pragmatic' accomodation to the 
limitations imposed by those Senne factors marginalised the 
Workshop's political interventions and made the demise of the 
shopfloor organisation inevitable.
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APPENDIX ONE: NOTES ON THE CMTC COMBINE
Shopfloor Politics at Northey Road and Banner Lane
At Webster & Bennett, the workplace organisation was small (eight 
shop stewards represented some 300 workers on the shopfloor) and 
weak, but highly centralised. In 1981, Leszczyszyn observed JSSC 
meetings were called at the whim of the convenor, no minutes were 
taken or reports posted on the board. Those who attended did so 
principally to learn of the activities of the convenor and his 
deputy. He also found there had been an almost complete turnover 
of stewards before his visit, so that most of those he 
interviewed were relatively young and inexperienced.1
Like Freddie Warr, Alex enjoyed a cosy, personal relationship 
with the senior managers; but there the similarity ends. In 1970, 
Alex became the factory's first convenor. Until then, the 
hostility of plant-level management had forced the unions to 
organise on a clandestine basis.3 For the next five years 
workplace politics was characterised by a series of 
confrontations as both sides tested the limits of their power on 
the shopfloor.3 Though part of the John Brown Group since 1952, 
Webster & Bennett was managed by its original owners - and in the 
autocratic style of many family businesses in the machine tool 
industry - until 1975.* In that year the firm became part of the 
conglomerate's Machine Tool Division. Anticipating the need to
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re-structure its machine tool interests in response to the 
continuing trade recession, corporate management decided a more 
centralised structure was necessary. As part of this 
centralisation, corporate management made new appointments to 
re-fashion its labour policies.9 Three years later and, 
coincidentally, shortly after the formation of the CMTC, these 
changes were felt at Northey Road when Webster & Bennett's Chief 
Executive made his first site visit.*
In a series of shopfloor meetings, he warned of the plant's 
closure if there were no improvements on 'performance'. Six 
months later, he gave the workforce a 'reprieve' and then 
proceeded to implement his vision of "practical industrial 
democracy". Union membership was actively encouraged; a 
"consultative committee" (a sort of latter-day JPC composed 
equally of stewards and worker representatives and chaired 
alternately by the Chief Executive and the convenor) was set up 
to broaden "worker participation" on issues traditionally outside 
the province of collective bargaining; and, perhaps most 
importantly, the convenor was appointed as the firm's new Labour 
Executive. Chiefly responsible for administering the firm's 
various welfare provisions, Alex was also invited to attend 
production meetings and, despite the sullen opposition of 
first-line supervision, encouraged to sort out any 'labour 
difficulties' using, if necessary, his direct access to the Chief 
Executive to do so. Alex was groomed for personnel management or, 
as the Chief Executive put it, the post was intended "to provide
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a career path for experienced and knowledgeable trade union 
officials within the Company”.T On one occasion, Alex was offered 
the post of personnel manager at Vickman's Banner Lane plant; but 
the opposition of the stewards there blocked his appointment.• 
(Not surprisingly, this particular development caused some 
tension between the two convenors - a tension that surfaced just 
once or twice in the Workshop’s presence at the final meetings of 
the CHTC.)
Initially, this new partnership between labour and capital 
benefltted both sides. Through a re-vamped productivity scheme, 
management secured major changes in working practices. For their 
part, the shopfloor workers enjoyed a substantial rise in 
earnings and improvements in various welfare provisions, 
including a sick pay scheme which provided benefits at 100\ of 
earnings. But it was not long before "practical industrial 
democracy" revealed another purpose.
At the beginning of the 1980s - as the NBB began dismembering the 
Herbert 'empire' - the recession began to seriously affect orders 
at Webster & Bennett. Soon there were cuts in the work programme 
and short-time working. Earnings quickly fell below the district 
average. To discourage abuse of the sick-pay scheme, the Labour 
Executive reduced benefits to 75\ of earnings - a decision he 
took without consulting other stewards or members of the 
"consultative committee”.* Then, In March 1981, when management 
announced 90 redundancies, Alex and the deputy convenor were
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given the main responsibility for selecting those who should be 
dismissed. Perhaps it is not surprising that when, shortly after 
this exercise, Leszczyszyn tried to probe employees' attitudes on 
"worker participation", he found among workers, stewards and 
foremen a strong reluctance to antagonise the convenor.10 Within 
three years, Alex's embrace of the Chief Executive's brand of 
factory-based corporatism was so enthusiastic that he succeeded 
in pressing together the role of personnel officer and steward.
At Wickman's Banner Lane plant, the workplace organisation was 
larger than the one at Webster & Bennett (during the 1970s it 
covered some 800 workers) and poorly integrated. Yet it shared 
some similarities with the Northey Road plant. Shortly after the 
war, Wickman's was acquired by the same parent company and the 
same, initial policy of de-centralisation allowed plant-level 
management to shape its own labour policies with a considerable 
degree of autonomy. However, these policies bore little 
resemblance to the 'tough', anti-union stance adopted by the 
former owners at Northey Road.
Brown's study suggests that at the beginning of the 1970s, 
management was more concerned about securing greater productivity 
than holding down labour costs. This strategy had created weak 
management control systems which, in turn, had produced an 
"indulgent junior management". Amongst the engineering firms 
Brown selected for his ten case studies on piecework bargaining.
Wickman's exhibited the highest 'Topsy factor' (ie the extent to 
which piecework wage increases rose outside the formal 
negotiating process) and the greatest 'leniency' on custom and 
practice. As bargaining awareness and power varied considerably 
between sections on the shopfloor, these 'indulgency patterns' 
discouraged the development of an integrated workplace 
organisation.xa-
Brown found "the dominant pieceworking stewards made no attempt 
to co-ordinate or assist the claims of indirect workers" (some of 
whom had opted out of the committee altogether). Also, the 
committee "kept no minutes, had no standing orders and kept few 
records." Sectional stoppages were frequent and, instead of 
finding evidence of a stable bargaining relationship, "mistrust 
of management was considerable" among the stewards. There was a 
high turnover of stewards (the average period in office was two 
years). Finally, it seemed that the only people attracted to the 
senior steward's job were those who saw it "as a way to extra 
cash": the piecework earnings of three of the four dominant 
stewards were consistently 40% above their section averages - 
achievements unrelated to skill or effort - while the fourth was 
an elderly man.1-* This then depicts a fragmented, or weakly 
integrated, stewards' organisation. It is difficult from the 
limited information available to trace the development of that 
pattern to the one encountered by Coventry Workshop; but, it 
seems likely that, in the latter half of the decade, the combined 
effect of the recession and senior management's determination to
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take greater control of production - as a part of John Brown's 
Machine Tool Division, Wickman's did not escape the industrial 
relations reforms promoted by corporate management13 - must have 
strengthened the convenor's position at the expense of the 
(hitherto) "dominant senior stewards". Certainly, by the time the 
combine was created, a leadership style had emerged which, while 
less autocratic than the one at Northey Road, still enjoyed 
considerable autonomy from the steward organisation.
These brief notes provide a glimpse of the character of the two 
workplace organisations that kept the CMTC combine ‘alive' after 
February 1980 when the senior stewards became pre-occupied with 
their own struggle for survival. As it happened, the combine did 
not outlast Doughty's departure for many months. The next section 
traces the final moments of the stewards' campaign, as I 
witnessed them from my position as one of Coventry Workshop's 
volunteers.
The End of a Campaign
In March 1980, three months after the sudden termination of my 
fieldwork at Edgwick, the Coventry Machine Tool Committee's 
(CMTC) executive was re-convened to consider the Workshop's 
proposal to go ahead with the much-delayed plan to hold a 
national delegate conference of shop stewards in the machine tool
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industry.
At that meeting most of the discussion focused on the news that 
Hickman's management had secured a license to produce a 
single-spindle machine designed by a Japanese company.1« The deal 
was very similar to the one rejected by the shop stewards three 
years earlier, and which had provided the spark for the CMTC's 
campaign. This time, having experienced one round of 
redundancies, the membership welcomed the deal and, despite their 
reservations, the stewards felt obliged to negotiate its 
implementation.
There was no enthusiasm for the Workshop's proposal to convene a 
national delegate conference - though it contained the offer of 
shouldering all the organisational and administrative work. Once 
again, the convenors wanted to gauge support before taking a 
decision. The Workshop, eager to put this question to rest, 
agreed to do this 'survey' work too.
Six months later, the CMTC executive - now reduced to two 
convenors: Bert Kingham (Wickman) and Alex Boyd (Webster & 
Bennett) - finally allowed the conference preparations to go 
ahead. But their mood was despondent and aggressive. They were 
unimpressed with the Workshop's report-back on the level of 
support for the event - out of some 77 plants contacted about the 
conference only stewards at nine said they would attend (on the 
day representatives from just four of those plants kept that
promise) - and the news from Edgwick suggested that the 
executive's third convenor and ‘star' of the campaign, Ron 
Doughty, would be made redundant within days. Bert felt the CMTC 
had achieved nothing and no longer had any purpose since his own 
plant was now dependent on a licensing agreement with a Japanese 
firm. Both convenors believed only one task remained: to ensure 
the conference - or "seminar" as it was now called - did not 
discredit the campaign's demise. Vith that aim, it was agreed 
that only the morning session would be devoted to the machine 
tool workers' "seminar"; the afternoon session, planned to be 
addressed by Tony Benn, would be turned into a public meeting. In 
their comments, the convenors barely concealed their resentment 
at what they regarded as the Workshop's aggressive advocacy of 
the seminar.
In the event, the occasion did not turn out as anyone had quite 
imagined. It was not the ‘funeral service' the two convenors had 
anticipated. The presence of delegates from ten different plants 
and the power of Benn's oratory, his appeal to the audience to 
"prepare for power" by devising a "national plan" for the 
industry, stirred feelings that some kind of campaign should be 
continued. But Alex did not allow the mood to overwhelm him. 
Determined to keep control of the situation by stalling any 
decision on the future of the campaign, he blatantly mis-used his 
authority as Chair by ignoring key items on the agenda (prepared 
by the Workshop) and refused to accept motions from the ‘floor'. 
Consequently, alongside renewed feelings of optimism, fresh
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resentments were stored up.
At an internal review a few days later, the Workshop determined 
it could no longer act as "a substitute for (the stewards') 
self-organisation". The CMTC had to be told that, having obtained 
the basis for an effective, national campaign, they now had to 
work out both their own objectives and how the Workshop could 
assist them - assuming, of course, that there was mutual 
agreement on aims.
At the next meeting with the CMTC, the mood was noticeably good 
humoured and friendly compared to earlier days. It was agreed 
that there should be a "national machine tool group". There was 
even talk of forming a "steering committee" to achieve that 
objective by inviting all the delegates who had attended the 
seminar to a meeting at Sheffield. But, none of the stewards 
voiced an opinion on the future purpose of the campaign. More 
significantly, no date was fixed for the "steering committee’s" 
first meeting.
In December, when the Workshop renewed contact with the 
convenors, it was clear there had been no progress. It was also 
apparent that the optimism generated by the seminar had gone. For 
their part, the Workshop's determination to negotiate a new 
contract with the CMTC had evaporated, too. For the time being it 
seemed enough that the convenors were still talking about forming 
some kind of national combine. However, we were soon reminded of
the limitations of the role provided for us in this new phase of 
the campaign.
In January 1981, Bert telephoned the Workshop to ask for details 
on grinding machine manufacturers in the UK. He explained that 
this information had been requested by the Rolls Royce JSSC.
Since this appeared to be an example of the link between 
'builders' and 'users' of machine tools that the Workshop had 
sought to encourage, the research was undertaken and the 
information 'phoned through to Bert within 24 hours. In response, 
he made a vague agreement to meet the Workshop to discuss the 
data. When he rang back again, a few days later, he talked about 
arranging a tri-partite meeting involving the campaign committee, 
the Rolls Royce stewards and the Workshop; but, as before, he 
suggested no possible dates. Then, a week later, he telephoned to 
ask for the full list of machine tool Manufacturers. A meeting 
with the Rolls Royce workers was fixed for the end of the aranth; 
but the Workshop was not invited. During the same telephone 
conversation, Bert also mentioned his plans for the Sheffield 
meeting and complained about how little time he had to do the 
necessary contact work. The Workshop's staff made some 
sympathetic noises, but, feeling rather 'used' over the grinding 
machine project, refused to be drawn into volunteering any 
assistance.
The "steering committee” meeting did not take place until the end 
of Pebruary 1981. By then the Workshop had learned that, despite
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a ruling from the AUEW district committee, Alex was continuing to 
combine his duties as works convenor with that of "Labour 
Executive" at the Northey Road plant. Also, Bert had made it 
clear that the Vorkshop was not expected to attend. However, we 
chose to ignore his heavy hints, hoping against hope that the 
event would produce a new constituency with whom we could 
establish a more fruitful dialogue.
The meeting took place at Sheffield. Twelve delegates from six 
plants, plus an unemployed worker, attended. The debate in the 
morning seemed positive. Agreement was reached on the need to 
form a national combine of shop stewards that would campaign for 
"nationalisation under workers' control". When the unemployed 
worker (coincidentally, a member of the Communist Party) raised 
the demand for selective import controls he found no support 
among the delegates from Wickman's and TI Churchill who argued 
strongly that their jobs depended on Japanese imports. A national 
executive, which included representation of the unemployed, was 
elected and there was also discussion about establishing regional 
committees as the campaign progressed. After this, I anticipated 
an afternoon session in which the next step in that campaign 
would be debated; but then, just a few minutes before lunch, Alex 
'observed' the delegates wanted to return home before dark and 
promptly closed the conference.
During lunch, the delegates formed into two cliques: those from 
Wickman, Webster & Bennett and TI Churchill grouped in one corner
of the room; those from Asquith, Herbert's and Snow & Co sat with 
the Workshop's representatives. After some messages were 
exchanged between the two cliques, Alex agreed to * re-open' the 
meeting in the bar. In the brief debate that followed, the 
delegates accepted the Workshop's proposal to contact the Joint 
Forum of Combine Committees and the TUC-LP Liaison Committee - 
Alex commented afterwards that these ideas could have been put to 
him informally and he would have "fixed something up" - and 
agreed to convene the newly-formed National Executive within a 
month.
The fact that this debate had to be forced through created a 
bitter atmosphere and set the scene for some acrimonious 
exchanges between several delegates. Initially, the argument was 
about a variant of Michel's iron law of oligarchy - namely, more 
members resulted in the centralisation of power on the shopfloor 
- but it quickly degenerated into a dispute about who possessed 
the most authority as convenor in which Alex and Bert made the 
greatest boasts about their power.
Following this meeting, the Workshop decided against any further, 
active involvement in the affairs of the stewards' campaign. 
Ironically, at the moment when the Workshop's hopes seemed 
fulfilled, when a national combine had been established to 
campaign for "nationalisation under workers' control" and the 
same body vehemently opposed import control, at that very moment 
it was obvious that the campaign was really at an end. The
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Sheffield conference was the 'funeral service' both convenors had 
prepared themselves for many months before.
But before it finally slid into oblivion - when Bert, along with 
most of his senior stewards, volunteered for redundancy - the 
CMTC caused one more minor stir in the local newspaper. In March 
that year, Alex, claiming to represent the committee's views, 
made public his opposition to the local authority's decision to 
provide a loan to enable a small firm to purchase a Japanese 
machine tool.18 The Workshop later learned that he was 'carpeted' 
by the Wickman stewards for failing to consult them over the 
press statement. That, as far as the Workshop was aware, was the 
combine's last act.
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NOTES ON METHODOLOGY AND A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fieldwork:
As the opening chapter suggests, this work is unlike most 
doctoral research in that it attempted to address some of the 
short-term needs of a working class constituency through a 
long-term academic project. I have also tried to show, perhaps 
most particularly in chapter 2, how the 'progress' of the 
research became entangled with the failing fortunes of that 
constituency and necessitated, on more than one occasion, a 
change of aims, as well as methodology.
These changes are reflected in the way I gathered and used 
interview material on Herbert's. In chapters 6 and 8, for 
example, the interpretation of the union's records was influenced 
in part by informal conversations with about a dozen stewards and 
members with whom I enjoyed frequent contact through the Workshop 
during a period when there was still some hope the stewards would 
launch a national campaign. In contrast, much of the interview 
material used in chapter 4 was gathered sometime after the demise 
of the CMTC combine, when the research no longer had an immediate 
working class constituency and much of my time was spent at the 
University. Also, ten informants were contacted through the 
'letters column' in the local newspapers, or as a result of
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visits to Herbert's recreation club, instead of through the 
stewards' network; they were visited rarely more than twice; and 
taped during comparatively structured interviews.
As circumstances determined, I used either my on-going 
association with the Workshop or my academic credentials to gain 
access to information. For example, to carry out the case study 
of new technology at Edgwick I had to approach Herbert's 
management as a postgraduate student. However, in all but the 
final phases of the fieldwork I used the Workshop as my 'base'. 
In addition to helping me to remain conscious of the short-term 
'activist' aims of the research, this allowed me to become 
familiar with the Workshop's approach to factory-based work and 
the changing character of its relationship with local labour 
organisations as the harsh climate of Thatcherism took hold of 
industrial politics.
Notes on Primary Sources:
The major part of the printary documentary sources for the Edgwick 
case study became available after the takeover by Tooling 
Investments and the subseguent departure of all the senior shop 
stewards. In June 1981, the newly-elected convenor for workers in 
the *new-build' section of the plant responded to my request for 
access to union records by handing over a cardboard box filled 
with notebooks and various papers which, he said, were discovered
in an old ammunition box in the union office. In addition to a 
miscellaneous assortment of documents, including a photocopy of 
correspondence between the works manager and the AES district 
secretary in 1898, the 'ammunition box papers' contained:
1. works convenors' log books covering most of the period from 
November 1951 to September 1980 (unfortunately most of the 
notes are rather cryptic);
2. the JSSC minute books which recorded most of the JSSC's 
meetings between March 1942 and December 1968;
3. the JSSC Secretary's log books covering the years 1962 to 
1979 in three periods: January 1962 to July 1964, September 
1968 to December 1971, and March 1973 to November 1979. Prom 
1968, they provide an invaluable record of the organisation's 
activities, containing details on meetings of the full JSSC 
and its executive committee, as well as the minutes of a 
number of sectional meetings, and the formal negotiations 
with management.
Other, very useful, primary documents became available after 
Tooling Investments' takeover, when a junior manager, intent on 
clearing out his office, gave the stewards the Industrial 
Relations Officer's manuscript minutes of meetings with the 
stewards from January 1941 to May 1948 inclusive, mistaking them 
to be the unions' records of talks with management. Shortly after 
the works convenor, Ron Doughty, was made redundant, he very 
kindly loaned these notebooks to me.
Also, in April 1983, additional records were transferred from the 
company's liquidator to the City Record Office. Accession 926, as 
they are collectively known, contain some minutes that are rather 
more illuminating than the records deposited before the company's 
collapse. Particularly useful are:
1. the minute book of the Board of Directors covering meetings 
from March 1944 to September 1960;
2. the minute books of the Departmental Board of Directors 
covering September 1941 to January 1945, January 1945 to 
November 1951, and February 1952 to January 1961.
Similarly, I could not obtain an extensive collection of the 
firm's annual Report and Accounts until Herbert's demise.
However, not all the internal company documents were obtained 
after the crash. Minutes of the site consultative committees, and 
other papers relating to the * participation period' of 1974-75, 
were given to Coventry Workshop by former staff stewards in 1978 
when colleagues were preparing the report Crisis in Engineering. 
Likewise, copies of the house journal, Alfred Herbert News, were 
made available during fieldwork in 1979. The more useful articles 
are cited in the references at the end of each relevant chapter.
At that time I was also given copies of several technical 
articles which, though unattributed to any national journal, had 
clearly identified authors and printed or re-printed by Herbert 
Machine Tools Ltd.. Particularly useful were:
W.A. Hawkins, "Herbert's Big Switch to GT", reprinted at an 
unspecified date.
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Craven, F., "The Use of NC in Group Technology" printed by 
Herbert Machine Tools Ltd. also at an unspecified date. 
Vightman, E.J., "Benefits of Computer Numerical Control (CNC) 
for Machine Tools", printed by HMT, undated.
The following reports of management consultants, loaned and given 
to me by former stewards at Herbert's, provide the final category 
of primary documents for the Edgwick case study:
1. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell £ Co., "Alfred Herbert Limited", a 
report dated 20 December 1974;
2. Idem, "Alfred Herbert Limited, Draft Documents for 
Discussion", (with appendices in a separate volume) dated 7 
March 1975;
3. Industron Ltd., "Multi-Client Production Lathe Survey - 
Report B: The United Kingdom Market for Capstan and Turret 
Lathes", prepared by Industron Ltd., Birmingham, in September
1973.
Newspaper clippings held at the City Record Office and Coventry 
Workshop have proved useful 'primary' documents. The clippings in 
the library of the latter organisation contain national and local 
media coverage during the 1970s. Those at the City Records Office 
are extracted from the local press but cover the earlier years.
Selective use was made of the AEU Coventry District Committee 
minutes held at the local offices of the AUEW (Engineering 
Section).
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Interviews with a large number of former managers and stewards 
have provided a rich source of oral evidence of events at 
Edgwick. Instead of naming them here, I believe it is sufficient 
to point out that key informants are listed in the endnotes to 
the relevant chapters. Many of these interviews were transcripted 
and, as such, will be deposited at the City Record Office in 
1988.
Finally, it is worth noting that I came across two other 
collections of primary documents which were not used in this case 
study. They are, firstly, the papers deposited with the Hollick 
family (in-laws to the Herbert's). A catalogue of those papers is 
kept at the library of Coventry Polytechnic. (They were not made 
available to me; but when I last enquired, negotiations were 
proceeding to make them more publicly accessible.) The second set 
of primary documents is a collection of the correspondence 
between Sir Halford Reddish and Sir Alfred Herbert. Containing 
some account of their respective views on, and support for, the 
principles of ‘Christian Management*, these papers are held at 
the Modern Record Centre, University of Warwick.
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